Smt. Atibai and ors. Vs. State of M.P. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
criminal - seizure - power of - wild life (protection) act, 1972 - petitioner was vehicle owner caught by respondent in prohibited area for illegal use and seized by respondent - petitioner alleged to have damaged eggs of wild life - petitioner filed application for recovery of tractor - rejected - hence, present revision - whether magistrate had power to grant order of seizure of vehicle when it was found in illegal use? - held, after filing of complaint magistrate is empowered to deal with property, including handing over same for temporary supurdari to its rightful owner - however, at the same time magistrate is to see gravity of offence - if magistrate is prima facie satisfied that vehicle was being used for committing offence under act, magistrate has to take into account statutory mandate that seized property becomes property of state, when same has been used for commission of offence under act and has been seized - hence, petition dismissed - section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture whether or not the final product is an excisable product. in the process of manufacturing of country spirit, the over proof spirit which is not potable is reduced to issuable strength, which is potable. colouring and flavouring agents are added at the time of maturation. thereafter the liquor is supplied in sealed bottles to the retail contractors. this is the process of treatment given to over proof spirit in order to render it fit for human consumption in the form of country liquor. if the process is analysed there cannot be any scintilla of doubt that the process involves the manufacturing one under the provisions of section 2(f) of central excise act, 1944. as per the m.p. country spirits rules as well as clause 6 of the tender conditions it is mandatory for a distiller to supply country liquor in sealed bottles and not otherwise. therefore, packaging and bottling of liquor come within the ambit and sweep of manufacture within the meaning of clause (f) of section 2 central excise act, 1944 in view of the definition contained in section 65(76b) of the finance act especially keeping in view the exclusionary facet and further regard being had to the circular issued by central board of excise and customs. - 2 lacs and two sureties in the like amount. if the magistrate is prima facie satisfied that the vehicle was being used for committing an offence under the act, the magistrate has to take into account the statutory mandate that the seized property becomes the property of the state government when the same has been used for commission of an offence under the act and has been seized. with regard to the merits of the case it is observed that if the magistrate is prima facie satisfied that the vehicle was being used in commission of the offence, he has to keep in mind the statutory mandate also.orderbrij mohan gupta, j.1. petitioners by shri p.s. bhadoriya, advocate.2. respondent/state by shri b.d. mahore, p.p. with shri m.l. gupta, range officer.3. this petition is for impugning the order dated 27-6-07 passed by asj, sabalgarh in criminal revision no. 100/07 by which the learned judge has affirmed an order dated 14-6-07 passed by jmfc, sabalgarh in criminal case no. 296/07 whereby the learned magistrate has rejected an application filed on behalf of the petitioners under section 451/457 of cr.pc for handing over tractor no. mp 06 ja/3236 to them on supurdgi with a trolley (hereinafter referred to as 'vehicle') seized by a forest officer for the offence punishable under sections 27, 29, 32, 39(1)(d), 50 and 51 of wild life (protection) act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act').4. facts as argued and as appeared from perusal of the copies of the relevant documents filed on behalf of the petitions, in brief are, that on 5-3-07 at about 4:00 a.m. (in the morning) during checking by a flying squad of forest officers one harprasad rawat was found carrying sand freshly dug out from chambal river, an area declared as a sanctuary under section 18 of the act, with spade and pick-axe (favada & gainti) without permission. the vehicle was seized by one bhagwat singh jadon game guard (forest guard), game range, sabalgarh. panchanama and seizure memo was prepared, forest crime no. 30/2006-07 was registered. accused harprasad was arrested on the spot. on 12-6-07 complaint was filed against harprasad alleging therein that by the said act of the accused natural habitat and eggs of wild life including tortoise, crocodile and gangage-crocodile (ghadial) are damaged. by such acts the number of wild life in the sanctuary is becoming less day by day. the area from which the sand was dug out was a prohibited area for entry without permission.5. after filing of the complaint, application was filed by the petitioners for handing over the vehicle in their supurdgi, as the vehicle has been registered in the name of late shri bhagwanlal rawat and the petitioners are his heirs. vide aforementioned orders considering fact that by the alleged act the eggs and infants of the wild life were damaged, the application has been rejected by both the courts below, as aforesaid.6. the first ground on which the impugned order has been assailed by shri bhadoriya, learned counsel for the petitioners is that as per the documents of the prosecution, the vehicle has been seized by a game guard who is not a forest officer and thus he is not authorized to seize the same. countering the contention on behalf of the state, attention has been drawn at the definition of the forest officer given under section 2(12a) of the act, section 2(2) of the forest act and also the rule 75 (1) of forest manual and it has been submitted that game guard is a forest guard and forest guard is a forest officer, as provided in aforementioned provisions. section 