Ms. Kanchan Kapoor and ors. Vs. Union of India (Uoi) Through the - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
1. it is trite that the coordinate bench of the tribunal has no authority in law to over-rule the decision of another coordinate bench.it is also trite that a direction issued by the tribunal when attained finality has to be implemented by the respondents in its true letter and spirit.2. keeping in mind the above two principles of law, a brief factual matrix of the oa is relevant to be highlighted, which transpires that applicants were initially engaged as casual production assistants on contract basis during the year 1987 and 1990. persistent requests of applicants to regularize their services as production assistants when not acceded to and in the meanwhile the posts of production assistant were re-designated as transmission executives (trex) in all india radio (air), oa-822/1991 filed by the tribunal in suresh sharma and ors. v.union of india, decided on 18.9.1992, pertaining to the production assistants, seeking regularization taking cognizance of approved scheme prepared by the respondents in the light of the decision of the tribunal in oa-563/1986 and directions dated 14.2.1992, scheme framed, whereby casual artists engaged on casual/assignment basis as production assistants upto 31.12.1991 on the rolls of the air who had worked for a period of 72 days in a year on aggregate basis has been made eligible for regularization, which would have to be from the prospective date and the recruitment rules in vogue would have to be resorted only to determine eligibility for regularization. it is also stressed that till production assistants are regularized at a station, no fresh recruitment would be resorted to. relying upon the aforesaid, directions have been issued in suresh sharma's case (supra) to implement and formulate a scheme for regularization of the casual workers within the time stipulated in judgment dated 14.2.1992.accordingly, the scheme as referred to above, when framed, respondents considered cases of applicants for regularization but as it was denied to them led to filing of oa-2873/97 and connected matters in ms.kanchal kapoor and anr. v. union of india and ors. etc. etc. decided on 6.7.1998, whereby it has been assailed that being engaged on casual basis as transmission executives/production assistants, non-regularization is not inconformity with the scheme and directions of the tribunal. with the following observations, oa stands disposed of: 11. i am convinced, on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the documents on record that news services division, external service division and commercial broadcasting service and such other organizations located in delhi are parts and parcels of the delhi station of all india radio and are mere offices or divisions of that station. the working of these divisions/offices is controlled by the station director of all india radio. therefore, the mere fact that these divisions/offices have separate heads of offices, as contended by the respondents in para 5(c ) of their counter, would not make them independent stations of all india radio. 12. it clearly appears that after having considered the applicants in these oas to be eligible for consideration of their cases for regularization, as is apparent from the list of casual production assistants having minimum 72 days of bookings prepared by the senior administrative officer. all india radio, new delhi, as at annexure a-viii, the respondents had second thoughts later and with a view to deny to the applicants the benefit of regularization the respondents wrongly held the applicants negligible. 13. in view of the facts and circumstances discussed above, all these oas deserve to be allowed. 14. in the result, i all these oas, quash the impugned letter/order dated 10.1.1997 informing the applicants in these oas that they have not been found eligible for regularization under the scheme approved by the tribunal and direct the respondents to consider the case of all these applicants for regularization on the assumption that they have been engaged for more than 72 days in a calendar year at one station of all india radio. the decision in the matter shall be taken by the respondents and communicated to the applicants within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.3. the aforesaid decision was carried before the high court of delhi in cwp no. 5533/98, wherein the following observation has been made, while affirming the decision of the tribunal: the tribunal has held that the service rendered in any of the units/divisions of the all india radio would be reckoned for the purposes of computing the period of 72 days. we are in agreement with the above interpretation by the tribunal. it renders the scheme more just and fair because, if an employee was required to complete the period of 72 days in one units/divisions within a station. this would also advance the course of justice. we do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned decision of the tribunal. dismissed.4. as a result thereof, applicants were found eligible under the scheme for regularization. in cp-288/98 filed by applicants for implementation of the directions, in the counter-reply filed by respondents in cp-288/98 on 17.2.1999 for the first time there has been a reference to the recruitment rules for the posts of transmission executives promulgated in 1992, as amended in 1994, wherein they have taken a defence of impracticability in regularization of applicants under the recruitment rules, which envisage 100% promotion as mode for the posts of transmission executives. however, it is acknowledged that respondents would comply with the directions of the tribunal in true letter and spirit by appointing applicants as ad hoc transmission executives. an order passed on 3.5.1999, in compliance of the directions of the tribunal in oa-2873/97, applicants were approved for recruitment to the posts of transmission executives, i.e., general and production in air and doordarshan, with the following stipulations: the concerned head of offices are therefore, requested to issue offer of appointment to them on ad hoc basis being the appointing authority in respect of group 'c' posts on the usual terms and conditions. the following conditions may invariably be incorporated in the offer of appointment. (i) their appointment shall be on ad-hoc basis subject to the outcome of the oa no. 1582/98 filed by shri v.k. jain and ors. v. u.o.i. and ors. general asstt. of doordarshan. (ii) their ad-hoc appointment shall be liable to be terminated in case the oa no. 1582/98 is decided in favour of the applicants. their right for appointment as transmission executive(g&p) shall however remain undisturbed. (iii) their appointment will further be subject to the rules/instructions to be framed/regulated by the prasar bharati corporation of india.v.k. jain and ors. v. union of india, decided on 11.2.2000, applicants who were general assistants and copyists working in doordarshan sought promotion on the basis of amended rules for transmission executives in 1994, an interim order passed by the tribunal has maintained status quo, which was reiterated later on.applicants in oa have also been impleaded as respondents in the oa. the tribunal observed as under: 8. there appears to be some justification in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents. in fact in 1992 rules for the transmission executive of the air and doordarshan either the applicants in doordarshan or the general assistants or copyists in the air are not shown as eligible for promotion. by the time the rules of 1992 had come into force the bombay bench of the tribunal has given directions in the oas filed by the general assistants and copyists of air allowing their claims. the respondents were directed to consider their cases for promotion to the posts of production assistants in accordance with 1976 rules as the posts of production assistant in air have been amalgamated into the posts of transmission executives (g&p). in order to implement the directions given, it is stated, the amendment was brought out in 1994. the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents, therefore, appears to be round and logical. but it should also be noticed that the applicants who were the general assistants and copyists in doordarshan are also handicapped in that they had also no avenues of promotion. they should retire as production assistants/transmission executives. in all fairness the employees in the doordarshan are also entitled for promotion to the posts of transmission executives (g&p). their posts are also in all respects equal with that of general assistants/copyists in air. the judgment of the tribunal of the bombay bench cannot be read as an embargo to consider the cases of the applicants for being eligible for consideration for promotion. in these circumstances, the government mighty have thought that there can be no good reason for discriminating the employees in the doordarshan. hence, the government amended the rules accordingly.6. as regards the plea of applicants, the following is the observations: 11. ma-1815/99 is filed by the third parties who were given ad hoc appointment as trex (g&p) in air delhi subject to the outcome of the above oa. the tribunal in its interim order dated 2.12.98 directed to maintain status quo regarding further appointment in the above posts till further orders. in view of the above orders the respondents terminated over zealously, the applicants by order dated 20.8.99. 