Manpuran Das and 50 ors. Vs. Union of India (Uoi) and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
1. this miscellaneous application under rule 24 of the cat (procedure) rules, 1987 has been filed by the manpuran das and 50 others, applicants of oa no. 1048/2000 which was decided by this tribunal on 22.12.2000.2. the case set up by the applicants in this miscellaneous application is that the tribunal has dismissed the original application no.1048/2000 on the ground of availability of the alternative remedy, but the said alternative remedy for referring the matter to the regional labour commissioner is not efficacious and effective. the further case of the applicants is that the tribunal inadvertently overlooked the mandatory provision of the indian railway act on the basis of which the railway servants (hours of employment) rules, 1961 have been framed and the regulation is subordinate to the act and therefore, such a regulation could not be made. it has been stated that section 71a(c) has been over looked and that the classification of chowkidar from the category of continuous to the essentially intermittent is contrary to section 71e(a) and (e) and section 71e(2) as well as section 143 has not been followed. it has been prayed that the order dated 12.12.2000 be recalled or reviewed for the ends of justice.3. no written reply has been filed by the respondents, but the application has been vehemently opposed.4. the contention of mr. chatterjee, learned counsel for the applicant may be summarised as follows: (i) the tribunal has got ample jurisdiction under rule 24 of the cat (procedure) rules, 1987 to recall its order. (ii) the order dated 22.12.2000 has been passed without considering the provisions of the railways act and the rules and therefore, the order should be recalled. (iii) the remedy suggested in the order is not efficacious and therefore, the order should be recalled.mr. chatterjee, learned counsel for the applicant has cited the cases of union of india and ors.v. charles david and ors., air 2000 sc 204; tulsipur sugar co. ltd. v. the state of u.p. and ors., air 1970 sc 70; s. nagraj and ors. v. state of karnataka, (1994) 26 atc 448 (sc)=1994(1) slj 61 (sc); union of india v. j.r. dhiman, (1999) 6 scc 403: bhagwan din and ors. v. union of india, (1995) 29 atc 257 (fb) and achyutanand pandey v. union of india and ors., (1996) 32 atc 3= 1996(2) slj 513 (jodhpur) (cat).5. on the other hand, mr. arora, learned counsel for the respondents contended that this tribunal is functus officio and cannot recall the well considered order under rule 24 of the cat (procedure) rules, 1987.he submitted that under rule 24 only typographical errors can be corrected to secure ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of its process. according to him, no final order can be recalled by the tribunal under rule 24 of the cat (procedure) rules, 1987.6. we have given the matter our anxious consideration. before we decide the controversy raised in this miscellaneous application, it is relevant to state that in the original application the subject matter of challenge was the order dated 21.8.2000 of the respondents whereby the category of the applicant chowkidars was changed from 'continuous' to 'essentially intermittent.' it was averred in the oa that the clw authorities did not have a right or authority to change the condition of service from 'continuous' to 'essentially intermittent'. in the reply to the said oa it was averred that the respondents were within their powers to change the category of its employees. it was also averred that the application was not maintainable as alternative remedy was available. the division bench of this tribunal comprising of hon'ble mr. justice r.n. ray, the then vice-chairman and one of us (hon'ble mr. b.p. singh, administrative member) after hearing both the learned counsel found force in the contention of learned counsel for the respondents that there was alternative remedy available to the applicants as they could approach the regional labour commissioner if they were aggrieved by the order of changing the category of the applicants. it was, therefore, held as follows: "since alternative remedies are available, we do not find it proper to adjudicate the matter before us. in such circumstances, we do not comment anything on the merit of the application but dispose of the oa with adirection upon the applicants, that the applicants along with the copy of this order may make representation to the regional labour commissioner within fortnight from this date and the regional labour commissioner will decide the matter by passing a speaking order after affording opportunity to both the parties and not take the point of limitation." 