Pranabandhu Panda and ors. Vs. State of Orissa - Court Judgment

R.N. Biswal, J.

1. This Criminal Misc. Case arises out of a petition filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. wherein the petitioners have sought for quashing the proceeding in G.R, Case No. 998 of 2000 pending before S.D.J.M., Sambalpur. Petitioner No. 3 is the husband of Opp.Party No. 2 while petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 are parents-in-law and petitioner No. 4 is her sister-in-law. Petitioner No. 3 married Opp.party No. 2 on 8.5.1997 in accordance with Hindu Rites and their Caste Custom at Sambalpur. After solemnization of marriage, Opp.party No. 2 lived in the official quarters of petitioner No. 1 at Bilaspur (Madhya Pradesh). It is alleged that the petitioners harassed Opp.party No. 2 in many a ways for non-fulfilment of their demand of a Car towards dowry. For some time Opp.Party No. 2 lived with petitioner No. 3 in Indore where the later was serving as Income Tax Inspector. During her stay there, Petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 also tortured her for non-fulfilment of their demand of a Car. In the meantime since Opp.Party No. 2 conceived, her parents brought her to Sambalpur where she gave birth to a male child on 23.9.1998. None of the petitioners visited Sambalpur to see the newborn baby till 1.10.1998 when Petitioner Nos. 1 and 3 went there and requested the parents of Opp.Party No. 2 to send her (Opp.Party No. 2) with the child to Bilaspur. Accordingly, Opp.party No. 2 and her child were escorted to Bilaspur on 13.10.1998 only to be neglected by the petitioners. On being informed of this, mother of Opp.party No. 2 came to Bilaspur and with the consent of the petitioners brought back Opp.Party No. 2 with the new born baby to Sambalpur. On 30.1.2000 father of the Opp.Party No. 2 conveyed a Panchayati of his caste men at Sambalpur where petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 were also present. They were requested by the Ponchmen to take back Opp.Party No. 2 and her child but they insisted that unless a Maruti Car was given they would not take them back. So, finding no other way Opp.Party No. 2 filed I.C.C. Case No. 40 of 2000 before the learned S.D.J.M., Sambalpur on the allegation of commission of offence punishable under Sections 498-A/34 I.P.C. read with Section 4 of the D.P, Act. The S.D.J.M. forwarded the complaint petition to the O.I.C., Mahila P.S. Sambalpur directing to treat it as F.I.R. and investigate into the case. Accordingly the O.I.C. treating it as F.I.R. registered P.S. Case No. 17 of 2000 and took up investigation. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted under Sections 498-A/406/34 I.P.C. read with Section 4 of the D.P. Act against all the petitioners. The S.D.J.M., (S), Sambalpur took cognizance of the said offences on 27.7.2001 against all the petitioners who faced their trial. On 4.5.2005 the petitioners filed the petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. before this Court with prayer to quash the proceeding as mentioned above.

2. Learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that as envisaged under Section 177 of Cr.P.C. every offence should be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. In the case at hand, the alleged occurrence having been taken place at Bilaspur and Indore, the S.D.J.M., Sambalpur lacks territorial jurisdiction to try the case. In support of his submission he relied on the decision in Y. Abraham Ajith and Ors. v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Anr. (2004) 29 OCR (SC) 241. As against this, learned Counsel for the Opp.Party No. 2 submitted that as per the complaint petition, on 30.1.2000 petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 reiterated their demand for a Maruti Car as dowry at Sambalpur also. So, the S.D.J.M. has jurisdiction to entertain the Criminal Case. Learned Counsel for the petitioners further submitted that petitioner No. 1, who was working as a Research Officer, Tribal Development Department, Madhya Pradesh was on Election duty as Zonal Officer, for the three tiers Panchayat Election at Chhatisgarh, the 1st phase of which was held on 28.1.2000 and the second phase on 1.2.2000. So, it cannot be conceived that he could be at Sambalpur on 30.1.2000. In support of his submission that the petitioner No. 1 was on Election Duty during the relevant time he relied on a certificate granted by the Sub-Collector Bilaspur showing that petitioner No. 1 was engaged as Zonal Officer to conduct the 1999-2000 three tiers Panchayat Election. He also relied on an affidavit sworn by the petitioner No. 1 to that effect. In this context learned Counsel for the Opp.Party No. 2 submitted that this Court cannot go into any document other than the documents produced by the Prosecution. So the certificate issued by the Sub-Collector, Bilaspur cannot be taken into consideration. Similarly, the affidavit sworn by petitioner No. 1 stating that he was engaged in election duty on 30.1.2000 at Bilaspur cannot be accepted.

