Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '531257',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
			'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
			'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
			'court' => 'Orissa',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
			'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A. Pasayat, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
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			'pubs' => '1994(I)OLR176',
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			'respondent' => 'Maheswar Barik and ors.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
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		'id' => '531257',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
		'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
		'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
		'court' => 'Orissa',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
		'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.</p><p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p></p><p>',
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			'id' => '531257',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
			'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
			'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
			'court' => 'Orissa',
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			'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
			'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A. Pasayat, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
		'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
		'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
		'court' => 'Orissa',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
		'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
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		'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.</p><p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p></p><p>',
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- state financial corporations act, 1951 [63/1951]. section 29; [p.k. tripathy, a.k. parichha & n.prusty, jj] discharge of loan orissa forest act (14 of 1972), section 56 confiscation of vehicle - held, the authorities under section 56 of the orissa forest act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of orissa state financial corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the orissa state financial corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the.....

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '531257',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
			'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
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			'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
			'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
			'court' => 'Orissa',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
			'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A. Pasayat, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
		'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
		'court' => 'Orissa',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
		'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.</p><p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1994(I)OLR176',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '531257',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
			'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
			'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
			'court' => 'Orissa',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
			'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A. Pasayat, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
		'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
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		'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
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		'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
		'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
		'court' => 'Orissa',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
		'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.</p><p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p></p><p>',
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a. pasayat, j.1. twelve persons who are opp. party nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable under section 341 and 294 read with section 34 of the indian penal code, 1860 (in short. 'ipc')- the learned judicial magistrate, first class, nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal under section 255(1) of the code of criminal procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'code').2. the background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :on 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of bakala- bandha were returning from kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. on the way, at the outskirt of village khutubandha some.....

Judgment:

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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '531257',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
			'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
			'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
			'court' => 'Orissa',
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			'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
			'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A. Pasayat, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'pubs' => '1994(I)OLR176',
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			'respondent' => 'Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
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			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
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$title_for_layout = 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '531257',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
		'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
		'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
		'court' => 'Orissa',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
		'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.</p><p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p>',
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A. Pasayat, J.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '531257',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
			'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
			'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
			'court' => 'Orissa',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
			'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A. Pasayat, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1994(I)OLR176',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
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			'circuit' => null
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		'id' => '531257',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
		'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
		'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
		'court' => 'Orissa',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
		'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judgement' => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.</p><p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '1994(I)OLR176',
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		'respondent' => 'Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p>',
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1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '531257',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
			'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
			'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
			'court' => 'Orissa',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
			'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A. Pasayat, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
		'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
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		'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
		'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
		'court' => 'Orissa',
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		'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
		'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
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		'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.</p><p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p>',
	(int) 13 => '<p>'
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2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :

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			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
			'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
			'court' => 'Orissa',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
			'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A. Pasayat, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1994(I)OLR176',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'chakradhar-swain-vs-maheswar-barik-ors',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '531257',
		(int) 1 => 'chakradhar-swain-vs-maheswar-barik-ors'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '531257',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
		'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
		'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
		'court' => 'Orissa',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
		'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.</p><p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p>',
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On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '531257',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
			'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
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			'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
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			'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
			'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
			'court' => 'Orissa',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
			'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A. Pasayat, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
		'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
		'court' => 'Orissa',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
		'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.</p><p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1994(I)OLR176',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p>',
