Gaurishankar and ors. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and anr. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- madhya pradesh municipal corporation act (23 of 1956)section 91 & m.p. municipal corporation act (1956), section 307(5): [a.k. patnaik, c.j., a.m. sapre & s.k.seth, jj] public nuisance - suit for injunction - held, section 91(i) of the c.p.c. is not exhaustive of the remedies that are available to a party even in case of a public nuisance or other wrongful act affecting or likely to affect the public. the remedy of the corporation and any other person under sub-section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956 is independent of the provisions of section 91 of the c.p.c. and not only the corporation but any other person can apply to the district court for injunction or removal or alteration of a building on the ground that the provisions of the act of 1956 or the bye-laws made thereunder have been contravened. sections 41(j) & 4 & m.p. municipal corporation act (1956), section 307(5): [a.k. patnaik, c.j., a.m. sapre & s.k. seth, jj] relief of injunction held, the reliefs under the specific relief act, 1963 are granted for the purpose of enforcing individual civil rights as will be clear from section 4 of the specific relief act. 1963. accordingly, injunction under part iii of the specific relief act, 1963 is granted to the plaintiff either to prevent a breach of an obligation in favour of the plaintiff, or to compel the performance of an obligation in his favour. unless, therefore, there is an obligation in favour of the plaintiff which needs to be enforced, the court cannot grant injunction. hence, it is provided in section 41(j) of the specific relief act. 1963 that an injunction cannot be granted when the plaintiff has no personal interest in the matter. the provisions of the specific relief act, 1963 do not apply to the right conferred on the corporation and any other person under sub-section (5) of section 307 of m.p. municipal corporation act, 1956. under the provisions of the act of 1956, every building must comply with the provisions of the act of 1956 and the byelaws made thereunder and hence if there is any breach of the provisions of the act of 1956 or the bye-laws made thereunder, sub-section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956 confers a right not only on the corporation but also any other person to apply to the district court for an injunction for removal or alteration of a building on the ground that there has been the contravention of the provisions of the act of 1956 or the bye-laws made thereunder. this remedy under sub-section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956 is independent of and different from the remedies under the specific relief act. 1963. section 307(5): [a.k. patnaik, c.j., a.m. sapre & s.k. seth,jj] injunction for removal or alternation of any building-locus standi to claim - held, the word any which has diverse meanings, therefore, has to be interpreted depending on the context and the subject matter of statute in which it is used. there are various other provisions in the act of 1956 and the byelaws made thereunder relating to buildings within the area of the corporation which have to be complied with. legislature has., therefore, to provide for some remedy if the provisions of the act of 1956 or the byelaws thereunder in respect of a building are violated. it is only for this reason that under sub-section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956, a right has been conferred not only on the corporation but on any other person to apply to the district court for injunction for removal of a building or alteration of any building on the ground that it contravenes any provisions of the act or the byelaws made thereunder. hence, not only the corporation but every other person has been given the right to apply to the district court for injunction for the removal or alteration of any building on the ground that it contravenes any provisions of the act or the byelaws made thereunder. the context and the subject-matter of the statute in which the word any has been used is thus, wide enough to include all persons other than the corporation or every other person other than the corporation or any other person other than the corporation. - 6/09 as well as entire criminal proceedings pending against petitioners is to be quashed. 4. considered the documents on record as well as fir in which complainant has specifically stated that the petitioners assaulted him by means of legs, fists, chappal and luhangi, they uttered obscene words in respect of his caste and abused him 'madarchod chamrawale' and they also assaulted his wife and threatened him to kill.orderindrani datta, j.1. the petitioners have filed this petition under section 482, cr.pc for quashing the fir registered in connection with crime no. 6/09 at police station, jigna, district datia.2. as per petition, respondent no. 2 complainant dayal has lodged fir against the petitioners alleging that on 22-2-09 complainant was returning to his home. in the way, present petitioners restrained him and abused him called him chamrawale and thereafter started beating him and threatened him to kill. wife of complainant reached on spot and tried to rescue complainant, then petitioners also assaulted her. on this report lodged by complainant vide crime no. 6/09, offence punishable under sections 323, 294, 506-b, 341/34, ipc and section 3(1)(x) of the sc/st (prevention of atrocities) act was registered against the present petitioners and in that crime police is trying to arrest present petitioners.3. it is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned fir and entire proceedings are illegal, arbitrary and contrary to law and liable to be quashed. prima facie, no case under section 3(1)(x) of sc/st act is made out against the present petitioners as it is not evident that petitioners uttered the word in order to lower the dignity of complainant nor used those words regarding his caste to humiliate him. there is no material to frame charges against the present petitioners under sections 323, 294, 506-b, 341/34, ipc and section 3(1)(x) of sc/st act. hence, entire fir in connection with crime no. 6/09 as well as entire criminal proceedings pending against petitioners is to be quashed.4. considered the documents on record as well as fir in which complainant has specifically stated that the petitioners assaulted him by means of legs, fists, chappal and luhangi, they uttered obscene words in respect of his caste and abused him 'madarchod chamrawale' and they also assaulted his wife and threatened him to kill.5. in the case of inder mohan goswami and anr. v. state of uttaranchal and ors. : air 2008 sc 251, the hon'ble apex court has examined the scope and ambit of section 482 of cr.pc. it has been observed by the apex court that inherent powers under section 482 should be exercised for the advancement of justice. if any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the court would be fully justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers of the court.6. furthermore, in the case of janata dal v. h.s. chowdhary and ors. : (1992) 4 scc 305, the hon'ble apex court has observed that the criminal courts are clothed with inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which done the courts exist. the power possessed by the high court under section 482 of the code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles.7. over and above, in the case of gorige pentaiah v. state of a.p. and ors. 2008 (5) m.p.h.t. 247 (sc) : 2008 air scw 6901, the hon'ble apex court has held that exercise of inherent powers under section 482 has to be done sparingly, carefully and only in situations laid down in section 482 of the code.8. on perusal of the evidence collected during investigation, it cannot be assumed that criminal proceedings are manifestly attended with malafide or maliciously instituted, therefore, it is not a fit case to invoke inherent powers conferred under section 482, cr.pc. as a result this petition is dismissed with a liberty to petitioners that they are free to raise all these grounds before the concerned court at the time of framing of charge.

