Smt. Namita Bose Vs. Deepak Kumar Bose - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
civil - second revision - delayed filing - sections 156(3), 203, 397(3) and 482 of code of criminal procedure, 1973 (cr.p.c.) - petitioner filed complaint against respondent before magistrate - magistrate forwarded same for investigation as per section 156(3) of cr.p.c. - after investigation final report was submitted on ground of insufficiency of evidence - petitioner filed protest petition - petition tagged with complaint petition - magistrate dismissed complaint under section 203 of cr.p.c. on account of non-appearance of petitioner and accepted final report - petitioner filed second complaint on same allegations but after very long time - dismissed - petitioner filed revision - dismissed - hence, present application under section 482 of cr.p.c. - held, petitioner failed to show good reason much less sufficient cause for non-participating in earlier complaint case - petitioner also failed to explain long delay of about four years between two complaints - petitioner is unable to show how non-interference with impugned order will result in miscarriage of justice - when section 397(3) of cr.p.c. debars second revision, application under section 482 of cr.p.c. shall not be entertained if in disguise that is second revision - application dismissed - state financial corporations act, 1951 [63/1951]. section 29; [p.k. tripathy, a.k. parichha & n.prusty, jj] discharge of loan orissa forest act (14 of 1972), section 56 confiscation of vehicle - held, the authorities under section 56 of the orissa forest act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of orissa state financial corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the orissa state financial corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. on the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. apart from that, the claim of the orissa state financial corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the state financial corporation act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. procedure is provided in the act, 1951 and the rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. if such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. the financial corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the act, 1872, being not available to the orissa state financial corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the orissa state financial corporation. agreement between the orissa state financial corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the contract act, 1872 read with the provisions in the act, 1951 and its rules. on the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. thus, by virtue of the provision in section 56 read with section 64 (2) of the act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by orissa state financial corporation. by doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the orissa state financial corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. in other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the orissa state financial corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the act, 1972 or the act, 1951. [air 2002 orissa 130 overruled]. -- state financial corporations act, 1951. section 29; discharge of loan orissa forest act (14 of 1972), section 56 confiscation of vehicle - held, the authorities under section 56 of the orissa forest act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of orissa state financial corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the orissa state financial corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. on the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. apart from that, the claim of the orissa state financial corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the state financial corporation act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. procedure is provided in the act, 1951 and the rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. if such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. the financial corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the act, 1872, being not available to the orissa state financial corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the orissa state financial corporation. agreement between the orissa state financial corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the contract act, 1872 read with the provisions in the act, 1951 and its rules. on the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. thus, by virtue of the provision in section 56 read with section 64 (2) of the act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by orissa state financial corporation. by doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the orissa state financial corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. in other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the orissa state financial corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the act, 1972 or the act, 1951. [air 2002 orissa 130 overruled]. - air 1949 madras 76 learned counsel for the petitioner argues that there being no bar for entertaining a second complaint, the impugned orders are bad in law and is liable to be set aside with a direction from this court to the s. he further argues that the custody of the aforesaid 'stridhana' of the petitioner in the hands of the opposite party amounts to entrustment and non- return of the same other clearly disclose offences under section 406 of indian penal code (in short, ipc'). in that context he refers to the case of pratibha rani v. 6. sub-section (3) of section 397 of the code provides that 'if an application, under this section has been made by any person either to the high court or to the sessions judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them'.the above quoted provision of law thus debars a second revision against the selfsame order by an unsuccessful revision-petitioner. however, inherent power is invokable if non-interference will result in manifest illegality to prevail resulting in miscarriage of justice or failure of ends of justice or result in abuse of the process of any court. , in the case of pramath nath taluqdar (supra) as per the majority view a second complaint is maintainable under exceptional circumstances. an order of dismissal under section 203, criminal procedure code, is however, no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts but it will be entertained only in exceptional circumstances, e. ' (from paragraph 48 pages 898-899). 