7. a reading of the order indicates that the contentions of both the parties were given thoughtful consideration. all the documents were perused and keeping in view the relevant provisions of the railway servants (hours of employment) rules, 1961 (hoer) the matter was disposed of.8. the serious question to be considered is whether the subject matter of the instant application comes within the scope of rule 24 of the cat (procedure) rules of 1987. rule 24 is reproduced hereunder: "the tribunal may make such orders or give such directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its order or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice." 9. a reading of the rule indicates that under this rule the tribunal has been empowered to make necessary order or to give direction for the following purposes: 10. the rule obviously is in the nature of preserving inherent powers of a court as is there in section 151 of the code of civil procedure in respect of civil courts and under section 482 of code of criminal procedure in respect of the high court in respect of criminal matters.11. a reading of section 151 of cpc and 482 of cr. pc and rule 24 as reproduced above, makes it clear that the scope of rule 24 is certainly wider. it seems to us that the scope has been widened keeping in view that there is no provision of execution in the cat act, 1985 and also there is no provision of correcting typographical errors etc. as is provided in section 152 of cpc. the wording of the rule indicates that the rule making authority was conssious of the fact that there may be difficulty in getting the orders of the tribunal implemented because of certain reasons, such as, some ambiguity appearing in the order, typographical error, mistake in the narration or facts etc. therefore, it has been provided in the rule that the tribunal may make any order or give direction to give effect to its order. the word 'order' appearing in the phrase 'to give effect to its order' obviously means the previous order which is required to be implemented. the rule has been worded in such a manner so that the implementation may not be avoided by the authorities on hyper technical grounds and the tribunal even after passing the order may have say in the matter to get its original order implemented.12. however, it is not permissible to extend the scope of rule 24 further. it is difficult to accept the proposition of the learned counsel for the applicant that the tribunal can altogether change its earlier order while exercising power under rule 24. the wordings in rule 24 "to give effect to its order" themselves indicate that no significant change can be made in the ultimate findings or conclusion drawn in the original order. what can be done is that if there exists some ambiguity in the original order, the same can be clarified by way of an order under rule 24 or if there is a typographical mistake, accidental slips or factual error in the order, the same can be corrected, so that there may be proper implementation of the original order.13. the words "to give effect to its order" by no stretch of imagination cannot be interpreted to mean to nullify or set aside the original order. if the original order is withdrawn in exercise of power under rule 24 and a fresh order is passed, which is radically opposite to the original order, it will tantamount to nullifying the original order. it could never be the intention of the legislature. in that case there will never be the end of the litigation, even in the first court.the loosing party will always make an application under rule 24 to recall the order and reverse the finding. the provisions of appeal are made for this very purpose that the party aggrieved by the order may challenge the order before the higher court. in our considered opinion, under rule 24 the original order cannot be altogether changed and there cannot be fresh order which is radically opposite to the original order.14. coming to the cases cited by mr. chatterjee, it may be stated that the case of achyutanand pandey (supra) relates to an interim order passed on earlier date which was modified by the jodhpur bench of this tribunal on the subsequent date of hearing. in the earlier order, the tribunal had granted two weeks' time to remove the defects. the defects could not be removed and the tribunal exercising the power under rule 24 recalled the earlier order and granted further time. obviously, the intermediary order was recalled in that case. this is not the position in the present case.union of india and ors. v. charles david and ors. (supra) does not help us in deciding the matter. there are no facts stated in the report. it was noticed by their lordships that their judgment reported as union of india v. k.g. radhakrishna panicker, air 1998 sc 2073=1998(3) slj 271 (sc) was not properly followed by the tribunal.their lordships, therefore, observed that if there was mistake on the part of the tribunal the party could approach the tribunal for correcting the factual error in the order. in the instant case, it is not said that there are some factual errors in the order dated 22.12.2000. therefore, this ruling does not help the applicant.in the case of 5. nagraj and ors. v. state of karnataka and ors.