R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors. - Court Judgment

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			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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1. this o.a. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.2. applicant who retired on superannuation as postal assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and dcrg but his leave encashment was withheld.3. applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case rc-11/84 under sections 420/467/471/ipc, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.4. applicant filed o.a.1832/98 before the tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. by an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest o.a. was disposed of.5. by an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the metropolitan magistrate, new delhi, applicant was.....

Judgment:

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			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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$title_for_layout = 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '54614',
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		'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
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		'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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		'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
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		'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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		'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '54614',
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			'appealno' => null,
			'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
			'casenote' => '',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
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			'citingcases' => null,
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			'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
			'court_type' => 'TRI',
			'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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			'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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			'pubs' => '(2005)(3)SLJ390CAT',
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		'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
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		'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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		'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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		'pubs' => '(2005)(3)SLJ390CAT',
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		'respondent' => 'Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '54614',
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			'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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			'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
			'court_type' => 'TRI',
			'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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			'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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$title_for_layout = 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '54614',
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		'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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		'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
		'court_type' => 'TRI',
		'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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		'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '54614',
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			'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
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			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
			'casenote' => '',
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			'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
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			'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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			'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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			'pubs' => '(2005)(3)SLJ390CAT',
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		'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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		'pubs' => '(2005)(3)SLJ390CAT',
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		'respondent' => 'Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '54614',
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			'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
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			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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			'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
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			'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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			'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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$title_for_layout = 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '54614',
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		'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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		'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
		'court_type' => 'TRI',
		'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.

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			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. 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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
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7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '54614',
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			'appealno' => null,
			'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
			'casenote' => '',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
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			'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
			'court_type' => 'TRI',
			'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
			'deposition' => null,
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			'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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			'pubs' => '(2005)(3)SLJ390CAT',
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		'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.

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			'id' => '54614',
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			'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
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			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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			'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
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			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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$title_for_layout = 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '54614',
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		'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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		'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
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		'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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		'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '54614',
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			'appealno' => null,
			'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
			'casenote' => '',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
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			'citingcases' => null,
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			'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
			'court_type' => 'TRI',
			'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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			'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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			'pubs' => '(2005)(3)SLJ390CAT',
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		'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
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		'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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		'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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		'pubs' => '(2005)(3)SLJ390CAT',
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		'respondent' => 'Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '54614',
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			'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
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			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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			'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
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			'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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			'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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$title_for_layout = 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '54614',
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		'appealno' => null,
		'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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		'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
		'court_type' => 'TRI',
		'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.

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			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. 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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
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			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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			'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
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			'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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			'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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			'pubs' => '(2005)(3)SLJ390CAT',
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		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.

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			'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
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			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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			'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
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			'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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$title_for_layout = 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '54614',
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		'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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		'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
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		'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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		'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.

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Code Context
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	'title_for_layout' => 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '54614',
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			'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
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			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
			'casenote' => '',
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			'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
			'court_type' => 'TRI',
			'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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			'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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			'pubs' => '(2005)(3)SLJ390CAT',
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		'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
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			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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			'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
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			'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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			'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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$title_for_layout = 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '54614',
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		'appealno' => null,
		'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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		'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
		'court_type' => 'TRI',
		'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.

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			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.

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			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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		'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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		'pubs' => '(2005)(3)SLJ390CAT',
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		'respondent' => 'Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '54614',
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			'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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			'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
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			'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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			'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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$title_for_layout = 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '54614',
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		'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
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		'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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		'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
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		'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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		'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '54614',
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			'appealno' => null,
			'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
			'casenote' => '',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
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			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => null,
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			'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
			'court_type' => 'TRI',
			'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
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			'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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			'pubs' => '(2005)(3)SLJ390CAT',
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			'respondent' => 'Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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		'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
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		'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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		'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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		'pubs' => '(2005)(3)SLJ390CAT',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.

