Prema and anr. Vs. Madhya Pradesh State Road Trans. Corpn. and anr. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- constitution of india 1055. article 141; [a.k. patnaik, c.j., dipak misra, abhay gohil, s. samvatsar, & s.k. gangele, jj] dismissal of slp arising from decision of high court whether binding precedent decision of division bench in rama and company v. state of madhya pradesh, [2007(ii) mpjr 229] overruled by full bench of same high court prior to delivery of decision of full bench order passed in division bench decision assailed in slp before supreme court dismissal of slp by short reasoned order, though declaration of law, but high court is bound to follow earlier decisions in field regard being had to concept of precedents as per law laid down by apex court and larger bench decision in jabalpur bus operators association, reported in [2003(1) mpjr 158]. court clarifies that dr. jaidev siddha v. jaiprakash siddha, 2007(2) mpjr (fb) 361; air 2007 mp 269 (fb) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of slp articles 226 & 227; [a.k. patnaik, c.j., dipak misra, abhay gohil, s. samvatsar, & s.k. gangele, jj] power to issue writ under article 226 - [per majority] the high courts exercise original jurisdiction under article 226 of the constitution and supervisory jurisdiction and the power of superintendence under article 227 of the constitution. but, an eloquent and fertile one, a writ of certiorari is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction. whenever word supervisory has been used in the context of article 226 it is in contrast with the appellate or revisional jurisdiction. when a writ is issued under article 226 of the constitution in respect of courts or tribunals it is done in exercise of original jurisdiction and the parameters are different than article 227 of the constitution of india. it is worth noting that the power under article 227 was there in a different manner under the government of india act. power of superintendence is distinct from the exercise of power of revisional or supervisory jurisdiction which is a facet of the power of superintendence. the confusion occurs when one applies the principle of equivalence or equates the exercise of supervisory power and power of superintendence with original or supervisory jurisdiction. there is an acceptable nuance between the concept of jurisdiction and exercise of power by certain parameters. both do come within the fundamental concept of judicial review but the jurisdiction exercised is different when under article 226 a writ is issued it is issued in exercise of original jurisdiction whether against a tribunal or inferior courts or administrative authorities. the word superintendence has not been used in article 226 of the constitution. it is also evident that the term writs is not referred to in article 227. on a scrutiny of article 227 it would be crystal clear that power of superintendence conferred on the high courts is a power that is restricted to the courts and tribunal in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. on the contrary the power conferred on the high court under article 226 is not constricted and confined to the courts and tribunals but it extends to any person or authority. be it noted, article 226 as has been engrafted in the constitution covers entirely a new area, a broader one in a larger spectrum. when the legislature has used the terms in exercise of original jurisdiction and supervisory jurisdiction it has to be understood that they are used in contradistinction in the constitutional context as has been interpreted by the apex court. the words of the section have to be understood to mean exercise of powers under article 226 of the constitution of india which is always original. -- m.p. samaj ke kamjor vargon ke krishi bhumi hadapne sambandhi kuchakron se paritran tatha mukti adhiniyam [3/1977]. section 2: writ appeal maintainability from order of single judge-when permissible held, maintainability of a writ appeal from an order of the learned single judge would depend upon many an aspect and cannot be put into a strait jacket formula. it cannot be stated with mathematical exactitude. it would depend upon the pleadings in the writ petition, nature of the order passed by the single judge, character and the contour of the order, directions issued, nomenclature given and the jurisdictional prospective in the constitutional context are to be perceived. it cannot be said in a hyper-technical manner that an order passed in a writ petition, if there is assail to the order emerging from the inferior tribunal or subordinate courts has to be treated all the time for all purposes to be under article 227 of the constitution of india. it would depend upon the real nature of the order passed by the learned single judge. the pleadings also assume immense significance. it would not be an over emphasis to state that an order in a writ petition can fit into the subtle contour of articles 226 and 227 of the constitution in a composite manner and they can co-inside, co-exist, overlap or imbricate. in this context it is apt to note that there may be cases where the single judge may feel disposed or inclined to issue a writ to do full and complete justice because it is to be borne in mind that article 226 of the constitution is fundamentally a repository and reservoir of justice based on equity and good conscience. it will depend upon factual matrix of each case. dr. jaidev siddha v. jaiprakash siddha, 2007(2) mpjr (fb) 361: air 2007 mp 269 (fb) is not impliedly overruled in view of dismissal of slp preferred against order reported in rama and company v. state of madhya pradesh [2007 (2) mpjr 229 (db) (mp)]. - its driver made good his escape. learned counsel also submits that looking to the fact that deceased was not earning anything and his mother was well placed in service, the compensation is reasonable and no case for enhancing this is made out. evidence clearly points out that it was driver of bus who was responsible for this accident. secondly, there is no doubt about deceased entering into good service. his family background is also very good.bhawani singh, c.j. and a.m. sapre, j. 