State of Bihar Through the Commissioner and Secretary, Industries Department Government of Bihar Vs. Jagarnath Mandal and ors. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/515942
SubjectService
CourtJharkhand High Court
Decided OnJan-27-2003
Case NumberLPA No. 645 of 2001
Judge V.K. Gupta, C.J. and; S.J. Mukhopadhaya, J.
Reported in[2003(2)JCR193(Jhr)]
ActsService Law
AppellantState of Bihar Through the Commissioner and Secretary, Industries Department Government of Bihar
RespondentJagarnath Mandal and ors.
Appellant Advocate A. Allam, Adv.
Respondent Advocate M.S. Anwar,; Satyendra Singh and; S.K. Dwivedi, Advs
Excerpt:
- motor vehicles act, 1988[c.a.no.59/1988] section 166; [a.k. patnaik, cj, a.k. gohil & s. samvatsar, jj] application for compensation for personal injury death of injured claimant subsequently for some other reasons held, claim for personal injury will abate on the death of claimant. claim will not survive to his legal representative except as regards claim for pecuniary loss to estate of claimant. - 3. after hearing the learned counsel for the parties in this appeal, first and foremost, we must clearly emphasize that the aforesaid stand of the respondents in the contempt application, viz.order1. on 4.2.2002, the learned judge while allowing cwjc no. 1016 of 1999 (r) directed,the respondent no. 3 in that writ petitioner to pay the retrial dues to the petitioners within a period of two months. the operative portion of that order reads thus :'it appears that this case is covered by the order passed in cwjc no. 3250 of 98 (r). however, having regard to the stand taken in the counter affidavit, this writ application is disposed of with a direction to respondent no. 3 to pay the entire retiral dues within two months from the date or receipt of a copy of this order. if the petitioner will have any grievance, he may file a representation before respondent no. 3 which shall be considered in accordance with law.'2. the district officer, khadi gramodyog board, patna was respondent.....
Judgment:
ORDER

1. On 4.2.2002, the learned Judge while allowing CWJC No. 1016 of 1999 (R) directed,the respondent No. 3 in that writ petitioner to pay the retrial dues to the petitioners within a period of two months. The operative portion of that order reads thus :

'It appears that this case is covered by the order passed in CWJC No. 3250 of 98 (R). However, having regard to the stand taken in the counter affidavit, this writ application is disposed of with a direction to respondent No. 3 to pay the entire retiral dues within two months from the date or receipt of a copy of this order. If the petitioner will have any grievance, he may file a representation before respondent No. 3 which shall be considered in accordance with law.'

2. The District Officer, Khadi Gramodyog Board, Patna was respondent No. 3 in the writ application, whether it was the District Officer or the Chief Executive Officer, Khadi Gramodyog Board, in pith and substance the direction to pay the retiral dues of the writ petitioner was aimed at the Khadi Gramodyog Board and it was the Board which was held liable by thelearned Single Judge to pay the retrial dues to the petitioner. Since admittedly, the retiral dues were not paid in time (these have not been paid actually till date), a contempt application [being MJC No. 554 of 2000 (R)] was filed and the learned Single Judge vide order dated 23.8.2001 impugned in this appeal, inter alia, passed the direction that if the retrial dues were not paid, the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar shall appear in person in Court. In the aforesaid order, it was also observed that the stand taken by the respondent in the contempt application that one of the reasons of not paying the retrial dues to the petitioner was that his appointment had not been approved by the State Government was wholly unjustified at this stage of the proceedings.

3. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties in this appeal, first and foremost, we must clearly emphasize that the aforesaid stand of the respondents in the contempt application, viz., that the writ petitioner's appointment had not been approved by the State Government was wholly untenable and totally misconceived. In the face of the clear direction issued by the writ Court on 4.2.2000, the binding obligation to pay the retiral dues to the writ petitioner came into operation and this obligation had nothing to do with the question whether the writ petitioner's appointment had been approved by the State Government or not. In reiteration, therefore, we wish to observe and direct that the right to receive the retrial dues stood vested in the writ petitioner from the date the aforesaid order was passed and this right continues in operation until the amount in full is paid to him. This right now is not depending on the approval or non-approval of his appointment by the State Government or by any other authority. Undisputedly, the writ petitioner served the respondents for full 36 years. When he retired and the writ Court had issued the aforesaid mandamus for payment of his retrial dues, the respondents came up with the aforesaid misconceived and untenable plea about the non-approval of his appointment. If anyone was aggrievedby the issuance of the aforesaid mandamus issued by the learned Single Judge, it was open to that party to challenge that order in appeal. Not doing so has resulted in the aforesaid order dated 4.2.2000 having assumed finality in law. That being the case, therefore, we have no hesitation in observing, declaring and directing that notwithstanding the so called alleged non approval of his appointment or notwithstanding even any alleged irregularity in his appointment, the fact is that he had served for 36 long years and because of the finality in law of the aforesaid judgment of the writ Court, the writ petitioner is entitled to receive his retrial benefits.

4. We, however, do not find ourselves in agreement with the view of the learned Single Judge that the Special Secretary, Government of Bihar, or the Chief Secretary, Government of Bihar in law were answerable to the contempt charge. The writ petitioner was an employee of the Khadi Gramodyog Board. It is the Board which is liable to pay the retrial dues to the writ petitioner. A direction was also issued by the Writ Court aimed at the Board to pay the dues, whether the District Officer was to pay or the Chief Executive Officer was liable to pay.

5. We, accordingly, while setting aside the aforesaid part of the impugned order which held the Special Secretary or the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bihar liable to pay, direct that the Khadi Gramodyog Board, Gandhi Maidan, Patna shall pay to the writ petitioner all the retiral dues to him as per the writ Court's order dated 4.2.2000 before the next date before us which we propose to fix by this order. The Khadi Gramodyog Board, shall, accordingly ensure that a Banker's cheque/ demand draft for the amount in question shall be handed over to the writ petitioner before the next date or brought in the Court. If the Board does not have the funds available for this purpose, it is between the Board and the State Government to enter into some sort of arrangement, so that funds are provided to the Board. If such ah arrangement between the State Govern-ment and the Board does not work out, again it is for the Board to make arrangement for the availability of the funds to pay the retiral dues to the petitioner, If by the next date in the Court, the payment is not made, we direct that the Board shall stop spending or expending any money under any head for any purpose whatsoever from the date till the payment is made to the writ petitioner. On the next date, the Chief Executive Officer of the Board and the District Officer at Ranchi shall also appear in person, if the dues by then are not paid to the petitioner.

Let the matter appear again on 12.2.2003.

Let copies of this order be given to the learned counsel for the parties.