| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/530435 |
| Subject | Narcotics |
| Court | Orissa High Court |
| Decided On | Nov-16-1993 |
| Case Number | Criminal Misc. Case No. 1607 of 1993 |
| Judge | A. Pasayat, J. |
| Reported in | 1994(I)OLR18 |
| Acts | Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 - Sections 37 |
| Appellant | Dukhishyam Sahu |
| Respondent | State of Orissa |
| Appellant Advocate | B. Panda, Devashis Panda and D.R. Nanda |
| Respondent Advocate | Addl. Standing Counsel |
| Cases Referred | Hadiani Dei v. State of Orissa and Ors..
|
Excerpt:
- state financial corporations act, 1951 [63/1951]. section 29; [p.k. tripathy, a.k. parichha & n.prusty, jj] discharge of loan orissa forest act (14 of 1972), section 56 confiscation of vehicle - held, the authorities under section 56 of the orissa forest act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of orissa state financial corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the orissa state financial corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. on the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. apart from that, the claim of the orissa state financial corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the state financial corporation act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. procedure is provided in the act, 1951 and the rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. if such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. the financial corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the act, 1872, being not available to the orissa state financial corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the orissa state financial corporation. agreement between the orissa state financial corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the contract act, 1872 read with the provisions in the act, 1951 and its rules. on the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. thus, by virtue of the provision in section 56 read with section 64 (2) of the act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by orissa state financial corporation. by doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the orissa state financial corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. in other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the orissa state financial corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the act, 1972 or the act, 1951. [air 2002 orissa 130 overruled]. -- state financial corporations act, 1951.
section 29; discharge of loan orissa forest act (14 of 1972), section 56 confiscation of vehicle - held, the authorities under section 56 of the orissa forest act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of orissa state financial corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the orissa state financial corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the loanee. on the other hand the vehicle having been found indulged in forest offences was made subject matter of a confiscation proceedings, and therefore, the procedure followed for confiscation of the vehicle and for its sale is punitive in nature and not with a view to give benefit to anybody including the department which initiated the confiscation proceeding. apart from that, the claim of the orissa state financial corporation as against its loanee (who had taken the vehicle on hire- purchase agreement) brings the loanee and the sureties within the default clause under the state financial corporation act, 1951 or the heirs and successors of such persons. procedure is provided in the act, 1951 and the rules thereof about the manner in which such loan is to be recovered, and in that context only the vehicle under the hire-purchase agreement is placed as the first charge. if such property is not available for any reason, then the loan is not automatically waived or the loanee and his sureties are not automatically redeemed of the liabilities to repay. the financial corporation is concerned with repayment of loan either from the property or persons offered as surety. thus, a vehicle, which is subject matter of confiscation proceeding under the act, 1872, being not available to the orissa state financial corporation for adjustment of the unpaid loan, that does not at all bring out an anomalous situation so as to defeat the right of the orissa state financial corporation. agreement between the orissa state financial corporation and the loanee is a pure and simple contract governed by the provisions of the contract act, 1872 read with the provisions in the act, 1951 and its rules. on the other hand, a confiscation proceeding under the act, 1972 is punitive in nature for commission of a forest offence. thus, by virtue of the provision in section 56 read with section 64 (2) of the act, 1972, the action taken for confiscation of the vehicle cannot be extended to grant protection of the loan advanced by orissa state financial corporation. by doing that it amounts to grant premium to the pick-pockets in as much as, by making payment of the confiscation amount in favour of the orissa state financial corporation the loan burden of the accused of the forest offence is reduced to the extent of the sale proceeds of the vehicle. in other words, on payment of the sale proceeds of the confiscation proceeding to the orissa state financial corporation towards discharge of the loan account of the accused of a forest offence, it would lead to a system to reward him by repayment of his loan. then it does not become a penalty nor the action become punitive, but it remains as a reward to the accused of forest offence. such a concept is totally not conceivable from any provision in the act, 