SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/610242 |
Subject | Civil |
Court | Punjab and Haryana |
Decided On | May-10-1907 |
Judge | Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ. |
Reported in | IIIInd.Cas.484 |
Appellant | Dhirta |
Respondent | Kesri |
Cases Referred | Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das |
Notice (8): Undefined variable: kword [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120]Code Contextecho "<div class='table-bordered'><b>Excerpt:</b><br/>";
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Lal Chand, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'dhirta-vs-kesri', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p>Lal Chand, J.</p><p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'dhirta-vs-kesri' $args = array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/610242/dhirta-vs-kesri' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das<br>'include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120]punjab court's act (xviii of 1884), section 40 - appeal--jurisdiction--suit for custody of wife--valuation of such suits changed during pendency of suit--suits valuation act (vii of 1887), section 9, rules under--value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--civil procedure code (act xiv of 1882), sections 97 and 99--re-admitted suit--date of institution. - sections 100-a [as inserted by act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & letters patent, 1865, clause 10: [dr. b.s. chauhan, cj, l. mohapatra & a.s. naidu, jj] letters patent appeal order of single judge of high court passed while deciding matters filed under order 43, rule1 of c.p.c., - held, after introduction of section 110a in the c.p.c., by 2002 amendment act, no letters patent appeal is maintainable against.....Code Contextecho "<div class='table-bordered'><b>Excerpt:</b><br/>";
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echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['casenote']))), $query);
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Lal Chand, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'dhirta-vs-kesri', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p>Lal Chand, J.</p><p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'dhirta-vs-kesri' $args = array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/610242/dhirta-vs-kesri' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das<br>'include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
Notice (8): Undefined variable: kword [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]Code Context}
//highest occurence of word in the judgement
echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['judgement']))), $query) . "</div>";
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Lal Chand, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'dhirta-vs-kesri', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p>Lal Chand, J.</p><p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'dhirta-vs-kesri' $args = array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/610242/dhirta-vs-kesri' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das<br>'include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]lal chand, j.1. the facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a division bench for decision. the suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th october 1005, was valued at rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. it was dismissed under section 97, civil procedure code, on 6th december 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -january 1906. on 19th january 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd january 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at rs. 520.2. meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction.....Code Context}
//highest occurence of word in the judgement
echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['judgement']))), $query) . "</div>";
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Lal Chand, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'dhirta-vs-kesri', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p>Lal Chand, J.</p><p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'dhirta-vs-kesri' $args = array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/610242/dhirta-vs-kesri' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das<br>'include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Lal Chand, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'dhirta-vs-kesri', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p>Lal Chand, J.</p><p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'dhirta-vs-kesri' $args = array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/610242/dhirta-vs-kesri' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>Lal Chand, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-', (int) 4 => '<p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,', (int) 5 => '<p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.', (int) 6 => '<p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.', (int) 7 => '<p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).', (int) 8 => '<p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'', (int) 9 => '<p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.', (int) 10 => '<p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.', (int) 11 => '<p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p>', (int) 12 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 13 $i = (int) 0include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
Lal Chand, J.
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Lal Chand, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'dhirta-vs-kesri', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p>Lal Chand, J.</p><p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'dhirta-vs-kesri' $args = array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/610242/dhirta-vs-kesri' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>Lal Chand, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-', (int) 4 => '<p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,', (int) 5 => '<p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.', (int) 6 => '<p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.', (int) 7 => '<p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).', (int) 8 => '<p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'', (int) 9 => '<p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.', (int) 10 => '<p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.', (int) 11 => '<p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p>', (int) 12 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 13 $i = (int) 1include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.
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echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Lal Chand, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'dhirta-vs-kesri', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p>Lal Chand, J.</p><p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'dhirta-vs-kesri' $args = array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/610242/dhirta-vs-kesri' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>Lal Chand, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-', (int) 4 => '<p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,', (int) 5 => '<p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.', (int) 6 => '<p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.', (int) 7 => '<p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).', (int) 8 => '<p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'', (int) 9 => '<p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.', (int) 10 => '<p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.', (int) 11 => '<p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p>', (int) 12 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 13 $i = (int) 2include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.
