Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others - Court Judgment

Excerpt:

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			'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
			'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
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			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
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			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
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			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
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			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
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		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
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		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
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		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
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		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
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Code Context
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			'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
			'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
			'sub' => 'Property',
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		)
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		'id' => '610271',
		'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
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Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
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- sections 100-a [as inserted by act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & letters patent, 1865, clause 10: [dr. b.s. chauhan, cj, l. mohapatra & a.s. naidu, jj] letters patent appeal order of single judge of high court passed while deciding matters filed under order 43, rule1 of c.p.c., - held, after introduction of section 110a in the c.p.c., by 2002 amendment act, no letters patent appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a single judge of a high court. a right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. it is pertinent to note that section 100-a introduced by 2002 amendment of the code starts with a non obstante clause. the purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the.....

Notice (8): Undefined variable: kword [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]
Code Context
                                    }

                                //highest occurence of word in the judgement

                                echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['judgement']))), $query) . "</div>";
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '610271',
			'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
			'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
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Code Context
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			'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
			'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
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order1. the petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the financial commissioner,haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. as a result, the order passed by the collector (agrarian), thanesar, was set aside. the petitioners pray that order of the financial commissioner may be quashed. a few fact may be noticed.2. on may 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to soran was declared surplus. on february 15, 1967, soran sold area of land to om prakash etc. the details like khasra nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by soran are not on the record. on december 30, 1982, soran passed away. on april 26, 1984, the sub-divisional officer (civil)-cum-collector (agrarian),.....

Judgment:

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			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1996P&amp; H21',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
			'sub' => 'Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'kehar-singh-vs-state-haryana',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '610271',
		(int) 1 => 'kehar-singh-vs-state-haryana'
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$title_for_layout = 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '610271',
		'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. No other point was urged.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Petition dismissed.<p>',
	(int) 17 => '<p>'
)
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ORDER

1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '610271',
			'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
			'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1996P&amp; H21',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
			'sub' => 'Property',
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			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '610271',
		'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1996P&amp; H21',
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		'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
		'sub' => 'Property',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. No other point was urged.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Petition dismissed.<p>',
	(int) 17 => '<p>'
)
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2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '610271',
			'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
			'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'id' => '610271',
		'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. No other point was urged.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Petition dismissed.<p>',
	(int) 17 => '<p>'
)
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3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.

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			'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
			'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1996P&amp; H21',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
			'sub' => 'Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'kehar-singh-vs-state-haryana',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '610271',
		(int) 1 => 'kehar-singh-vs-state-haryana'
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$title_for_layout = 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '610271',
		'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. No other point was urged.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Petition dismissed.<p>',
	(int) 17 => '<p>'
)
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4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '610271',
			'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
			'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1996P&amp; H21',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
			'sub' => 'Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '610271',
		'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1996P&amp; H21',
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		'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
		'sub' => 'Property',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. No other point was urged.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Petition dismissed.<p>',
	(int) 17 => '<p>'
)
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5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '610271',
			'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
			'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '610271',
		'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. No other point was urged.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Petition dismissed.<p>',
	(int) 17 => '<p>'
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6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.

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			'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
			'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1996P&amp; H21',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
			'sub' => 'Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'kehar-singh-vs-state-haryana',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '610271',
		(int) 1 => 'kehar-singh-vs-state-haryana'
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$title_for_layout = 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '610271',
		'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. No other point was urged.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Petition dismissed.<p>',
	(int) 17 => '<p>'
)
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7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '610271',
			'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
			'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1996P&amp; H21',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
			'sub' => 'Property',
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			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '610271',
		'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1996P&amp; H21',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
		'sub' => 'Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
$casename_url = 'kehar-singh-vs-state-haryana'
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$caseref = 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. No other point was urged.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Petition dismissed.<p>',
	(int) 17 => '<p>'
)
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'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.'

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
Code Context
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '610271',
			'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
			'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1996P&amp; H21',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
			'sub' => 'Property',
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			'circuit' => null
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '610271',
		'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1996P&amp; H21',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
		'sub' => 'Property',
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		'circuit' => null
	)
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$caseref = 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. No other point was urged.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Petition dismissed.<p>',
	(int) 17 => '<p>'
)
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A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '610271',
			'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
			'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1996P&amp; H21',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
			'sub' => 'Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'kehar-singh-vs-state-haryana',
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		(int) 0 => '610271',
		(int) 1 => 'kehar-singh-vs-state-haryana'
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$title_for_layout = 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '610271',
		'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
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$caseref = 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. No other point was urged.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Petition dismissed.<p>',
	(int) 17 => '<p>'
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8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--

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			'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
			'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
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			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
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		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
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		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. No other point was urged.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Petition dismissed.<p>',
	(int) 17 => '<p>'
)
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'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'

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Code Context
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '610271',
			'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
			'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1996P&amp; H21',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
			'sub' => 'Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '610271',
		'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1996P&amp; H21',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
		'sub' => 'Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. No other point was urged.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Petition dismissed.<p>',
	(int) 17 => '<p>'
)
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The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '610271',
			'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
			'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'pubs' => 'AIR1996P&amp; H21',
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			'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
			'sub' => 'Property',
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$title_for_layout = 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '610271',
		'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
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		'prhistory' => '',
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$caseref = 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. No other point was urged.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Petition dismissed.<p>',
	(int) 17 => '<p>'
)
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9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.