1972 or the act, 1951. [air 2002 orissa 130 overruled]. a. pasayat, j.1. the short but important point that needs consideration is whether a person accused of having made infraction of the provisions of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances act, 1985 (in short, the 'act'), who has been released on bail during stage of investigation is required to be remanded to jail custody on cognizance of the offence being taken by seamed sessions judge, because the requirements under section 37(b)(ii) of the act were not kept in view while bail was granted.2. facts situation lies within a narrow compass. petitioner was released on bail as per order of learned sub-divisional judicial magistrate, bhubaneswar (in short, the 'sdjm') on 27-11-1990. a direction was given by learned sdjm for appearance of accused before learned sessions judge, purl on 23-4-1993. on that day petitioner was absent and a petition was filed praying for time and it. was allowed till 1-6-1993. on 1-6-1993 adjournment was again sought for, and granted. date of appearance was fixed to 17-6-1993, on which date petitioner appeared and prayed for continuance) of bail granted at the stage of investigation. learned sessions judge, pun rejected the prayer for continuance of bail and directed the petitioner-accused to be remanded to custody being of the view that restriction imposed under section 37(b) of the act was not considered while granting bail.3. mr. d. panda, learned counsel for petitioner submitted that considerations while granting bail and cancelling bail are entirely different. even in a case where bail has been erroneously granted, the same cannot be cancelled though it is shown that grant was improper. learned counsel for state on the other hand, submitted that where grant itself is contrary to saw, there is no bar in cancelling bail, and learned sessions judge was justified in directing cancellation of bail.4. similar question came up for consideration of a division bench of this court in hadiani dei v. state of orissa and ors.. *(1993) 6 ocr 588. it was observed that improper grant recedes to background when question of cancellation of bail is subject-matter of consideration. in that case, order of learned sessions judge directing cancellation under similar circumstances was vacated and it was directed that petitioner would continue on previous bail unless the same is cancelled on any of the grounds indicated in the case. there is no distinguishing feature so far as this case is concerned. order of learned sessions judge so far it relates to cancellation of bail is concerned, is vacated. petitioner would continue on his previous bail unless the same is cancelled on any of the grounds indicated in hadiani dei's case (supra). it is stated that the case is now pending before second additional sessions judge, bhubaneswar.the criminal misc. case is disposed of.
Judgment:A. Pasayat, J.
1. The short but important point that needs consideration is whether a person accused of having made infraction of the provisions of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (in short, the 'Act'), who has been released on bail during stage of investigation is required to be remanded to jail custody on cognizance of the offence being taken by Seamed Sessions Judge, because the requirements under Section 37(b)(ii) of the Act were not kept in view while bail was granted.
2. Facts situation lies within a narrow compass. Petitioner was released on bail as per order of learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Bhubaneswar (in short, the 'SDJM') on 27-11-1990. A direction was given by learned SDJM for appearance of accused before learned Sessions Judge, Purl on 23-4-1993. On that day petitioner was absent and a petition was filed praying for time and it. was allowed till 1-6-1993. On 1-6-1993 adjournment was again sought for, and granted. Date of appearance was fixed to 17-6-1993, on which date petitioner appeared and prayed for continuance) of bail granted at the stage of investigation. Learned Sessions Judge, Pun rejected the prayer for continuance of bail and directed the petitioner-accused to be remanded to custody being of the view that restriction imposed Under Section 37(b) of the Act was not considered while granting bail.
3. Mr. D. Panda, learned counsel for petitioner submitted that considerations while granting bail and cancelling bail are entirely different. Even in a case where bail has been erroneously granted, the same cannot be cancelled though it is shown that grant was improper. Learned counsel for State on the other hand, submitted that where grant itself is contrary to Saw, there is no bar in cancelling bail, and learned Sessions Judge was justified in directing cancellation of bail.
4. Similar question came up for consideration of a Division Bench of this Court in Hadiani Dei v. State of Orissa and Ors.. *(1993) 6 OCR 588. It was observed that improper grant recedes to background when question of cancellation of bail is subject-matter of consideration. In that case, order of learned Sessions Judge directing cancellation under similar circumstances was vacated and it was directed that petitioner would continue on previous bail unless the same is cancelled on any of the grounds indicated in the case. There is no distinguishing feature so far as this case is concerned. Order of learned Sessions Judge so far it relates to cancellation of bail is concerned, is vacated. Petitioner would continue on his previous bail unless the same is cancelled on any of the grounds indicated in Hadiani Dei's case (supra). It is stated that the case is now pending before Second Additional Sessions Judge, Bhubaneswar.
The Criminal Misc. Case is disposed of.