Manoj Vs. Savita - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture whether or not the final product is an excisable product. in the process of manufacturing of country spirit, the over proof spirit which is not potable is reduced to issuable strength, which is potable. colouring and flavouring agents are added at the time of maturation. thereafter the liquor is supplied in sealed bottles to the retail contractors. this is the process of treatment given to over proof spirit in order to render it fit for human consumption in the form of country liquor. if the process is analysed there cannot be any scintilla of doubt that the process involves the manufacturing one under the provisions of section 2(f) of central excise act, 1944. as per the m.p. country spirits rules as well as clause 6 of the tender conditions it is mandatory for a distiller to supply country liquor in sealed bottles and not otherwise. therefore, packaging and bottling of liquor come within the ambit and sweep of manufacture within the meaning of clause (f) of section 2 central excise act, 1944 in view of the definition contained in section 65(76b) of the finance act especially keeping in view the exclusionary facet and further regard being had to the circular issued by central board of excise and customs. - jabalpur, this petitioner has challenged not only the aforesaid order dated 19-2-2001, but also seeks quashment of aforesaid criminal case, after being unsuccessful in his crl. thirdly, this petition for quashment of complaint, is filed after remaining unsuccessful in the two courts below, which in fact is a second revision in the garb of application filed under section 482 of the code, which is not permissible.ordernarain singh 'azad', j.1. feeling aggrieved by the order of dismissal of an application, filed by this petitioner under section 245 of the code of criminal procedure, hereinafter referred to as the code, in criminal case no. 1218/2000, pending in the court of j.m.f.c. jabalpur, this petitioner has challenged not only the aforesaid order dated 19-2-2001, but also seeks quashment of aforesaid criminal case, after being unsuccessful in his crl. rev. no. 307/2001, which stood disposed of by iind a.s.j. jabalpur, on 7-5-2002.2. as per this petitioner, on a report dated 20-9-1998, lodged by respondent against this petitioner, crime no. 162/98, was registered for offences punishable under section 498a/494/506 of the ipc and under section 3/4 of the dowry prohibition act, in respect of which the police submitted expungement report, bearing no. 13/6-12-98. thereafter, the respondent, the wife of this petitioner filed a private complaint in the court of j.m.f.c. jabalpur, which is registered as complaint case no. 472/99. on report being called from concerning police station katangi, it is informed that in respect of the allegations levelled in her first information report dated 20th sept. 1998, the respondent has filed the private complaint against this petitioner, with exaggerated facts, which is registered as complaint case no. 1218/ 2000. on being summoned by the court of jmfc, this petitioner filed an application under sub-section (2) of section 245 of the code, which stood disallowed on 19-2-2001. the petitioner's challenge to aforesaid order in crl. rev. no. 360/2001, also resulted in rejection by the second addl. sessions judge, jabalpur, on 7-5-2002, and hence the petitioner has approached this court, seeking exercise of inherent powers for quashment of the proceedings of the criminal complaint no. 1218/2000.3. it is argued on behalf of the petitioner that the submission of expungement report by the concerning police station katangi, and its acceptance, amount to discharge of the petitioner and hence a second criminal case, on the same set of facts is barred, as per principle of autrefois acquit. in support of this argument, shri p.r. soni, learned counsel for the petitioner, has drawn the court's attention to chittaranjan saha v. state, reported in air 1960 patna 168 : 1960 cri lj 503, and mahomed safi v. state of west bengal, reported in air 1966 sc 69 : (1966 cri lj 75).4. but, it is found explained by their lordships of the supreme court in mahomed safi v. state of west bengal (1966 cri lj 75) (supra) that --for the bar under section 403(1) to operate the accused must have been (a) tried by a court; (b) which is of competent jurisdiction and; (c) acquitted of the offences alleged to have been committed by him or by an offence with which he might have been charged under section 236 or for which he might have been convicted under section 237 of the code.'5. thus, in this case, the principle of autrefois acquit, does not come to the rescue of the petitioner because he was not discharged by the court in respect of report dated 20-9-98, lodged by respondent. secondly, the expungement report even if submitted by concerning police station katangi, is not proved to have been accepted by the court, which was not found to accept the same merely on submission. thirdly, this petition for quashment of complaint, is filed after remaining unsuccessful in the two courts below, which in fact is a second revision in the garb of application filed under section 482 of the code, which is not permissible.6. thus, no interference in exercise of inherent powers is called for and hence this petition does not merit, which stands disallowed and rejected at the stage of motion hearing.