9. learned counsel for the petitioner is unable to show a good reason much less sufficient cause for non-participating in the earlier complaint case.orderp.k. tripathy, j.1. heard.2. petitioner's move to sustain a second complaint on the self- same allegations having been turned down by learned s. d. j. m. cuttack in his order on 5. 1. 1995 in i. c. c. no. 95 of 1994 and which was maintained by learned first additional sessions judge, cuttack in his order dated 29. 3. 1995 in criminal revision no. 29 of 1995, she has approached this court for legal remedy seeking invocation of inherent power under section 482, code of criminal procedure, 1973 (for short 'the code').3. to adjudicate the issue relevant facts, shorn of unnecessary details, is placed as follows:marital status came into being between the petitioner and the opp. party, as stated, on 4. 5. 1974. that relationship was shattered followed with an order for maintenance in her favour in 1984 in a proceeding under section 125 of the code vide order in criminal misc. case no. 301 of 1982. she alleges that at the time of desertion, opp. party retained her 'stridhana' i. e., presentations given by relatives to her at the time of marriage viz., ornaments made of gold weighing 21 tolas and 12 annas and furnitures and utensils etc. at initial periods petitioner's request to return the said articles was avoided by the opp. party with request to wait for some time. after the death of her mother-in-law on 14. 1. 1989, her further similar request was avoided by the opp. party on 1. 2. 1989. her further approach in that respect on 16. 1. 1990 was turned down by the opposite party, who, on that occasion, scolded her. hence she filed a complaint registered as i. c. c. no. 18 of 1990 in the court of s. d. j. m., cuttack. learned s. d. j. m. forwarded the same for investigation as per the provisions in sub-section (3) of section 156 of the code. thus g. r. case no. 226 of 1990 was registered. after the investigation a final report was submitted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. petitioner was intimated through a notice. thereafter she filed a protest petition in the form of a complaint. that was registered as i. c. c. no. 80 of 1990 and later on tagged with g. r. case no. 226 of 1990. learned s. d. j. m. took up the case for enquiry under section 202 of the code. in that respect he granted half a dozen time but the complainant did not appear in court nor produced her witnesses. hence on 11. 9. 1 990 learned s. d. j. m. dismissed the complaint under section 203 of the code and also accepted the final report. about four years thereafter, on the self-same allegations, petitioner filed a complaint on 2. 8. 1 994. it was explained therein that due to communication gap she could not appear in the previous complaint case. learned s. d. j. m. after taking stock of the above facts and antecedent of the case dismissed the complaint under section 203 of the code. learned s. d. j. m. has stated in his order that after availing the opportunity since the petitioner did not participate in the case resulting in dismissal of the complaint and acceptance of the final report, the further complaint in that respect is not liable to be entertained. learned additional sessions judge found the explanation of the petitioner to be unsatisfactory and accordingly dismissed the revision.4. relying on the ratio in the cases of state of rajasthan v. aruna devi and ors.: (1995) 8 ocr (sc) 267, pramath nath talukdar etc. v. saroj ranjan sarkar: air 1962 supreme court 876 and mappillaisami thevar and ors. v. muthuswamy iyer:air 1949 madras 76 learned counsel for the petitioner argues that there being no bar for entertaining a second complaint, the impugned orders are bad in law and is liable to be set aside with a direction from this court to the s. d. j. m. to proceed with the complaint case. he further argues that the custody of the aforesaid 'stridhana' of the petitioner in the hands of the opposite party amounts to entrustment and non- return of the same other clearly disclose offences under section 406 of indian penal code (in short, 'ipc'). in that context he refers to the case of pratibha rani v. suraj kumar and anr.: air 1985 sc 628.5. learned courfsel for the opposite party while repelling to the aforesaid argument, inter alia, contends that the present application under see. 482 of the code, in true sense, is a second revision in disguise and in view of the provision in sub-section (3) of section 397 of the code this application is not entertainable. since the above argument of the opposite party is on the point of jurisdiction and maintainability of the present proceeding, that is taken up for consideration on priority basis.6. sub-section (3) of section 397 of the code provides that 'if an application, under this section has been made by any person either to the high court or to the sessions judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them'. the above quoted provision of law thus debars a second revision against the