(supra) it has been held that an order of the competent court even though erroneous, mistaken or improperly obtained, cannot be substituted or clarified and modified by the executive authorities. we are unable to understand how this ruling helps the applicants. it may be that their lordships revised/modified the earlier order in order to do complete justice in that case, but in the instant case, we do not find any factual error in the order and therefore, the order cannot be recalled.union of india v. j.r. dhiman (supra) helps the applicants. that was a case where the central administrative tribunal clarified the earlier order in the contempt petition exercising the power under rule 24 of the cat (procedure) rules, 1987. their lordship help that the tribunal had no authority to pass any such order in the contempt petition. it is obvious by the observation in the judgment that subsequent to passing of the final order in the original application, the order cannot be modified or revised by the tribunal.in the case of bhagwan din and others (supra) it was held by this tribunal that the tribunal is a substitute of the high court in service matters and exercises jurisdiction under articles 226 and 227 of the constitution. the hon'ble supreme court has, however made clear observations with regard to power and status of the tribunal in the cases of l. chandra kumar v. the union of india and ors., jt 1997(3) s.c. 589=1998(2) slj 124 (sc) and t. sudhakar prasad v. govt. of a.p.and ors., jt 15. even on merits, there is no case in favour of the applicants. there is specific provision in tbe administrative tribunals act contained in section 20 which says that the tribunal cannot admit an application unless the applicant has availed of all the remedies available under the relevant service rules.16. it is relevant to state that chapter vi-a (section 71-a to 71-g) of the railway acts of 1890 defines essentially intermittent employment.chapter vi-a empowered the government to make rules on hours of employment of the railway servants. the railway servants (hours of employment) rules, 1961 were framed under the railways act of 1890.because of saving clause in section 200 of rail ways act of 1989 the rules of 1961 continue to be in force. it is stated in clause (a) of section 71-a of the act of 1890 that the employment of railway servant is said to be 'continuous' except when it is excluded or has been declared to be 'essentially intermittent* or 'intensive.' under section 71e clause (a) the central government may make rules prescribing the authority who may declare that the employment of any railway servant is 'essentially intermittent' or 'intensive.' 17. then there is specific provision about the change of category of an employee in rule 3 of he railways servants (hours of employment) rules, 1961. rule 3 empowers the railway administration to classify or declare the category of a railway servant. it is provided in sub-rule (2) that whenever classification in the category of employee in the railway is made under sub-rule (1) of rule 3, a copy of such declaration shall be sent to the regional labour commissioner concerned. in rule 4 it is provided that if any question arises in respect of a declaration made under rule 3, the matter shall be referred to the regional labour commissioner whose decision, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (2) shall be final. it is further provided in sub-rule (2) of rule 4 that any person aggrieved by a decision of the regional labour commissioner may prefer an appeal to the government, whose decision shall be final.it is thus obvious that rule 3 of the rules of 1961 confer ample powers on the railway administration to declare the category of its employees and if the employees think that such a declaration is bad, they can refer the matter to the regional labour commissioner and if they do not get relief from him, they can approach the government. obviously this tribunal had passed the order dated 22.12.2000 keeping in view these provisions.18. in exercise of the power conferred on the railway administration the services of the chowkidars have been declared to be 'essentially intermittent'. it can be said that in declaring the service of the applicant chowkidars as 'intermittent' provisions of railways act or rules make thereunder have been violated.19. as to whether the remedy of approaching the regional labour commissioner is efficacious or not cannot be gone into in the instant proceedings. this is a matter which could be agitated in the original application. it is significant to point out that in the original application it was nowhere stated that the provisions under rules of 1961 did not provide efficacious remedy. it is pertinent to note that in the reply to the o.a. it was stated in categorical terms that alternative remedy was available, yet the applicants did not file rejoinder contending that the remedy was not efficacious.20. in the original application, the tribunal found that the applicants did not avail of the remedy available to them under rules of 1961. if the applicants were aggrieved by the order of this tribunal dated 22.12.2000, they had the remedy under the law to file an appeal or challenge the order before the high court in the writ jurisdiction. it cannot be legal and proper for this tribunal now to recall its own order when no factual error in the order has been pointed out by mr.chatterjee, and this is no accidental slip or typographical error.21. this matter also does not come within the parameters of review. a judgment or order can be reviewed only in the circumstances stated in order 47, rule 1 of c.p.c. such circumstances are that the party seeking review satisfies that he has discovered new and important matter or evidence which after the due diligence was not within his knowledge or there was some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or there are other sufficient reasons for the review. we do not find any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. it is not stated that new evidence has been discovered. as also, there is no sufficient reason to review the well considered order passed by this tribunal.

