Mubarak Vs. Darshansingh - Court Judgment

SooperKanoon Citationsooperkanoon.com/511239
SubjectInsurance;Motor Vehicles
CourtMadhya Pradesh High Court
Decided OnApr-27-2000
JudgeA.M. Sapre, J.
Reported in1(2001)ACC26
AppellantMubarak
RespondentDarshansingh
Appellant AdvocateMr. H.G. Shukla
Respondent AdvocateMr. V. Bhakshi
Excerpt:
- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture whether or not the final product is an excisable product. in the process of manufacturing of country spirit, the over proof spirit which is not potable is reduced to issuable strength, which is potable. colouring and flavouring agents are added at the time of maturation. thereafter the liquor is supplied in sealed bottles to the retail contractors. this is the process of treatment given to over proof spirit in order to render it fit for human consumption in the form of country liquor. if the process is analysed there cannot be any scintilla of doubt that the process involves the manufacturing one under the provisions of section 2(f) of central excise act, 1944. as per the m.p. country spirits rules as well as clause 6 of the tender conditions it is mandatory for a distiller to supply country liquor in sealed bottles and not otherwise. therefore, packaging and bottling of liquor come within the ambit and sweep of manufacture within the meaning of clause (f) of section 2 central excise act, 1944 in view of the definition contained in section 65(76b) of the finance act especially keeping in view the exclusionary facet and further regard being had to the circular issued by central board of excise and customs. - 4. having heard leaned counsel for the parties and having persued the entire record of the case including the impugned award, i am of the view that this appeal has no substance and the same deserves to be dismissed 5. in my opinion, the tribunal was perfectly justified in coming to conclusion that claimant failed to prove the nature of injuries and the resultant loss suffered due to those injuries. accordingly and in view of this discussion, in my opinion, no interference is called for in the well-reasoned finding and the discussion of the tribunal.ordera.m. sapre, j.1. claimant is felt aggrieved by an award rendered by additional m.a.c.t., mandleshwar dated 21.2.1997 passed in claim case no. 127/90. by impugned award, the claimant is awarded a total sum of rs. 6,000/- for the injuries that he suffered. claimant is dissatisfied with what has been awarded to him by learned tribunal. he wants enhancement in the award sum and for that purpose has filed present appeal.2. facts for disposal of this appeal are these on 1.3.1989 at about 4.00 p.m., claimant was coming from his village and was going on the road khalghat road. when claimant was passing from the road, one truck bearing no. mkn-1925 which was driven by respondent no. 1-darshansingh dashed to claimant as a result of which claimant fell down and suffered injuries. it is this accident causing injuries on the body of the claimant gave rise to filing of claim petition by the claimant before the learned tribunal. the claimant claimed compensation of rs. 50,000/- for the injuries that he suffered. the matter was contested only by insurance company. so far as driver and owner of the offending vehicle were concerned, they remained ex-parte. by impugned award, the tribunal held driver of the offending vehicle guilty of rash and negligent driving. while awarding the compensation for the injuries and the resultant loss, in the opinion of tribunal, the claimant was only held entitled to claim a sum of rs. 6,000/-. the tribunal found that nature of injury suffered by the claimant was very simply in nature and did not result into any disability much less permanent disability. it is this award, which is challenged in this appeal by the claimant.3. heard mr. h.g. shukla, learned counsel for plaintiff (claimant) and mr. v. bhakshi learned counsel for respondent no. 3-insurance company. having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the entire record of the case including the impugned award. i am of the view that this appeal has no substance and the same deserves to be dismissed.4. having heard leaned counsel for the parties and having persued the entire record of the case including the impugned award, i am of the view that this appeal has no substance and the same deserves to be dismissed5. in my opinion, the tribunal was perfectly justified in coming to conclusion that claimant failed to prove the nature of injuries and the resultant loss suffered due to those injuries. claimant did not lead any medical evidence nor examined any doctor to prove the nature of injuries, loss suffered, and disability factor. these are all material piece of evidence which a claimant is under legal obligation to lead before he can claim any compensation. in the absence of any medical evidence, it is difficult for the court of make any assessment regarding resultant loss that might have been suffered by the claimant. accordingly and in view of this discussion, in my opinion, no interference is called for in the well-reasoned finding and the discussion of the tribunal.6. the appeal being devoid of substance is accordingly dismissed. no cost.
Judgment:
ORDER

A.M. Sapre, J.

1. Claimant is felt aggrieved by an award rendered by Additional M.A.C.T., Mandleshwar dated 21.2.1997 passed in Claim Case No. 127/90. By impugned award, the claimant is awarded a total sum of Rs. 6,000/- for the injuries that he suffered. Claimant is dissatisfied with what has been awarded to him by learned Tribunal. He wants enhancement in the award sum and for that purpose has filed present appeal.

2. Facts for disposal of this appeal are these on 1.3.1989 at about 4.00 p.m., claimant was coming from his village and was going on the road Khalghat Road. When claimant was passing from the road, one truck bearing No. MKN-1925 which was driven by respondent No. 1-Darshansingh dashed to claimant as a result of which claimant fell down and suffered injuries. It is this accident causing injuries on the body of the claimant gave rise to filing of claim petition by the claimant before the learned Tribunal. The claimant claimed compensation of Rs. 50,000/- for the injuries that he suffered. The matter was contested only by Insurance Company. So far as driver and owner of the offending vehicle were concerned, they remained ex-parte. By impugned award, the Tribunal held driver of the offending vehicle guilty of rash and negligent driving. While awarding the compensation for the injuries and the resultant loss, in the opinion of Tribunal, the claimant was only held entitled to claim a sum of Rs. 6,000/-. The Tribunal found that nature of injury suffered by the claimant was very simply in nature and did not result into any disability much less permanent disability. It is this award, which is challenged in this appeal by the claimant.

3. Heard Mr. H.G. Shukla, learned Counsel for plaintiff (claimant) and Mr. V. Bhakshi learned Counsel for respondent No. 3-Insurance Company. Having heard learned Counsel for the parties and having perused the entire record of the case including the impugned award. I am of the view that this appeal has no substance and the same deserves to be dismissed.

4. Having heard leaned counsel for the parties and having persued the entire record of the case including the impugned award, I am of the view that this appeal has no substance and the same deserves to be dismissed

5. In my opinion, the Tribunal was perfectly justified in coming to conclusion that claimant failed to prove the nature of injuries and the resultant loss suffered due to those injuries. Claimant did not lead any medical evidence nor examined any doctor to prove the nature of injuries, loss suffered, and disability factor. These are all material piece of evidence which a claimant is under legal obligation to lead before he can claim any compensation. In the absence of any medical evidence, it is difficult for the Court of make any assessment regarding resultant loss that might have been suffered by the claimant. Accordingly and in view of this discussion, in my opinion, no interference is called for in the well-reasoned finding and the discussion of the Tribunal.

6. The appeal being devoid of substance is accordingly dismissed. No cost.