12. it is now stated by the learned counsel for the applicants that against the order of their termination the applicants approached the high court and the high court had passed interim order restoring the applicants into service. the learned counsel for the applicants and respondents in oa submit that the applicants herein need not be disturbed pending the disposal of the oa and they would continue in service subject to the final result of the oa in terms of their appointment orders. in the circumstances no order need be passed on this application. the ma is accordingly disposed of.7. by an order passed on 20.8.1999 on the basis of the directions in oa-1582/98 the ad hoc appointments of applicants were terminated with immediate effect to be reviewed after the final outcome of the oa.being aggrieved with by this order applicants have sought modification of interim order, which was turned down on 25.8.1999, which led to filing of the cwp no. 5368/99 before the high court of delhi, whereby order dated 20.8.1999 was stayed and status quo was maintained.8. after the finalization of oa-1582/98, on 3.2.2006 the high court of delhi finally concluded the wp no. 5368/99, with the following observations: so far this petition is concerned, we are of the considered opinion that the same has been rendered infructuous. we dispose of the writ petition in the aforesaid manner giving liberty to the applicants to file fresh petition in accordance with law. we also make it clear that nothing said herein would be construed as our decision or views one way or the other with regard to other reliefs in the writ petition wherein the petitioners, who were impleaded as respondents in the original application, have also challenged the order of termination dated 20th august, 1999. in our considered opinion, the petitioners could not have gone beyond the scope of the original application, which was pending before the tribunal, in this writ petition. therefore, if the petitioners are also aggrieved in respect of other reliefs, the remedy of the petitions would be elsewhere.9. as a result thereof, on review of the order the respondents reiterated termination of ad hoc appointments of applicants and rather vide order dated 11.5.2006 on the recommendations of the dpc 7 general assistants and copyists have been promoted as transmission executives, (general & production).10. by virtue of this oa an order passed on 19.5.2006 in ma-856/2006, stayed the operation of the order dated 11.5.2006 and status quo has been maintained as regards continuance of applicants as ad hoc transmission executives.11. learned senior counsel shri r. venkataramani, at the outset, contended that situation arisen in the present oa, whereby there has been a conflict of interest of two categories of employees is the creation of government. in the above backdrop what has been contended is that in oa-822/91 pertaining to the production assistants a scheme was to be formulated, which has reiterated the stipulated time limit in oa-563/1986 and on formulation of the scheme by the respondents where the regularization has to be done prospectively and the recruitment rules were only to be invoked for ascertaining qualifications, it is the government which slacked in its action by not considering the cases of applicants at an appropriate time. as a result thereof, oa-2873/97 when filed, what has been reiterated on quashing the order dated 10.1.1997 is a misconceived action on the part of respondents to deny regularization to applicants of consideration to deem on calendar basis 72 days. the intent was to consider applicants for regularization under the scheme formulated in pursuance of the directions of the tribunal, which has attained finality. however, an order passed by the respondents on 3.5.1999, appointing applicants on recruitment as transmission executives (general and production) in a definite pay scale, the ad hoc status accorded was not the intent of the tribunal and moreover the decision has been subjected to the final outcome in oa-1582/1998, yet the policy laid down and the erstwhile recruitment rules of 1992, which exclusively pertained to 100% direct recruitment, would have to be resorted to in case of applicants and because of delay in consideration of their claims, the rules of 1994 prescribing 100% promotion have replaced the earlier rules and the right accrued to applicants has been defeated by the government without any reasonable basis.12. learned counsel would also contend that once a right has been accrued to applicants to be considered as an implication of the decision of the tribunal, even in umadevi (supra) the constitution bench has denuded the directions issued by the tribunal and other courts pertaining to regularization against the constitutional mandate as a precedent, but the decisions already rendered on the doctrine of prospective ruling have to be respected and complied with. reliance has been placed on a decision of the tribunal in oa-2238/2005 in vinod kumar and ors. v. union of india and anr. decided on 23.8.2006, to substantiate the plea.13. learned senior counsel would also contend that right of applicants for regularization by virtue of an order passed on 6.7.1998 when affirmed in cwp no. 5533/98 vide order dated 30.10.1998 by the high court had attained finality and cannot be allowed to be attacked collaterally before any court. a decision of the constitution bench of the apex court consisting of seven-judge in madan mohan pathak v. union of india , has been relied upon to contend that if a duty is cast upon respondents on the basis of a decision of the tribunal, would not absolve them to carry out the writ of mandamus.14. learned counsel would also contend that having recognized the right and entitlement of applicants of regularization while appointing them on ad hoc basis and observing that their right shall remain undisturbed the final order passed in oa-1582/98 having not disturbed the right and entitlement of applicants for regularization, their termination now in the guise of carrying out the directions of the tribunal, cannot be countenanced and rather it is arbitrary, unjust and unreasonable.15. on the other hand, learned counsel appearing for official respondents have vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that regularization in the wake of recruitment rules promulgated in 1994 whereby 100% promotion is the methodology to fill up the posts of transmission executive, regularization cannot be a mode of recruitment and has relied upon the decision of the apex court in dr. chanchal goel v. state of rajasthan 2003 (2) sc slj 92.16. learned counsel would contend that principle of legitimate expectation has no application in the present case, as the constitution bench decision in umadevi (supra) ruled against the right of those who are temporarily appointed. in the above backdrop it is stated that any scheme promulgated for regularization is de hors the constitution and being contrary to the recruitment rules, cannot be enforced.17. learned counsel would also contend that after 100% promotion has been introduced in the amended rules of 1994 applicants have no right to be considered and as their appointments were subjected to the decision in v.k. jain (supra), which is final and binding on respondents, the posts of transmission executive (general & production) are to be filled up as per the recruitment rules of 1994.18. learned counsel representing the private respondents contended that six out of seven private respondents have been promoted and only one is left. he also adopts the arguments advanced by the learned counsel of official respondents and stated that applicants have no right to be regularized in the wake of amendment of the rules in 1994.19. in rejoinder the pleas taken by applicants in the oa have been reiterated.20. we have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.21. insofar as regularization being mode of appointment is concerned, law is very clear on the point as held by the constitution bench in umadevi (supra) that such a mode is not prescribed under the mode of recruitment and is against the constitution.22. however, despite holding that right of equality enshrined under article 14 of the constitution of india and right to freedom and personal liberty under article 21 would not be effected, if an appointment is regularized de hors the rules. however, an irregular appointee who has continued for number of years without the intervention of the orders of the court, the following is the observation by the constitution bench in umadevi (supra): 44. one aspect needs to be clarified. there may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in s.v. narayanappa (supra), r.n. nanjundappa (supra), and b.n. nagarajan (supra), and referred to in paragraph 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of courts or of tribunals. the question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. in that context, the union of india, the state governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularize as a one time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. the process must be set in motion within six months from this date. we also clarify that regularization, if any already made, but not subjudice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further by-passing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme.23. accordingly, the apex court with regard to the cases where direction has been issued, running counter to the decision or the principles settled, it is ruled that these decisions would stand denuded of their status as precedent. the tribunal has considered the aforesaid in oa-2238/2005 (supra), where the following observation has been made: 21. i have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material placed on record. 22. it is trite that whatever has been stated and pleaded has been concluded and observed by the apex court in a constitution bench decision, which is a binding precedent upon the tribunal under article 141 of the constitution. what has been precluded by the apex court to the courts subordinate as well as the tribunal is not to entertain a fresh grievance of regularization of temporary, casual and daily wager, unless the statutory rules so provide, and also if the decisions rendered directing regularization by the subordinate courts, would be denuded to the extent that the cases would no more be a valid precedent for other cases to follow. 