selfsame order by an unsuccessful revision-petitioner. in other words, if an order of a criminal court is challenged, in a criminal revision, before the sessions judge or high court a second revision by the selfsame petitioner against that very order is not maintainable before the high court or the sessions judge, as the case may be. when the statutory provision, as quoted above, debars a second revision, an application under section 482 of the code shall not be entertained if in disguise that is a second revision. mere allegation of an illegality, in such a case shall not be sufficient to invoke the inherent power by way of ignoring the above stated statutory mandate in debarring a second revision. however, inherent power is invokable if non-interference will result in manifest illegality to prevail resulting in miscarriage of justice or failure of ends of justice or result in abuse of the process of any court. there having a thin line of demarcation in exercise of revisional jurisdiction and invoking of the inherent power, this court must examine the matter accordingly so as to avoid exercising the revisional power'in the name of exercising inherent power. keeping in view the aforesaid principle, contention of the petitioner is considered to find out if this is a fit case where inherent power should be invoked.7. in the case of pratibha rani (supra), the apex court set aside the order of punjab and haryana high court, in which the high court had quashed the criminal proceeding brought by pratibha rani against her husband and in-laws on the ground that by retaining her ornaments and other belongings (i. e. the stridhana) and by refusing to return the same to her, the accused persons (i. e. the husband and in-laws) did not commit the offence under section 406, ipc. reversing that finding, the apex court held that such allegations prima facie constitute an offence under section 406, ipc. learned counsel for the opp. party rightly argues that such a contention is irrelevant for consideration in this case, because the courts below have not dismissed the complaint on any such ground. learned counsel for the petitioner has no reply in that respect.8. learned counsel for the petitioner argues with emphasis on his submission that as per the settled position of law there is no bar to entertain a second complaint. in that context it is relevant to refer to the citation relied upon by him.in the case of 'state of rajasthan' (supra) the facts before the apex court was that after acceptance of the final report by the magistrate, he took cognizance of the offences when on the basis of a further investigation, as per the order of the superintendent of police, a charge-sheet was filed. placing reliance on the case of pramath nath taluqdar (supra) and referring to the provision in section 173(8) of the code, the apex court maintained the order of the magistrate.in the case of mappillaisami (supra) the point for consideration before a division bench of madras high court was whether the order of conviction against the petitioner should be held as illegal because of the fact that the accused persons were discharged for non-appearance of the complainant in the trial court in time and later on, the same day on the prayer of the complainant the case revived with a separate number but without examination of the complainant under section 200 of the old code. the ratio in that case is not found relevant so far as the present contention of the petitioner is concerned.,in the case of pramath nath taluqdar (supra) as per the majority view a second complaint is maintainable under exceptional circumstances. in that context the apex court has propounded that:'......an order of dismissal under section 203, criminal procedure code, is however, no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts but it will be entertained only in exceptional circumstances, e. g., where the previous order was passed on an incomplete record or on a misunderstanding of the nature of complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish or where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on the record in the previous proceedings, have been adduced. it cannot be said to be in the interest of justice that after a decision has been given against the complainant upon a full consideration of his case, he or any other person should be given another opportunity to have his complaint enquireds into. ilr 12 lah. 9 at p. 12: (air 1930 lah 879 at p. 880):air 1949 pat. 256: air 1949 bom 384; doraisami v. subramania, air 1918 mad 484. in regard to the adducing of new facts for the bringing of afresh complaint the special bench in the judgment under appeal did not accept the view of the bombay high court or the patna high court in the cases above quoted and adopted the opinion of maclean cj in ilr 28 cal 211 at p. 216, affirmed by a full bench in ilr 28 cal. 652 (fb). it held therefore that a fresh complaint can be entertained where there is manifest error, or manifest miscarriage of justice in the previous order or when fresh evidence is forthcoming.'(from paragraph 48 pages 898-899).9. learned counsel for the petitioner is unable to show a good reason much less sufficient cause for non-participating in the earlier complaint case. he also fails to explain the long delay of about four years between the two complaints. similarly he is unable to show how non-interference with the impugned order will result in miscarriage of justice. under such circumstances, this court does not find any justifiable reason to interfere with the impugned orders by invoking the inherent power. hence the criminal misc. case is dismissed. however, this dismissal order shall not be construed as a bar if the petitioner shall seek redress from the courts of competent jurisdiction on a fresh cause of action.

