Sarnam Singh Yadav Vs. Raghuveer Singh - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- section 2(f): [dipak misra, k.k. lahoti & rajendra menon, jj] service tax - packaging and bottling of liquor whether amounts to manufacture within meaning of section 2(f) of central excise act 1944? finance act 932 of 1994), section 65 (76 b) (as amended on 16.6.2005) - held, the first limb of the inclusive definition of the manufacture under section 2(f) of central excise act has a very wide connotation. as the definition clause lays down an inclusive facet, the term manufacture has to be construed in a natural and plain manner and would include any process incidental or ancillary to the completion of a manufactured product. keeping in view the context in which the term manufacture has been used, it would take in its fold incidental and ancillary process in the manufacture or finishing of any manufactured product. it does not leave any room for doubt that an allied process should be integral and inextricable part of manufacture of completeness and presentability of the manufactured product. section 65(76b) of finance act used the words but it does not include. thus it is a definition which has the inclusive as well as exclusive facet. by virtue of the same it may include certain things and exclude others. it is well settled principle of law that a definition is not to be read in isolation and has to read in context of phrase which it defines, releasing that function of a definition is to give precision and certainty to the word or phrase which would otherwise be vague and uncertain. regard being had to the exclusionary fact in the finance act, though a limited one it would exclude the manufacturing process as defined under section 2(f) of the 1944 act. keeping in view the aforesaid dictionary clauses and circulars issued by the c.b.e.c. it is quite luminescent that would manufacture has to be understood in a broader sense and not to be confined or restricted to the excisable product in the act. it would include all processes which amount to manufacture whether or not the final product is an excisable product. in the process of manufacturing of country spirit, the over proof spirit which is not potable is reduced to issuable strength, which is potable. colouring and flavouring agents are added at the time of maturation. thereafter the liquor is supplied in sealed bottles to the retail contractors. this is the process of treatment given to over proof spirit in order to render it fit for human consumption in the form of country liquor. if the process is analysed there cannot be any scintilla of doubt that the process involves the manufacturing one under the provisions of section 2(f) of central excise act, 1944. as per the m.p. country spirits rules as well as clause 6 of the tender conditions it is mandatory for a distiller to supply country liquor in sealed bottles and not otherwise. therefore, packaging and bottling of liquor come within the ambit and sweep of manufacture within the meaning of clause (f) of section 2 central excise act, 1944 in view of the definition contained in section 65(76b) of the finance act especially keeping in view the exclusionary facet and further regard being had to the circular issued by central board of excise and customs. - in view of this statement, the identity of the appellant is well established. chaturvedi, learned counsel for the appellant contended that there is no legal and reliable evidence on record to hold that the accident had occurred because of the rash and negligent driving of the appellant. so far as legal and reliable evidence is concerned, the evidence of aw 1 raghuveer singh is on record, which has been minutely considered. even in cross-examination the identity of the accused has been well established.fakhruddin, j.1. this misc. appeal has been filed under section 173 of the motor vehicles act, 1988, against the award passed by the motor accident claims tribunal, guna on 3.4.1996 in claim case no. 1/92, by shri p.v. namjoshi.2. the facts in the case are, on 20.7.91, respondent was going on agra-bombay road by the road-side to see his brother pancham singh. near r.k. nursing home, appellant sarnam singh came by driving scooter no. dli 9949 rashly and negligently and dashed the respondent, as a result of which respondent sustained injury and fracture in left thigh. appellant thereafter ran away from the place of occurrence. the respondent was admitted in the hospital. the first information report was lodged by his brother pancham singh within 15 minutes, which is ex. p 1 on record. in the fir, it is mentioned that sarnam singh yadav resident of mahaveer pura, guna, dashed with his scooter. so there is no dispute about the identity. the fir mentions the name of the appellant. the offence was registered on 20.7.1991, at 12.30. the investigation was made and the criminal case no. 1419/91 was filed in the court of chief judicial magistrate, first class. during the proceedings, certified copies of ex. p 1, ex. p 2 and ex. p 3 were filed. ex. p 4, p 5, p 6, p 7, p 8, p 9, p 10, p 11, p 12, p 13, p 14 & p 15 are the medical bills, which have been duly proved.3. the appellant filed the written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint. it was contended that the scooter no. dbi 9949 on 20th july, 1991 was in the name of smt. sunita, a-56, hurshan land kings camp. delhi. this was mentioned in para 2 of the written statement as per the information of the appellant. the appellant did not mention at all anything thereafter. para 2 is relevant and is quoted below:xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx4. it was further admitted that guna police has filed the case against the appellant, but the said case is false. during trial of the claim, raghuvir singh was examined as aw 1. he states in his evidence that on 20.7.1991 while he was going on a cycle to meet his brother pancham singh, appellant