J.P. Agarwala Vs. State of Orissa - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/530285
SubjectCriminal
CourtOrissa High Court
Decided OnNov-07-1989
Case NumberCriminal Revn. No. 419 of 1983
JudgeJ. Das, J.
Reported in69(1990)CLT220; 1990CriLJ1193
Acts Essential Commodities Act, 1955 - Sections 7 and 10C; Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1966; Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1965; Orissa Rice (Control and Inter-district Movement) Order, 1973; Orissa Rice and Paddy Control (Amendment) Order 1984; Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) - Sections 313
AppellantJ.P. Agarwala
RespondentState of Orissa
Appellant AdvocateM. Jain, Adv.
Respondent AdvocateP.K. Mohanty, Addl. Govt. Adv.
DispositionPetition dismissed
Cases Referred(Balabhadra Raja Guru Mohapatra v. The State
Excerpt:
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- state financial corporations act, 1951 [63/1951]. section 29; [p.k. tripathy, a.k. parichha & n.prusty, jj] discharge of loan orissa forest act (14 of 1972), section 56 confiscation of vehicle - held, the authorities under section 56 of the orissa forest act, 1972 are not obliged to release the vehicle from the confiscation proceeding or to pay the sale proceeds of the vehicle after the order of confiscation in favour of orissa state financial corporation when such vehicles were purchased on being financed by the orissa state financial corporation and the loan had not been liquidated by the date of the seizure/confiscation of the vehicle. concept of first charge or second charge has no applicability when the vehicle is not otherwise disposed of to determine the liabilities of the.....
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orderj. das, j.1. this criminal revision arises out of the appellate judgment dated 30-7-1983 passed by sri g. s. patnaik, sessions judge, koraput, jaypore upholding the conviction and sentence dated 8-4-1982 passed by sri s. nayak, judicial magistrate, first class, bissam cuttack, in ii (c) c.c. 14 of 1980 convicting the petitioner under section 7 of the essential commodities act and sentencing him to undergo r.i. for one year and to pay a fine of rs. 1,000/-, in default, to undergo r.i. for two months and directing that the seized paddy be confiscated.2. the prosecution case, briefly stated is that on 22-2-1980 sri p. n. misra (p.w. 3), the supply supervisor along with sri v. rama rao patnaik (p.w. 4) attached to s.d.o. office detained the truck bearing registration no. crr 2262 and.....
Judgment:
ORDER

J. Das, J.

1. This criminal revision arises out of the appellate judgment dated 30-7-1983 passed by Sri G. S. Patnaik, Sessions Judge, Koraput, Jaypore upholding the conviction and sentence dated 8-4-1982 passed by Sri S. Nayak, Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bissam Cuttack, in II (c) C.C. 14 of 1980 convicting the petitioner under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act and sentencing him to undergo R.I. for one year and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default, to undergo R.I. for two months and directing that the seized paddy be confiscated.

2. The prosecution case, briefly stated is that on 22-2-1980 Sri P. N. Misra (P.W. 3), the Supply Supervisor along with Sri V. Rama Rao Patnaik (P.W. 4) attached to S.D.O. Office detained the truck bearing registration No. CRR 2262 and checked the same, P.Ws. 3 and 4 found that the accused was taking 120 bags of paddy weighing 93 quintals 99 Kgs. and 700 grams in the said truck. The accused-petitioner could not produce any authority for transporting of the said paddy. The accused stated that 12 bags of paddy belongs to him and the remaining paddy belongs to others, but there were no material in support of the plea of the accused. Hence the paddy was seized and given in zima of V. Parayya (P.W. 5)., who executed zimanama marked Ext. 2. After necessary inquiry P. R. was submitted and so the accused stood his trial and stands convicted and sentenced as above.

3. In his defence the accused stated that out of 120 bags of paddy found in the truck, 12 bags belong to him and other bags belong , to different persons and all of them were taking paddy together in the truck.