2(12a) of the act provides that forest officer means the forest officer appointed under clause (2) of section 2 of the indian forest act, 1927 (16 of 1927) or under any other act for the time being in force in a state. section 2(2) of the forest act provides that a forest officer means any person whom the state government or any officer empowered by the state government in this behalf, may appoint to carry out all or any of the purposes of this act or to do anything required by this act or any rule made thereunder to be done by a forest officer. the rule 75 (1) of the forest manual as cited on which the attention has been drawn on behalf of the state goes as under:75. (1) the conservator of forests, powers of forestall collectors, assistant officers, notificationcommissioners, deputy nos. 130-130-848xv,conservator, assistant dated 31-1-28 andconservators, extra-assistant nos. 624-625-341-conservators (whether probationers xv, dated 12-6-28,or otherwise), tehsildars, forest and no. 718-xv,rangers, deputy rangers, foresters dated 12-8-29.and forest guards, whether in permanent or temporary employment, are appointed to do all acts and exercise all powers that are provided by the act, to be done or exercised by any forest officer.(emphasis supplied)thus, it appears that a forest guard, whether permanent or temporary is appointed to do all acts and exercise all powers that are provided by the act to be done or exercised by any forest officer. as provided by section 50 (1)(c) of the act, a forest officer may seize any vehicle used for committing the offence punishable under the act. on perusal of this provision contention of shri bhadoriya that the vehicle was not seized by an authorized officer, cannot be sustained.7. the second ground as raised by shri bhadoriya is, that after filing of the complaint, a magistrate becomes empowered to deal with the property including handing over the same in temporary supurdgi to his rightful owner during pendency of the case. before observing anything on this point the observation of apex court in its latest pronouncement in this regard in state of u.p. and anr. v. lallo singh 2007(3) crimes 224 (sc), is required to be reproduced not only for the decision of this case but for general guidance also. the relevant extracts of the judgment are as under:2. background facts in a nutshell are as follows :- one hoshiyar singh, the brother of the revisionist, lalloo singh was allegedly found carrying sand on a tractor trolley being dug and loaded from the bed of jamuna river, within the sanctuary declared under section 18 of the act. the forest authorities intercepted the tractor trolley, arrested hoshiyar singh and seized the tractor trolley in exercise of the powers conferred under the provisions of the act. a revision was filed by lallo singh claiming to be the owner of the tractor trolley. he, therefore, moved an application for release of the same. the viith addl. chief judicial magistrate in exercise of the powers conferred under section 457 of the code released the tractor trolley in favour of the revisionist on his furnishing personal bond of rs. 2 lacs and two sureties in the like amount. against that order, the stale of u.p. through district forest officer, agra filed a criminal revision no. 85/1999 before the sessions judge, agra which was heard and disposed of by special judge (e.c. act). the revisional court being of the view that the tractor trolley seized under the act, which has become the property of the government, held that same could not be released by the magistrate, allowed the revision and set aside the order of the magistrate. hence, the revision by the revisionist, lalloo singh was filed as noted above.3. the high court by the impugned order held that the magistrate had the jurisdiction.when the matter was before the apex court, after hearing the parties and considering the upto date amended provision, it has been observed:13. for appreciating this contention reference is necessary to section 39 of the act. clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 39 deals with a situation when any vehicle, vessel, weapon, trap or tool has been used for committing an offence and has been seized under the provisions of the act. the twin conditions are that the vehicle etc. must have been used for committing an offence and has been seized. mere seizure of the property without any material to show that the same has been used for committing an offence does not make the seized property, the property of the government. at this juncture, it is also be noted that under sub-section (1) of section 50 action can be taken if the concerned official has reasonable grounds for believing that any person has committed an offence under the act. in other words there has to be reasonable ground for believing that an offence has been committed. when any person is detained or things seized are taken before the magistrate, he has the power to deal with the same 'in accordance with law'. there is a significant addition in sub-section (4) by act 16 of 2003, i.e., requirement of intimation to the chief wild life warden or the officer authorized in this regard as to the action to be taken by the magistrate when the seized property is taken before a magistrate. a combined reading of the omitted sub-section (2) and the substituted sub-section (3-a) of the section 50 makes the position clear that prior to the omission, the officials under the act had the power to direct release of the seized article. under sub-section (1), the power for giving temporary custody subject to the condition that the same shall be produced if and when required by the magistrate is indicative of the fact that the magistrate can pass appropriate orders in respect of the purported seized property which is taken before him. while dealing with an application for temporary release of custody, there cannot be a complete