	(int) 13 => '<p>'
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3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '531257',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
			'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
			'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
			'court' => 'Orissa',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
			'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A. Pasayat, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1994(I)OLR176',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'chakradhar-swain-vs-maheswar-barik-ors',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '531257',
		(int) 1 => 'chakradhar-swain-vs-maheswar-barik-ors'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '531257',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
		'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
		'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
		'court' => 'Orissa',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
		'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.</p><p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p>',
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4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;

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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '531257',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
			'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
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			'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
			'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
			'court' => 'Orissa',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
			'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A. Pasayat, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
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		'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
		'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
		'court' => 'Orissa',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
		'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.</p><p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1994(I)OLR176',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p>',
	(int) 13 => '<p>'
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(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '531257',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
			'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
			'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
			'court' => 'Orissa',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
			'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A. Pasayat, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1994(I)OLR176',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'chakradhar-swain-vs-maheswar-barik-ors',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '531257',
		(int) 1 => 'chakradhar-swain-vs-maheswar-barik-ors'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '531257',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
		'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
		'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
		'court' => 'Orissa',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
		'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.</p><p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p>',
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(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '531257',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
			'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
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			'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
			'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
			'court' => 'Orissa',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
			'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
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			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A. Pasayat, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
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		'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
		'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
		'court' => 'Orissa',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
		'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.</p><p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1994(I)OLR176',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p>',
	(int) 13 => '<p>'
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5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '531257',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
			'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
			'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
			'court' => 'Orissa',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
			'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A. Pasayat, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1994(I)OLR176',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'chakradhar-swain-vs-maheswar-barik-ors',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '531257',
		(int) 1 => 'chakradhar-swain-vs-maheswar-barik-ors'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '531257',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
		'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
		'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
		'court' => 'Orissa',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
		'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.</p><p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p>',
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6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '531257',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
			'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
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			'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
			'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
			'court' => 'Orissa',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
			'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A. Pasayat, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
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		'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
		'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
		'court' => 'Orissa',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
		'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.</p><p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1994(I)OLR176',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p>',
	(int) 13 => '<p>'
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7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '531257',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
			'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
			'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
			'court' => 'Orissa',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
			'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A. Pasayat, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1994(I)OLR176',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'chakradhar-swain-vs-maheswar-barik-ors',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '531257',
		(int) 1 => 'chakradhar-swain-vs-maheswar-barik-ors'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '531257',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
		'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
		'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
		'court' => 'Orissa',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
		'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.</p><p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p>',
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8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '531257',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
			'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
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			'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
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			'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
			'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
			'court' => 'Orissa',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
			'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
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			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A. Pasayat, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
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		'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
		'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
		'court' => 'Orissa',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
		'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.</p><p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '1994(I)OLR176',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p>',
	(int) 13 => '<p>'
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In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '531257',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
			'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
			'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => '',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
			'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
			'court' => 'Orissa',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
			'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">A. Pasayat, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '1994(I)OLR176',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Maheswar Barik and ors.',
			'sub' => 'Criminal',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'chakradhar-swain-vs-maheswar-barik-ors',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '531257',
		(int) 1 => 'chakradhar-swain-vs-maheswar-barik-ors'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Chakradhar Swain Vs Maheswar Barik and ors - Citation 531257 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '531257',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/51485/indian-penal-code-45-of-1860-complete-act">Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860</a> - Sections 294, 339 and 341',
		'appealno' => 'Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990',
		'appellant' => 'Chakradhar Swain',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951 [63/1951]. Section 29; [P.K. Tripathy, A.K. Parichha & N.Prusty, JJ] Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled]. -- STATE FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS ACT, 1951. 