3. It is the settled principle of law that an accused cannot be permitted to adduce defence evidence at the stage of taking cognizance of an offence or framing of charge. At these stages the Court has to examine the materials produced by the prosecution only. Of course in a proceeding under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., this Court, in exceptional cases can look into the documents which are of unimpeachable character and can legally be translated to relevant evidence. In the case at hand the certificate dated 14.11.2005 issued by the Sub-Collector, Bilaspur shows that petitioner No. 1 was engaged by the Collector, Bilaspur vide order dated 19.1.2005 as Zonal Officer in 1999-2000 three tiers Panchayat Election. It does not reflect the date of election. As per the decision in Smt. Sudha Devi v. M.P. Narayanan and Ors. : [1988]3SCR756 affidavits are not included in the definition of evidence in Section 3 of the Evidence Act. The same can be used as evidence only if for sufficient reasons Court passes an order under Order XIX Rule 1 or 2 of C.P.C. So, the affidavit sworn by petitioner No. 1 cannot be considered as evidence. Neither the certificate issued by the Sub-Collector, Bilaspur nor the affidavit can be considered to be of unimpeachable character and neither of the documents can be legally translated to relevant evidence. So both the documents cannot be taken into consideration by this Court. Accordingly, from the available material it cannot be said that petitioner No. 1 did not attend the meeting at Sambalpur on 30.1.2000.

4. As envisaged under Section 178(C) of Cr.P.C. where an offence is a continuing one and continues to be committed in more local areas than one it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. In the case at hand Opp.Party No. 1 was alleged to have been tortured for non-fulfilment of demand of dowry by all the petitioners at Bilaspur. Petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 tortured her, for the same reason at Indore and petitioner Nos. 1 and 2 reiterated their demand for a Maruti car towards dowry at Sambalpur. Since the petitioners are accused of the same offences committed in course of the same transaction they can be legally charged together as per the provision contained under Section 223 of Cr.P.C. In fact they have been charged together for the aforesaid offences. Section 184(b) provides that where the offences committed by several persons are such that they may be charged with, and tried together by virtue of the provisions of Section 223 of Cr.P.C. the offences may be inquired into or tried by any Court competent to inquire in to or try any of the offences, So, the case at hand can be tried at Sambalpur.

5. Moreover, as mentioned earlier cognizance of the offences under Sections 498-A/406/34 I.P.C. read with Section 4 of the D.P Act was taken on 27.7.2001. As submitted by the learned Counsel for the Complainant-Opp.party No. 2 at the stage of recording of accused statement, the present CRLMC has been filed. There is inordinate delay of about 4 years in filing the CRLMC. So, according to him it should be dismissed on this ground alone. In support of his submission he relied upon the decision in Bah Baybordi v. State of Karnataka reported in (1991) (1) Crimes 191. Per contra, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that delay alone cannot be a ground to reject a petition under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. in each and every case.

In appropriate cases even if there is inordinate delay in moving the Court, extraordinary power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised to undo the wrong. In support of his submission he relied upon the decision in Ganga Traders and Industries (P) Ltd., and Anr. v. Santosh Kumar Agarwala (1990) 3 O.C.R. 749 wherein this Court held that even though there is delay in moving the Court inherent power can be exercised to prevent the abuse of process of Court.

6. No doubt this Court has unbriddled power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., to prevent the abuse of process of Court; delay alone cannot thwart this power. Bat in the present case the petitioners submitted to the orders of taking cognizance and framing of charge and faced the trial and after about 4 years of taking of cognizance, at the stage of recording of accused statement only, filed the present case, in all probabilities to delay the progress of the case. Moreover, as held earlier, since the S.D.J.M., Sambalpur does not lack territorial jurisdiction to try the criminal case, there is no abuse of the process of Court. So, the decision in M/s. Ganga Traders (supra) is not applicable to the present case. As such the CRLMC deserves to be dismissed on the ground of laches of the petitioners also.

In the result the CRLMC stands dismissed.