Ramesh and anr. Vs. State of M.P. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture whether or not the final product is an excisable product. in the process of manufacturing of country spirit, the over proof spirit which is not potable is reduced to issuable strength, which is potable. colouring and flavouring agents are added at the time of maturation. thereafter the liquor is supplied in sealed bottles to the retail contractors. this is the process of treatment given to over proof spirit in order to render it fit for human consumption in the form of country liquor. if the process is analysed there cannot be any scintilla of doubt that the process involves the manufacturing one under the provisions of section 2(f) of central excise act, 1944. as per the m.p. country spirits rules as well as clause 6 of the tender conditions it is mandatory for a distiller to supply country liquor in sealed bottles and not otherwise. therefore, packaging and bottling of liquor come within the ambit and sweep of manufacture within the meaning of clause (f) of section 2 central excise act, 1944 in view of the definition contained in section 65(76b) of the finance act especially keeping in view the exclusionary facet and further regard being had to the circular issued by central board of excise and customs. - deceased phoolwati whenever used to come to her parents' place from the house of her in-laws, she used to complain that her husband and mother-in-law i. 1 ramesh was informed by one metia bai that dead body of phoolwati is floating in her well. appellants denied to have committed any offence and their plea was that phoolwati had gone to well to fetch water and she slipped in the well and ultimately died. 1 nanhi bai had although stated in her evidence that whenever the deceased phoolwati used to come, she used to narrate about the harassment meted out to her by the appellants but in para-5 of her cross-examination she had clearly stated that she did not disclose about the harassment meted out to her daughter to the police during the course of investigation.c.k. prasad, j.1. appellants being aggrieved by their conviction for offence under section 306 of the indian penal code and sentence of rigorous imprisonment for five years and fine of rs. 1,000/-, in default rigorous imprisonment for three months, passed by iiird addl. sessions judge, chhindwara in sessions trial no. 153/88 by judgment dated 29.11.1989, have preferred this appeal.2. according to the prosecution, two years prior to 8.8.1988, deceased phoolwati was married to appellant no. 1 ramesh and he used to assault the deceased on the issue of preparation of meal. deceased phoolwati whenever used to come to her parents' place from the house of her in-laws, she used to complain that her husband and mother-in-law i.e. appellant no. 2 mst. phutana bai harassed her. according to the prosecution on 8.8.1988 at 7 a.m. she had gone to answer the call of the nature but did not return and on search the utensil which she had carried was found near the bamboo bush but she was found traceless. search was made at her parents' place but she was not found. on 9.8.1988, appellant no. 1 gave report to the police station, damua. on 10.8.1988, the brother-in-law of appellant no. 1 ramesh was informed by one metia bai that dead body of phoolwati is floating in her well. report of the incident was given to the police station and on receipt thereof, p.w. 7 narendra prasad dwivedi came to the place of occurrence, prepared the inquest memo and sent the dead body for post-mortem examination.3. police after usual investigation submitted charge-sheet against the appellants and they were ultimately committed to the court of sessions to face the trial. appellants denied to have committed any offence and their plea was that phoolwati had gone to well to fetch water and she slipped in the well and ultimately died. prosecution in support of its case had altogether examined seven witnesses. two defence witnesses have also been examined.4. the trial court on appreciation of evidence held' that mst. phoolwati committed suicide and the appellants abetted the commission of offence.5. i have heard mr. s.k. tiwari for the appellants and mr. s.k. gangrade, p.l. for the state. mr. tiwari submits that prosecution having not proved beyond all reasonable doubt that appellants had subjected the deceased to cruelty, presumption under section 113b of the evidence act cannot be raised and as such it cannot be said that the appellants abetted the commission of suicide by phoolwati. mr. gangrade, however, appearing on behalf of the state submits that the prosecution having established cruelty by the husband, the trial court rightly raised presumption under section 113a of the evidence act and held the appellants guilty of abetting suicide.6. having appreciated the rival submission, i find subsance in the submission of mr. tiwari. p.w. 1 nanhi bai had although stated in her evidence that whenever the deceased phoolwati used to come, she used to narrate about the harassment meted out to her by the appellants but in para-5 of her cross-examination she had clearly stated that she did not disclose about the harassment meted out to her daughter to the police during the course of investigation. p.w. 2 chokhelal, who happens to be the father of the deceased had stated in his evidence that his daughter after the marriage came to her parents' place only once. p.w. 6 dhanlal who happens to be the uncle of the deceased had stated in his evidence that she narrated to him about the assault two months prior to the date when she committed suicide. p.w, 1 nanhi bai and p.w. 6 dhanlal in their earlier statements during the course of investigation had not stated about the assault or harassment by the appellants. p.w. 2 chokhelal had stated that the deceased came to his house only once after the marriage. in view of the aforesaid omission and infirmity, i am of the opinion that the prosecution has not been able to prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the deceased was ever subjected to cruelty. once this element is missing, presumption under section 113a of the evidence act of abetment cannot be raised. it is relevant here to state that the trial court has convicted the appellant by raising presumption as provided under section 113a of the evidence act. as stated earlier the sine qua non for raising such presumption is the proof of cruelty by the husband or relatives of the husband. this being absent, no presumption can be raised.7. from the discussion aforesaid, it is evident that the prosecution has not been able to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt.8. in the result, appeal is allowed. impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is set aside. appellants are on bail. they shall be discharged of their bail bonds.