Dharmawati Devi and ors. Vs. Gurbachan Singh and anr. - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/514431
SubjectInsurance;Motor Vehicles
CourtUttaranchal High Court
Decided OnJun-26-2006
Judge P.C. Verma and; B.C. Kandpal, JJ.
Reported inII(2007)ACC109
AppellantDharmawati Devi and ors.
RespondentGurbachan Singh and anr.
Cases ReferredShivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More
Excerpt:
- motor vehicles act, 1988[c.a.no.59/1988] section 166; [a.k. patnaik, cj, a.k. gohil & s. samvatsar, jj] application for compensation for personal injury death of injured claimant subsequently for some other reasons held, claim for personal injury will abate on the death of claimant. claim will not survive to his legal representative except as regards claim for pecuniary loss to estate of claimant. - this part of the act is clearly a departure from the usual common principle of law that a claimant should establish negligence on the part of the owner or driver of the motor vehicle before claiming any compensation for the death or permanent disablement caused on account of a motor vehicle accident. this part of the act is clearly a departure from the usual common law principle that.....p.c. verma, j.1. this appeal has been preferred by the appellants against the judgment and order dated 21st february, 1990, passed by the motor accident claims tribunal, nainital (hereinafter referred as 'the tribunal') in motor accident claim no. 41 of 1981, smt. dharamawati devi and ors. v. gurucharan singh and ors., whereby the claim petition was dismissed by 'the tribunal'.2. brief facts of the case are, that on 25th november, 1980, at about 1.30 p.m. karan singh was standing on the kachhi patri of road near the east of lok bastra ekkai haripara and persuaded the farmers not to supply sugarcane to the factory. one tractor bearing registration no. utf 6339 driven by gurcharan singh-opposite party no. 1 in a very rash and negligent manner came there and crushed the deceased. the.....
Judgment:

P.C. Verma, J.

1. This appeal has been preferred by the appellants against the judgment and order dated 21st February, 1990, passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Nainital (hereinafter referred as 'the Tribunal') in Motor Accident Claim No. 41 of 1981, Smt. Dharamawati Devi and Ors. v. Gurucharan Singh and Ors., whereby the claim petition was dismissed by 'the Tribunal'.

2. Brief facts of the case are, that on 25th November, 1980, at about 1.30 p.m. Karan Singh was standing on the Kachhi Patri of road near the east of Lok Bastra Ekkai Haripara and persuaded the farmers not to supply sugarcane to the factory. one tractor bearing registration No. UTF 6339 driven by Gurcharan Singh-opposite party No. 1 in a very rash and negligent manner came there and crushed the deceased. The claimant claimed Rs. 15,00,000 as compensation. At the time of accident, the deceased was practising lawyer. He was aged 46 years arid his professional income was Rs. 1,000 and by agriculture and other income comes to Rs. 5,000. The deceased was a promising practising lawyer and was income-tax assessee. Therefore, the claimants filed a claim petition before the Tribunal concerned in lieu of the death of Karan Singh.

3. The owners/respondents filed their written statement in the claim petition before the Tribunal concerned alleging therein that the petition for compensation was misconceived and was based on wrong facts and allegations. The respondents also alleged that the deceased was not a practising Advocate and highly exaggerated income has been shown by the claimants. It was also alleged that the deceased at the time of accident was 55 years of age and he was sick person having very short expectancy of his life. He never looked after the agriculture farm. The Insurance Company also disputed the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to try the claim petition. The accident was occurred due to the fault of the deceased and the claim petition was liable to be dismissed.

4. The opposite party No. 3-Insurance Company contested the case by filing written statement stating therein that the Insurance Company is not liable to pay amount of compensation and that the vehicle alleged to be involved in the accident was not being driven by the person holding a licence and the tractor was insured for compensation risk for Rs. 1,50,000 only. The claim petition was not maintainable under law as the death of the deceased-Karan Singh was caused by an intentional act of committing his murder by the driver of the tractor who was planning to murder the deceased for the last several days preceding the incident. It was also alleged that the death of Karan Singh was not the result of any accident of the motor vehicle but the offending tractor was used for commission of murder of the deceased; hence the Insurance Company is not liable to pay any compensation.