Section 29; Discharge of loan  Orissa Forest Act (14 of 1972), Section 56  Confiscation of vehicle - Held, The Authorities under Section 56 of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of Orissa State Financial Corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. Concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. On the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the Department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. Apart from that, the claim of the Orissa State Financial Corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the State Financial Corporation Act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. Procedure is provided in the Act, 1951 and the Rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. If such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. The Financial Corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. Thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1872, being not available to the Orissa State Financial Corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the Orissa State Financial Corporation. Agreement between the Orissa State Financial Corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the Contract Act, 1872 read with the provisions in the Act, 1951 and its Rules. On the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the Act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. Thus, by virtue of the provision in Section 56 read with Section 64 (2) of the Act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by Orissa State Financial Corporation. By doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the Orissa State Financial Corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. In other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the Orissa State Financial Corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. Then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. Such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the Act, 1972 or the Act, 1951. [AIR 2002 Orissa 130 Overruled].  -  The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance',the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => '',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi',
		'counseldef' => 'D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)',
		'court' => 'Orissa',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1993-12-10',
		'deposition' => 'Revision dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'A. Pasayat, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.</p><p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').</p><p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :</p><p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial</p><p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.</p><p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;</p><p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?</p><p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?</p><p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.</p><p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.</p><p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.</p><p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.</p><p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
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		'pubs' => '1994(I)OLR176',
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		'respondent' => 'Maheswar Barik and ors.',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'circuit' => null
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	(int) 0 => '<p>A. Pasayat, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. Twelve persons who are opp. party Nos. 1 to 12 in this revision application, faced trial on the basis of an information lodged by the present petitioner, for allegedly having committed offences punishable Under Section 341 and 294 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short. 'IPC')- The learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nayagarh did not accept the prosecution allegations, and directed their acquittal Under Section 255(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (in short, the 'Code').',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The background facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows :',
	(int) 3 => '<p>On 7-10-1987 at about 9 a. m. some of the villagers of Bakala- bandha were returning from Kanjian forest with fuel wood on their bullocks. On the way, at the outskirt of village Khutubandha some of the villagers of the said viilage(the accused persons headed by Narayan Biswal) restrained them and told them that the villagers of Bakalabandha cannot go on the village road of Khutubandha with their bullocks. Thereafter they abused them in filthy language. Out of fear the villagers of Bakalabandha did not tell them anything, and sent message to their village, for help. Chakradhar Swain, the present petitioner submitted a written report before the Officer-in-charge of Suagaon Police Station at about 7 p. m. Investigation was under taken, on completion whereof charge-sheet was submitted and the twelve accused persons faced trial',
	(int) 4 => '<p>3. The accused persons pleaded innocence.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>4. The learned Judicial Magistrate took up the following points for consideration ;',
	(int) 6 => '<p>(i) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of ail wrongfully restrained the informant and his villagers on the relevant date, at the time and place as alleged ?',
	(int) 7 => '<p>(ii) Whether the accused persons in furtherance of their common intention of all abused the informant and his villagers in obscene language in a public place causing annoyance to others at the relevant time ?',
