Saranan Chattopadhyaya Vs State of Bihar Now Jharkhand and anr - Citation 520210 - Court Judgment

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			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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		'judgement' => '<p>Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p>4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => '2006CriLJ921; I(2006)DMC663; [2006(1)JCR101(Jhr)]',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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$casename_url = 'saranan-chattopadhyaya-vs-bihar-jharkhand'
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$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/520210/saranan-chattopadhyaya-vs-bihar-jharkhand'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr.<br>'
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 120
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

- constitution of india. articles 12 & 226: [m. karpaga vinayagam, c.j., narendra nath tiwari & d.p.singh, jj] writ petition - maintainability - whether state co-operative milk producers federation ltd., is a state within meaning of article 12 ? - held, from perusal of relevant rules of byelaws, it is clear that state government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. further there is nothing to indicate that government has any functional and administrative control over federation. state government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of federation including managing director. federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to state.....

Notice (8): Undefined variable: kword [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]Code Context                                    }

                                //highest occurence of word in the judgement

                                echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['judgement']))), $query) . "</div>";
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
$dataForView = array(
	'title_for_layout' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya Vs State of Bihar Now Jharkhand and anr - Citation 520210 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '520210',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 4; Bihar Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1976; <a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 245(1); Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Sections 420',
			'appealno' => 'Cri. Revision No. 210 of 1998 (R)',
			'appellant' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya Vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' S.K. Laik, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Benani Verma, APP and; Kalyan Banerjee, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-11-22',
			'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Amareshwar Sahay, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'prhistory' => '',
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$title_for_layout = 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya Vs State of Bihar Now Jharkhand and anr - Citation 520210 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 4; Bihar Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1976; <a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 245(1); Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Sections 420',
		'appealno' => 'Cri. Revision No. 210 of 1998 (R)',
		'appellant' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya Vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr.;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' S.K. Laik, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Benani Verma, APP and; Kalyan Banerjee, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-11-22',
		'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' Amareshwar Sahay, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p>4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p></p><p>',
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		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
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		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Criminal',
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		'circuit' => null
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$url = 'https://sooperkanoon.com/case/amp/520210/saranan-chattopadhyaya-vs-bihar-jharkhand'
$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr.<br>'
include - APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123
View::_evaluate() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 971
View::_render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 933
View::render() - CORE/Cake/View/View.php, line 473
Controller::render() - CORE/Cake/Controller/Controller.php, line 963
Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
[main] - APP/webroot/index.php, line 109

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 123]Code Context                                    }

                                //highest occurence of word in the judgement

                                echo $this->Wand->highlight($this->Excerpt->extractRelevant($kword,strtolower(strip_tags($desc['Judgement']['judgement']))), $query) . "</div>";
$viewFile = '/home/legalcrystal/app/View/Case/amp.ctp'
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	'title_for_layout' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya Vs State of Bihar Now Jharkhand and anr - Citation 520210 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '520210',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 4; Bihar Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1976; <a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 245(1); Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Sections 420',
			'appealno' => 'Cri. Revision No. 210 of 1998 (R)',
			'appellant' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya Vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr.;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' S.K. Laik, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => ' Benani Verma, APP and; Kalyan Banerjee, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-11-22',
			'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' Amareshwar Sahay, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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amareshwar sahay, j.1 .in this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial court rejecting the petition under section 245(1) of the code of criminal procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.2. the facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party no. 2 before the chief judicial magistrate, dhanbad, against the petitioner and one budha dev banerjee for commission of the offence under section 420 of the indian penal code and section 4 of the dowry prohibition act, which was registered as c.p. case no. 268 of 1995.3. in the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party no. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, meena chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter......

Judgment:

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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.',
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	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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	(int) 11 => '<p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p>',
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Amareshwar Sahay, J.

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			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.',
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	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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	(int) 11 => '<p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p>',
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1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.

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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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		'counselplain' => ' S.K. Laik, Adv.',
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		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
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		'judge' => ' Amareshwar Sahay, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p>4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Amareshwar Sahay, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p>',
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2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 4; Bihar Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1976; <a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 245(1); Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Sections 420',
			'appealno' => 'Cri. Revision No. 210 of 1998 (R)',
			'appellant' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya Vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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			'counselplain' => ' S.K. Laik, Adv.',
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			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
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			'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
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			'judge' => ' Amareshwar Sahay, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya Vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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		'judgement' => '<p>Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p>4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.',
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	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p>',
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3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 4; Bihar Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1976; <a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 245(1); Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Sections 420',
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			'casename' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya Vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p>',
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4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.

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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 4; Bihar Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1976; <a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 245(1); Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Sections 420',
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		'casename' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya Vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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		'judgement' => '<p>Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p>4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Amareshwar Sahay, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p>',
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5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 4; Bihar Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1976; <a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 245(1); Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Sections 420',
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			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'judgement' => '<p>Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p>4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p>',
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6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 4; Bihar Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1976; <a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 245(1); Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Sections 420',
			'appealno' => 'Cri. Revision No. 210 of 1998 (R)',
			'appellant' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya',
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			'casename' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya Vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
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			'judge' => ' Amareshwar Sahay, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya Vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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		'judgement' => '<p>Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p>4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Amareshwar Sahay, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p>',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'
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7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.

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			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.',
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	(int) 10 => '<p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p>',
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8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 4; Bihar Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1976; <a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 245(1); Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Sections 420',
		'appealno' => 'Cri. Revision No. 210 of 1998 (R)',
		'appellant' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya',
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		'casename' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya Vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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		'counselplain' => ' S.K. Laik, Adv.',
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		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
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		'decidedon' => '2005-11-22',
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		'judge' => ' Amareshwar Sahay, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p>4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Amareshwar Sahay, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p>',
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9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 4; Bihar Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1976; <a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 245(1); Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Sections 420',
			'appealno' => 'Cri. Revision No. 210 of 1998 (R)',
			'appellant' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya Vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
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			'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
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			'judge' => ' Amareshwar Sahay, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya Vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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		'judge' => ' Amareshwar Sahay, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p>4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 1 => '<p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.',
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	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p>',
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Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
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10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.