adjudication of the issues involved as the same is a matter for trial. while dealing with the application the magistrate has to take into account the statutory mandate that the seized property becomes the property of the state government when the same has been used for commission of an offence under the act and has been seized. it appears that insertion in sub-section (4) relating to the intimation to the chief wild life officer or the officer authorized by him is intended to give concerned official an opportunity of placing relevant materials on record before the magistrate passes any order relating to release or custody. in appropriate cases on consideration of materials placed before him, prayer for such release or custody can be rejected.14. it is to be noted that under sub-section (1) of section 50 for the purpose of entry, seizure, arrest and detention the official has to form the belief on reasonable grounds that the person has committed an offence under the act. the magistrate is, therefore, required to consider these aspects while dealing with the application as noted above. it cannot be a routine exercise. as noted above, the high court is not justified in holding that section 457 of the code has application.15. it appears that by order dated 26-3-2001 respondent was required to indicate whether he is prepared to deposit a bond of rs. 2,00,000/- as security. if the said security has been furnished, because of passage of time the impugned order shall remain in force, though in view of the analysis made above the conclusions are not sustainable.(emphasis supplied)8. on perusal of the observation of the apex court, it appears that this contention of shri bhadoriya is true that after filing of a complaint a magistrate is empowered to deal with the property, including handing over the same for temporary supurdgi to its rightful owner. however, at the same time a magistrate is to see the gravity of the offence. if the magistrate is prima facie satisfied that the vehicle was being used for committing an offence under the act, the magistrate has to take into account the statutory mandate that the seized property becomes the property of the state government when the same has been used for commission of an offence under the act and has been seized.8.1 on perusal facts of the instant case and case before the apex court both appear more or less similar. it was also a dispute before the apex court, as to whether a magistrate is empowered to release the property under section 457 of cr.pc or not, the same has been concluded in negative. with regard to the merits of the case it is observed that if the magistrate is prima facie satisfied that the vehicle was being used in commission of the offence, he has to keep in mind the statutory mandate also.9. during the course of arguments, in support of the contention that after seizure in such offence a magistrate can hand over the same on supurdgi to the rightful owner till final disposal of the case under section 451 of cr.pc, the attention of the court was drawn on the following orders of this court:(1) amar chand jain v. state of m.p. 2000(ii) mpwn 67.(2) umashankar v. state of m.p. 2000(4) m.p.h.t. 49 (noc) : 2001(i) mpwn 24.(3) kunjilal gupta and anr. v. state of m.p. and ors. 2006(3) mplj 254.(4) raghuveer v. superintendent and project officer, national chambal sanctuary 2004(1) m.p.h.t. 325 : 2004(i) mpwn 77.as observed in this order, while placing reliance on the judgment of the apex court, the same view has been taken, hence, dealing these orders in detail docs not require. these orders do not mandate that in such cases, it is mandatory for a magistrate to hand over the property on supurdgi to a rightful claimant. considering the facts of the case, gravity of the allegation about involvement of the vehicle and the offender is material to consider whether in a particular case, the vehicle concerned is required to be given on supurdgi or not. in this particular case, considering the mandate of the apex court and also the gravity of the act of involvement as alleged against the vehicle, giving the same on supurdgi is not being considered in favour of the petitioners. during the course of arguments, attention was also drawn on behalf of the petitioners on two orders of this bench dated 28th february, 2007 and 21st march, 2007 passed in m.cr.c. nos. 660/07 (prathvi raj v. state of m.p.) and 800/07 (lakshmi narayan v. state of m.p.), in which the vehicles were given on supurdgi. on perusal of both the orders, it appears that it was not objected on behalf of the state particularly on the point that proceedings for confiscation have not been started. at that time, the aforementioned judgment of the apex court was neither cited nor before the court for consideration. as such the ratio of the orders, cited on behalf of the petitioners, cannot fruitfully be utilized in favour of them in the present case, after perusal of the observation of the apex court in the aforementioned case.10. perhaps the statutory mandate is based on the present day circumstances observing that day by day forests and wild lives are being destroyed. it is not only an anti-environmental work but a menace to the society also. at the time of enacting such strict provisions with regard to seizure and disposal of the vehicle, the legislature appears aware of false implications also. as argued, considering these aspects the provisions of section 53 have been enacted, which provide punishment for wrongful seizure etc.11. on perusal of the papers, prima facie it appears that the vehicle was involved in commission of the offence under the act. in view of the observation of the apex court, orders passed by both the courts below do not appear erroneous. accordingly, the contention of shri bhadoriya is replied. no abuse of the process of court appears in existence of the orders, hence, the petition is dismissed.