4. The trial court and the appellate court gave concurrent finding that the defence plea is not true and that the accused-petitioner is himself liable for the storage and that transportation of paddy exceeding ten quintals amounts to storage. In these circumstances, the revision petition has been filed.

5. The learned advocate for the petitioner Mr. Jain argued that the prosecution is misdirected as the provisions of the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1966 does not apply to the facts of the case and as the provisions of Orissa Rice (Control and Inter-district Movement) Order, 1973 are applicable to the facts of the case and hence the conviction and sentence passed against the petitioner is vitiated. Mr. Jain also argued that the defence plea can be accepted as sufficient and established, if the accused gives a reasonable explanation and if such explanation creates doubt in the prosecution case and the accused is not required to prove its plea beyond all reasonable doubts.

6. It has been held by a Division Bench decision of this Court in Criminal Revn. No. 50 of 1984 Reported in (1989) 1 Orissa LR 66* (Sri Bijay Kumar Agarwala v. State) that transport of rice or paddy or rice and paddy taken together in quantity exceeding ten quintals at a time inside the State of Orissa amounts to storage within the meaning of Clause 3 of the Orissa and Paddy Control Order, 1965. In Criminal Revn. No. 50 of 1984 the earlier view of this Court in the decision reported in AIR 1954 Orissa 95 : (1954 Cri LJ 478) (Balabhadra Raja Guru Mohapatra v. The State) was reiterated and the views expressed in the later decisions to the contrary, were held to be incorrect. In any case, the learned advocate for the petitioner Mr. Jain does not dispute the above proposition of law. Hence, there is no difficulty in taking a view that transporting in the truck exceeding the permissible limits of paddy amounts to storage.

7. It may be mentioned that there is no dispute about the fact that the accused was taking 120 bags of paddy in truck No. CRR 2252. The trial court and the appellate court have given concurrent finding that the accused was taking 120 bags of paddy in truck No. CRR 2252 and the accused has also admitted this although he has given a different explanation.

8. The Orissa Rice (Control and Inter-district Movement) Order, 1973 does not in any way override the provisions of Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1965. The 1973 Order was made for a specified purpose to control the movement of rice and paddy from and district to another in the State of Orissa with a view to maintaining the supply of rice and paddy and for securing its equitable distribution and availability at fair price within the State of Orissa.

8A. The Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1965 is the general order regulating the purchase and storage of rice within the State of Orissa.

9. Thus, there is no conflict in between the * Reported in (1989) 1 Orissa LR 66 provisions of the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1965 and the Orissa Rice (Control and Inter-district Movement) Order, 1973.

9A. Clause 2(f) of the Orissa Rice and paddy Control Order is as follows :

' 'storage in wholesale quantity' means storage of rice or paddy or rice and paddy taken together in quantity -

(i) exceeding ten quintals at a time inside the State of Orissa excluding the border area, and

(ii) exceeding two quintals inside the border area.'

The above sub-clause clearly indicates that storage of rice or paddy taken together in quantity exceeding ten quintals at a time anywhere inside the State of Orissa excluding the border area is covered by the order.

In this case there is no doubt that there was storage of 120 bags of paddy within the meaning of Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order, 1965, the quantity of which is 93 quintals 99 K.Gs. and 700 grams and the storage was in a place in the district of Koraput. Hence, the case is covered by the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order.

As the facts and circumstances of the case stand, the case would have been also covered by the provisions of Orissa Rice (Control and Inter-district Movement) Order 1973, as the export of rice exceeded six quintals in weight in aggregate and as the defence plea stands, each of the person claiming to be transporting more than 6 quintals of rice from Koraput to Bolangir would be deemed do have violated the provisions of 1973 Order. Since, however, the trial court has not directed its attention to this aspect and the accused has not also given a due notice, I am not inclined to consider the applicability of the provisions of 1973 Order.

