Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment

Judgment:

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			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Constitution',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
)
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Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the Constitution of India?

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
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			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.

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			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
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		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
)
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3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution of India.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Constitution',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
)
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Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
)
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6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, declined to interfere with the order.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
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			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Constitution',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
)
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It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
)
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9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915 in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
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			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Constitution',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
)
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Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :

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			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
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		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
)
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Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
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			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Constitution',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
)
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(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
)
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(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
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			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Constitution',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
)
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(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
)
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11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
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	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of Constitution of India.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
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			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
		'sub' => 'Constitution',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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M.Y. Eqbal, J.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
	)
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
)
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15. I agree.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
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			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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N.N. Tiwari, J.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
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16. I agree.

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			'id' => '519859',
			'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
			'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
			'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
			'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
			'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
			'court' => 'Jharkhand',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>?</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p style="text-align: justify;">It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a>.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">15. I agree. </p><p style="text-align: justify;">N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">16. I agree.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Constitution',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
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	'casename_url' => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '519859',
		(int) 1 => 'swapan-kumar-bandopadhyay-vs-bokaro-steel'
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$title_for_layout = 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors - Citation 519859 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '519859',
		'acts' => 'Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; <a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); <a href="/act/51550/government-of-india-act-1915-19-repealed-complete-act">Government of India Act, 1915</a> - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; <a href="/act/51737/constitution-of-india-complete-act">Constitution of India</a> - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18',
		'appealno' => 'L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004',
		'appellant' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.',
		'casenote' => ' - CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. Articles 12 & 226: [M. Karpaga Vinayagam, C.J., Narendra Nath Tiwari & D.P.Singh, JJ] Writ petition - Maintainability - Whether State Co-operative Milk Producers Federation Ltd., is  a State within meaning of Article 12 ? - Held, From perusal of relevant Rules of byelaws, it is clear that State Government has no role to play either in policy decision for raising funds for federation or its expenditure and thus have no financial control. Further there is nothing to indicate that Government has any functional and administrative control over Federation. State Government has no role to play in matter of appointment of any of officials of Federation including Managing Director. Federation is totally independent in all respects and in no way subservient to State Government in conduct of its business. Federation in no way can be termed as agency of State Government and does not come within meaning of Article 12 of Constitution. Writ petitions against Federation is not maintainable.  -  So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227..In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226..In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows :It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. Ram Chander Rai reported in AIR2003SC3044 ,the Supreme Court held as follows :Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. (5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied :(1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby. (7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. 12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => 'Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => ' Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,; ',