Judgment:
ORDER

Narain Singh 'Azad', J.

1. Feeling aggrieved by the order of dismissal of an application, filed by this petitioner under Section 245 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, hereinafter referred to as the Code, in Criminal Case No. 1218/2000, pending in the Court of J.M.F.C. Jabalpur, this petitioner has challenged not only the aforesaid order dated 19-2-2001, but also seeks quashment of aforesaid criminal case, after being unsuccessful in his Crl. Rev. No. 307/2001, which stood disposed of by IInd A.S.J. Jabalpur, on 7-5-2002.

2. As per this petitioner, on a report dated 20-9-1998, lodged by respondent against this petitioner, Crime No. 162/98, was registered for offences punishable under Section 498A/494/506 of the IPC and under Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, in respect of which the police submitted expungement report, bearing No. 13/6-12-98. Thereafter, the respondent, the wife of this petitioner filed a private complaint in the Court of J.M.F.C. Jabalpur, which is registered as Complaint Case No. 472/99. On report being called from concerning Police Station Katangi, it is informed that in respect of the allegations levelled in her first information report dated 20th Sept. 1998, the respondent has filed the private complaint against this petitioner, with exaggerated facts, which is registered as Complaint Case No. 1218/ 2000. On being summoned by the Court of JMFC, this petitioner filed an application under Sub-section (2) of Section 245 of the Code, which stood disallowed on 19-2-2001. The petitioner's challenge to aforesaid order in Crl. Rev. No. 360/2001, also resulted in rejection by the Second Addl. Sessions Judge, Jabalpur, on 7-5-2002, and hence the petitioner has approached this Court, seeking exercise of inherent powers for quashment of the proceedings of the Criminal Complaint No. 1218/2000.

3. It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that the submission of expungement report by the concerning police station Katangi, and its acceptance, amount to discharge of the petitioner and hence a second criminal case, on the same set of facts is barred, as per principle of autrefois acquit. In support of this argument, Shri P.R. Soni, learned counsel for the petitioner, has drawn the Court's attention to Chittaranjan Saha v. State, reported in AIR 1960 Patna 168 : 1960 Cri LJ 503, and Mahomed Safi v. State of West Bengal, reported in AIR 1966 SC 69 : (1966 Cri LJ 75).

4. But, it is found explained by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mahomed Safi v. State of West Bengal (1966 Cri LJ 75) (supra) that --

For the bar Under Section 403(1) to operate the accused must have been (a) tried by a Court; (b) which is of competent jurisdiction and; (c) acquitted of the offences alleged to have been committed by him or by an offence with which he might have been charged Under Section 236 or for which he might have been convicted Under Section 237 of the Code.'

5. Thus, in this case, the principle of autrefois acquit, does not come to the rescue of the petitioner because he was not discharged by the Court in respect of report dated 20-9-98, lodged by respondent. Secondly, the expungement report even if submitted by concerning police station Katangi, is not proved to have been accepted by the Court, which was not found to accept the same merely on submission. Thirdly, this petition for quashment of complaint, is filed after remaining unsuccessful in the two Courts below, which in fact is a second revision in the garb of application filed Under Section 482 of the Code, which is not permissible.

6. Thus, no interference in exercise of inherent powers is called for and hence this petition does not merit, which stands disallowed and rejected at the stage of motion hearing.