9B. As it has been held in the preceding paragraph that the storage in wholesale quantity of paddy is within the meaning of Clause 2(f) of the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order.

10. At the time of detection i.e. on 22-2-80 the meaning of dealer as per Clause 2(b) stood as follows:

' 'Dealer' means any person who purchases, sells or stores in wholesale quantity rice or paddy or rice and paddy taken together'. The meaning was modified by the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control (Amendment) Order 1984.

Clause 3(2) of the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order stood as follows at the time of the occurrence:

'For the purpose of this clause, any person who stores rice or paddy or rice and paddy taken together in quantity exceeding ten quintals inside the State of Orissa excluding the border area and exceeding two quintals inside the border area shall, unless the contrary proved, be deemed to act as a dealer,'

Clause 2(b) read with Clause 3(2) clearly goes to show that any person who stores rice or paddy or rice and paddy taken together in quantity exceeding ten quintals inside the State of Orissa is deemed to act as a dealer, unless the contrary is proved. Hence, it is clear that once it is proved that a person has stored more than ten quintals of paddy or rice or rice and paddy taken together there is presumption that he is a dealer and the burden shifts on to him to rebut that presumption by proving to the contrary.

In this case, it has been clearly established that the accused was taking 120 bags of paddy which exceeded the permissible limit and hence he is deemed to be a dealer within the meaning of the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order and it is for the accused to rebut that presumption by proving to the contrary.

It may be mentioned that whoever stores rice or paddy exceeding the permissible limit anywhere inside the State of Orissa is deemed to act as a dealer and as in this case it has been proved that the accused was transporting 120 bags of paddy in a truck and it was found within the State of Orissa, so the accused must be deemed to be a dealer within the meaning of the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order.

In the light of Clause 3(2) also the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order is applicable to this case.

11. The charge in this case is as follows:

'I, Sri Srikanto Naik, J.M.F.C., hereby charge you Jagadish Prasad Agarwala, as follows--

That you on or about the 22nd day of February, 1981 on between Dohikhal and Amadola Road, leading to Kalahandi district. You found storing Q.93.77.700 gms of coarse paddy in 125 bags and transporting the same to Balangir for sale. Thereby you contravened Clause 3 of the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order 1965 and thereby committed an offence punishable under Section 7 E.C. Act more of the Indian Penal Code and within cognizance and I hereby direct that you be tried by the said Court on the said charges.

Dated this 23rd day of March, 1981.

Sd. S. Naik

Magistrate.

Charge read over and explained to the learned Advocate accused who pleads not guilty and claimed to be tried.

Sd. S. Naik

Magistrate.'

As the circumstances of the stand and as per the provisions of law discussed above, the charge is quite correct and there is no misdirection in the charge and hence there is absolutely nothing to show that the trial is vitiated.

12. In a criminal case, the burden on the accused is not as heavy as that of the prosecution and the accused can be exonerated of the liability, if it is found that the has given reasonable explanation and/or the explanation of the accused creates doubt in the prosecution case.

In the Essential Commodities Act there is a departure from the ordinary rules of criminal law in the matter of proof of defence plea.

As per Clause 3(2) of the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order 1965, which has been discussed above, the accused is deemed to be a dealer and hence, the burden shifts on to him to prove to the contrary.

'Prove' has been defined in Section 3 of the Evidence Act which is as follows:

'A fact is said to be proved when, after considering the matters before it, the Court either believes it to exist, or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists.'

The term 'prove' indicates the degree of certainty which is required to treat a fact as proved, and is so worded as to provide for two conditions of mind; first, that in which a man feels absolutely certain of a fact, in other words, 'believes it to exist', and, second, that in which, though he may not feel absolutely certain of a fact, he thinks it so extremely probable that a prudent man wound, under the circumstances, act on the assumption of its existence. Thus, the burden on the accused as per Clause 3(2) of the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order is quite heavy and once he is deemed to act as a dealer, he is to prove to the contrary and within the meaning of the term 'prove' under Section 3 of the Evidence Act, it must be to a degree of certainty. Thus, it is an exception to the general rule of establishing the defence plea.