		'counseldef' => ' Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,; ',
		'court' => 'Jharkhand',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2005-12-02',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => ' S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.',
		'judgement' => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.</p><p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : </p><p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?</p><p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :</p><p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.</p><p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.</p><p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.</p><p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.</p><p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.</p><p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.</p><p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.</p><p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :</p><p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.</p><p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.</p><p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.</p><p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....</p><p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :</p><p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.</p><p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : </p><p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.</p><p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :</p><p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :</p><p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.</p><p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.</p><p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.</p><p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.</p><p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.</p><p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.</p><p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.</p><p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.</p><p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.</p><p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.</p><p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,</p><p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.</p><p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.</p><p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.</p><p>15. I agree. </p><p>N.N. Tiwari, J.</p><p>16. I agree.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]',
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		'respondent' => 'Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. The only question referred to and sought to be answered by this Bench in these appeals is : ',
	(int) 2 => '<p>Whether an appeal under Clause 10 of Letters Patent (commonly known as Letters Patent Appeal--LPA) is maintainable against an order passed by a single Judge under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>?',
	(int) 3 => '<p>2. The brief facts of the case are as follows :',
	(int) 4 => '<p>Appellant Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 was an employee of M/s. Bharat Refractories Limited (hereinafter referred to as M/s. B.R.L.). He was allotted a Flat No. 6013 in Sector IV-F of Bokaro Steel City. Even after his dismissal from service, he did not vacate the official quarter. On an application jointly preferred by 'Bokaro Steel Plant' of Steel Authority of India Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the SAIL) and M/s. B.R.L., a proceeding under Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the 1971 Act) was initiated against the appellant, registered as A/E Case No. 21/97 before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. In the said case, the appellant filed an objection challenging the jurisdiction of the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant and pleaded that the house was allotted to him by M/s. B.R.L. and as such the said proceeding was not maintainable before the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. He further pleaded that there was a separate Estate Officer appointed under Section 3 of the 1971 Act for M/s. B.R.L. His plea was accepted and the case was dismissed, holding the same as not maintainable, by order dated 14th August, 1999 passed by the Estate Officer, Bokaro Steel Plant. Against the said order, Misc. Appeal being No. 53/99 was filed by M/s. B.R.L. in the Court of District Judge, Bokrao. After giving notice and hearing the parties, the learned 1st Additional District Judge, Bokaro, vide judgment dated 19th January, 2002 allowed the appeal and directed the appellant to vacate the Quarter. For about two years thereafter, the appellant did not choose to move before any Court of law against the said judgment dated 19th January, 2002. After more than two years, a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> was preferred by appellant against the judgment dated 19th January, 2002, registered as W.P. (C) No. 1341 of 2004, which was dismissed by the learned single Judge by impugned order dated 25th March, 2004 both on merit and on the ground of delay.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>3. So far as appellant Domon Mahto or L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 is concerned, he was married with the 2nd respondent-Meena Devi on 3rd May, 2001. Later on, because of disputes and differences between them, they started living separately. A Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 was filed by the appellant praying for a decree of divorce. The 2nd respondent-Meena Devi (wife) appeared in the said case and filed an application under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>, claiming maintenance pendente lite. The learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad on hearing the parties, vide impugned order dated 9th July, 2003 allowed the petition and directed the appellant (husband to pay monthly maintenance of Rs. 1500/- to his wife-2nd respondent, pendente lite from the date of filing the petition i.e. 9th May, 2003 as also the expenses of the proceedings.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>4. The appellant Doman Mahato challenged the aforesaid order before this Court under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Initially, the learned single Judge tried to get the dispute settled by negotiation as the wife agreed to lead conjugal life with her husband, but since the appellant (husband) refused to keep his wife, the case was heard on merit. By impugned order dated 30th April, 2004, the learned single Judge in exercise of power conferred under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order of maintenance pendente lite. Against the said order, L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 has been preferred by the appellant.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>5. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned Counsel for the appellant-Doman Mahato, referred to Supreme Court decision in the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , wherein by majority decision, the Supreme Court held that after the amendment of CPC a litigant may pursue his remedy under Article 226 and/or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Reliance was also placed on Supreme Court decision in the case of Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society v. Swaraj Developers, reported in : [2003]3SCR762 , wherein the Supreme Court held that remedy under Article 227 was available to a party aggrieved by an order of a Civil Court.