5. On the pleadings of the parties, the Tribunal framed following issues:

1. Whether the tractor No. UTF 6339 was being driven by Gurucharan Singh respondent No. 1 or by Gurnam Singh driver on 25th November, 1980 at 1.30 p.m. near Lok Vastra Ikai Haripura, P.S. Jaspur? Its effects?

2. Whether the accident in question resulting in the death of Karan Singh occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the tractor in question by its driver? Its effect?

3. What was the age of the deceased?

4. Whether the deceased was a practising lawyer? If so, its effect?

5. To what amount of compensation, if any, are the claimants entitled and against whom of the respondents?

6. Whether the driver of the tractor in question did not hold a valid driving licence? If so, its effect?

7. Whether the death of the deceased was not the result of the accident in question and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try this petition?

8. Whether the Insurance Company is not liable to pay any compensation as alleged in Para 15 of the amended written statement of opposite party No. 3, Paper No. 18B?

9. Whether the accident of the deceased has been caused with the intention of committing murder and this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try the petition as alleged in Paras 12 and 14 of the amended written statement of opposite party No. 3 Paper No. 18B?

6. In support of their claim petition the claimants examined PW 1 Smt. Dharmawati, PW 2 Baboo Singh and PW 3 Shyam Singh and filed documents. The opposite parties examined DW 1 Hari Singh and filed documents.

7. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties and perusing the entire material on record, the Tribunal dismissed the claim petition.

8. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid impugned judgment and award, the appellants/claimants have filed the appeal before this Court.

9. Heard learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.

10. Learned Counsel for the appellant has argued that the judgment and award passed by the Tribunal is against the weight of the evidence on record as the Tribunal has passed the impugned order on the basis of wrong appreciation of the provision of law. It has also been submitted that the judgment passed by the Criminal Court has no binding effect to the findings to be recorded by the Tribunal in summary trial. As it is undisputed that the deceased succumbed to injuries by the offending tractor being driven by the respondent No. 1 and the said tractor was insured with National Insurance Company.

11. It reveals from the perusal of the record that the learned Tribunal has dismissed the claim petition on the basis of this fact that the deceased Karan Singh was hit by the tractor which was being driven by his driver and hitting Karan Singh by the tractor was an intentional act. Therefore, a First Information Report pertaining to the murder of Karan Singh was lodged at police station and in the Sessions Trial, the accused was convicted for having committed the offence of murder. Therefore, the Tribunal further held that accident was not the result of rash and negligent driving of the tractor and hence, the claimants are not entitled to any compensation under the provision of Motor Vehicles Act.

12. From the bare perusal of the provision of Motor Vehicles Act, we do not find ourselves in agreement with the findings recorded by the Tribunal as Law of Torts is a developing law. The concept of 'strict liability', 'absolute liability' and 'fault liability', give rise to action in tort. The difference has been explained by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in case of Jay Laxmi Salt Works (P) Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, reported in 1994 (2) ACJ 902, between 'strict liability', and 'fault liability' arises from presence and absence of mental element. A breach of legal duty wilfully or deliberately or even maliciously is negligence emanating from fault liability but injury or damage resulting without any intention yet due to lack of foresight, etc., is strict liability. Since the duty is the primary yardstick to determine the tortious liability its ambit keeps on widening on the touchstone of fairness, practicality of the situation etc. Their Lordships further observed that truly speaking, entire Law of Torts is founded and structured on morality that no one has a right to injure or harm others intentionally or even innocently. Therefore, it would be primitive to class strictly or close finally the ever expanding and growing horizon of tortious liability.

13. The Apex Court in case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and Anr. reported in MANU/SC/0469/1987 : [1987]3SCR404 , has considered the provisions of Section 92-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1939 Act'). Their Lordships held that in any claim for compensation under Sub-section (1) of Section 92A of the 1939 Act, the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. An interim relief has been granted under Section 92A ibid to the legal representatives of the victims who have died on account of motor vehicle accidents. They could claim Rs. 15,000 without any proof of negligence on the part of the owner of the vehicle or of any other person. This part of the Act is clearly a departure from the usual common principle of law that a claimant should establish negligence on the part of the owner or driver of the motor vehicle before claiming any compensation for the death or permanent disablement caused on account of a motor vehicle accident. To that extent the substantive law of the country stands modified.