13. Section 10C of the Essential Commodities Act also makes a great departure from general rules of criminal jurisprudence in the matter of proof of the defence plea. Section 10C is as follows :

'Presumption of culpable mental states --

(1) In any prosecution for any offence under this Act which requires a culpable mental state on the part of the accused, the court shall presume the existence of such mental state but it shall be a defence for the accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as an offence in that prosecution.

Explanation -- In this section 'culpable mental state' includes intention, motive, knowledge of a fact and the belief in, or reason to believe a fact.

(2) For the purposes of this section a fact is said to be proved only when the court believes it to exist beyond reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is established by a preponderance of probability.'

The above section makes it clear that whenever a culpable mental state is presumed by the Court, it shall be a defence for the accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as an offence in that prosecution. This section makes it further clear that for the purposes of this section a fact is said to be proved only when the court believes it to exist beyond reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is established by a preponderance of probability.

In the above circumstances, Section 10C is a clear departure from the ordinary rules of criminal jurisprudence in the matter of proof of defence plea and the section casts heavy burden on the accused to prove its defence plea beyond all reasonable doubts.

In view of the provisions contained in Clause 9(2) of the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order and Section 10C if the Essential Commodities Act, the contention of the learned advocate for the petitioner that the defence plea can be established by a preponderance of probability or by creating a doubt in the prosecution case or by giving a reasonable explanation so as to create doubt in the prosecution case cannot be sustained. It is to be seen in this case as to whether the accused has been able to prove his defence plea beyond all reasonable doubts or in other words to a decree of certainty.

14. Both the trial court and the appellate court gave the finding that the defence plea is not true and no reliance can be placed on the documents filed by the accused in proof of the defence plea.

The incident took place on 22-2-80. There is evidence to the effect that the accused stated out of 120 bags of paddy only 12 bags belongs to him and the remaining bags of paddy belongs to other persons. At that time however, the accused could not show any documents like the way bills and receipts etc. filed in the case at a later stage.

It appears that the accused appeared in the case on 18-8-80 i.e. six months after the incident. On 9-9-80 a petition was filed through advocate Sri S. Babu Rao by ten persons including the accused to release the seized paddy in their favour. As per the petition, each of the claimants claimed 12 to 13 bags out of the seized paddy. The vouchers and the way bills proved an behalf of the defence was filed on 7-1-81 i.e. about 11 months after the incident. It is strange that neither the vouchers not the way bills etc. were shown to the Supply Supervisor (P.W. 3) nor those documents were filed on 9-9-80 along with the petition wherein the claimants prayed for releasing the paddy bags in their favour. Thus, the way bills, receipts and vouchers etc. did not see the light of the day till 7-1-81. The inordinary delay in filing the receipts and vouchers creates enough doubt in the genuineness of those documents. If the way bills and the receipts etc. would have been prepared contemporaneously with the alleged sale of paddy to different persons, there is no doubt about the fact that those documents should have been with the accused at the time of detection of those documents could have been shown to the Supply on demand. A period of eleven months is more than enough to create some vouchers and receipts.