Judgment:
ORDER

Indrani Datta, J.

1. The petitioners have filed this petition under Section 482, Cr.PC for quashing the FIR registered in connection with Crime No. 6/09 at Police Station, Jigna, District Datia.

2. As per petition, respondent No. 2 complainant Dayal has lodged FIR against the petitioners alleging that on 22-2-09 complainant was returning to his home. In the way, present petitioners restrained him and abused him called him Chamrawale and thereafter started beating him and threatened him to kill. Wife of complainant reached on spot and tried to rescue complainant, then petitioners also assaulted her. On this report lodged by complainant vide Crime No. 6/09, offence punishable under Sections 323, 294, 506-B, 341/34, IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act was registered against the present petitioners and in that crime police is trying to arrest present petitioners.

3. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned FIR and entire proceedings are illegal, arbitrary and contrary to law and liable to be quashed. Prima facie, no case under Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act is made out against the present petitioners as it is not evident that petitioners uttered the word in order to lower the dignity of complainant nor used those words regarding his caste to humiliate him. There is no material to frame charges against the present petitioners under Sections 323, 294, 506-B, 341/34, IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act. Hence, entire FIR in connection with Crime No. 6/09 as well as entire criminal proceedings pending against petitioners is to be quashed.

4. Considered the documents on record as well as FIR in which complainant has specifically stated that the petitioners assaulted him by means of legs, fists, chappal and Luhangi, they uttered obscene words in respect of his caste and abused him 'Madarchod Chamrawale' and they also assaulted his wife and threatened him to kill.

5. In the case of Inder Mohan Goswami and Anr. v. State of Uttaranchal and Ors. : AIR 2008 SC 251, the Hon'ble Apex Court has examined the scope and ambit of Section 482 of Cr.PC. It has been observed by the Apex Court that inherent powers under Section 482 should be exercised for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the Court, then the Court would be fully justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers of the Court.

6. Furthermore, in the case of Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary and Ors. : (1992) 4 SCC 305, the Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that the Criminal Courts are clothed with inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though unrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, but should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which done the Courts exist. The power possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Courts must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles.

7. Over and above, in the case of Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A.P. and Ors. 2008 (5) M.P.H.T. 247 (SC) : 2008 AIR SCW 6901, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 has to be done sparingly, carefully and only in situations laid down in Section 482 of the Code.

8. On perusal of the evidence collected during investigation, it cannot be assumed that criminal proceedings are manifestly attended with malafide or maliciously instituted, therefore, it is not a fit case to invoke inherent powers conferred under Section 482, Cr.PC. As a result this petition is dismissed with a liberty to petitioners that they are free to raise all these grounds before the concerned Court at the time of framing of charge.