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echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Lal Chand, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'dhirta-vs-kesri', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p>Lal Chand, J.</p><p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'dhirta-vs-kesri' $args = array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/610242/dhirta-vs-kesri' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>Lal Chand, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-', (int) 4 => '<p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,', (int) 5 => '<p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.', (int) 6 => '<p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.', (int) 7 => '<p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).', (int) 8 => '<p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'', (int) 9 => '<p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.', (int) 10 => '<p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.', (int) 11 => '<p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p>', (int) 12 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 13 $i = (int) 3include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-
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}
echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Lal Chand, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'dhirta-vs-kesri', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p>Lal Chand, J.</p><p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'dhirta-vs-kesri' $args = array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/610242/dhirta-vs-kesri' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>Lal Chand, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-', (int) 4 => '<p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,', (int) 5 => '<p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.', (int) 6 => '<p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.', (int) 7 => '<p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).', (int) 8 => '<p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'', (int) 9 => '<p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.', (int) 10 => '<p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.', (int) 11 => '<p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p>', (int) 12 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 13 $i = (int) 4include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Lal Chand, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'dhirta-vs-kesri', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p>Lal Chand, J.</p><p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'dhirta-vs-kesri' $args = array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/610242/dhirta-vs-kesri' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>Lal Chand, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-', (int) 4 => '<p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,', (int) 5 => '<p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.', (int) 6 => '<p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.', (int) 7 => '<p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).', (int) 8 => '<p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'', (int) 9 => '<p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.', (int) 10 => '<p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.', (int) 11 => '<p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p>', (int) 12 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 13 $i = (int) 5include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.
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echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Lal Chand, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'dhirta-vs-kesri', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p>Lal Chand, J.</p><p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'dhirta-vs-kesri' $args = array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/610242/dhirta-vs-kesri' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>Lal Chand, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-', (int) 4 => '<p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,', (int) 5 => '<p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.', (int) 6 => '<p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.', (int) 7 => '<p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).', (int) 8 => '<p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'', (int) 9 => '<p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.', (int) 10 => '<p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.', (int) 11 => '<p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p>', (int) 12 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 13 $i = (int) 6include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.
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echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Lal Chand, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'dhirta-vs-kesri', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p>Lal Chand, J.</p><p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'dhirta-vs-kesri' $args = array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/610242/dhirta-vs-kesri' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>Lal Chand, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-', (int) 4 => '<p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,', (int) 5 => '<p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.', (int) 6 => '<p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.', (int) 7 => '<p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).', (int) 8 => '<p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'', (int) 9 => '<p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.', (int) 10 => '<p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.', (int) 11 => '<p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p>', (int) 12 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 13 $i = (int) 7include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Lal Chand, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'dhirta-vs-kesri', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p>Lal Chand, J.</p><p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'dhirta-vs-kesri' $args = array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/610242/dhirta-vs-kesri' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>Lal Chand, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-', (int) 4 => '<p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,', (int) 5 => '<p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.', (int) 6 => '<p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.', (int) 7 => '<p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).', (int) 8 => '<p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'', (int) 9 => '<p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.', (int) 10 => '<p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.', (int) 11 => '<p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p>', (int) 12 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 13 $i = (int) 8include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'
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}
echo html_entity_decode($this->Wand->highlight($content[$i], $query));
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Lal Chand, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'dhirta-vs-kesri', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p>Lal Chand, J.</p><p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'dhirta-vs-kesri' $args = array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/610242/dhirta-vs-kesri' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>Lal Chand, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-', (int) 4 => '<p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,', (int) 5 => '<p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.', (int) 6 => '<p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.', (int) 7 => '<p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).', (int) 8 => '<p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'', (int) 9 => '<p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.', (int) 10 => '<p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.', (int) 11 => '<p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p>', (int) 12 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 13 $i = (int) 9include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Lal Chand, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'dhirta-vs-kesri', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p>Lal Chand, J.</p><p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'dhirta-vs-kesri' $args = array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/610242/dhirta-vs-kesri' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>Lal Chand, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-', (int) 4 => '<p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,', (int) 5 => '<p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.', (int) 6 => '<p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.', (int) 7 => '<p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).', (int) 8 => '<p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'', (int) 9 => '<p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.', (int) 10 => '<p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.', (int) 11 => '<p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p>', (int) 12 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 13 $i = (int) 10include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Lal Chand, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'dhirta-vs-kesri', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p>Lal Chand, J.</p><p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'dhirta-vs-kesri' $args = array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/610242/dhirta-vs-kesri' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>Lal Chand, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-', (int) 4 => '<p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,', (int) 5 => '<p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.', (int) 6 => '<p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.', (int) 7 => '<p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).', (int) 8 => '<p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'', (int) 9 => '<p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.', (int) 10 => '<p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.', (int) 11 => '<p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p>', (int) 12 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 13 $i = (int) 11include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109
9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.