Judgment:
ORDER

P.K. Tripathy, J.

1. Heard.

2. Petitioner's move to sustain a second complaint on the self- same allegations having been turned down by learned S. D. J. M. Cuttack in his order on 5. 1. 1995 in I. C. C. No. 95 of 1994 and which was maintained by learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Cuttack in his order dated 29. 3. 1995 in Criminal Revision No. 29 of 1995, she has approached this Court for legal remedy seeking invocation of inherent power Under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'the Code').

3. To adjudicate the issue relevant facts, shorn of unnecessary details, is placed as follows:

Marital status came into being between the petitioner and the opp. party, as stated, on 4. 5. 1974. That relationship was shattered followed with an order for maintenance in her favour in 1984 in a proceeding Under Section 125 of the Code vide order in Criminal Misc. Case No. 301 of 1982. She alleges that at the time of desertion, opp. party retained her 'Stridhana' i. e., presentations given by relatives to her at the time of marriage viz., ornaments made of gold weighing 21 tolas and 12 annas and furnitures and utensils etc. At initial periods petitioner's request to return the said articles was avoided by the opp. party with request to wait for some time. After the death of her mother-in-law on 14. 1. 1989, her further similar request was avoided by the opp. party on 1. 2. 1989. Her further approach in that respect on 16. 1. 1990 was turned down by the opposite party, who, on that occasion, scolded her. Hence she filed a complaint registered as I. C. C. No. 18 of 1990 in the Court of S. D. J. M., Cuttack. Learned S. D. J. M. forwarded the same for investigation as per the provisions in Sub-section (3) of Section 156 of the Code. Thus G. R. Case No. 226 of 1990 was registered. After the investigation a final report was submitted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. Petitioner was intimated through a notice. Thereafter she filed a protest petition in the form of a complaint. That was registered as I. C. C. No. 80 of 1990 and later on tagged with G. R. Case No. 226 of 1990. Learned S. D. J. M. took up the case for enquiry Under Section 202 of the Code. In that respect he granted half a dozen time but the complainant did not appear in Court nor produced her witnesses. Hence on 11. 9. 1 990 learned S. D. J. M. dismissed the complaint Under Section 203 of the Code and also accepted the final report. About four years thereafter, on the self-same allegations, petitioner filed a complaint on 2. 8. 1 994. It was explained therein that due to communication gap she could not appear in the previous complaint case. Learned S. D. J. M. after taking stock of the above facts and antecedent of the case dismissed the complaint Under Section 203 of the Code. Learned S. D. J. M. has stated in his order that after availing the opportunity since the petitioner did not participate in the case resulting in dismissal of the complaint and acceptance of the final report, the further complaint in that respect is not liable to be entertained. Learned Additional Sessions Judge found the explanation of the petitioner to be unsatisfactory and accordingly dismissed the revision.

4. Relying on the ratio in the cases of State of Rajasthan v. Aruna Devi and Ors.: (1995) 8 OCR (SC) 267, Pramath Nath Talukdar etc. v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar: AIR 1962 Supreme Court 876 and Mappillaisami Thevar and Ors. v. Muthuswamy Iyer:AIR 1949 Madras 76 learned counsel for the petitioner argues that there being no bar for entertaining a second complaint, the impugned orders are bad in law and is liable to be set aside with a direction from this Court to the S. D. J. M. to proceed with the complaint case. He further argues that the custody of the aforesaid 'Stridhana' of the petitioner in the hands of the opposite party amounts to entrustment and non- return of the same other clearly disclose offences Under Section 406 of Indian Penal Code (in short, 'IPC'). In that context he refers to the case of Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar and Anr.: AIR 1985 SC 628.

5. Learned courfsel for the opposite party while repelling to the aforesaid argument, inter alia, contends that the present application under See. 482 of the Code, in true sense, is a second revision in disguise and in view of the provision in Sub-section (3) of Section 397 of the Code this application is not entertainable. Since the above argument of the opposite party is on the point of jurisdiction and maintainability of the present proceeding, that is taken up for consideration on priority basis.