Judgment:
1. This miscellaneous application under Rule 24 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987 has been filed by the Manpuran Das and 50 others, applicants of OA No. 1048/2000 which was decided by this Tribunal on 22.12.2000.

2. The case set up by the applicants in this Miscellaneous Application is that the Tribunal has dismissed the original application No.1048/2000 on the ground of availability of the alternative remedy, but the said alternative remedy for referring the matter to the Regional Labour Commissioner is not efficacious and effective. The further case of the applicants is that the Tribunal inadvertently overlooked the mandatory provision of the Indian Railway Act on the basis of which the Railway Servants (Hours of Employment) Rules, 1961 have been framed and the regulation is subordinate to the Act and therefore, such a regulation could not be made. It has been stated that Section 71A(c) has been over looked and that the classification of Chowkidar from the category of continuous to the essentially intermittent is contrary to Section 71E(a) and (e) and Section 71E(2) as well as Section 143 has not been followed. It has been prayed that the order dated 12.12.2000 be recalled or reviewed for the ends of justice.

3. No written reply has been filed by the respondents, but the application has been vehemently opposed.

4. The contention of Mr. Chatterjee, learned Counsel for the applicant may be summarised as follows: (i) The Tribunal has got ample jurisdiction under Rule 24 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987 to recall its order.

(ii) The order dated 22.12.2000 has been passed without considering the provisions of the Railways Act and the Rules and therefore, the order should be recalled.

(iii) The remedy suggested in the order is not efficacious and therefore, the order should be recalled.

Mr. Chatterjee, learned Counsel for the applicant has cited the cases of Union of India and Ors.v. Charles David and Ors., AIR 2000 SC 204; Tulsipur Sugar Co. Ltd. v. The State of U.P. and Ors., AIR 1970 SC 70; S. Nagraj and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (1994) 26 ATC 448 (SC)=1994(1) SLJ 61 (SC); Union of India v. J.R. Dhiman, (1999) 6 SCC 403: Bhagwan Din and Ors. v. Union of India, (1995) 29 ATC 257 (FB) and Achyutanand Pandey v. Union of India and Ors., (1996) 32 ATC 3= 1996(2) SLJ 513 (Jodhpur) (CAT).

5. On the other hand, Mr. Arora, learned Counsel for the respondents contended that this Tribunal is functus officio and cannot recall the well considered order under Rule 24 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987.

He submitted that under Rule 24 only typographical errors can be corrected to secure ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of its process. According to him, no final order can be recalled by the Tribunal under Rule 24 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987.

6. We have given the matter our anxious consideration. Before we decide the controversy raised in this miscellaneous application, it is relevant to state that in the original application the subject matter of challenge was the order dated 21.8.2000 of the respondents whereby the category of the applicant Chowkidars was changed from 'continuous' to 'essentially intermittent.' It was averred in the OA that the CLW authorities did not have a right or authority to change the condition of service from 'continuous' to 'essentially intermittent'. In the reply to the said OA it was averred that the respondents were within their powers to change the category of its employees. It was also averred that the application was not maintainable as alternative remedy was available. The Division Bench of this Tribunal comprising of Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.N. Ray, the then Vice-Chairman and one of us (Hon'ble Mr. B.P. Singh, Administrative Member) after hearing both the learned Counsel found force in the contention of learned Counsel for the respondents that there was alternative remedy available to the applicants as they could approach the Regional Labour Commissioner if they were aggrieved by the order of changing the category of the applicants. It was, therefore, held as follows: "Since alternative remedies are available, we do not find it proper to adjudicate the matter before us. In such circumstances, we do not comment anything on the merit of the application but dispose of the OA with adirection upon the applicants, that the applicants along with the copy of this order may make representation to the Regional Labour Commissioner within fortnight from this date and the Regional Labour Commissioner will decide the matter by passing a speaking order after affording opportunity to both the parties and not take the point of limitation." 7. A reading of the order indicates that the contentions of both the parties were given thoughtful consideration. All the documents were perused and keeping in view the relevant provisions of the Railway Servants (Hours of Employment) Rules, 1961 (HOER) the matter was disposed of.

8. The serious question to be considered is whether the subject matter of the instant application comes within the scope of Rule 24 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules of 1987. Rule 24 is reproduced hereunder: "The Tribunal may make such orders or give such directions as may be necessary or expedient to give effect to its order or to prevent abuse of its process or to secure the ends of justice." 9. A reading of the rule indicates that under this Rule the Tribunal has been empowered to make necessary order or to give direction for the following purposes: 10. The Rule obviously is in the nature of preserving inherent powers of a Court as is there in Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of Civil Courts and under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure in respect of the High Court in respect of criminal matters.