1. this appeal is directed against the award of 5th member, motor accidents claims tribunal, indore ('mact for short) dated 31.10.1998.2. deceased samir bist (20) met with an accident on 10.9.1991 at 8.30 p.m. on a.b. road, indore near bungalow of dr. verma when his scooter no. mp-09-b-6789 was hit by bus no. cpw 6718 owned by m.p. state road transport corporation (mpsrtc) driven by ranjitsingh while the bus was coming for going to h.i.g. colony. the matter was reported at the police station, tukoganj and first information report 652 of 1991 was registered. deceased was subjected to post-mortem examination, report is available on file. allegation is that bus was being driven rashly and negligently as a result of which the scooter was hit by it. deceased fell off the scooter and his head was crushed by the bus; its driver made good his escape. deceased was taken to the hospital where he died. it is stated that deceased was 20 years old, healthy and handsome young man. at the time of accident he was studying in b.sc. ii year in holkar science college, indore. he was doing computer course and was senior under officer of national cadet corps (ncc). he had secured other merit certificates. this apart he possessed pilot course licence and had bright future. as a result of this accident, his family members not only suffered financially but also mentally. accordingly, a claim for rs. 44,00,000 has been preferred.3. respondents have filed statements in defence although common thread passes through it. in substance, the defence taken is that bus was not involved in this accident. the deceased struck against kinetic hero honda and he died after falling from scooter. he hit the rear portion of the bus but did not come underneath the tyre. due to the accident crowd collected and looking to the possible violence the driver left the bus and place. driver is not responsible for the accident, therefore, not liable for the compensation. mact framed as many as 11 issues in this case. finding recorded is that accident took place as stated by the claimants. it was due to the rash and negligent driving of the bus that the deceased received the injuries as a result of which he died. the deceased was 20 years old at the time of accident and was a brilliant student and had received pilot's licence. with respect to receiving all financial assistance in case he had lived, finding recorded is that duration for the same could be 12 years and while awarding the compensation the tribunal has awarded compensation of rs. 1,55,000 on various counts carrying interest at the rate of 12 per cent from the date of application till the date of realisation. cost of rs. 500 has been also awarded.4. claimants have filed this appeal challenging the award on the grounds stated in the memorandum of appeal. we have perused the same and other documents on file apart from hearing the learned counsel from both the sides.5. mr. s.n. saxena, learned counsel for claimants vehemently submits that mact has not awarded just compensation in this case. learned counsel contends that background of deceased is completely demonstrated in this case and looking to that the compensation awarded is absolutely meagre and deserves to be enhanced. learned counsel mrs. h.m. zelawat, submits on the other hand that the award is reasonable and deserves to be upheld. learned counsel also submits that looking to the fact that deceased was not earning anything and his mother was well placed in service, the compensation is reasonable and no case for enhancing this is made out.6. we have given our consideration to the facts, evidence and submissions made by learned counsel for parties. we take note of certain facts which are absolutely clear in this case. evidence clearly points out that it was driver of bus who was responsible for this accident. mact has found on evidence that he was driving the vehicle rashly and negligently and committed the accident. it was the bus which hit the scooter on which deceased was moving. as a result of this accident the deceased fell and died later on in the hospital. we confirm this finding since there is ample evidence on record to support it.7. next question is whether the determination of compensation in this case is just as envisaged under the provisions of motor vehicles act, 1988. the court has to settle just compensation. what is just compensation has been matter of decisions by various courts. it is the duty of the court to award just compensation in motor accidents cases to be determined on the facts, evidence and experience. the evidence in this case is that the deceased was 20 years old at the time of accident. he was studying in b.sc. part ii in holkar science college, indore. he was senior under officer in ncc, a highest post in ncc at batallion level with great chance of getting into the army. this apart he possessed pilot's licence with bright prospects of becoming commercial pilot where the salary is very high. he possessed many other certificates. secondly, there is no doubt about deceased entering into good service. his family background is also very good. his mother is a teacher in science in st. rapheals school, indore while father (dead) was a retired lecturer from the motilal nehru college, allahabad. his younger brother (claimant no. 2) has joined the army. his maternal uncle was in air force. maternal grandfather retired as lt. col. with this background, it would be unreasonable to fix the yearly income of the deceased at rs. 22,000 settled by mact in this case. reasonably speaking, this amount should be rs. 36,000 p.a. looking to the age of the deceased and the claimants the appropriate multiplier in this case should be 15. this way, compensation awardable in this case is rs. 5,40,000. to this would be added rs. 2,000 towards funeral expenses taking the total amount of compensation to rs. 5,42,000 (rs. five lakh forty-two thousand).8. accordingly this appeal is allowed. respondent nos. 1 and 2 are directed to pay compensation of rs. 5,42,000 (five lakh forty-two thousand) to the claimants with interest at the rate of 12 per cent from the date of application till its realisation jointly and severally. costs of parties.