23. the doctrine of prospective ruling is a constitutional doctrine, which has arisen from not only the principle of stare decisis but also with an underline object that prospective ruling is to avoid a confusion in the hierarchy of judiciary whereby the orders passed by the courts subordinate as precedent under article 141 of the constitution. if a decision rendered in the past is denuded of its power or effect, redressal thereof would lead to confusion and a chaotic situation where the principle of stare decisis would not only be violative but also there would be an indiscipline in judicial system. accordingly, the decisions, which are not to be treated as prospective, there should have to be a finding by the apex court or the courts whose orders are binding as precedent on us to operate the order retrospectively as well. 24. in the light of above, though the decision of the apex court cannot be interpreted, like a statute, but its ratio deci dendi has to be inferred from the cause of action, discussion made, law decided and also the observation made, which are binding on tribunal as being obiter dicta. the apex court in umadevi's case (supra) does not lay down that any decision rendered whereby regularization has been ordered, has to be set aside or to be denuded of its effect. what is to be denuded in the said judgment is its precedent value, i.e., the aforesaid judgment whereby regularization has been ordered, would not have to be treated as a precedent for other cases to follow, i.e., only logical inference, which can be drawn from the above that the ratio deci dendi in the cases decided before pronouncement of umadevi's case (supra) would not be affected by the prospective ruling of umadevi's case (supra).24. applicants have been appointed on casual basis and when the respondents have recognized them after getting tested and screened, adopted such a procedure whereby applicants had continued for more than 15 years uninterruptedly without any protection of the court. however, a decision of the tribunal in suresh sharma (supra) directed respondents, in the wake of recruitment rules, to frame a scheme within six months as directed in oa-563/1986. accordingly, a scheme prepared thereafter acknowledged minimum 72 days' service in aggregate in a year for qualification of a fresh artist for regularization. even fresh recruitment has not been proceeded till regularization has been given effect to. it is not disputed that applicants have been considered in the scheme but their claims were rejected on the ground of miscalculation of working days, which has been set right by the tribunal in oa-2873/97, directing respondents to consider their claims for regularization on the assumption of their engagement for 72 days in a calendar year. this decision was implemented immediately as a result thereof, though in principle the extension of scheme and consideration thereof, of regularization to applicants has been acknowledged by respondents by issuing an order on 3.5.1999, approving their recruitment to the posts of transmission executive but were appointed on ad hoc basis. in the meanwhile, oa-1582/1998 filed by the transmission executives seeking 100% promotional avenues under the recruitment rules of 1994 was filed though the claim of applicants for continuing on ad hoc basis has been subjected to the final outcome of this case but their right for appointment ordered to be remained undisturbed. however, the decision of the tribunal directing consideration of regularization of applicants once attained finality in the oa, the decision as an interim measure, in v.k. jain (supra) restricted the claim of applicants, which when challenged before the high court, status quo as to the continuance of applicants has been accorded. however, the final outcome of oa-1582/1998 though directed consideration of claim of applicants therein under the amended rules of 1994, yet keeping in light the continuance of service of applicants subject to final result of the oa, no specific direction has been issued as to the rights of applicants being affected though applicants have been impleaded vide ma-1815/99 in the above oa. rather it is observed that the respondents have terminated the service of applicants overzealously. however, writ petitions preferred before the high court accorded liberty to applicants to file the present oa. the decision of the tribunal where consideration for regularization and their being qualified under the 1990 rules when amended rules had not come into being, when not disputed, delay on the part of respondents to process the case of applicants for regularization has resulted in a conflict between the two categories of employees without any fault attributable to applicants.25. however, if a decision of the tribunal is rendered, which acknowledges consideration for regularization, placement on ad hoc is not the compliance in true letter and spirit. however, despite this ad hoc arrangement when it is made clear to the respondents by a promise that their right would not be disturbed the principle of legitimate expectation has come into being.26. the apex court in umadevi (supra) as to legitimate expectation, observed as under: 46. learned senior counsel for some of the respondents argued that on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the employees, especially of the commercial taxes department, should be directed to be regularized since the decisions in dharwad (supra), piara singh (supra), jacob, and gujarat agricultural university and the like, have given rise to an expectation in them that their services would also be regularized. the doctrine can be invoked if the decisions of the administrative authority affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there have been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn {see lord diplock in council of civil service unions v. minister for the civil service 1985 appeal cases 374, national buildings construction corporation v. s. raghunathan and dr. chanchal goyal v. state of rajasthan . there is no case that any assurance was given by the government or the concerned department while making the appointment on daily wages that the status conferred on him will not be withdrawn until some rational reason comes into existence for withdrawing it. the very engagement was against the constitutional scheme. though, the commissioner of the commercial taxes department sought to get the appointments made permanent, there is no case that at the time of appointment any promise was held out. no such promise could also have been held out in view of the circulars and directives issued by the government after the dharwad decision. though, there is a case that the state had made regularizations in the past of similarly situated employees, the fact remains that such regularizations were done only pursuant to judicial directions, either of the administrative tribunal or of the high court and in some case by this court. moreover, the invocation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot enable the employees to claim that they must be made permanent or they must be regularized in the service though they had not been selected in terms of the rules for appointment. the fact that in certain cases the court had directed regularization of the employees involved in those cases cannot be made use of to found a claim based on legitimate expectation. the argument if accepted would also run counter to the constitutional mandate. the argument in that behalf has therefore to be rejected.27. having regard to the above, it is a case where an assurance has been given by respondents that rights of applicants would not be disturbed, now disturbing their rights is not a role model played by respondents in a welfare state. though no one can be regularized or appointed against the constitutional mandate or the decision of the constitutional bench, yet they are an exception in this category as appointed under the then provisions in vogue and continued for more than 10 years, they have a right to be considered as a separate block as a one time measure for their regularization. though right to employment is not a fundamental right, but to continue on unreasonable ground showing arbitrariness, is also not fair and legitimate in the circumstances.28. the decision of the tribunal in oa-2873/1997 is reiteration of oa-822/1991, which on attainment of finality, respondents are duty bound to respect and follow the dicta and a subsequent decision, which does not impede, in any manner, this right independently of 1994 statutory rules ibid, cannot be countenanced and the following observation supports the contentions of applicants in madan mohan pathak (supra): 8. the object of the act was, in effect, to take away the force of the judgment of the calcutta high court recognising the settlements in favour of class iii and class iv employees of the corporation. rights under that judgment could be said to arise independently of article 19 of the constitution, i find myself in complete agreement with my learned brother bhagwati that to give effect to the judgment of the calcutta high court is not the same thing as enforcing a right under article 19 of the constitution. it may be that a right under article 19 of the constitution becomes linked up with the enforceability of the judgment. nevertheless, the two could be viewed as separable sets of rights. if the right conferred by the judgment independently is sought to be set aside, section 3 of the act, would, in my opinion, be invalid for trenching upon the judicial power. 9. i may, however, observe that even though the real object of the act may be to set aside the result of the mandamus issued by the calcutta high court, yet, the section does not mention this object at all. probably this was so because the jurisdiction of a high court and the effectiveness of its orders derived their force from article 226 of the constitution itself. these could not be touched by an ordinary act of parliament. even if section 3 of the act seeks to take away the basis of the judgment of the calcutta high court, without mentioning it, by enacting what may appear to be a law, yet, i think that, where the rights of the citizen against the state are concerned, we should adopt an interpretation which upholds those rights. therefore, according to the interpretation i prefer to adopt the rights which had passed into those embodied in a judgment and became the basis of a mandamus from the high court could not be taken away in this indirect fashion.29. in the above view of the matter, even though the recruitment rules now provide 100% promotion, yet a right when accrued to applicants, it is for the government, when their rights have been preserved with a promise, not to disturb them and a methodology is to be carved out to respect the dicta of the tribunal, which has attained finality and also an exception to umadevi (supra), even one time scheme could take care of rights accrued to applicants. respondents cannot shirk from their responsibility, as it is their belated action which has ultimately prejudiced the rights of applicants, as in 1992 till 1994 when the recruitment rules prescribing direct recruitment applicants' claim could have been processed but delay and their misconceived action of not computing their period of engagement correctly, the right which has been declared by the tribunal, would relate back to their eligibility in the past and with reference to the scheme framed, which was also to be inconsonance with the eligibility criteria laid down under the statutory rules.30. in the result, for the foregoing reasons, this oa is partly allowed. impugned orders are set aside. respondents are directed, on reconsideration to evolve a methodology as well as ways and means inconsonance with the direction of the tribunal and constitution bench of the apex court, to appoint applicants as transmission executives (general & production) on regular basis. in such an event, law shall take its own course. it is needless to observe in the light that applicants are still continuing their status quo to this regard shall be maintained. the above directions shall be complied with, within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.no costs.