11. A reading of Section 151 of CPC and 482 of Cr. PC and Rule 24 as reproduced above, makes it clear that the scope of Rule 24 is certainly wider. It seems to us that the scope has been widened keeping in view that there is no provision of execution in the CAT Act, 1985 and also there is no provision of correcting typographical errors etc. as is provided in Section 152 of CPC. The wording of the Rule indicates that the Rule making authority was conssious of the fact that there may be difficulty in getting the orders of the Tribunal implemented because of certain reasons, such as, some ambiguity appearing in the order, typographical error, mistake in the narration or facts etc. Therefore, it has been provided in the Rule that the Tribunal may make any order or give direction to give effect to its order. The word 'order' appearing in the phrase 'to give effect to its order' obviously means the previous order which is required to be implemented. The Rule has been worded in such a manner so that the implementation may not be avoided by the authorities on hyper technical grounds and the Tribunal even after passing the order may have say in the matter to get its original order implemented.

12. However, it is not permissible to extend the scope of Rule 24 further. It is difficult to accept the proposition of the learned counsel for the applicant that the Tribunal can altogether change its earlier order while exercising power under Rule 24. The wordings in Rule 24 "to give effect to its order" themselves indicate that no significant change can be made in the ultimate findings or conclusion drawn in the original order. What can be done is that if there exists some ambiguity in the original order, the same can be clarified by way of an order under Rule 24 or if there is a typographical mistake, accidental slips or factual error in the order, the same can be corrected, so that there may be proper implementation of the original order.

13. The words "to give effect to its order" by no stretch of imagination cannot be interpreted to mean to nullify or set aside the original order. If the original order is withdrawn in exercise of power under Rule 24 and a fresh order is passed, which is radically opposite to the original order, it will tantamount to nullifying the original order. It could never be the intention of the legislature. In that case there will never be the end of the litigation, even in the first Court.

The loosing party will always make an application under Rule 24 to recall the order and reverse the finding. The provisions of appeal are made for this very purpose that the party aggrieved by the order may challenge the order before the higher Court. In our considered opinion, under Rule 24 the original order cannot be altogether changed and there cannot be fresh order which is radically opposite to the original order.

14. Coming to the cases cited by Mr. Chatterjee, it may be stated that the case of Achyutanand Pandey (supra) relates to an interim order passed on earlier date which was modified by the Jodhpur Bench of this Tribunal on the subsequent date of hearing. In the earlier order, the Tribunal had granted two weeks' time to remove the defects. The defects could not be removed and the Tribunal exercising the power under Rule 24 recalled the earlier order and granted further time. Obviously, the intermediary order was recalled in that case. This is not the position in the present case.Union of India and Ors. v. Charles David and Ors. (supra) does not help us in deciding the matter. There are no facts stated in the report. It was noticed by their Lordships that their judgment reported as Union of India v. K.G. Radhakrishna Panicker, AIR 1998 SC 2073=1998(3) SLJ 271 (SC) was not properly followed by the Tribunal.

Their Lordships, therefore, observed that if there was mistake on the part of the Tribunal the party could approach the Tribunal for correcting the factual error in the order. In the instant case, it is not said that there are some factual errors in the order dated 22.12.2000. Therefore, this ruling does not help the applicant.

In the case of 5. Nagraj and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors.

(supra) it has been held that an order of the competent Court even though erroneous, mistaken or improperly obtained, cannot be substituted or clarified and modified by the executive authorities. We are unable to understand how this ruling helps the applicants. It may be that their Lordships revised/modified the earlier order in order to do complete justice in that case, but in the instant case, we do not find any factual error in the order and therefore, the order cannot be recalled.Union of India v. J.R. Dhiman (supra) helps the applicants. That was a case where the Central Administrative Tribunal clarified the earlier order in the contempt petition exercising the power under Rule 24 of the CAT (Procedure) Rules, 1987. Their Lordship help that the Tribunal had no authority to pass any such order in the contempt petition. It is obvious by the observation in the judgment that subsequent to passing of the final order in the original application, the order cannot be modified or revised by the Tribunal.