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>He also placed reliance on Supreme Court decision in the case of Subal Paul, reported in : [2003]1SCR1092 , wherein the Supreme Court held that letters patent appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court in an appeal under Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act is maintainable.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>6. As noticed above, the appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' of L.P.A. No. 312 of 2004 preferred a petition under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the appellate order dated 19th January, 2002 and the appellant, 'Doman Mahato' of L.P.A. No. 393 of 2004 filed a petition under Article 226 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> against the order dated 9th July, 2002 passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Dhanbad under Section 24 of the <a>Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a>. Learned single Judge, however, exercising supervisory power under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, declined to interfere with the order.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>7. It is a settled law that where an order is without jurisdiction or involves non-exercise of jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or there is a grave dereliction of duty or flagrant violation of the law as distinguished from a merely erroneous decision of fact or law or flatten irregularity in procedure or an error of law apparent on the face of the record or that the finding is perverse, being founded on no material whatever, High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>. However, the power under Article 227 cannot be exercised to correct an error of law, not being an error apparent on the face of record.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>8. A similar issue fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 25094 of 1994 as was preferred by one 'Dr. Ranjit Singh'. The Supreme Court vide its order dated 20th November, 1995 while interpreting the provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, which expressly bars the appeal or revision, except as provided by Sub-section (1) held, as follows :',
	(int) 13 => '<p>It is true that Sub-section (4) of Section 10 of the Family Courts Act expressly bars an appeal or revision except as provided by Sub-section (1). Sub-section (1) provides an appeal only against a final order passed by the Family Court. In this sense, the revision filed under Section 115 of the CPC was not maintainable. In law, but in extraordinary cases, 'he High Court may not be precluded from exercising its powers under Article 227 of the Constitution and rectify any grave injustice caused. Be that as it may, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are not inclined to interfere with the matter also because the High Court has merely remanded the matter and it is upon the petitioner-husband to bring all the relevant facts to the notice of the trial Court at the time of hearing of the petition under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>The Special Leave Petition is dismissed with the aforesaid observations.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>9. In the instant case of 'Doman Mahato' the order dated 9th July, 2003 passed in Title (Matrimonial) Suit No. 289 of 2002 by the Principle Judge. Family Court, Dhanbad having been challenged, learned single Judge instead of exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226, exercised power under Article 227, as evident from the impugned order dated 30th April, 2004 passed in W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003. Therefore, it is clear that the impugned order in that case was passed under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 16 => '<p>10. The question : Whether a Letters Patent Appeal against an order passed under Article 226 and/or under Article 227 is maintainable or not and whether such right can be curtailed without any express provision under the statute, fell for consideration before the Supreme Court, from time to time.',
	(int) 17 => '<p>In the case of 'Umaji Keshao Mesh-ram v. Smt. Radhikabai', reported in : [1986]1SCR731 , the Supreme Court held, as follows :.no appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent lies to the High Court against the order of a single Judge of the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, no less and no more.'.the reference to Section 107 of the <a>Government of India Act, 1915</a> in Clause 15 of the Letters Patent must necessarily be read as a reference to Article 227 of the Constitution. So read an appeal under Clause 15 is clearly not maintainable against an order made in exercise of the powers under Article 227.....In our opinion, where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution and the party chooses to file his application under both these Articles, in fairness and justice to such party and in order not to deprive him of the valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226....',
	(int) 18 => '<p>In the case of Subhilabai Laxminarayan Mudliyar v. Nihalchand Waghajibhai Shaha . reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 11, the Supreme Court endorsing the aforesaid view, held as follows :',
	(int) 19 => '<p>The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court wrongly understood the above Umaji Kesho Mesram case. In Umaji case it was clearly held that where the facts justify a party in filing an application either under Article 226 or 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a> and the party chooses to file his application under both these articles. In fairness of justice to party and in order not to deprive him of valuable right of appeal the Court ought to treat the application as being made under Article 226 and if in deciding the matter, in the final order the Court gives ancillary directions which may pertain to Article 227, this ought not to be held to deprive a party of the right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent where the substantial part of the order sought to be appealed against is under Article 226. Rule 18 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules read with Clause 15 of the Letters Patent provides for appeal to the Division Bench of the High Court from a judgment of the learned single Judge passed on a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. In the present case the Division Bench was clearly wrong in holding that the appeal was not maintainable against the order of the learned single Judge. In these circumstances we set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench and direct that the Letters Patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned single Judge would now be heard and decided on merits. In view of the fact that it is an old matter we request the High Court to decide the Letters Patent Appeal within six months. It is further directed that till the final disposal of the Letters Patent Appeal the operation of the order of the single Judge shall remain stayed. The appeals are allowed in part with no order as to costs.',
	(int) 20 => '<p>Similar was the view of the Supreme Court in the case of Ratnagiri District Central Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Dinkar Kashinath Waive reported in (1993) Suppl (1) SCC 9, wherein the Court held as follows : ',