15. The defence has tried to place too much reliance in Ext. C which is said to be a copy of the petition sent to the C.S.O., Jeypore. I fail to understand as to how Ext. C could be admitted in the evidence. It is admittedly a copy of the original petition. To the naked eye it appears that the writings are partly in carbon process and partly in ink. Even some signatures appear to be in carbon process and some signatures appear to be in ink and there are also two thump impressions. Although the D.Ws. state that they give an application to the C.S.O., Jeypore and although Ext. C is said to be the copy of the application, no attempt has been made to call for the original application. There is no proof as to who is the author of Ext. C. There is also no proof that Ext. C was prepared in the same carbon process or that it is a copy of the original application and it was compared with the Original application and found to be correct. In any case, there is nothing to show that the original application could not have been available and hence, there is absolutely no basis for admitting the secondary evidence. There is also no explanation as to why a part of the writing is in ink and another part is in carbon process and as to why some signatures are in carbon process and some signatures are in ink. It may be stated that the circumstances are such that Ext. C does not even possess the character of secondary evidence in the absence of proof that it was prepared in the same carbon process or that it was copied from the original and compared with the original and found to be correct. In these circumstances, Ext. C is not at all admissible in the evidence and hence, this document cannot be considered as an item of defence evidence. If Ext. C is ignored, the very basis of the defence plea falls to the ground.

16. The documents said to be way-bills and purchase vouchers etc. have not been proved in accordance with law. The D.Ws. only identified those documents and they have not stated as to who wrote those documents, hence, it could not be said that the documents have been proved in accordance with law.

D.W. 1 has proved the way-bill (Ext. A) and the purchase voucher marked Exts. B and B/A. He has not stated as to who wrote Exts. A, B and B/A. In cross-examination this D.Ws. has stated that he cannot name the person from whom he purchased the paddy. He has not also stated that the above documents have been written in his presence. Thus, those documents have not been proved in accordance with law and at best the documents have been identified, but identification of documents will not prove the contents.

Rama Majhi (D.W. 2) has proved the receipts marked Exts. D and D/A and waybills marked Exts. E and E/A. He has also not stated as to who prepared the documents. In cross-examination he has stated that he cannot name the person from whom he purchased the paddy. He has again stated that he purchased paddy from seven persons. It is, however, seen that the entire quantity of paddy purchased by D.W. 2 is covered by the purchase vouchers marked Exts. D and D/A which also bear the signature of two sellers. The paddy said to be purchased under Exts. D and D/A is reflected in the way-bills. The fact that admittedly D.W. 2 purchased paddy from seven persons, whereas two sellers have granted the receipts covering the entire purchase, creates suspicions and hence, no reliance can be placed in the Exts. Added to it, the exhibites have not been proved in accordance with law.

Ram Krishna Kandol (P.W. 3) has also only identified the way-bills marked Exts. F and F/A and the vouchers marked Exts. G and G/A and hence, the contents have not been proved. It is also seen that Ram Krishna Kandol (P.W. 3) has not sign and he gives his thump impression, this goes to show that D.W. 3 has no capacity to read or write. In such circumstances, D.W. 3 is not competent to prove Exts. G. G/A and F and F/A. Further D.W. 3 has stated that he purchased paddy from nine persons. But his entire purchase is covered by two purchase vouchers marked Exts. G and G/A signed by two sellers. This is also a suspicious feature and hence, no reliance can be placed in these exhibits.

Chhabil Bog (P.W. 4) has proved way-bills Exts. H and H/A and the purchase vouchers Exts. I and I/A. All the exhibits appear to bear the signature of Thabir Bag and this makes these exhibits suspicious. In his deposition Chhabil Bag has affixed his L.T.I. He has also stated in cross-examination that he does not know how to sign and generally gives his thumb impression and he does not know how to read and write. He has also stated clearly that he had not signed in Ext. H or I or on Ext. C. In view of such statement of D.W. 4 the appearance of thus signature in these exhibits makes these exhibits suspicious and there is reason to believe that these documents have been created by somebodyelse in the name of D.W. 2. Added to this, Chhabil Bag being an illeterate person, he is not competent to prove the documents and hence, the contents of the documents cannot be said to have been proved.