6. Sub-section (3) of Section 397 of the Code provides that 'If an application, under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them'. The above quoted provision of law thus debars a second revision against the selfsame order by an unsuccessful revision-petitioner. In other words, if an order of a Criminal Court is challenged, in a criminal revision, before the Sessions Judge or High Court a second revision by the selfsame petitioner against that very order is not maintainable before the High Court or the Sessions Judge, as the case may be. When the statutory provision, as quoted above, debars a second revision, an application Under Section 482 of the Code shall not be entertained if in disguise that is a second revision. Mere allegation of an illegality, in such a case shall not be sufficient to invoke the inherent power by way of ignoring the above stated statutory mandate in debarring a second revision. However, inherent power is invokable if non-interference will result in manifest illegality to prevail resulting in miscarriage of justice or failure of ends of justice or result in abuse of the process of any Court. There having a thin line of demarcation in exercise of revisional jurisdiction and invoking of the inherent power, this Court must examine the matter accordingly so as to avoid exercising the revisional power'in the name of exercising inherent power. Keeping in view the aforesaid principle, contention of the petitioner is considered to find out if this is a fit case where inherent power should be invoked.

7. In the case of Pratibha Rani (supra), the apex Court set aside the order of Punjab and Haryana High Court, in which the High Court had quashed the criminal proceeding brought by Pratibha Rani against her husband and in-laws on the ground that by retaining her ornaments and other belongings (i. e. the Stridhana) and by refusing to return the same to her, the accused persons (i. e. the husband and in-laws) did not commit the offence Under Section 406, IPC. Reversing that finding, the apex Court held that such allegations prima facie constitute an offence Under Section 406, IPC. Learned counsel for the opp. party rightly argues that such a contention is irrelevant for consideration in this case, because the Courts below have not dismissed the complaint on any such ground. Learned counsel for the petitioner has no reply in that respect.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues with emphasis on his submission that as per the settled position of law there is no bar to entertain a second complaint. In that context it is relevant to refer to the citation relied upon by him.

In the case of 'State of Rajasthan' (supra) the facts before the apex Court was that after acceptance of the final report by the Magistrate, he took cognizance of the offences when on the basis of a further investigation, as per the Order of the Superintendent of Police, a charge-sheet was filed. Placing reliance on the case of Pramath Nath Taluqdar (supra) and referring to the provision in Section 173(8) of the Code, the apex Court maintained the order of the Magistrate.

In the case of Mappillaisami (supra) the point for consideration before a Division Bench of Madras High Court was whether the order of conviction against the petitioner should be held as illegal because of the fact that the accused persons were discharged for non-appearance of the complainant in the trial Court in time and later on, the same day on the prayer of the complainant the case revived with a separate number but without examination of the complainant Under Section 200 of the Old Code. The ratio in that case is not found relevant so far as the present contention of the petitioner is concerned.,

In the case of Pramath Nath Taluqdar (supra) as per the majority view a second complaint is maintainable under exceptional circumstances. In that context the apex Court has propounded that:

'......An order of dismissal Under Section 203, Criminal Procedure Code, is however, no bar to the entertainment of a second complaint on the same facts but it will be entertained only in exceptional circumstances, e. g., where the previous order was passed on an incomplete record or on a misunderstanding of the nature of complaint or it was manifestly absurd, unjust or foolish or where new facts which could not, with reasonable diligence, have been brought on the record in the previous proceedings, have been adduced. It cannot be said to be in the interest of justice that after a decision has been given against the complainant upon a full consideration of his case, he or any other person should be given another opportunity to have his complaint enquireds into. ILR 12 Lah. 9 at p. 12: (AIR 1930 Lah 879 at p. 880):AIR 1949 Pat. 256: AIR 1949 Bom 384; Doraisami v. Subramania, AIR 1918 Mad 484. In regard to the adducing of new facts for the bringing of afresh complaint the Special Bench in the judgment under appeal did not accept the view of the Bombay High Court or the Patna High Court in the cases above quoted and adopted the opinion of Maclean CJ in ILR 28 Cal 211 at p. 216, affirmed by a Full Bench in ILR 28 Cal. 652 (FB). It held therefore that a fresh complaint can be entertained where there is manifest error, or manifest miscarriage of justice in the previous order or when fresh evidence is forthcoming.'

(from paragraph 48 pages 898-899).

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner is unable to show a good reason much less sufficient cause for non-participating in the earlier complaint case. He also fails to explain the long delay of about four years between the two complaints. Similarly he is unable to show how non-interference with the impugned order will result in miscarriage of justice. Under such circumstances, this Court does not find any justifiable reason to interfere with the impugned orders by invoking the inherent power. Hence the Criminal Misc. Case is dismissed. However, this dismissal order shall not be construed as a bar if the petitioner shall seek redress from the Courts of competent jurisdiction on a fresh cause of action.