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$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp' $dataForView = array( 'title_for_layout' => 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ', 'desc' => array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Lal Chand, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ), 'casename_url' => 'dhirta-vs-kesri', 'args' => array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) ) $title_for_layout = 'Dhirta Vs Kesri - Citation 610242 - Court Judgment | ' $desc = array( 'Judgement' => array( 'id' => '610242', 'acts' => '', 'appealno' => '', 'appellant' => 'Dhirta', 'authreffered' => '', 'casename' => 'Dhirta Vs. Kesri', 'casenote' => 'Punjab Court's Act (XVIII of 1884), Section 40 - Appeal--Jurisdiction--Suit for custody of wife--Valuation of Such suits changed during pendency of suit--Suits Valuation Act (VII of 1887), Section 9, Rules under--Value of suits instituted before not affected by these rules--Civil Procedure Code (Act XIV of 1882), Sections 97 and 99--Re-admitted suit--Date of institution. - Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002], 110 & 104 & Letters Patent, 1865, Clause 10: [Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Letters Patent Appeal Order of Single Judge of High Court passed while deciding matters filed under Order 43, Rule1 of C.P.C., - Held, After introduction of Section 110A in the C.P.C., by 2002 Amendment Act, no Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable against judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge of a High Court. A right of appeal, even though a vested one, can be taken away by law. It is pertinent to note that Section 100-A introduced by 2002 Amendment of the Code starts with a non obstante clause. The purpose of such clause is to give the enacting part of an overriding effect in the case of a conflict with laws mentioned with the non obstante clause. The legislative intention is thus very clear that the law enacted shall have full operation and there would be no impediment. It is well settled that the definition of judgment in Section 2(9) of C.P.C., is much wider and more liberal, Intermediary or interlocutory judgment fall in the category of orders referred to Clause (a) to (w) of Order 43, Rule 1 and also such other orders which poses the characteristic and trapping of finality and may adversely affect a valuable right of a party or decide an important aspect of a trial in an ancillary proceeding. Amended Section 100-A of the Code clearly stipulates that where any appeal from an original or appellate decree or order is heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court, no further appeal shall lie. Even otherwise, the word judgment as defined under Section 2(9) means a statement given by a Judge on the grounds of a decree or order. Thus the contention that against an order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal filed under Section 104 C.P.C., a further appeal lies to a Division Bench cannot be accepted. The newly incorporated Section 100A in clear and specific terms prohibits further appeal against the decree and judgment or order of a Single Judge to a Division Bench notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent. The Letters Patent which provides for further appeal to a Division Bench remains intact, but the right to prefer a further appeal is taken away even in respect of the matters arising under the special enactments or other instruments having the force of law be it against original/appellate decree or order heard and decided by a Single Judge. It has to be kept in mind that the special statute only provide for an Appeal to the High Court. It has not made any provision for filing appeal to a Division Bench against the judgment or decree or order of a Single Judge. No Letters Patent Appeal shall lie against a judgment/order passed by a Single Judge in an appeal arising out of a proceeding under a Special Act. Sections 100-A [As inserted by Act 22 of 2002] & 104:[Dr. B.S. Chauhan, CJ, L. Mohapatra & A.S. Naidu, JJ] Writ Appeal Held, A Writ Appeal shall lie against judgment/orders passed by Single Judge in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a writ application filed under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution, if any order/judgment/decree is passed in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226, a writ appeal will lie. But, no writ appeal will lie against a judgment/order/decree passed by a Single Judge in exercising powers of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution. - It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339). 