Chandra Sen Bhati (P.W. 5) has proved the way-bills marked Exts. J and J/A and the purchase voucher marked Exts. K and K/A. He his also a person, who gives his thump impression. In his deposition he has affixed his thump impression. He has stated that he has purchased paddy from the mill at Muniguda. There is, however, no receipt granted by the Mill. In the deposition the name of D.W. 5 has not been written as Chandra Singh Bhati. In Exts. J, J/A, K and K/A the name of the purchaser is shown to be Chandra Bhanu Bhati. Again there are two thump impressions in Exts. J and J/A. Under these thump impressions the name Chandra Bhanu has been written. These circumstances make these exhibits suspicious. Added to it D.W. 5 is also illeterate. He is not competent to prove the contents of these exhibits and hence, there is no legal proof of the exhibits and on the other hand, the exhibits are suspicious. In cross-examination D.W. 5 has stated that he come to court on being called by the accused and the accused has also paid money to come to court. This goes to show that D.W. 5, who is a coolie by profession, can be gained over easily and hence no reliance can be palced in his testimony.

Gangadhar Sahu (P.W. 6) has proved the way-bills marked Exts. L and L/A and the purchase vouchers marked Exts. M and M/A. D.W. 6 has further stated that these exhibits are prepared by the accused and this statement goes unchallenged. This goes to show that the accused has prepared these documents for his own benefit and it also gives an indication that the other documents might have been prepared at his instance. In cross-examination P.W. 6 has stated that he signs in Oriya only. In his deposition also P.W. 6 has signed in Oriya. It is, however, seen that Exts. L, L/A, M and M/A bear the signature of Gangadhar Sahoo in english. D.W. 6 has stated that he also signed in Ext. C in english. This statement appears to have been incorrectly recorded as Ext. C contents the signature of Gangadhar Sahu in Oriya. Thus, it is clear that D.W. 6 signs in Oriya only. In view of that the appearance of english signature of Gangadhar Sahu in Exts. L, L/A, M and M/A make the exhibits suspicious. Added to it these exhibits have been written in exglish and Gangadhar Sahu, as it appears, does not know english and hence he is not competent to prove the exhibits. Hence, the contents of these exhibits cannot be said to be proved in accordance with law. D.W. 6 further stated that he purchased the paddy from fifteen people and he brought blank receipts from one of the mills at Muniguda and then the driver of accused wrote the receipts marked Exts. M and M/A. D.W. 6 has also stated that the driver of the truck signed above the heading of the signature of the seller. All these statements clearly go to show that Exts. L, L/A, M and M/A have been manufactured subsequently by the driver of the accused and D. W. 6 has also stated that at the time of manufacturing the documents the accused was also present. Hence, no reliance can be placed in these documents.

Ram Prakash Agrawal (D.W. 7) has stated in cross-examination that he is the brother of the accused. He has proved the Exts. N and N/A. He has further stated that the accused granted the purchase bill. In cross-examination D.W. 7 has stated that the seller had not granted any receipt and he obtained Exts. N and N/A from different persons on 21-2-80. This statement goes to show that Exts. N and N/A were manufactured subsequently. Again this statement is also inconsistent with the statement in examination-in-chief, as he stated in examination-in-chief that on 20-2-80 the accused granted the purchase bill. In these circumstances, no reliance can be placed in the testimony of D.W. 7 or in Exts. N and N/A. It may also be observed that he is admittedly the brother of the accused and he is an interested witness.

Chhotalal Gupta (D.W. 8) has proved the purchase vouchers marked Ext. O and the way-bill marked Ext. O/A. D.W. 8 has stated then that he purchased paddy from one Dilip and Ext. O is the purchase receipt granted by the seller. It is seen that one Dilip Kumar Suna has signed in Oriya in Ext. O, whereas Ext. O has been written in English. There is no evidence as to who filled up the columns of the receipt in English. Similarly, there is also nothing in the statement of D.W. 8 as to who prepared Ext. O/A and the contents of Exts. O and O/A have not been proved in accordance with law. D.W. 8 is a resident of mauza Tusura in the district of Bolangir and he come to court to depose on 20-2-82. In cross-examination D.W. 8 has stated that he was not summoned to appear in the court but the accused told him that the case stands posted to 20-2-80 and hence he came to the court. The fact that D.W. 8 travelled to a long distance to depose as defence witness with the request of the accused goes to show that he is interested for the accused.

