Smt. K. Mallika, J. Vs. Executive Engineer, Potteru Irrigation Division - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/534922
SubjectInsurance;Motor Vehicles
CourtOrissa High Court
Decided OnNov-12-1999
JudgeP.K. Misra, J.
Reported inI(2000)ACC395; 89(2000)CLT26
AppellantSmt. K. Mallika, J.
RespondentExecutive Engineer, Potteru Irrigation Division
Cases ReferredAmbaguda v. Smt. D. Buchitali and
Excerpt:
- labour & services pay scale:[tarun chatterjee & r.m. lodha,jj] fixation - orissa service code (1939), rule 74(b) promotion - government servant, by virtue of rule 74(b), gets higher pay than what he was getting immediately before his promotion - circular dated 19.3.1983 modifying earlier circular dated 18.6.1982 resulting in reduction of pay of employee on promotion held, it is not legal. statutory rules cannot be altered or amended by such executive orders or circulars or instructions nor can they replace statutory rules. - 5. law is now well settled that in order to succeed, the claimant has to establish that the death was on account of an accident; the accident was in course of employment as well as arose out of employment. it is well established that under this section.....p.k. misra, j.1. the claimant has filed this appeal against the decision of the workmen's compensation commissioner, jeypore (in short, the 'commissioner') rejecting an application for compensation.2. the claimant-applicant is the widow of late k. bhagirathan, who was working as an assistant store keeper under the respondent. the deceased had gone from balimela to hirakud for collecting materials for the project. it appears that the deceased was admitted to v.s.s. medical college and hospital, burla, on 2.2.1981 and subsequently died there on 16.2.1981. an application for compensation was filed by the widow on the ground that the death was caused due to an accident arising out of and in course of employment.3. the respondent in written statement stated that the deceased was admitted to.....
Judgment:

P.K. Misra, J.

1. The claimant has filed this appeal against the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, Jeypore (in short, the 'Commissioner') rejecting an application for compensation.

2. The claimant-applicant is the widow of late K. Bhagirathan, who was working as an Assistant Store Keeper under the respondent. The deceased had gone from Balimela to Hirakud for collecting materials for the project. It appears that the deceased was admitted to V.S.S. Medical College and Hospital, Burla, on 2.2.1981 and subsequently died there on 16.2.1981. An application for compensation was filed by the widow on the ground that the death was caused due to an accident arising out of and in course of employment.

3. The respondent in written statement stated that the deceased was admitted to hospital on 2.2.1981 and was operated as there was perforation of the peptic ulcer and subsequently he had died. It was claimed, inter alia, that the death was not on account of any accident arising out of employment.

4. The Commissioner found that the deceased was a workman, but there was no material to indicate that the death was on account of an accident arising out of employment.

5. Law is now well settled that in order to succeed, the claimant has to establish that the death was on account of an accident; the accident was in course of employment as well as arose out of employment. See : (1997)ILLJ34SC Regional Director, E.S.I. Corporation and Anr. v. Francis De Costa and Anr. 1999 (1) O.L.R. 326, SAIL Rourkela Steel Plant v. Rajesh Kisan. The expression 'accident' has not been defined in the Workmen's Compensation Act. This expression generally means, some unexpected event happening without design'. As observed in the decision reported in 76 (1993) C.L.T. 699 The General Superintendent, Talcher Thermal Station v. Smt. Bijuli Naik, it can be said that the expression 'accident' has been used in the popular and ordinarily sense and means 'mishap' or 'untoward event not expected or designed.'

6. Keeping in view the aforesaid principle, it can be said that the rupture of the peptic ulcer of the deceased can be taken to be an 'accident'. However, the moot question is as to whether such accident arose out of employment. In the decision reported in : (1954)ILLJ614Bom , Laxmibai Atmaram v. Chairman and Trustees, Bombay Port Trust, it was observed that if the workman died as a natural result of the disease from which he was suffering, then it cannot be said that the death was caused in an accident arising out of employment. Similarly, if the workman is suffering from a particular disease and as a result of wear and tear of his employment, he died of that disease, it cannot be said that the death arose out of the employment. But where it is established that the nature of work undertaken is a contributory cause for the death or has accelerated the death, then it can be said that death arose out of employment of the deceased. In the decision reported in 1969 (2) L.LJ. 812 Mackinnon Mackenzia and Co. (Private) Ltd. v. Rita Fernandez (Smt.), it was observed by the Supreme Court:.It is well established that under this section there must be some causal connection between the death of the workman and his employment. If the workman dies as a natural result of the disease from which he was suffering or while suffering from a particular disease he dies of that disease as a result of wear and tear of his employment, no liability would be fixed upon the employer. But if the employment is a contributory cause or has accelerated 'the death, or if the death was due not only to the disease but the disease coupled with the employment, then it could be said that the death arose out of the employment and the employer would be liable.

Even if a workman dies from a pre-existing disease, if the disease is aggravated or accelerated under circumstances which can be said to be accidental, his death results from injury by accident....

From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear that in order to succeed, it must be established that there was a causal connection between the death and the employment of the deceased.

7. In the present case, no evidence has been adduced on behalf of the claimant to indicate that the deceased suffered frpm peptic ulcer because of the nature of job entrusted to him. It is, of course, well-known that stress and strain coupled with irregular food habit is the prime cause for causing peptic ulcer. However, in the absence of any evidence, it cannot be surmised that the deceased must have suffered from peptic ulcer because of the stress and strain undergone by him in course of his employment. From the evidence adduced from the side of the employer, it appears that the deceased had taken some analgesic to suppress the pain he was having due to tooth-ache. From the materials on record, it appears that suddenly there was perforation of the peptic ulcer and the deceased had to be hospitalised and operated upon. Thus, it can be concluded that the taking of analgesic must have caused the perforation of the peptic ulcer. The materials on record do not establish that there was a causal connection between the death and the nature of work undertaken by the deceased.

8. The learned Counsel for the appellant has cited the decisions reported in 1987 (1) O.L.R. 158 : I (1987) ACC 339 Director (T.&M.;), D.N.K. Project, Ambaguda v. Smt. D. Buchitali and 76 (1993) C.L.T. 699 (supra). A perusal of the aforesaid decisions indicates that it was found that there was a causal connection between the death and the employment and the nature of employment had contributed to the eventual death of the workman. There is no such material in the present case. In such view of the matter, the appeal of the claimant has to be dismissed. However, there would be no order as to costs.