14. Section 140 of the 1988 Act is the pari materia provision of Section 92A of the 1939 Act providing for liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no-fault. The requirement being 'death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from any accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle', an amount of interim award under Section 140 of the 1988 Act on account of 'no-fault liability' has been enhanced from Rs. 25,000 to Rs. 50,000.

15. Section 161 of the 1988 Act makes special provisions for compensation in case of hit and run motor accident. Further statutory change has taken place in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 by Insertion of Section 163-A which provides as under:

163-A. Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle of the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle, compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be.

Explanation--For the purposes of this sub-section, 'permanent disability' shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923).

(2) In any claim for compensation under Sub-section (1) the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle concerned or of any other person.

(3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time-to-time amend the Second Schedule.

16. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Ramanbhai Prabhatbhai and Anr. (supra), has laid down thus:

Section 92A of the Act provides that where the death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of the said section. The amount of compensation which is payable thereunder in respect of the death of any person is a fixed sum of fifteen thousand rupees and the amount of compensation payable under it in respect of the permanent disablement of any person is a fixed sum of seven thousand and five hundred rupees. Sub-section (3) of Section 92A of the Act provides that in any claim for compensation under Sub-section (1) of Section 92A, the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. It is thus seen that to a limited extent relief has been granted under Section 92-A of the Act to the legal representatives of the victims who have died on account of motor vehicles accidents. Now they can claim Rs. 15,000 without proof of any negligence on the part of the owner of the vehicle or of any other person. This part of the Act is clearly a departure from the usual common law principle that a claimant should establish negligence on the part of the owner or driver of the motor vehicle before claiming any compensation for the death or permanent disablement caused on account of a motor vehicle accident. To that extent the substantive law of the country stands modified.

17. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Shivaji Dayanu Patil v. Vatschala Uttam More reported in MANU/SC/0402/1991 : [1991]3SCR26a , has laid down that 'the expression 'arising out of has a wider connotation as compared to the 'accident caused'. The expression 'arising out of has been used in Sections 165, 163A and Section 140 of the 1988 Act. There is departure from the previous Act of 1939 in which under Section 95(1)(b)(ii) the expression used was 'caused by'. The words used in Sections 140, 163A and 165 the Apex Court laid down that use of expression 'arising out of indicates that for the purpose of awarding compensation under Section 92A of 1939 Act the causal or permanent disablement is not required to be direct and proximate and it can be less immediate. This would imply that accident should be connected with the use of the motor vehicle but the said connection need not be direct and immediate. This construction of the expression 'arising out of the use of motor vehicle' in Section 92A of the 1939 Act enlarge the field of protection made available to the victims of an accident and is in consonance with the beneficial object underlying the enactment'.

18. In the instant case it is clear from the allegation made in the claim petition as well as the evidence available on record that the murder was not originally intended. Even if it is a case of murder having the intention or knowledge, it was definitely an accidental murder arising out of use of motor vehicle. Thus the claim petition was clearly maintainable before the Claims Tribunal and the Tribunal has erred in holding that it has having no jurisdiction to entertain the claim petition.

19. In the case at hand it is quite clear that the death was caused by the act of driver which cannot be said to be designed by the deceased as in view of the facts of the case, the intention, which is hidden in the mind is not of much significance, as the murder was not the main act contemplated. It was clearly a case of accidental death/murder as averred in pleadings as well as evidence adduced by the parties. Hence, the claim petition was triable by Claims Tribunal under the provision of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and it could not be dismissed at threshold.

20. We have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that from the material available on record a case of accidental death/murder is made out. Thus the Claims Tribunal has a jurisdiction to try the case and the observations recorded by the Tribunal with regard to the maintainability of the claim petition is sustainable. Thus the dismissal of the claim petition at the outset is bad in law. The impugned judgment and award is accordingly not sustainable.

21. In view of the above, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and award dated 21st February, 1990, passed by the M.A.C.T., Nainital in MAC. No. 41 of 1981. It is directed that the Claims Tribunal shall deal with the matter afresh and decide the same on merit after recording the evidence.

22. As the matter is quite old, therefore, it is desirable that the matter be decided expeditiously and preferably within a period of three months.