Judgment:
1. It is trite that the coordinate Bench of the Tribunal has no authority in law to over-rule the decision of another coordinate Bench.

It is also trite that a direction issued by the Tribunal when attained finality has to be implemented by the respondents in its true letter and spirit.

2. Keeping in mind the above two principles of law, a brief factual matrix of the OA is relevant to be highlighted, which transpires that applicants were initially engaged as Casual Production Assistants on contract basis during the year 1987 and 1990. Persistent requests of applicants to regularize their services as Production Assistants when not acceded to and in the meanwhile the posts of Production Assistant were re-designated as Transmission Executives (TREX) in All India Radio (AIR), OA-822/1991 filed by the Tribunal in Suresh Sharma and Ors. v.Union of India, decided on 18.9.1992, pertaining to the Production Assistants, seeking regularization taking cognizance of approved scheme prepared by the respondents in the light of the decision of the Tribunal in OA-563/1986 and directions dated 14.2.1992, scheme framed, whereby casual artists engaged on casual/assignment basis as Production Assistants upto 31.12.1991 on the rolls of the AIR who had worked for a period of 72 days in a year on aggregate basis has been made eligible for regularization, which would have to be from the prospective date and the recruitment rules in vogue would have to be resorted only to determine eligibility for regularization. It is also stressed that till Production Assistants are regularized at a station, no fresh recruitment would be resorted to. Relying upon the aforesaid, directions have been issued in Suresh Sharma's case (supra) to implement and formulate a scheme for regularization of the casual workers within the time stipulated in judgment dated 14.2.1992.

