Dalip Kumar Vs. R.T.A. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- madhya pradesh municipal corporation act (23 of 1956)section 91 & m.p. municipal corporation act (1956), section 307(5): [a.k. patnaik, c.j., a.m. sapre & s.k.seth, jj] public nuisance - suit for injunction - held, section 91(i) of the c.p.c. is not exhaustive of the remedies that are available to a party even in case of a public nuisance or other wrongful act affecting or likely to affect the public. the remedy of the corporation and any other person under sub-section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956 is independent of the provisions of section 91 of the c.p.c. and not only the corporation but any other person can apply to the district court for injunction or removal or alteration of a building on the ground that the provisions of the act of 1956 or the bye-laws made thereunder have been contravened. sections 41(j) & 4 & m.p. municipal corporation act (1956), section 307(5): [a.k. patnaik, c.j., a.m. sapre & s.k. seth, jj] relief of injunction held, the reliefs under the specific relief act, 1963 are granted for the purpose of enforcing individual civil rights as will be clear from section 4 of the specific relief act. 1963. accordingly, injunction under part iii of the specific relief act, 1963 is granted to the plaintiff either to prevent a breach of an obligation in favour of the plaintiff, or to compel the performance of an obligation in his favour. unless, therefore, there is an obligation in favour of the plaintiff which needs to be enforced, the court cannot grant injunction. hence, it is provided in section 41(j) of the specific relief act. 1963 that an injunction cannot be granted when the plaintiff has no personal interest in the matter. the provisions of the specific relief act, 1963 do not apply to the right conferred on the corporation and any other person under sub-section (5) of section 307 of m.p. municipal corporation act, 1956. under the provisions of the act of 1956, every building must comply with the provisions of the act of 1956 and the byelaws made thereunder and hence if there is any breach of the provisions of the act of 1956 or the bye-laws made thereunder, sub-section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956 confers a right not only on the corporation but also any other person to apply to the district court for an injunction for removal or alteration of a building on the ground that there has been the contravention of the provisions of the act of 1956 or the bye-laws made thereunder. this remedy under sub-section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956 is independent of and different from the remedies under the specific relief act. 1963. section 307(5): [a.k. patnaik, c.j., a.m. sapre & s.k. seth,jj] injunction for removal or alternation of any building-locus standi to claim - held, the word any which has diverse meanings, therefore, has to be interpreted depending on the context and the subject matter of statute in which it is used. there are various other provisions in the act of 1956 and the byelaws made thereunder relating to buildings within the area of the corporation which have to be complied with. legislature has., therefore, to provide for some remedy if the provisions of the act of 1956 or the byelaws thereunder in respect of a building are violated. it is only for this reason that under sub-section (5) of section 307 of the act of 1956, a right has been conferred not only on the corporation but on any other person to apply to the district court for injunction for removal of a building or alteration of any building on the ground that it contravenes any provisions of the act or the byelaws made thereunder. hence, not only the corporation but every other person has been given the right to apply to the district court for injunction for the removal or alteration of any building on the ground that it contravenes any provisions of the act or the byelaws made thereunder. the context and the subject-matter of the statute in which the word any has been used is thus, wide enough to include all persons other than the corporation or every other person other than the corporation or any other person other than the corporation. - [1980]2scr1024 had occasion to consider the aspect of the matter, the vehicle being fit to ride as additional requirement and safety factor in the shape of the year of the model has been held to be an extra measure, a further insurance against machine failure.orderv.d. gyani, j.1. this order shall govern the disposal of these petitioner i.e. (m.p. no. 1010/90 mohd. ummar v. r.ta. m.p. no. 942/90 smt. surjeet kaur r.t.a.; m.p. no. 861/ 90 indersingh v. r.ta.; m.p. no. 947/90 updeshsing v. r.ta. m.p. no. 869/90 mohd ashfak v. r.ta.; m.p. no. 638/90 umabai v. r.ta., m.p. no. 1011/90 omprakash pandey v. r.ta. raising a common question of law, it is for this reason that they were heard to gather and are being decided by a common order. 2. the petitioners are claimants for permits to ply auto rickshaw in the city of indore. one of the conditions imposed by the respondent is that latest model i.e. of the year 1990 auto rickshaws be introduced on the roads, and it is this imposition of condition which has been challenged in all these petitions.3. shri gupta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners argued that firstly such a condition could not be legally imposed moreso, when the permits were applied for, in the later part of the year 1989. it is however, not in dispute that the impugned order imposing the aforesaid condition was passed much later. it was also con tended on the basis of a solitary instance that discrimination was practised by the respondent but this plea was later abandoned, when it was brought to the notice of the petitioners 'counsel that even in this solitary case the application was made in the year 1987 and order was passed much prior to the impugned order.4. the sole question that survives for consideration is whether the respondent can impose such a condition of plying a latest model, vehicle.5. section 74 of the motor vehicle act, 1988 (for short 'the act') governs grant of permit. the various conditions which can be imposed have been enumerated thereunder and lastly in clause (iii) it is said 'any other conditions may be prescribed.' it is in exercise of this power that the condition has been prescribed. it cannot, therefore, be contended that the respondent has no power to impose such a condition.6. what now remains to be seen is whether it has any rationale behind it and has any nexus with the statutory object the supreme court in subhash v. state of u.p. : [1980]2scr1024 had occasion to consider the aspect of the matter, the vehicle being fit to ride as additional requirement and safety factor in the shape of the year of the model has been held to be an extra measure, a further insurance against machine failure.7. following the above judgment, we do not find any unreasonableness in the condition regarding model of the vehicle. it may be noted that permit-seekers, in the past have been buying and bringing old models of vehicles from adjoining states of gujarat and maharashtra and plying them on the roads of the city.8. for the foregoing reasons these petitions deserved to be dismissed. they are accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.