Judgment:
ORDER

Brij Mohan Gupta, J.

1. Petitioners by Shri P.S. Bhadoriya, Advocate.

2. Respondent/State by Shri B.D. Mahore, P.P. with Shri M.L. Gupta, Range Officer.

3. This petition is for impugning the order dated 27-6-07 passed by ASJ, Sabalgarh in Criminal Revision No. 100/07 by which the learned Judge has affirmed an order dated 14-6-07 passed by JMFC, Sabalgarh in Criminal Case No. 296/07 whereby the learned Magistrate has rejected an application filed on behalf of the petitioners under Section 451/457 of Cr.PC for handing over Tractor No. MP 06 JA/3236 to them on Supurdgi with a trolley (hereinafter referred to as 'vehicle') seized by a Forest Officer for the offence punishable under Sections 27, 29, 32, 39(1)(d), 50 and 51 of Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act').

4. Facts as argued and as appeared from perusal of the copies of the relevant documents filed on behalf of the petitions, in brief are, that on 5-3-07 at about 4:00 a.m. (in the morning) during checking by a flying squad of Forest Officers one Harprasad Rawat was found carrying sand freshly dug out from Chambal river, an area declared as a sanctuary under Section 18 of the Act, with spade and pick-axe (favada & gainti) without permission. The vehicle was seized by one Bhagwat Singh Jadon Game Guard (Forest Guard), Game Range, Sabalgarh. Panchanama and seizure memo was prepared, Forest Crime No. 30/2006-07 was registered. Accused Harprasad was arrested on the spot. On 12-6-07 complaint was filed against Harprasad alleging therein that by the said act of the accused natural habitat and eggs of wild life including tortoise, crocodile and gangage-crocodile (ghadial) are damaged. By such acts the number of wild life in the sanctuary is becoming less day by day. The area from which the sand was dug out was a prohibited area for entry without permission.

5. After filing of the complaint, application was filed by the petitioners for handing over the vehicle in their Supurdgi, as the vehicle has been registered in the name of Late Shri Bhagwanlal Rawat and the petitioners are his heirs. Vide aforementioned orders considering fact that by the alleged act the eggs and infants of the wild life were damaged, the application has been rejected by both the Courts below, as aforesaid.

6. The first ground on which the impugned order has been assailed by Shri Bhadoriya, learned Counsel for the petitioners is that as per the documents of the prosecution, the vehicle has been seized by a Game Guard who is not a Forest Officer and thus he is not authorized to seize the same. Countering the contention on behalf of the State, attention has been drawn at the definition of the Forest Officer given under Section 2(12A) of the Act, Section 2(2) of the Forest Act and also the Rule 75 (1) of Forest Manual and it has been submitted that Game Guard is a Forest Guard and Forest Guard is a Forest Officer, as provided in aforementioned provisions. Section 2(12A) of the Act provides that Forest Officer means the Forest Officer appointed under Clause (2) of Section 2 of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (16 of 1927) or under any other Act for the time being in force in a State. Section 2(2) of the Forest Act provides that a Forest Officer means any person whom the State Government or any officer empowered by the State Government in this behalf, may appoint to carry out all or any of the purposes of this Act or to do anything required by this Act or any Rule made thereunder to be done by a Forest Officer. The Rule 75 (1) of the Forest Manual as cited on which the attention has been drawn on behalf of the State goes as under:

75. (1) The Conservator of Forests, Powers of Forestall Collectors, Assistant Officers, NotificationCommissioners, Deputy Nos. 130-130-848XV,Conservator, Assistant dated 31-1-28 andConservators, Extra-Assistant Nos. 624-625-341-Conservators (whether probationers XV, dated 12-6-28,or otherwise), Tehsildars, Forest and No. 718-XV,Rangers, Deputy Rangers, Foresters dated 12-8-29.and Forest Guards, whether in permanent or temporary employment, are appointed to do all acts and exercise all powers that are provided by the Act, to be done or exercised by any Forest Officer.(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, it appears that a Forest Guard, whether permanent or temporary is appointed to do all acts and exercise all powers that are provided by the Act to be done or exercised by any Forest Officer. As provided by Section 50 (1)(c) of the Act, a Forest Officer may seize any vehicle used for committing the offence punishable under the Act. On perusal of this provision contention of Shri Bhadoriya that the vehicle was not seized by an Authorized Officer, cannot be sustained.

7. The second ground as raised by Shri Bhadoriya is, that after filing of the complaint, a Magistrate becomes empowered to deal with the property including handing over the same in temporary Supurdgi to his rightful owner during pendency of the case. Before observing anything on this point the observation of Apex Court in its latest pronouncement in this regard in State of U.P. and Anr. v. Lallo Singh 2007(3) Crimes 224 (SC), is required to be reproduced not only for the decision of this case but for general guidance also. The relevant extracts of the judgment are as under:

2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows :- One Hoshiyar Singh, the brother of the revisionist, Lalloo Singh was allegedly found carrying sand on a tractor trolley being dug and loaded from the bed of Jamuna River, within the sanctuary declared under Section 18 of the Act. The Forest Authorities intercepted the tractor trolley, arrested Hoshiyar Singh and seized the tractor trolley in exercise of the powers conferred under the provisions of the Act. A revision was filed by Lallo Singh claiming to be the owner of the tractor trolley. He, therefore, moved an application for release of the same. The VIIth Addl. Chief Judicial Magistrate in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 457 of the Code released the tractor trolley in favour of the revisionist on his furnishing personal bond of Rs. 2 lacs and two sureties in the like amount. Against that order, the Stale of U.P. through District Forest Officer, Agra filed a Criminal Revision No. 85/1999 before the Sessions Judge, Agra which was heard and disposed of by Special Judge (E.C. Act). The Revisional Court being of the view that the tractor trolley seized under the Act, which has become the property of the Government, held that same could not be released by the Magistrate, allowed the revision and set aside the order of the Magistrate. Hence, the revision by the revisionist, Lalloo Singh was filed as noted above.

3. The High Court by the impugned order held that the Magistrate had the jurisdiction.

When the matter was before the Apex Court, after hearing the parties and considering the upto date amended provision, it has been observed:

13. For appreciating this contention reference is necessary to Section 39 of the Act. Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 39 deals with a situation when any vehicle, vessel, weapon, trap or tool has been used for committing an offence and has been seized under the provisions of the Act. The twin conditions are that the vehicle etc. must have been used for committing an offence and has been seized. Mere seizure of the property without any material to show that the same has been used for committing an offence does not make the seized property, the property of the Government. At this juncture, it is also be noted that under Sub-section (1) of Section 50 action can be taken if the concerned official has reasonable grounds for believing that any person has committed an offence under the Act. In other words there has to be reasonable ground for believing that an offence has been committed. When any person is detained or things seized are taken before the Magistrate, he has the power to deal with the same 'in accordance with law'. There is a significant addition in Sub-section (4) by Act 16 of 2003, i.e., requirement of intimation to the Chief Wild Life Warden or the officer authorized in this regard as to the action to be taken by the Magistrate when the seized property is taken before a Magistrate. A combined reading of the omitted Sub-section (2) and the substituted Sub-section (3-A) of the Section 50 makes the position clear that prior to the omission, the officials under the Act had the power to direct release of the seized article. Under Sub-section (1), the power for giving temporary custody subject to the condition that the same shall be produced if and when required by the Magistrate is indicative of the fact that the Magistrate can pass appropriate orders in respect of the purported seized property which is taken before him. While dealing with an application for temporary release of custody, there cannot be a complete adjudication of the issues involved as the same is a matter for trial. While dealing with the application the Magistrate has to take into account the statutory mandate that the seized property becomes the property of the State Government when the same has been used for commission of an offence under the Act and has been seized. It appears that insertion in Sub-section (4) relating to the intimation to the Chief Wild Life Officer or the officer authorized by him is intended to give concerned official an opportunity of placing relevant materials on record before the Magistrate passes any order relating to release or custody. In appropriate cases on consideration of materials placed before him, prayer for such release or custody can be rejected.