Accordingly, the scheme as referred to above, when framed, respondents considered cases of applicants for regularization but as it was denied to them led to filing of OA-2873/97 and connected matters in Ms.

Kanchal Kapoor and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors. etc. etc. decided on 6.7.1998, whereby it has been assailed that being engaged on casual basis as Transmission Executives/Production Assistants, non-regularization is not inconformity with the scheme and directions of the Tribunal. With the following observations, OA stands disposed of: 11. I am convinced, on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the documents on record that News Services Division, External Service Division and Commercial Broadcasting Service and such other organizations located in Delhi are parts and parcels of the Delhi station of All India Radio and are mere offices or divisions of that station. The working of these divisions/offices is controlled by the Station Director of All India Radio. Therefore, the mere fact that these divisions/offices have separate heads of offices, as contended by the respondents in para 5(c ) of their counter, would not make them independent stations of All India Radio.

12. It clearly appears that after having considered the applicants in these OAs to be eligible for consideration of their cases for regularization, as is apparent from the list of casual Production Assistants having minimum 72 days of bookings prepared by the Senior Administrative Officer. All India Radio, New Delhi, as at annexure A-VIII, the respondents had second thoughts later and with a view to deny to the applicants the benefit of regularization the respondents wrongly held the applicants negligible.

13. In view of the facts and circumstances discussed above, all these OAs deserve to be allowed.

14. In the result, I all these OAs, quash the impugned letter/order dated 10.1.1997 informing the applicants in these OAs that they have not been found eligible for regularization under the Scheme approved by the Tribunal and direct the respondents to consider the case of all these applicants for regularization on the assumption that they have been engaged for more than 72 days in a calendar year at one station of All India Radio. The decision in the matter shall be taken by the respondents and communicated to the applicants within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

3. The aforesaid decision was carried before the High Court of Delhi in CWP No. 5533/98, wherein the following observation has been made, while affirming the decision of the Tribunal: The Tribunal has held that the service rendered in any of the units/divisions of the All India Radio would be reckoned for the purposes of computing the period of 72 days. We are in agreement with the above interpretation by the Tribunal. It renders the scheme more just and fair because, if an employee was required to complete the period of 72 days in one units/divisions within a station. This would also advance the course of justice.

We do not find any reason to interfere with the impugned decision of the Tribunal. Dismissed.

4. As a result thereof, applicants were found eligible under the scheme for regularization. In CP-288/98 filed by applicants for implementation of the directions, in the counter-reply filed by respondents in CP-288/98 on 17.2.1999 for the first time there has been a reference to the recruitment rules for the posts of Transmission Executives promulgated in 1992, as amended in 1994, wherein they have taken a defence of impracticability in regularization of applicants under the recruitment rules, which envisage 100% promotion as mode for the posts of Transmission Executives. However, it is acknowledged that respondents would comply with the directions of the Tribunal in true letter and spirit by appointing applicants as ad hoc Transmission Executives. An order passed on 3.5.1999, in compliance of the directions of the Tribunal in OA-2873/97, applicants were approved for recruitment to the posts of Transmission Executives, i.e., General and Production in AIR and Doordarshan, with the following stipulations: The concerned Head of offices are therefore, requested to issue offer of appointment to them on ad hoc basis being the appointing authority in respect of Group 'C' posts on the usual terms and conditions. The following conditions may invariably be incorporated in the offer of appointment.

(i) Their appointment shall be on ad-hoc basis subject to the outcome of the OA No. 1582/98 filed by Shri V.K. Jain and Ors. v. U.O.I. and Ors. General Asstt. of Doordarshan.

(ii) Their ad-hoc appointment shall be liable to be terminated in case the OA No. 1582/98 is decided in favour of the applicants.

Their right for appointment as Transmission Executive(G&P) shall however remain undisturbed.

(iii) Their appointment will further be subject to the rules/instructions to be Framed/regulated by the Prasar Bharati Corporation of India.V.K. Jain and Ors. v. Union of India, decided on 11.2.2000, applicants who were General Assistants and Copyists working in Doordarshan sought promotion on the basis of amended rules for Transmission Executives in 1994, an interim order passed by the Tribunal has maintained status quo, which was reiterated later on.

Applicants in OA have also been impleaded as respondents in the OA. The Tribunal observed as under: 8. There appears to be some justification in the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents. In fact in 1992 rules for the Transmission Executive of the AIR and Doordarshan either the applicants in Doordarshan or the General Assistants or Copyists in the AIR are not shown as eligible for promotion. BY the time the rules of 1992 had come into force the Bombay Bench of the Tribunal has given directions in the OAs filed by the General Assistants and Copyists of AIR allowing their claims. The respondents were directed to consider their cases for promotion to the posts of Production Assistants in accordance with 1976 rules as the posts of Production Assistant in AIR have been amalgamated into the posts of Transmission Executives (G&P). In order to implement the directions given, it is stated, the amendment was brought out in 1994. The contention of the learned Counsel for the respondents, therefore, appears to be round and logical. But it should also be noticed that the applicants who were the General Assistants and Copyists in Doordarshan are also handicapped in that they had also no avenues of promotion. They should retire as Production Assistants/Transmission Executives. In all fairness the employees in the Doordarshan are also entitled for promotion to the posts of Transmission Executives (G&P). Their posts are also in all respects equal with that of General Assistants/Copyists in AIR. The judgment of the Tribunal of the Bombay Bench cannot be read as an embargo to consider the cases of the applicants for being eligible for consideration for promotion. In these circumstances, the Government mighty have thought that there can be no good reason for discriminating the employees in the Doordarshan. Hence, the Government amended the rules accordingly.