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			'id' => '610271',
			'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
			'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1996P&amp; H21',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
			'sub' => 'Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'kehar-singh-vs-state-haryana',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '610271',
		(int) 1 => 'kehar-singh-vs-state-haryana'
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$title_for_layout = 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '610271',
		'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. No other point was urged.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Petition dismissed.<p>',
	(int) 17 => '<p>'
)
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10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '610271',
			'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
			'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1996P&amp; H21',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
			'sub' => 'Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
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		(int) 1 => 'kehar-singh-vs-state-haryana'
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$title_for_layout = 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '610271',
		'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. No other point was urged.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Petition dismissed.<p>',
	(int) 17 => '<p>'
)
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11. No other point was urged.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '610271',
			'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
			'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'id' => '610271',
		'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR1996P&amp; H21',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
		'sub' => 'Property',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
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$ctype = ' High Court'
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. No other point was urged.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Petition dismissed.<p>',
	(int) 17 => '<p>'
)
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12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '610271',
			'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
			'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
			'deposition' => '',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR1996P&amp; H21',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
			'sub' => 'Property',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'kehar-singh-vs-state-haryana',
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		(int) 0 => '610271',
		(int) 1 => 'kehar-singh-vs-state-haryana'
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$title_for_layout = 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs State of Haryana and Others - Citation 610271 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '610271',
		'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'State of Haryana and Others',
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$caseref = 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. No other point was urged.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Petition dismissed.<p>',
	(int) 17 => '<p>'
)
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13. Petition dismissed.

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			'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
			'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
			'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
			'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
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			'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => 'ORDER<p style="text-align: justify;">1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p style="text-align: justify;">A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p style="text-align: justify;">'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. No other point was urged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Petition dismissed.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 - Sections 12, 18(1), (5) and (6), 33(2) and 84(5); <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Article 226; <a href="/act/136818/the-punjab-security-of-land-tenures-act-1953-complete-act">Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a> - Sections 33; <a href="/act/136723/the-pepsu-tenancy-and-agricultural-lands-act-1955-complete-act">Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>; East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948 - Sections 42',
		'appealno' => 'Civil Writ Petn. No. 12251 of 1992',
		'appellant' => 'Kehar Singh and Another',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Kehar Singh and Another Vs. State of Haryana and Others',
		'casenote' => ' - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent  Appeal  Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., -  Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act.

Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal  Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. 
 -  The details like Khasra Nos. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'.It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953, as well as the Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955, were repealed. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Anil Khetarpal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1995-03-28',
		'deposition' => '',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Jawaharlal Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.</p><p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.</p><p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.</p><p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?</p><p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'</p><p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.</p><p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--</p><p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' </p><p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.</p><p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--</p><p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'</p><p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.</p><p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.</p><p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.</p><p>11. No other point was urged.</p><p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.</p><p>13. Petition dismissed.<p></p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => 'ORDER<p>1. The petitioners are aggrieved by the order of the Financial Commissioner,Haryana, by which it was held that the big landowner having died in 1982, the benefit of inheritance was not admissible to his heirs. As a result, the order passed by the Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, was set aside. The petitioners pray that order of the Financial Commissioner may be quashed. A few fact may be noticed.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. On May 27, 1960, land measuring 13 acres 4 1/2 units belonging to Soran was declared surplus. On February 15, 1967, Soran sold area of land to Om Prakash etc. The details like Khasra Nos. etc. regarding the land which had been sold by Soran are not on the record. On December 30, 1982, Soran passed away. On April 26, 1984, the Sub-Divisional Officer (Civil)-cum-Collector (Agrarian), Thanesar, while considering the matter and regarding the choice of area, held that 'the land of big owner has not been declared surplus and during this period the big land owner has also died. After his death, the heirs of big land owner have become small land owners. Therefore, no land can be declared as surplus, and Om Parkash etc. Shall remain in possession of the land so purchased. Rule be consigned to record room.' It appears that the State of Haryana filed a revision petition invoking the suo motu jurisdiction of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). This revision petition having been accepted, the two sons of Soran have filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. They challenge the order of the Commissioner on various grounds which shall be presently noticed.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>3. The claim made on behalf of the petitioners has been controverted in the written statement filed on behalf of the respondents. However, no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest the petition.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>4. Mr. Anil Kheterpal, learned counsel for the petitioners has contended that the order passed by the Financial Commissioner cannot be sustained in view of the provisions of S.33(2), sub-clause (ii) of the Act. It has been further contended that the power underS. 18 could not have been invoked to correct an error of law and that in any case, the revision petition could not have been filed after the lapse of 3 years. Learned counsel maintains that since the land had not been utilised, it cannot be said to have vested in the State. Is the counsel right?',
	(int) 4 => '<p>5. The Government of India had appointed a Central Committee on land reforms. After the receipt of the report, a national policy was envisaged. The purpose was to make additional land available for distribution to landless persons so as to secure equitable distribution of land and remove economic disparities. As a result, it was felt that the permissible area should be suitably-reduced and a family should be made 'a unit for the purpose of permissible area'. It was further felt that the surplus area should vest in the State Government for allotment to the landless persons and conferment of proprietaty rights on them. With these objects, the legislature of Haryana had passed the 'Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972'. It received the assent of the President of India on December 22, 1972 and was published in the Gazetee on December 23, 1972. By Section 33 of the Act, the provisions of the <a>Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, 1953</a>, as well as the <a>Pepsu Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1955</a>, were repealed. In Cl. (2)(ii), it was inter alia provided that 'the repeal of the provisions shall not affect the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, under the provisions of either of the said enactments, which shall be continued and disposed of as if this Act had not been passed.......'',
	(int) 5 => '<p>6. A perusal of the provision shows that it is applicable only in cases where the proceedings for the determination of the surplus area were pending before December 23, 1972. It has, however, no relevance to the facts of the present case. Herein, the declaration regarding surplus area had already been issued as far back as May 27, 1960. In fact, by virtue of the provisions Section 12 of the Act, this area had come to vest in the State Government with effect from January 24, 1971. The Collector haderred in holding that 'the land of the big owner had not been declared surplus.....'.In this situation, the provisions of Section 33(2)(ii) of the Act cannot be invoked.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>7. Equally lacking in merit is the contention that the power of the Financial Commissioner under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked to correct errors of law. Section 18 of the Act provides for the remedy of appeal, review and revision. Cl. (6) reads as under :--',
	(int) 7 => '<p>'Notwithstanding anything contained inthe foregoing sub-sections, the FinancialCommissioner may suo motu at any time callfor the record of any proceedings or order ofany authority subordinate to him for thepurpose of satisfying himself as to the legalityor propriety of such proceedings or order, andmay pass such order in relation thereto as hemay deem fit.' ',
	(int) 8 => '<p>A perusal of the above provision shows that irrespective of the provisions contained in sub-sees. (1) to (5), the Financial Commissioner has been authorised to call for the record of any proceedings or order of any authority subordinate to him for the purpose of satisfying himself not only with regard to the legality but even the propriety of such proceedings or order. He is further competent to pass such order as he may deem fit. A very vide power to determine the legality as well as the propriety of the order has been vested in the Financial Commissioner. It is not a limited jurisdiction. It is very wide in amplitude. It is not confined to determining errors of jurisdiction only. In view of this clear provision, the contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners that the power could not have been invoked for the purpose of correcting an error of law, has no merit and cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. Mr. Khetarpal has referred to a decision of the Full Bench in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri, 1970 Pun LJ 402 to contend that the suo motu powers of the Financial Commissioner are only those as conferred by Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The contention is misconceived. In Whaunkal's case (supra), their Lordships were considering the provisions of Section 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act,1987. Sub-Sec. (5) provide as under :--',
	(int) 10 => '<p>'If, after examining the record, the Financial Commissioner is of opinion that it is expedient to interfere with the proceedings or the order or decree on any ground on which the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction may under the law for the time being in force interfere with the proceedings or an order or decree of a Civil Court, he shall fix a day for hearing the case and may on that or any subsequent day to which he may adjourn the hearing or which he may appoint in this behalf, pass such order as he thinks fit in the case.'',
	(int) 11 => '<p>The provision in Section 84(5) of the Act is totally different from the provision in Section 18(6). The decision in Dhaunkal's case (supra) has no relevance to the present case. Consequently even this contention cannot be sustained.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>9. It was then contended that the power under Section 18(6) cannot be invoked regardless of time and delay. The contention has no merit. Admittedly, no period of limitation has been prescribed. In fact, the legislature has authorised the Financial Commissioner to exercise the power at 'any time'. When the legislature, in its wisdom, has not placed any limitation on the power of the Financial Commissioner, the Court cannot add to the words of the statute and lay down a period of limitation. A similar contention had been raised in the context of Section 42 of the East Punjab Holdings (Consolidation) and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. It was rejected by a Full Bench of this Court in Nar Singh Mansoor Singh v. State, AIR 1967 Punj III, and by a Division Bench in Haqiqat Singh v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab, AIR 1981 Punj & Har 204. In view of these authoritative pronouncements, the contention has to be rejected.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>10. Lastly, it was contended that the land having not been utilised, it did not vest in the State. The contention has to be only noted to be rejected. The provisions of Section 12 of the Haryana Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1972 are clear. The land which had remained Unutilised till the appointed day, came tobe automatically vested in the State.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>11. No other point was urged.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>12. Accordingly, there is no merit in this petition. It is dismissed. However, since no one has appeared on behalf of the respondents to contest this petition. I make no order as to costs.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>13. Petition dismissed.<p>',
	(int) 17 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 18
$i = (int) 17
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