6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. ' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission.', 'caseanalysis' => null, 'casesref' => 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das;', 'citingcases' => '', 'counselplain' => '', 'counseldef' => '', 'court' => 'Punjab and Haryana', 'court_type' => 'PC', 'decidedon' => '1907-05-10', 'deposition' => '', 'favorof' => null, 'findings' => null, 'judge' => ' Rattigan and; Lal Chand, JJ.', 'judgement' => '<p>Lal Chand, J.</p><p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.</p><p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.</p><p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-</p><p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,</p><p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.</p><p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.</p><p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).</p><p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'</p><p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.</p><p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.</p><p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p></p><p>', 'observations' => null, 'overruledby' => null, 'prhistory' => '', 'pubs' => 'IIIInd.Cas.484', 'ratiodecidendi' => '', 'respondent' => 'Kesri', 'sub' => 'Civil', 'link' => null, 'circuit' => null ) ) $casename_url = 'dhirta-vs-kesri' $args = array( (int) 0 => '610242', (int) 1 => 'dhirta-vs-kesri' ) $url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/610242/dhirta-vs-kesri' $ctype = '' $caseref = 'Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das<br>' $content = array( (int) 0 => '<p>Lal Chand, J.', (int) 1 => '<p>1. The facts are given in full in the order referring the case to a Division Bench for decision. The suit is for custody of wife, and, when instituted on 26th October 1005, was valued at Rs, 510 for the purposes of jurisdiction under the rules then in force. It was dismissed under Section 97, Civil Procedure Code, on 6th December 1905, and was re-admitted on 4th -January 1906. On 19th January 1900 the plain, was returned for amending the names of certain defendants, and the amended plaint was re-filed on 22nd January 1906, valuing the suit for purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 520.', (int) 2 => '<p>2. Meanwhile the rule relating to valuation of such suits had been superseded and a new rule fixing the valuation of such suits at Rs. 1,000 for purposes of jurisdiction was issued with the sanction of the Local Government on 4th December 1905.', (int) 3 => '<p>3. The question raised is, whether under the circumstances, a further appeal is admissible in the case as of right under Section 40, Punjab Courts Act. We feel obliged to hold that the question must be answered in the negative, with reference to the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the provisions of the General Clauses Act of 1897, According to Section 12, nothing in Part I or Part 11. shall be construed to affect the jurisdiction of any Court-', (int) 4 => '<p>(a) with respect to any suit instituted before rules under Part 1 applicable to the valuation take effect or Part 1.1 has come into force, as the case may be, or,', (int) 5 => '<p>(b) with respect to any appeal arising out of such suit.', (int) 6 => '<p>4. The power to frame rules under Part I is given by Section 3 of the Act to the Local Government and by Section 5(2), under the same part, it is enacted that a rule under that section shall not take effect until the expiration of one month after the rule has been published in the local official Gazette. Reading the latter section with Section 12, it is clear, so far, that a rule for valuation framed under Section 3, Part I, cannot affect either the jurisdiction of a Court or the appeal in any suit instituted before the rule takes effect under Section 5(2) of the Act.', (int) 7 => '<p>5. By Section 7 of the Act, Part 1 I came into force on the 1st day of July 1897, and power to frame rules under this part is conferred by Section 9 on the High Court with the previous sanction of the Local Government. The words used in Section 9 are: The High Court may, with the previous sanction of the Local Government, direct that suits of that class shall, for the purposes of the Court Fees Act, 1870, and of this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force, be treated as if their subject-matter was of such value as the High Court thinks fit to specify in this behalf'' The rule relating to valuation in suits for custody of wife was framed by this Court, after securing the necessary sanction under Section 9, and Section 12 by its terms is inapplicable to such rules. The section, so far as Part 11 is concerned, merely refers to suits instituted before the part came into force and not to suits instituted before the rule came into force, as is expressly provided in case of rules framed under Part I. Why this distinction was made is not so obvious. But looking to the language used in Section 9 and the obvious intention as deducible from the purview of Section 12, it