6. As regards the plea of applicants, the following is the observations: 11. MA-1815/99 is filed by the third parties who were given ad hoc appointment as TREX (G&P) in AIR Delhi subject to the outcome of the above OA. The Tribunal in its interim order dated 2.12.98 directed to maintain status quo regarding further appointment in the above posts till further orders. In view of the above orders the respondents terminated over zealously, the applicants by order dated 20.8.99.

12. It is now stated by the learned Counsel for the applicants that against the order of their termination the applicants approached the High Court and the High Court had passed interim order restoring the applicants into service. The learned Counsel for the applicants and respondents in OA submit that the applicants herein need not be disturbed pending the disposal of the OA and they would continue in service subject to the final result of the OA in terms of their appointment orders. In the circumstances no order need be passed on this application. The MA is accordingly disposed of.

7. By an order passed on 20.8.1999 on the basis of the directions in OA-1582/98 the ad hoc appointments of applicants were terminated with immediate effect to be reviewed after the final outcome of the OA.Being aggrieved with by this order applicants have sought modification of interim order, which was turned down on 25.8.1999, which led to filing of the CWP No. 5368/99 before the High Court of Delhi, whereby order dated 20.8.1999 was stayed and status quo was maintained.

8. After the finalization of OA-1582/98, on 3.2.2006 the High Court of Delhi finally concluded the WP No. 5368/99, with the following observations: So far this petition is concerned, we are of the considered opinion that the same has been rendered infructuous. We dispose of the writ petition in the aforesaid manner giving liberty to the applicants to file fresh petition in accordance with law. We also make it clear that nothing said herein would be construed as our decision or views one way or the other with regard to other reliefs in the writ petition wherein the petitioners, who were impleaded as respondents in the Original Application, have also challenged the order of termination dated 20th August, 1999. In our considered opinion, the petitioners could not have gone beyond the scope of the Original Application, which was pending before the Tribunal, in this writ petition. Therefore, if the petitioners are also aggrieved in respect of other reliefs, the remedy of the petitions would be elsewhere.

9. As a result thereof, on review of the order the respondents reiterated termination of ad hoc appointments of applicants and rather vide order dated 11.5.2006 on the recommendations of the DPC 7 General Assistants and Copyists have been promoted as Transmission Executives, (General & Production).

10. By virtue of this OA an order passed on 19.5.2006 in MA-856/2006, stayed the operation of the order dated 11.5.2006 and status quo has been maintained as regards continuance of applicants as ad hoc Transmission Executives.

11. Learned Senior Counsel Shri R. Venkataramani, at the outset, contended that situation arisen in the present OA, whereby there has been a conflict of interest of two categories of employees is the creation of Government. In the above backdrop what has been contended is that in OA-822/91 pertaining to the Production Assistants a Scheme was to be formulated, which has reiterated the stipulated time limit in OA-563/1986 and on formulation of the Scheme by the respondents where the regularization has to be done prospectively and the recruitment rules were only to be invoked for ascertaining qualifications, it is the Government which slacked in its action by not considering the cases of applicants at an appropriate time. As a result thereof, OA-2873/97 when filed, what has been reiterated on quashing the order dated 10.1.1997 is a misconceived action on the part of respondents to deny regularization to applicants of consideration to deem on calendar basis 72 days. The intent was to consider applicants for regularization under the Scheme formulated in pursuance of the directions of the Tribunal, which has attained finality. However, an order passed by the respondents on 3.5.1999, appointing applicants on recruitment as Transmission Executives (General and Production) in a definite pay scale, the ad hoc status accorded was not the intent of the Tribunal and moreover the decision has been subjected to the final outcome in OA-1582/1998, yet the policy laid down and the erstwhile recruitment rules of 1992, which exclusively pertained to 100% direct recruitment, would have to be resorted to in case of applicants and because of delay in consideration of their claims, the rules of 1994 prescribing 100% promotion have replaced the earlier rules and the right accrued to applicants has been defeated by the Government without any reasonable basis.

12. Learned Counsel would also contend that once a right has been accrued to applicants to be considered as an implication of the decision of the Tribunal, even in Umadevi (supra) the Constitution Bench has denuded the directions issued by the Tribunal and other Courts pertaining to regularization against the constitutional mandate as a precedent, but the decisions already rendered on the doctrine of prospective ruling have to be respected and complied with. Reliance has been placed on a decision of the Tribunal in OA-2238/2005 in Vinod Kumar and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. decided on 23.8.2006, to substantiate the plea.

13. Learned Senior Counsel would also contend that right of applicants for regularization by virtue of an order passed on 6.7.1998 when affirmed in CWP No. 5533/98 vide order dated 30.10.1998 by the High Court had attained finality and cannot be allowed to be attacked collaterally before any Court. A decision of the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court consisting of seven-Judge in Madan Mohan Pathak v. Union of India , has been relied upon to contend that if a duty is cast upon respondents on the basis of a decision of the Tribunal, would not absolve them to carry out the writ of mandamus.

14. Learned Counsel would also contend that having recognized the right and entitlement of applicants of regularization while appointing them on ad hoc basis and observing that their right shall remain undisturbed the final order passed in OA-1582/98 having not disturbed the right and entitlement of applicants for regularization, their termination now in the guise of carrying out the directions of the Tribunal, cannot be countenanced and rather it is arbitrary, unjust and unreasonable.