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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 4; Bihar Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1976; <a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 245(1); Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Sections 420',
			'appealno' => 'Cri. Revision No. 210 of 1998 (R)',
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			'casename' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya Vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and anr.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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			'counselplain' => ' S.K. Laik, Adv.',
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			'judge' => ' Amareshwar Sahay, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya Vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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		'judgement' => '<p>Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p>4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Amareshwar Sahay, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p>',
	(int) 12 => '<p>'
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Dispatcher::_invoke() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 200
Dispatcher::dispatch() - CORE/Cake/Routing/Dispatcher.php, line 167
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11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.

Notice (8): Undefined variable: query [APP/View/Case/amp.ctp, line 144]Code Context                                         echo $this->Adsense->display('responsive_rect'); 

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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'id' => '520210',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/52033/dowry-prohibition-act-1961-complete-act">Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961</a> - Sections 4; Bihar Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1976; <a href="/act/50902/code-of-criminal-procedure-1973-complete-act">Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973</a> - Sections 245(1); Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Sections 420',
		'appealno' => 'Cri. Revision No. 210 of 1998 (R)',
		'appellant' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Saranan Chattopadhyaya Vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and anr.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  , reported in (1997)10SCC524 ,submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
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		'counselplain' => ' S.K. Laik, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => ' Benani Verma, APP and; Kalyan Banerjee, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-11-22',
		'deposition' => 'Petition allowed',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => ' Amareshwar Sahay, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Amareshwar Sahay, J.</p><p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.</p><p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.</p><p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.</p><p>4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.</p><p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.</p><p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.</p><p>9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.</p><p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.</p><p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Amareshwar Sahay, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1 .In this application the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27.4.1998 passed by the trial Court rejecting the petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure filed by the petitioner for his discharge.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The facts in short are that a complaint petition was filed by the opposite party No. 2 before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dhanbad, against the petitioner and one Budha Dev Banerjee for commission of the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, which was registered as C.P. Case No. 268 of 1995.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. In the complaint petition, it was alleged that the complainant-opposite party No. 2, had a marriageable daughter, namely, Meena Chakraborty and he was in search of matching groom for his daughter. A common relative, namely, Budhdev Banerjee (the other co-accused) assured the complainant that the marriage between her daughter and Asish Chattopadhya, son of petitioner can be settled provided some cost and expenses are paid to him for approaching the petitioner, who at that time at Vishakapattannm. Accordingly, the complainant paid Rs. 10,000/- to the other co-accused Budhadev Banerjee. It was further alleged that the petitioner being the father of the boy gave his consent for the marriage of his son and the date of marriage was also fixed, but later on, the accused stated demanding dowry which could not be fulfilled and therefore, the accused petitioner cancelled the marriage by sending telegram.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Cognizance was taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Subsequently two witnesses were examined by the complainant before charge. At that stage a petition under Section 245(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure was filed on behalf of the petitioner stating therein that there was no material at all on the record to frame charge against the petitioner and therefore, he may be discharged.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. The learned Magistrate by the impugned order rejected the said petition for discharge holding that there was prima facie evidence on record to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. On behalf of the petitioner a specific point was raised that in view of Bihar Amendment which came into force in 1976, no cognizance could have been taken against the petitioner for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, unless a sanction was obtained from the competent authority as envisaged under proviso to Section 4 of the Act by way of Bihar Amendment. From the impugned order, I find that the learned Magistrate has not even touched the said point and only in one line has stated that he has found prima Jade evidence to frame charge under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. Therefore, it appears that the impugned order suffers from non-application of mind.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. Mr. S.K. Laik, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relying on a decision in the case of Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr., reported in : (1997)10SCC524 , submitted that the cognizance taken under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was absolutely bad-in-law in view of the Bihar Amendment of 1976, whereby obtaining of sanction was a condition precedent for taking cognizance for the offence under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Mr. Kalyan Banerjee, learned Counsel for the opposite party No. 2, rather conceded on this point.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. So far as the offence under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, admittedly, according to the complainant, no money was paid directly to the petitioner by the complainant nor there was any material on record to show that the petitioner in any way induced the complainant to deliver any property or money and, therefore, in my view, there was no material at all to frame charge under Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. In view of the discussions and findings above, 1 hold that the learned Court below has wrongly refused to discharge the petitioner. Accordingly, this application is allowed. The impugned order of the learned Court below is hereby set aside and the petitioner is discharged.<p>',
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Subject	Criminal
Court	Jharkhand High Court
Decided On	Nov-22-2005
Case Number	Cri. Revision No. 210 of 1998 (R)
Judge	Amareshwar Sahay, J.
Reported in	2006CriLJ921; I(2006)DMC663; [2006(1)JCR101(Jhr)]
Acts	Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 - Sections 4; Bihar Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1976; Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) , 1973 - Sections 245(1); Indian Penal Code (IPC) - Sections 420
Appellant	Saranan Chattopadhyaya
Respondent	State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and anr.
Appellant Advocate	S.K. Laik, Adv.
Respondent Advocate	Benani Verma, APP and; Kalyan Banerjee, Adv.
Disposition	Petition allowed
Cases Referred	Rajesh Kumar Kejriwal and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Anr.

Saranan Chattopadhyaya Vs. State of Bihar (Now Jharkhand) and anr. - Court Judgment