seems reasonable to hold that the rules framed under Section 9, Part II of the Act, were not intended to have retrospective effect so as to affect jurisdiction with respect to an appeal in a suit instituted before the rule came into force. It is true that, speaking generally, an enactment relating to matters of mere procedure is held to have a retrospective effect and to apply to suits or actions already instituted (Max-well on Interpretation of Statutes, page 339).', (int) 8 => '<p>6. But apparently this principle is not now recognised by the Indian Legislature under the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) and was not applied by this Court in Chowdhri Narsing Das v. Lala Dholan Das 21 P.R. 1900 F.B. as is apparent from the following extract from the judgment of the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chatterji, at page 41: The further discussion of the question appears to be concluded by the wording of the New General Clauses Act X of 1897. Clauses (c) and (e) of Section 6 of that Act, and particularly the latter, seem to save the entire procedure applicable under the old law, as it expressly provides that any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed. It would scorn that this section not only saves the rights, liabilities and obligations accrued before the passing of the Act, but also the procedure to give effect to them, and makes it necessary, when a Procedure Act is repealed and a new procedure substituted, to provide how far the new procedure will apply to proceedings pending at the time or to be instituted thereafter, to enforce existing rights and obligations.'', (int) 9 => '<p>7. The concluding words of Section 6, Act X of 1897, that 'any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced...as if the repealing Act or Regulations had not been passed,' make it absolutely clear that the procedure laid down by the repealing Act is not at all intended to have retrospective effect as regards suits instituted under the repealed enactment.', (int) 10 => '<p>8. Act X of 1897 doubtless refers by its terms to legislative enactments and not to rules framed under authority conferred by a legislative enactment. But the provisions of the Act may be referred to for guidance in a matter of a similar nature, and having regard to the scope of the provisions of Section 12 of the Suits Valuation Act and the language of Section 9 of the Act as already quoted, it seems to be clear that the rule in question does not, and was not intended to, apply to suits instituted before the rule itself was issued. If the procedure in suits already instituted is not affected by any enactment passed subsequent to such institutions it would seem to follow as a necessary corollary that such procedure is not to be affected by rules framed or issued after such institutions. The suit in the present case was, no doubt, dismissed for default and re-admitted, and the plaint was returned, for amendment and was amended after the new rule came into force. But the amendment of the plaint does not affect at least the principal defendant Musammat Kesri, and against her the suit was certainly instituted on a date prior to the issue of the new rule. As regards re-admission after dismissal for default it cannot be treated as changing the date of institution of the suit. It was doubtless open to the plaintiff under Section 99, Civil Procedure Code, to bring a fresh suit, but he elected not to do so, and proceeded after re-admission, with the suit as originally instituted. The suit must, therefore, be held as instituted on the date when the plaint was originally filed and not on the date of its re-admission. The terms of Section 99 are: 'The Court shall pass an order to set aside the dismissal and appoint a day for proceeding with the suit.' These terms clearly preclude the suit after re-admission being treated as a fresh suit or as instituted on the date of re-admission. We, therefore, feel constrained to hold that the new rule passed in supersession of the existing rule is inapplicable and that the value of the suit for the purposes of the jurisdiction in this case must be held to be below Rs. 1,000 as set out in the plaint.', (int) 11 => '<p>9. A further appeal is consequently inadmissible in the case as of right under Section 40 of the Punjab Courts Act.<p>', (int) 12 => '<p>' ) $paragraphAfter = (int) 1 $cnt = (int) 13 $i = (int) 12include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144 View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971 View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933 View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473 Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963 Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200 Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167 [main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109