	(int) 21 => '<p>It is clear that so far as the present case was concerned the relief granted by the learned single Judge clearly indicate that he was exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 and not under Article 227 of the Constitution and in this view of the matter and in the light of what has been laid down by this Hon'ble Court in the judgment referred to above a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 15 would be maintainable before the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal is, therefore, allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench is set aside. The matter is sent back to the High Court and it is expected that the Division Bench will hear the appeal on merits and dispose it of in accordance with law expeditiously preferably within four months from today.',
	(int) 22 => '<p>In the case of Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai reported in : AIR2003SC3044 , the Supreme Court held as follows :',
	(int) 23 => '<p>Such like matters frequently arise before the High Court. We sum up our conclusions in a nutshell, even at the risk of repetition and state the same as hereunder :',
	(int) 24 => '<p>(1) Amendment by Act 46 of 1999 with effect from 1.7.2002 in Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot and does not affect in any manner the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.',
	(int) 25 => '<p>(2) Interlocutory orders, passed by the Courts subordinate to the High Court, against which remedy of revision has been excluded by CPC Amendment Act 46 of 1999 are nevertheless open to challenge in and continue to be subject to, certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.',
	(int) 26 => '<p>(3) Certiorari, under Article 226 of the Constitution, is issued for correcting gross errors of jurisdiction i.e. when a Subordinate Court is found to have acted (i) without jurisdiction by assuming jurisdiction where there exists none; or (ii) in excess of its jurisdiction-by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (iii) acting in flagrant disregard of law or the rules of procedure or acting in violation of principles of natural justice where there is no procedure specified and thereby occasioning failure of justice.',
	(int) 27 => '<p>(4) Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the Subordinate Courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction.',
	(int) 28 => '<p>(5) Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied : (1) the error in manifest and apparent on the fact of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby.',
	(int) 29 => '<p>(6) A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be preceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the Subordinate Court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent.',
	(int) 30 => '<p>(7) The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the above said two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or proceedings in a Subordinate Court and the error though calling for correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings in an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and/or early disposal of the suit or proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as, if not corrected at that very moment, may become incapable of correction at a later stage and refusal to intervene would result in travesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the Us.',
	(int) 31 => '<p>(8) The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a Court, of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct of mere formal or technical character.',
	(int) 32 => '<p>(9) In practice, the parameters for exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari and those calling for exercise of supervisory jurisdiction are almost similar and the width of jurisdiction exercise by the High Court in India unlike English Courts has almost obliterated the distinction between the two jurisdictions. While exercising jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, the High Court may annul or set aside the act, order or proceedings of the Subordinate Courts but cannot substitute its own decision in place thereof. In exercise of supervisory jurisdiction the High Court may not only give suitable directions so as to guide the Subordinate Court as to the manner in which act or proceed thereafter or afresh, the High Court may in appropriate cases itself make an order in supersession or substitution of the order of the Subordinate Court as the Court should have made in the facts and circumstances of the case.',
	(int) 33 => '<p>11. So far as Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Appeal of the High Court of Patna, as adopted by the Jharkhand High Court is concerned, it is almost same and similar to Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Appeal of Bombay High Court. Therefore, the principles as laid down by the Supreme Court and referred to above, is also applicable in the present cases.',
	(int) 34 => '<p>12. From the decisions of the Supreme Court aforementioned, it is clear that a if a single Judge exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 as well as both under Articles 226 and 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, against such judgment, Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 shall lie before this Court. On the other hand, if learned single Judge exercises his jurisdiction only under Article 227 of the Constitution Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 would not be maintainable against such judgment before a Division Bench of this Court,',
	(int) 35 => '<p>13. From the writ petition W.P.C. (C) No. 1341 of 2004 preferred by appellant 'Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay' (L.P.A. 312/2004), it is evident that the said application was preferred only under Article 227 of the <a>Constitution of India</a>, whereas the appellant 'Doman Mahato' (L.P.A. 393/2004) had filed writ petition, W.P. (C) No. 3612 of 2003 under Article 226 of Constitution, but the learned single Judge passed the impugned order in exercise of his jurisdiction under Article 227 of <a>Constitution of India</a>.',
	(int) 36 => '<p>14. In the circumstances, both the appeals filed under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order(s) passed under Article 227 of Constitution are not maintainable. The question as raised in these appeals is, accordingly, answered in negative and against the appellants. Both the appeals are, accordingly, dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order, as to costs.',
	(int) 37 => '<p>M.Y. Eqbal, J.',
	(int) 38 => '<p>15. I agree. ',
	(int) 39 => '<p>N.N. Tiwari, J.',
	(int) 40 => '<p>16. I agree.<p>',
	(int) 41 => '<p>'
)
$paragraphAfter = (int) 1
$cnt = (int) 42
$i = (int) 41
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Subject	Constitution
Court	Jharkhand High Court
Decided On	Dec-02-2005
Case Number	L.P.A. Nos. 312 and 393 of 2004
Judge	S.J. Mukhopadhaya, A.C.J.,; M.Y. Eqbal and; N.N. Tiwari, JJ.
Reported in	AIR2006Jhar19; [2006(1)JCR1(Jhr)]
Acts	Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 - Sections 3; Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - Sections 24; Indian Succession Act - Sections 299; Family Courts Act - Sections 10(4), 19(1) and 19(4); Government of India Act, 1915 - Sections 107; Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) (Amendment) Act, 1999 - Sections 115; Constitution of India - Articles 226 and 227; Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules - Rule 18
Appellant	Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay;doman Mahto
Respondent	Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors.;state of Jharkhand and anr.
Appellant Advocate	Siddharth Ranjan, Adv. in LPA 312/2004,; Indrajit Sinha,;
Respondent Advocate	Ananda Sen, Adv. for respondent 1 in LPA 312/2004,; G.P. No. 1 in LPA 393/2004,;
Disposition	Appeal dismissed
Cases Referred	Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai

Swapan Kumar Bandopadhyay Vs. Sail Through Its Unit Bokaro Steel City and ors. - Court Judgment