Sukhnandan Vs. South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- constitution of india 1055. article 141; [a.k. patnaik, c.j., dipak misra, abhay gohil, s. samvatsar, & s.k. gangele, jj] dismissal of slp arising from decision of high court whether binding precedent decision of division bench in rama and company v. state of madhya pradesh, [2007(ii) mpjr 229] overruled by full bench of same high court prior to delivery of decision of full bench order passed in division bench decision assailed in slp before supreme court dismissal of slp by short reasoned order, though declaration of law, but high court is bound to follow earlier decisions in field regard being had to concept of precedents as per law laid down by apex court and larger bench decision in jabalpur bus operators association, reported in [2003(1) mpjr 158]. court clarifies that dr. jaidev siddha v. jaiprakash siddha, 2007(2) mpjr (fb) 361; air 2007 mp 269 (fb) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of slp articles 226 & 227; [a.k. patnaik, c.j., dipak misra, abhay gohil, s. samvatsar, & s.k. gangele, jj] power to issue writ under article 226 - [per majority] the high courts exercise original jurisdiction under article 226 of the constitution and supervisory jurisdiction and the power of superintendence under article 227 of the constitution. but, an eloquent and fertile one, a writ of certiorari is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction. whenever word supervisory has been used in the context of article 226 it is in contrast with the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. when a writ is issued under article 226 of the constitution in respect of courts or tribunals it is done in exercise of original jurisdiction and the parameters are different than article 227 of the constitution of india. it is worth noting that the power under article 227 was there in a different manner under the government of india act. power of superintendence is distinct from the exercise of power of revisional or supervisory jurisdiction which is a facet of the power of superintendence. the confusion occurs when one applies the principle of equivalence or equates the exercise of supervisory power and power of superintendence with original or supervisory jurisdiction. there is an acceptable nuance between the concept of jurisdiction and exercise of power by certain parameters. both do come within the fundamental concept of judicial review but the jurisdiction exercised is different when under article 226 a writ is issued it is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction whether against a tribunal or inferior courts or administrative authorities. the word superintendence has not been used in article 226 of the constitution. it is also evident that the term writs is not referred to in article 227. on a scrutiny of article 227 it would be crystal clear that power of superintendence conferred on the high courts is a power that is restricted to the courts and tribunal in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. on the contrary the power conferred on the high court under article 226 is not constricted and confined to the courts and tribunals but it extends to any person or authority. be it noted, article 226 as has been engrafted in the constitution covers entirely a new area, a broader one in a larger spectrum. when the legislature has used the terms in exercise of original jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction it has to be understood that they are used in contradistinction in the constitutional context as has been interpreted by the apex court. the words of the section have to be understood to mean exercise of powers under article 226 of the constitution of india which is always original. -- m.p. samaj ke kamjor vargon ke krishi bhumi hadapne sambandhi kuchakron se paritran tatha mukti adhiniyam [3/1977]. section 2: writ appeal maintainability from order of single judge-when permissible held, maintainability of a writ appeal from an order of the learned single judge would depend upon many an aspect and cannot be put into a strait jacket formula. it cannot be stated with mathematical exactitude. it would depend upon the pleadings in the writ petition, nature of the order passed by the single judge, character and the contour of the order, directions issued, nomenclature given and the jurisdictional prospective in the constitutional context are to be perceived. it cannot be said in a hyper-technical manner that an order passed in a writ petition, if there is assail to the order emerging from the inferior tribunal or subordinate courts has to be treated all the time for all purposes to be under article 227 of the constitution of india. it would depend upon the real nature of the order passed by the learned single judge. the pleadings also assume immense significance. it would not be an over emphasis to state that an order in a writ petition can fit into the subtle contour of articles 226 and 227 of the constitution in a composite manner and they can co-inside, co-exist, overlap or imbricate. in this context it is apt to note that there may be cases where the single judge may feel disposed or inclined to issue a writ to do full and complete justice because it is to be borne in mind that article 226 of the constitution is fundamentally a repository and reservoir of justice based on equity and good conscience. it will depend upon factual matrix of each case. dr. jaidev siddha v. jaiprakash siddha, 2007(2) mpjr (fb) 361: air 2007 mp 269 (fb) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of slp preferred against order reported in rama and company v. state of madhya pradesh [2007 (2) mpjr 229 (db) (mp)]. - we consider it safe to take her income as rs. on deposit the amount shall be disbursed to the claimant keeping in mind the well settled guidelines laid down by the supreme court.usha shukla, j.1. this is an appeal for. enhancement of compensation awarded by the second additional motor accidents claims tribunal, bilaspur in claim case no. 34 of 1986.2. the claimant is the husband of gondibai. she died on 6.11.79 in an accident with truck no. mhg 5764 belonging to respondent no. 1. this truck was insured with respondent no. 3 and was being driven by respondent no. 2 at the time of the accident.3. the claims tribunal awarded a sum of rs. 16,000 for mental agony and loss of consortium on account of the death of his wife and rs. 2,000 as funeral expenses, total rs. 18,000 against a claim of rs. 4,50,000.4. it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the amount awarded was wholly inadequate. reference was made to section 140 of the motor vehicles act, 1988 that the compensation under no fault liability too was rs. 50,000 hence the claimant should be awarded rs. 4,50,000 as claimed.5. the deceased was the wife of the claimant. she was aged about 25 years, at the time of the accident. she was a vegetable vendor. the original pleading that she was earning rs. 300 per month by selling vegetables was amended by substituting rs. 750 per month as her income. claimant sukhnandan, aw 1, had deposed that she was earning rs. 25 per day. we consider it safe to take her income as rs. 750 per month. the dependency of the claimant would thus be rs. 500 per month, i.e., rs. 6,000 per annum. taking a multiplier of 13 the compensation comes to rs. 78,000. to this rs. 2,000 is added as funeral expenses and rs. 5,000 for loss of consortium. the total compensation comes to rs. 85,000 which in our opinion would be just and proper compensation. thus the appellant is entitled to get the sum of rs. 85,000 with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from the date of application till realisation.6. respondents are directed to deposit the amount less the amount already deposited within a period of two months from the date of supply of certified copy of this order failing which the amount shall carry interest at the rate of 15 per cent per annum. on deposit the amount shall be disbursed to the claimant keeping in mind the well settled guidelines laid down by the supreme court.7. the award of claims tribunal shall be substituted as indicated hereinabove. counsel's fee rs. 500, if pre-certified.