15. On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing for official respondents have vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that regularization in the wake of recruitment rules promulgated in 1994 whereby 100% promotion is the methodology to fill up the posts of Transmission Executive, regularization cannot be a mode of recruitment and has relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Dr. Chanchal Goel v. State of Rajasthan 2003 (2) SC SLJ 92.

16. Learned Counsel would contend that principle of legitimate expectation has no application in the present case, as the Constitution Bench decision in Umadevi (supra) ruled against the right of those who are temporarily appointed. In the above backdrop it is stated that any Scheme promulgated for regularization is de hors the Constitution and being contrary to the recruitment rules, cannot be enforced.

17. Learned Counsel would also contend that after 100% promotion has been introduced in the amended rules of 1994 applicants have no right to be considered and as their appointments were subjected to the decision in V.K. Jain (supra), which is final and binding on respondents, the posts of Transmission Executive (General & Production) are to be filled up as per the recruitment rules of 1994.

18. Learned Counsel representing the private respondents contended that six out of seven private respondents have been promoted and only one is left. He also adopts the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel of official respondents and stated that applicants have no right to be regularized in the wake of amendment of the rules in 1994.

19. In rejoinder the pleas taken by applicants in the OA have been reiterated.

20. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.

21. Insofar as regularization being mode of appointment is concerned, law is very clear on the point as held by the Constitution Bench in Umadevi (supra) that such a mode is not prescribed under the mode of recruitment and is against the Constitution.

22. However, despite holding that right of equality enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India and right to freedom and personal liberty under Article 21 would not be effected, if an appointment is regularized de hors the rules. However, an irregular appointee who has continued for number of years without the intervention of the orders of the Court, the following is the observation by the Constitution Bench in Umadevi (supra): 44. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as explained in S.V. NARAYANAPPA (supra), R.N. NANJUNDAPPA (supra), and B.N. NAGARAJAN (supra), and referred to in paragraph 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of courts or of tribunals.

The question of regularization of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases above referred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularize as a one time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularization, if any already made, but not subjudice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further by-passing of the constitutional requirement and regularizing or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme.

23. Accordingly, the Apex Court with regard to the cases where direction has been issued, running counter to the decision or the principles settled, it is ruled that these decisions would stand denuded of their status as precedent. The Tribunal has considered the aforesaid in OA-2238/2005 (supra), where the following observation has been made: 21. I have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material placed on record.

22. It is trite that whatever has been stated and pleaded has been concluded and observed by the Apex Court in a Constitution Bench decision, which is a binding precedent upon the Tribunal under Article 141 of the Constitution. What has been precluded by the Apex Court to the Courts subordinate as well as the Tribunal is not to entertain a fresh grievance of regularization of temporary, casual and daily wager, unless the statutory rules so provide, and also if the decisions rendered directing regularization by the subordinate Courts, would be denuded to the extent that the cases would no more be a valid precedent for other cases to follow.

23. The doctrine of prospective ruling is a constitutional doctrine, which has arisen from not only the principle of stare decisis but also with an underline object that prospective ruling is to avoid a confusion in the hierarchy of judiciary whereby the orders passed by the Courts subordinate as precedent under Article 141 of the Constitution. If a decision rendered in the past is denuded of its power or effect, redressal thereof would lead to confusion and a chaotic situation where the principle of stare decisis would not only be violative but also there would be an indiscipline in judicial system. Accordingly, the decisions, which are not to be treated as prospective, there should have to be a finding by the Apex Court or the Courts whose orders are binding as precedent on us to operate the order retrospectively as well.

24. In the light of above, though the decision of the Apex Court cannot be interpreted, like a statute, but its ratio deci dendi has to be inferred from the cause of action, discussion made, law decided and also the observation made, which are binding on Tribunal as being obiter dicta. The Apex Court in Umadevi's case (supra) does not lay down that any decision rendered whereby regularization has been ordered, has to be set aside or to be denuded of its effect.

What is to be denuded in the said judgment is its precedent value, i.e., the aforesaid judgment whereby regularization has been ordered, would not have to be treated as a precedent for other cases to follow, i.e., only logical inference, which can be drawn from the above that the ratio deci dendi in the cases decided before pronouncement of Umadevi's case (supra) would not be affected by the prospective ruling of Umadevi's case (supra).

24. Applicants have been appointed on casual basis and when the respondents have recognized them after getting tested and screened, adopted such a procedure whereby applicants had continued for more than 15 years uninterruptedly without any protection of the Court. However, a decision of the Tribunal in Suresh Sharma (supra) directed respondents, in the wake of recruitment rules, to frame a Scheme within six months as directed in OA-563/1986. Accordingly, a Scheme prepared thereafter acknowledged minimum 72 days' service in aggregate in a year for qualification of a fresh artist for regularization. Even fresh recruitment has not been proceeded till regularization has been given effect to. It is not disputed that applicants have been considered in the Scheme but their claims were rejected on the ground of miscalculation of working days, which has been set right by the Tribunal in OA-2873/97, directing respondents to consider their claims for regularization on the assumption of their engagement for 72 days in a calendar year. This decision was implemented immediately as a result thereof, though in principle the extension of Scheme and consideration thereof, of regularization to applicants has been acknowledged by respondents by issuing an order on 3.5.1999, approving their recruitment to the posts of Transmission Executive but were appointed on ad hoc basis. In the meanwhile, OA-1582/1998 filed by the Transmission Executives seeking 100% promotional avenues under the recruitment rules of 1994 was filed though the claim of applicants for continuing on ad hoc basis has been subjected to the final outcome of this case but their right for appointment ordered to be remained undisturbed. However, the decision of the Tribunal directing consideration of regularization of applicants once attained finality in the OA, the decision as an interim measure, in V.K. Jain (supra) restricted the claim of applicants, which when challenged before the High Court, status quo as to the continuance of applicants has been accorded. However, the final outcome of OA-1582/1998 though directed consideration of claim of applicants therein under the amended rules of 1994, yet keeping in light the continuance of service of applicants subject to final result of the OA, no specific direction has been issued as to the rights of applicants being affected though applicants have been impleaded vide MA-1815/99 in the above OA. Rather it is observed that the respondents have terminated the service of applicants overzealously. However, Writ Petitions preferred before the High Court accorded liberty to applicants to file the present OA. The decision of the Tribunal where consideration for regularization and their being qualified under the 1990 Rules when amended Rules had not come into being, when not disputed, delay on the part of respondents to process the case of applicants for regularization has resulted in a conflict between the two categories of employees without any fault attributable to applicants.