In the case of Bhagwan Din and others (supra) it was held by this Tribunal that the Tribunal is a substitute of the High Court in service matters and exercises jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has, however made clear observations with regard to power and status of the Tribunal in the cases of L. Chandra Kumar v. The Union of India and Ors., JT 1997(3) S.C. 589=1998(2) SLJ 124 (SC) and T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Govt. of A.P.and Ors., JT 15. Even on merits, there is no case in favour of the applicants. There is specific provision in tbe Administrative Tribunals Act contained in Section 20 which says that the Tribunal cannot admit an application unless the applicant has availed of all the remedies available under the relevant service rules.

16. It is relevant to state that Chapter VI-A (Section 71-A to 71-G) of the Railway Acts of 1890 defines Essentially Intermittent Employment.

Chapter VI-A empowered the Government to make Rules on Hours of Employment of the Railway Servants. The Railway Servants (Hours of Employment) Rules, 1961 were framed under the Railways Act of 1890.

Because of saving clause in Section 200 of Rail ways Act of 1989 the Rules of 1961 continue to be in force. It is stated in Clause (a) of Section 71-A of the Act of 1890 that the employment of railway servant is said to be 'continuous' except when it is excluded or has been declared to be 'essentially intermittent* or 'intensive.' Under Section 71E Clause (a) the Central Government may make Rules prescribing the authority who may declare that the employment of any railway servant is 'essentially intermittent' or 'intensive.' 17. Then there is specific provision about the change of category of an employee in Rule 3 of he Railways Servants (Hours of Employment) Rules, 1961. Rule 3 empowers the Railway administration to classify or declare the category of a Railway servant. It is provided in Sub-rule (2) that whenever classification in the category of employee in the Railway is made under Sub-rule (1) of Rule 3, a copy of such declaration shall be sent to the Regional Labour Commissioner concerned. In Rule 4 it is provided that if any question arises in respect of a declaration made under Rule 3, the matter shall be referred to the Regional Labour Commissioner whose decision, subject to the provisions of Sub-rule (2) shall be final. It is further provided in Sub-rule (2) of Rule 4 that any person aggrieved by a decision of the Regional Labour Commissioner may prefer an appeal to the Government, whose decision shall be final.

It is thus obvious that Rule 3 of the Rules of 1961 confer ample powers on the Railway administration to declare the category of its employees and if the employees think that such a declaration is bad, they can refer the matter to the Regional Labour Commissioner and if they do not get relief from him, they can approach the Government. Obviously this Tribunal had passed the order dated 22.12.2000 keeping in view these provisions.

18. In exercise of the power conferred on the Railway administration the services of the Chowkidars have been declared to be 'essentially intermittent'. It can be said that in declaring the service of the applicant Chowkidars as 'intermittent' provisions of Railways Act or Rules make thereunder have been violated.

19. As to whether the remedy of approaching the Regional Labour Commissioner is efficacious or not cannot be gone into in the instant proceedings. This is a matter which could be agitated in the original application. It is significant to point out that in the original application it was nowhere stated that the provisions under Rules of 1961 did not provide efficacious remedy. It is pertinent to note that in the reply to the O.A. it was stated in categorical terms that alternative remedy was available, yet the applicants did not file rejoinder contending that the remedy was not efficacious.

20. In the original application, the Tribunal found that the applicants did not avail of the remedy available to them under Rules of 1961. If the applicants were aggrieved by the order of this Tribunal dated 22.12.2000, they had the remedy under the law to file an appeal or challenge the order before the High Court in the writ jurisdiction. It cannot be legal and proper for this Tribunal now to recall its own order when no factual error in the order has been pointed out by Mr.

Chatterjee, and this is no accidental slip or typographical error.

21. This matter also does not come within the parameters of review. A judgment or order can be reviewed only in the circumstances stated in Order 47, Rule 1 of C.P.C. Such circumstances are that the party seeking review satisfies that he has discovered new and important matter or evidence which after the due diligence was not within his knowledge or there was some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or there are other sufficient reasons for the review. We do not find any mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. It is not stated that new evidence has been discovered. As also, there is no sufficient reason to review the well considered order passed by this Tribunal.