14. It is to be noted that under Sub-section (1) of Section 50 for the purpose of entry, seizure, arrest and detention the official has to form the belief on reasonable grounds that the person has committed an offence under the Act. The Magistrate is, therefore, required to consider these aspects while dealing with the application as noted above. It cannot be a routine exercise. As noted above, the High Court is not justified in holding that Section 457 of the Code has application.

15. It appears that by order dated 26-3-2001 respondent was required to indicate whether he is prepared to deposit a bond of Rs. 2,00,000/- as security. If the said security has been furnished, because of passage of time the impugned order shall remain in force, though in view of the analysis made above the conclusions are not sustainable.

(Emphasis supplied)

8. On perusal of the observation of the Apex Court, it appears that this contention of Shri Bhadoriya is true that after filing of a complaint a Magistrate is empowered to deal with the property, including handing over the same for temporary Supurdgi to its rightful owner. However, at the same time a Magistrate is to see the gravity of the offence. If the Magistrate is prima facie satisfied that the vehicle was being used for committing an offence under the Act, the Magistrate has to take into account the statutory mandate that the seized property becomes the property of the State Government when the same has been used for commission of an offence under the Act and has been seized.

8.1 On perusal facts of the instant case and case before the Apex Court both appear more or less similar. It was also a dispute before the Apex Court, as to whether a Magistrate is empowered to release the property under Section 457 of Cr.PC or not, the same has been concluded in negative. With regard to the merits of the case it is observed that if the Magistrate is prima facie satisfied that the vehicle was being used in commission of the offence, he has to keep in mind the statutory mandate also.

9. During the course of arguments, in support of the contention that after seizure in such offence a Magistrate can hand over the same on Supurdgi to the rightful owner till final disposal of the case under Section 451 of Cr.PC, the attention of the Court was drawn on the following orders of this Court:

(1) Amar Chand Jain v. State of M.P. 2000(II) MPWN 67.

(2) Umashankar v. State of M.P. 2000(4) M.P.H.T. 49 (NOC) : 2001(I) MPWN 24.

(3) Kunjilal Gupta and Anr. v. State of M.P. and Ors. 2006(3) MPLJ 254.

(4) Raghuveer v. Superintendent and Project Officer, National Chambal Sanctuary 2004(1) M.P.H.T. 325 : 2004(I) MPWN 77.

As observed in this order, while placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court, the same view has been taken, hence, dealing these orders in detail docs not require. These orders do not mandate that in such cases, it is mandatory for a Magistrate to hand over the property on Supurdgi to a rightful claimant. Considering the facts of the case, gravity of the allegation about involvement of the vehicle and the offender is material to consider whether in a particular case, the vehicle concerned is required to be given on Supurdgi or not. In this particular case, considering the mandate of the Apex Court and also the gravity of the act of involvement as alleged against the vehicle, giving the same on Supurdgi is not being considered in favour of the petitioners. During the course of arguments, attention was also drawn on behalf of the petitioners on two orders of this Bench dated 28th February, 2007 and 21st March, 2007 passed in M.Cr.C. Nos. 660/07 (Prathvi Raj v. State of M.P.) and 800/07 (Lakshmi Narayan v. State of M.P.), in which the vehicles were given on Supurdgi. On perusal of both the orders, it appears that it was not objected on behalf of the State particularly on the point that proceedings for confiscation have not been started. At that time, the aforementioned judgment of the Apex Court was neither cited nor before the Court for consideration. As such the ratio of the orders, cited on behalf of the petitioners, cannot fruitfully be utilized in favour of them in the present case, after perusal of the observation of the Apex Court in the aforementioned case.

10. Perhaps the statutory mandate is based on the present day circumstances observing that day by day forests and wild lives are being destroyed. It is not only an anti-environmental work but a menace to the society also. At the time of enacting such strict provisions with regard to seizure and disposal of the vehicle, the legislature appears aware of false implications also. As argued, considering these aspects the provisions of Section 53 have been enacted, which provide punishment for wrongful seizure etc.

11. On perusal of the papers, prima facie it appears that the vehicle was involved in commission of the offence under the Act. In view of the observation of the Apex Court, orders passed by both the Courts below do not appear erroneous. Accordingly, the contention of Shri Bhadoriya is replied. No abuse of the process of Court appears in existence of the orders, hence, the petition is dismissed.