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			'id' => '54614',
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			'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
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			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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			'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
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			'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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$title_for_layout = 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '54614',
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		'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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		'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
		'court_type' => 'TRI',
		'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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		'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '54614',
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			'appealno' => null,
			'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
			'casenote' => '',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => null,
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => null,
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			'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
			'court_type' => 'TRI',
			'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
			'deposition' => null,
			'favorof' => '',
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			'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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			'pubs' => '(2005)(3)SLJ390CAT',
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		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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		'pubs' => '(2005)(3)SLJ390CAT',
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		'respondent' => 'Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).

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	'title_for_layout' => 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
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			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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			'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
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			'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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			'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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$title_for_layout = 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '54614',
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		'appealno' => null,
		'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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		'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
		'court_type' => 'TRI',
		'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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		'favorof' => '',
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		'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.

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			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. 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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
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			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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			'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
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			'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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			'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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			'pubs' => '(2005)(3)SLJ390CAT',
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		'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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		'pubs' => '(2005)(3)SLJ390CAT',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '54614',
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			'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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			'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
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			'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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			'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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$title_for_layout = 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '54614',
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		'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
		'authreffered' => null,
		'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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		'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
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		'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
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		'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'R K Gupta Vs Union of India Uoi and ors - Citation 54614 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '54614',
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			'appealno' => null,
			'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
			'authreffered' => null,
			'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
			'casenote' => '',
			'caseanalysis' => '',
			'casesref' => null,
			'citingcases' => null,
			'counselplain' => null,
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			'court' => 'Central Administrative Tribunal CAT Delhi',
			'court_type' => 'TRI',
			'decidedon' => '2005-02-11',
			'deposition' => null,
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			'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
			'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p align="justify">2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p align="justify">4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p align="justify">5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p align="justify">6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p align="justify">7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p align="justify">9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p align="justify">10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p align="justify">11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p align="justify">12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p align="justify">13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p align="justify">14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p align="justify">15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p align="justify">16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p align="justify">17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p align="justify"> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p align="justify"> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p align="justify"> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p align="justify"> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p align="justify">19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p align="justify">20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p align="justify">21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p align="justify">Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p align="justify">22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p align="justify">23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p align="justify">24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