sarnam singh driving a scooter rashly and negligently, dashed him. he also described the injuries sustained in an accident. he states that from 20th july to 30th july, 1991 he remained in the hospital. his brother pancham singh lodged the report, which is ex. p 1 on record. he further states that he could not appear in the 10th class examination for which he was appearing as he was admitted in the hospital for medical treatment. he got treatment even after three months of the incident. he states that he still feels pain in the leg while walking. in cross-examination there is nothing much, however in para 7 he was asked whether he knew sarnam singh before the date of the incident. he states that he knew sarnam singh before the date of the incident. in view of this statement, the identity of the appellant is well established. on further cross-examination in para 9 he states that in the month of august, supplementary examination was held but he could not appear as he could not fill up the examination form. he appeared in the month of april, 1992.5. sarnam singh was examined as dw 1. he states for the first time that it was on 25.7.1991 that scooter no. dbi 9949 was purchased by his son rajesh from smt. sunita, resident of delhi. this was transferred in the name of rajesh on that very day, as per ex. d 1. a perusal of this document shows that on 25.7.1991 the said scooter was transferred in the name of rajesh by the registration authority at guna. he also states that on 20.7.1991 this scooter was not in the name of his family members. this statement appears to be an after-thought. he denied that he was driving the scooter on 20.7.1991 and as a result of which the accident occurred, and the injuries caused to raghuvir singh. in cross-examination he further admits that scooter was seized by guna police and it was his son, who made an application for release of the scooter. in para 6, he was questioned to the effect that the brother of the respondent had lodged the report to which he does not know. he denied that he had no knowledge that the police had sent raghuvir singh for medical examination. in para 7 he states that he was not supplied the copies of the fir and the medical reports. he further states that some witnesses have been examined in that case. in para 8 he was asked about the terms, before the incident. he admits that there was no dispute between the parties before the date of the incident. however, he further states that it was the brother of the applicant, who lodged the report against him. in para 9 he states that when the scooter was seized from his house he was not available. the scooter was seized before his son. in para 10, it was stated that the person, who sold the scooter is not related to them and the scooter was not brought from delhi. he states that the scooter was from guna.6. the appellant examined sunderlal (dw 1), who only states in his evidence that the incident did not occur on 20.7.1991 at about 12 o'clock from the scooter of the appellant sarnam singh. in the fir, the incident had occurred at 11.45. his statement is, therefore, of no value. in cross-examination, this witness states that the report was not lodged before him. however, he admits that darogaji had prepared the spot map before him.7. mr. k.b. chaturvedi, learned counsel for the appellant contended that there is no legal and reliable evidence on record to hold that the accident had occurred because of the rash and negligent driving of the appellant. he submitted that in the absence of the owner of the vehicle the claim could not have been filed and which is not maintainable. he relied on 1986 (ii) mpwn 225, kalooram v. kusumchandra. so far as quantum is concerned, learned counsel placed reliance on 1985 mpwn 199, sardarmal v. bhagbali, counsel states that the injuries were simple and only a sum of rs. 3,000/- as compensation could have been awarded.8. mr. k.n. gupta, learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that the report was promptly lodged within minutes. learned counsel submits that in this case sarnam singh was the driver and owner of the vehicle and under section 68 of the motor vehicles act, a claim can be raised even against a driver. so far as legal and reliable evidence is concerned, the evidence of aw 1 raghuveer singh is on record, which has been minutely considered. he has categorically stated that it was sarnam singh, who was driving the scooter. the report. (ex. p 1) (sic) have been duly proved. even in cross-examination the identity of the accused has been well established. apart from it, in the written statement what was stated by the appellant is that this scooter does not belong to him. it was on 25th july, 1991 that this scooter was got purchased and thereafter it was registered in the name of his son rajesh was not mentioned. this story appears to be concocted and an after-thought.9. having considered the evidence of aw 1 raghuvir singh and aw 2 and having gone through the findings recorded by the claims tribunal, this court is of the opinion that it was appellant sarnam singh, who dashed with his scooter and caused injuries to raghuvir singh, complainant. so far as the case of kalooram v. c. chandra 1986 (ii) mtwn 225, is concerned, it was a case in which the owner of the vehicle was dead and the l.rs. of the deceased were not brought on record. this case is different from the present case in hand. so far as quantum is concerned, the trial court has awarded very meagre amount which cannot be said to be excessive. in the facts & circumstances of the case, the amount awarded appears to be much lower but there is no cross-objection.10. in view of what has been stated above, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. counsel fee rs. 1,000/- (rs. one thousand). it is directed in the ends of justice that if the amount so awarded is not paid within one month it will carry 18% interest on the remaining amount.