Jugal Kishore Agrawala (P.W. 9) has proved purchase voucher Ext. P and the waybill Ext. P/A. Both these documents have been written in English. D.W. 9 does not say as to who wrote these documents. In cross-examination he has only stated that Exts. P and P/A were prepared at Hat, Muniguda. This statement is not sufficient for proof of a document in accordance with law. D.W. 9 has further stated that the accused gave him the purchase receipt and he filled the same and he also prepared the way-bill. This goes to show that D.W. 9 has prepared the documents at the instance of the accused subsequently. D.W.9 has stated further that being called by the accused he came to the court. This goes to show that D.W. 9 is interested for the accused and he has come to court to depose with a view to oblige the accused and hence, the testimony of D.W. 9 is also not free from doubt.

17. After discussing the materials for the defence, it is found that there are telling circumstances to show that the documents were prepared subsequently at the instance of the accused and the documents have-not also been proved in the case in accordance with law. Some of the witnesses do not have good social status as they are foolish and one of them has stated that being paid by the accused he came to the court to depose and one witness is the brother of the accused and two other witnesses have been found to be interested for the accused. Thus, the credibility of the defence witnesses suffers to a great extent. It is also found that some documents are clearly false and the falsity of these documents are also reflected in the other documents, as there are convincing materials to show that some documents have been prepared either by the accused or at the instance of the accused. These circumstances coupled with the fact that the documents did not see the light of the day for about eleven months after the incident make the entire defence evidence far from truth and no reliance can be placed in the defence plea.

The trial Court and the appellate Court have discussed the defence plea in detail but their attention has not been drawn to certain other aspects which have been discussed in the preceding paragraphs. In any case, the finding of the trial Court and the appellate Court regarding the untrue character of the defence evidence must be held to be correct and I agree with the same specially in view of the appraisal made by me independently.

18. The learned advocate for the petitioner argued that in the statement under Section 313, Cr. P.C. there is no question that the accused was carrying 120 bags of paddy without licence or permit and hence, the incriminating circumstance appearing against the accused has not been put to him and hence the conviction cannot be sustained.

I do not agree with the contention of the learned advocate for the petitioner. A question has been put that the accused was carrying 120 bags of paddy in truck No. ORR 2352 and the accused had admitted that he was carrying the paddy i.e. 125 bags. This by itself amounts to storage in wholesale quantity as discussed in the earlier paragraphs and hence, according to Clause 3 (2) of the Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order the accused is deemed to be a dealer. The storage of paddy exceeding the permissible limit by any person at any place within the State of Orissa is itself violation of Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order and it is an offence and once a person is deemed to act as a dealer, it is for him to rebut the presumption by proving his defence plea beyond all reasonable doubts. In these circumstances, the very question that the accused was carrying 125 bags of paddy in a truck is the main incriminating circumstance in this case. It is for the accused to rebut the presumption that he was acting as a dealer within the meaning of Orissa Rice and Paddy Control Order without legal authority.

It may also be mentioned that a person storing more than the permissible quantity of paddy or rice or rice and paddy taken together is deemed to be a dealer, but the exceptions are that if that person is a cultivator or landlord he was not deemed to be a dealer in respect of the produce of his own land. Acting as a dealer is an offence, but it is not an offence, if a person acts as a dealer with a licence. Thus, once a person stores rice or paddy or rice and paddy taken together in quantity exceeding the permissible limit, the offence is completed and that person is to show as to whether he is a cultivator or land owner or licence holder. In such circumstances, the contention of the learned advocate for the petitioner cannot be sustained.

19. In the result, there is no merit in the revision petition and the same is dismissed and the conviction and sentence passed against the petitioner are upheld.