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			'pubs' => '(2005)(3)SLJ390CAT',
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			'respondent' => 'Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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		'appellant' => 'R.K. Gupta',
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		'casename' => 'R.K. Gupta Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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		'judge' => 'S Raju, M A S.K.',
		'judgement' => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.</p><p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.</p><p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.</p><p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.</p><p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.</p><p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.</p><p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.</p><p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.</p><p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.</p><p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.</p><p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.</p><p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.</p><p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.</p><p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.</p><p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.</p><p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.</p><p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.</p><p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.</p><p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.</p><p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.</p><p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).</p><p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.</p><p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.</p><p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.</p><p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.</p><p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.',
		'observations' => '',
		'overruledby' => null,
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		'pubs' => '(2005)(3)SLJ390CAT',
		'ratiodecidendi' => null,
		'respondent' => 'Union of India (Uoi) and ors.',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 1 => 'r-k-gupta-vs-union-india-uoi-ors'
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	(int) 0 => ' 1. This O.A. is directed an order dated 28.5.2004, whereby the period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 has been restricted to subsistence allowance paid to applicant.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>2. Applicant who retired on superannuation as Postal Assistant on 26.2.96 was accorded provisional pension and DCRG but his leave encashment was withheld.3. Applicant was placed under suspension on 26.7.85 due to his alleged involvement in a criminal case RC-11/84 under Sections 420/467/471/IPC, through the suspension was revoked by an order dated 4.5.98.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>4. Applicant filed O.A.1832/98 before the Tribunal for release of his retiral benefits. By an order dated 6.4.99 with a direction to calculate the benefits and interest O.A. was disposed of.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>5. By an order dated 29.11.2003 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, New Delhi, applicant was acquitted of the criminal charges for lack of sufficient evidence and as offence of conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>6. O.A. 64/2004 was filed by applicant for treatment of suspension period. By an order dated 11.3.2004 directions were issued to pass a reasoned order. A show cause notice dated 8.4.2004 issued to applicant under FR 54-B (1)(a) and (b) a proposal has been made to treat the suspension period as restricted to subsistence allowance already paid which was responded to by applicant through the representation.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>7. By an order dated 28.5.2004 by holding that applicant was acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence his exoneration was not treated as honourable and the period of suspension from 26.7.85 to 4.5.85 is restricted to subsistence allowance already drawn.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>9. Learned Counsel of applicant states that the impugned order is illegal as treatment of suspension period is not covered under FR 54(4) and as he has been acquitted he is entitled to full pay and allowances, as there is no concept of honourable acquittal in Cr. P.C. and as the Department has not decided to proceed further in a disciplinary proceeding and no appeal has been preferred by the prosecution against the acquittal relying upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar v. Uttari Haryana Bijili Vitran Nigam, 2005 (1) ATJ 154 it is stated that there is no concept of honourable acquittal and once a person is acquitted he is to be paid fully pay and allowances for the suspension period.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>10. On the other hand, respondents' Counsel Mr. R.P. Aggarwal vehemently opposed the contentions and contended that as the acquittal was not honourable pay and allowances were restricted to subsistence allowance already paid after a due show cause notice to applicant, which I legally tenable and does not suffer from any legal infirmity.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>11. In the rejoinder, learned Counsel of applicant relies upon a decision of the Apex Court instate of Punjab and Ors. v. Shyambhu Nath Singhla and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 237 to contend that on acquittal during the suspension period one is entitled to full salary and allowances.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>12. We have carefully considered the rival contentions of the parties and perused the material on record.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>13. Application of FR-54 to the case of applicant is misconceived. What applies in the present situation is FR 54-B, which provides that when a Government servant who has been suspended is re-instated the authority shall pass a specific order as to whether the period should be treated as spent on duty or not and as per FR-54-B(1) where the authority is of the opinion that suspension was wholly unjustified, full pay and allowances are to be accorded but if the suspension is delayed due to reasons directly attributable to the Government servant a show cause notice shall be served to decide treatment of suspension period.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>14. In the light of the above proposition we must advert to a Full Bench decision of this Tribunal in Ram Kumar Yadav v. Union of India and Ors., (1994-1996) ATFB 177, where the reference was answered to the extent that a Government servant is not, as a matter of rightly entitled to full pay and allowances for the period he remains under suspension on account of criminal charge, which ends in his acquittal by giving him benefit of doubt. Moreover, as far as denial of full salary under FR 54-B on account of benefit of doubt, the same was answered in the affirmative.