25. However, if a decision of the Tribunal is rendered, which acknowledges consideration for regularization, placement on ad hoc is not the compliance in true letter and spirit. However, despite this ad hoc arrangement when it is made clear to the respondents by a promise that their right would not be disturbed the principle of legitimate expectation has come into being.

26. The Apex Court in Umadevi (supra) as to legitimate expectation, observed as under: 46. Learned Senior Counsel for some of the respondents argued that on the basis of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, the employees, especially of the Commercial Taxes Department, should be directed to be regularized since the decisions in Dharwad (supra), Piara Singh (supra), Jacob, and Gujarat Agricultural University and the like, have given rise to an expectation in them that their services would also be regularized. The doctrine can be invoked if the decisions of the Administrative Authority affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which either (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there have been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn {See Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service 1985 Appeal Cases 374, National Buildings Construction Corporation v. S. Raghunathan and Dr.

Chanchal Goyal v. State of Rajasthan . There is no case that any assurance was given by the Government or the concerned department while making the appointment on daily wages that the status conferred on him will not be withdrawn until some rational reason comes into existence for withdrawing it. The very engagement was against the constitutional scheme. Though, the Commissioner of the Commercial Taxes Department sought to get the appointments made permanent, there is no case that at the time of appointment any promise was held out. No such promise could also have been held out in view of the circulars and directives issued by the Government after the Dharwad decision. Though, there is a case that the State had made regularizations in the past of similarly situated employees, the fact remains that such regularizations were done only pursuant to judicial directions, either of the Administrative Tribunal or of the High Court and in some case by this Court.

Moreover, the invocation of the doctrine of legitimate expectation cannot enable the employees to claim that they must be made permanent or they must be regularized in the service though they had not been selected in terms of the rules for appointment. The fact that in certain cases the court had directed regularization of the employees involved in those cases cannot be made use of to found a claim based on legitimate expectation. The argument if accepted would also run counter to the constitutional mandate. The argument in that behalf has therefore to be rejected.

27. Having regard to the above, it is a case where an assurance has been given by respondents that rights of applicants would not be disturbed, now disturbing their rights is not a role model played by respondents in a welfare State. Though no one can be regularized or appointed against the constitutional mandate or the decision of the constitutional Bench, yet they are an exception in this category as appointed under the then provisions in vogue and continued for more than 10 years, they have a right to be considered as a separate block as a one time measure for their regularization. Though right to employment is not a Fundamental Right, but to continue on unreasonable ground showing arbitrariness, is also not fair and legitimate in the circumstances.

28. The decision of the Tribunal in OA-2873/1997 is reiteration of OA-822/1991, which on attainment of finality, respondents are duty bound to respect and follow the dicta and a subsequent decision, which does not impede, in any manner, this right independently of 1994 statutory rules ibid, cannot be countenanced and the following observation supports the contentions of applicants in Madan Mohan Pathak (supra): 8. The object of the Act was, in effect, to take away the force of the judgment of the Calcutta High Court recognising the settlements in favour of Class III and Class IV employees of the Corporation.

Rights under that judgment could be said to arise independently of Article 19 of the Constitution, I find myself in complete agreement with my learned brother Bhagwati that to give effect to the judgment of the Calcutta High Court is not the same thing as enforcing a right under Article 19 of the Constitution. It may be that a right under Article 19 of the Constitution becomes linked up with the enforceability of the judgment. Nevertheless, the two could be viewed as separable sets of rights. If the right conferred by the judgment independently is sought to be set aside, Section 3 of the Act, would, in my opinion, be invalid for trenching upon the judicial power.

9. I may, however, observe that even though the real object of the Act may be to set aside the result of the mandamus issued by the Calcutta High Court, yet, the section does not mention this object at all. Probably this was so because the jurisdiction of a High Court and the effectiveness of its orders derived their force from Article 226 of the Constitution itself. These could not be touched by an ordinary act of Parliament. Even if Section 3 of the Act seeks to take away the basis of the judgment of the Calcutta High Court, without mentioning it, by enacting what may appear to be a law, yet, I think that, where the rights of the citizen against the State are concerned, we should adopt an interpretation which upholds those rights. Therefore, according to the interpretation I prefer to adopt the rights which had passed into those embodied in a judgment and became the basis of a Mandamus from the High Court could not be taken away in this indirect fashion.

29. In the above view of the matter, even though the recruitment rules now provide 100% promotion, yet a right when accrued to applicants, it is for the Government, when their rights have been preserved with a promise, not to disturb them and a methodology is to be carved out to respect the dicta of the Tribunal, which has attained finality and also an exception to Umadevi (supra), even one time Scheme could take care of rights accrued to applicants. Respondents cannot shirk from their responsibility, as it is their belated action which has ultimately prejudiced the rights of applicants, as in 1992 till 1994 when the recruitment rules prescribing direct recruitment applicants' claim could have been processed but delay and their misconceived action of not computing their period of engagement correctly, the right which has been declared by the Tribunal, would relate back to their eligibility in the past and with reference to the Scheme framed, which was also to be inconsonance with the eligibility criteria laid down under the statutory rules.

30. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, this OA is partly allowed. Impugned orders are set aside. Respondents are directed, on reconsideration to evolve a methodology as well as ways and means inconsonance with the direction of the Tribunal and constitution Bench of the Apex Court, to appoint applicants as Transmission Executives (General & Production) on regular basis. In such an event, law shall take its own course. It is needless to observe in the light that applicants are still continuing their status quo to this regard shall be maintained. The above directions shall be complied with, within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.

No costs.