	(int) 8 => '<p>5. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution case. While the accused persons examined one witness named Chaitanya Nayak (PW 1) in support of their plea of innocence. The learned trial Magistrate came to hold that the place where the alleged obstruction took place was not a public road, and therefore. Section 341 had no application. Similarly as regards applicability of Section 294, IPC, he held that in view of the admission of the affected persons, who were examined as witness that no annoyance was caused. Section 294 had no application.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>6. The learned counsel for the informant-petitioner strenuously urged that the analysis of the evidence as made by the learned Judicial Magistrate is erroneous and the order needs reversal. The learned counsel appearing for the accused however. supported, the judgment of acquittal.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>7. In order to attract application of Section 341, IPC, which provides for punishment for wrongful restraint, it has to be proved that (i) there was obstruction by the accused ; (ii) such obstruction prevented a person from proceeding in a direction to which he had a right to proceed ; and (iii) the accused caused such obstruction voluntarily. The obstructor must intend or know or would have reason to believe that the means adopted would cause obstruction of the complainant. 'Wrongful restraint' is defined in Sec. .339, IPC. The ingredients essential to make Section 339 applicable are ; (i) voluntary obstruction' of a person; (ii) the obstruction must be such as to prevent the person from proceeding in any direction in which he has a right to proceed. The Explanation to Section 339 makes it clear that the obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not an offence within the meaning of Section 339. very citizen has a right to use the public road in a legal manner and will have a right to travel on it. But it an act is done in good faith with a belief that it is justified in law a conviction Under Section 339 will not stand. It is the bona fide colour of the claim which has to be considered. The Explanation to Section 339 applies only to a private way over land or water. Wrongful restraint means keeping a person out of a place where he wishes to be, and has a right to be. 'Restraint' implies abridgement of the liberty of a person against his will. Sees 339 to 348 come under the head 'Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful Confinement' in the 1PC. The provisions under this head are for the punishment of offences, in which the offender, although he may have no design against human life, and no intention to inflict bodily hurt, either wholly deprives the injured person of his freedom or in some degree abridges his personal liberty. The learned trial Magistrate has referred to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 in arriving at the conclusion that the passage by the affected persons was over a private land, it being the thrashing floor of Jaykrishns Behari, Baikuntha Behari and Narayan Biswal. The learned counsel for the informant- petitioner has strenuously urged that since long the villagers were using the land in question as a passage and had.a customary right of use. Adequate evidence in this regard having not been placed before the trial Court, in view of the finding of fact recorded by the learned trial Magistrate with reference to the evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that the Exception to Section 339 applied as the obstruction was on a private way over the land. I find no scope for interference while exercising revisional jurisdiction.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>8. Coming to the question whether Section 294, I PC had any application, it is seen that the allegations were that obscene words and vulgar language were used by the accused persons. The sine qua non application of See. 294 is annoyance. The section itself provides that whoever, to the annoyance of others, does any obscene act in any public place, or sings, recites or utters any obscene song, ballad or words, in or near any public place shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three months, or with fine or with both. Unless annoyance is caused, the act will not be punishable. There must be definite evidence that annoyance was caused to a particular person or persons in general.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>In the case at hand the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution accepted that no annoyance was caused, even after the so-called vulgar words were uttered. Additionally, the act must be done in a public place. A public place is one where public go, no matter whether they have right to go or not. What is a public place may vary from time to time. The Court has to consider first whether a particular place at the relevant time was used by the public. No material has been placed before the trial Court that the act was done at a public place. In fact, the finding of the trial Court is that the prosecution failed to prove that the occurrence took place at a public place. In the absence of any material about o'annoyance', the learned trial Magistrate was justified in holding that the prosecution has failed to establish the allegations of commission of offence punishable Under Section 294, IPC. The scope for interference in a case of acquittal that too at the behest of the informant is every limited. Though it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever an informant moves for an interference Court shall not interfere, unless the conclusions are patently perverse, unreasonable or are of such nature as no reasonable person would come to such a conclusion, it would not be desirable to interfere. The presumption of innocence of a person gets re-inforced by the order of acquittal, which is not to be lightly tampered with unless it is of such nature that maintenance thereof would be against the interest of justice. I do not consider this to be a case of that nature. The villagers of the villages neighbouring to each other are fighting this litigation since about seven years over a small matter like taking of bullocks over a particular place. With the hope that they shall live in future as good neighbours, I dismiss the revision application. 'Love thy neighbour' should be the approach. My non-interference should not encourage the villagers to take law into their own hands, and to rejoice their success in this case. Law is intended to foster goodwill, peace and amity between citizens, more particularly when they happen to be neighbours.<p>',
	(int) 13 => '<p>'
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Subject	Criminal
Court	Orissa High Court
Decided On	Dec-10-1993
Case Number	Criminal Revision No. 488 of 1990
Judge	A. Pasayat, J.
Reported in	1994(I)OLR176
Acts	Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860 - Sections 294, 339 and 341
Appellant	Chakradhar Swain
Respondent	Maheswar Barik and ors.
Appellant Advocate	D. Nayak, N. Bisoi and R.N. Bisoi
Respondent Advocate	D.P. Dhal, S.K. Nayak and A.K. Acharya (for opp. party Nos. 1 to 13) and ;Addl. Standing Counsel (for opp. party No. 13)
Disposition	Revision dismissed

Chakradhar SwaIn Vs. Maheswar Barik and ors. - Court Judgment