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>15. Though the Full Bench decision of the Tribunal is binding on a Division Bench of the Tribunal, but as a trite law of precedent of there exists a decision of the High Court of Delhi or of the Apex Court or for want of decision of the concerned High Court under which the Bench is situated, the decision of the other High Court shall be binding and would overrule the decision of the Full Bench impliedly.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>16. The Apex Court in Shyambhu Nath Singhla (supra) has clearly held that on discharge from criminal case for want of proper sanction and on re-instatement one is entitled to full salary and allowances for the period he was kept under suspension.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>17. As regards issue of honourable acquittal or acquittal on benefit of doubt these are alien terms in Cr. P.C. An acquittal is an acquittal for the purpose of a criminal case and to this effect Punjab and Haryana High Court in Shashi Kumar (supra) made the following observations: "7. In any event, the terms 'acquittal' or 'fully exonerated' are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram, . Rajamannar, C.J. delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under: There is on conception like "acquittal" in Criminal P.C. The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.',
	(int) 15 => '<p> Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental inquiry.',
	(int) 16 => '<p> Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of the suspension. To such a case Article 193 (b) does not apply." 8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal v. State of Punjab through Secretary to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and Ors., AIR 1967Punjab and Haryana 422 (Punj.). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3, 7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol. I Part-1, it was observed as follows: The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial. The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being even a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted.' The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted in the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the Court, the accused is acquitted. I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this: the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a Court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 17 => '<p> The reason is obvious; the Criminal Courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.',
	(int) 18 => '<p> 9. The judgment rendered in the case of Union of India v. Jayaram (supra) has also been followed by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in the case of Ramsinhji Viraji Rathod, Parman and Society v. The State of Gujarat and Anr. 1971 SLR 743. In the aforesaid case, it has been observed as follows; "7. Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations, which was under consideration before the Madras High Court was substantially similar to our Rule 152, with this difference, that instead of the words 'fully exonerated' the words were 'honourably acquitted.' With respect we are in agreement with the reasoning of Rajamannar, C.J. and in our opinion, it is not open to the authorities concerned to bring in the concept of acquittal or full exoneration so far as the judgment of the Criminal Court is concerned. In a criminal trial the accused is only called upon to meet the charge levelled against him and he may meet the charge--(A) by showing that the prosecution case against him is not true or (b) that it is not proved beyond reasonable doubt; or (c) by establishing positively that his defence version is the correct version is not correct. In any case of these three cases, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt or that the prosecution case is not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as not true or that the defence version is correct and is to be preferred as against the prosecution version, the Criminal Code is bound to acquit the accused. The accused is not called upon in every case to establish his complete innocence and it is sufficient for the purposes of criminal trial that he satisfies the Court that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. Since it is not called upon to prove a positive case, the concept of acquittal or full exoneration can have no place in a criminal trial and it is because of this reasoning that we agree with the observations of Rajamannar, C.J. in Jayaram's case, AIR 1960 Mad. 325."Andhra Bank v. W.T. Seshachalam, 2004(1) SC SLJ 264=2004(2) SLJ 254 (SC), held that when a criminal proceeding is launched after investigation by an outside agency employee is acquitted of the criminal charge, he would be entitled to full pay and allowances as subsistence allowance for the period of suspension.',
	(int) 19 => '<p>19. The Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Om Kumar and Ors., 2004(3) SLJ 272 held that if one is acquitted by the Court the entire period of suspension is to be treated as duty for all purposes.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>20. The decision of the Full Bench stands impliedly over-ruled by the decision of the High Court as well as Apex Court (supra).',
	(int) 21 => '<p>21. From the perusal of the decision of the Metropolitan Magistrate, we are of the considered view that the applicant was acquitted as sufficient evidence has not been put-forth to establish the offence.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>Accordingly, applicant was acquitted from the charges. This, in our considered view, is an acquittal on merit. The benefit of doubt is also an acquittal on merit. What is to be seen is that if the evidence has not come-forth to establish the ingredients of offence a person is deemed to be acquitted on merit, as if not involved in the allegation of criminal offence alleged against him. This, to our considered view, is nothing but an acquittal on merit.',
	(int) 23 => '<p>22. FR 54-B(3) obligates the authority to record a finding that the suspension was wholly unjustified or not? From the perusal of the orders passed on show cause notice we find that the only consideration is that applicant is acquitted for lack of sufficient evidence and has been treated not to be an exoneration. This finding goes contrary to the ratio laid down by the High Court of Delhi, Punjab and Haryana as well as the Apex Court and on the face of it is not well founded and misconceived.',
	(int) 24 => '<p>23. We also find that instead of applying FR 54-B(3) a resort has been made by the respondents to FR 54(4), which is misconceived in the present case, shows lack of application of mind by the respondents.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.'
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24. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, O.A. is allowed. Impugned order dated 28.5.2004 is set aside. Respondents are directed to treat the suspension period from 26.7.85 to 5.5.88 as duty for all purposes and in that event applicant would be entitled to all consequential benefits, including retiral benefits. This shall be disbursed to applicant, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. No costs.