Judgment:
ORDER

V.D. Gyani, J.

1. This order shall govern the disposal of these petitioner i.e. (M.P. No. 1010/90 Mohd. Ummar v. R.TA. M.P. No. 942/90 Smt. Surjeet Kaur R.T.A.; M.P. No. 861/ 90 Indersingh v. R.TA.; M.P. No. 947/90 Updeshsing v. R.TA. M.P. No. 869/90 Mohd Ashfak v. R.TA.; M.P. No. 638/90 Umabai v. R.TA., M.P. No. 1011/90 Omprakash Pandey v. R.TA. raising a common question of law, It is for this reason that they were heard to gather and are being decided by a common order.

2. The petitioners are claimants for permits to ply auto rickshaw in the city of Indore. One of the conditions imposed by the respondent is that latest model i.e. of the year 1990 auto rickshaws be introduced on the roads, and it is this imposition of condition which has been challenged in all these petitions.

3. Shri Gupta, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners argued that firstly such a condition could not be legally imposed moreso, when the permits were applied for, in the later part of the year 1989. It is however, not in dispute that the impugned order imposing the aforesaid condition was passed much later. It was also con tended on the basis of a solitary instance that discrimination was practised by the respondent but this plea was later abandoned, when it was brought to the notice of the petitioners 'counsel that even in this solitary case the application was made in the year 1987 and order was passed much prior to the impugned order.

4. The sole question that survives for consideration is whether the respondent can impose such a condition of plying a latest model, vehicle.

5. Section 74 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 (for short 'The Act') governs grant of permit. The various conditions which can be imposed have been enumerated thereunder and lastly in clause (iii) it is said 'any other conditions may be prescribed.' It is in exercise of this power that the condition has been prescribed. It cannot, therefore, be contended that the respondent has no power to impose such a condition.

6. What now remains to be seen is whether it has any rationale behind it and has any nexus with the statutory object The Supreme Court in Subhash v. State of U.P. : [1980]2SCR1024 had occasion to consider the aspect of the matter, the vehicle being fit to ride as additional requirement and safety factor in the shape of the year of the model has been held to be an extra measure, a further insurance against machine failure.

7. Following the above judgment, we do not find any unreasonableness in the condition regarding model of the vehicle. It may be noted that permit-seekers, in the past have been buying and bringing old models of vehicles from adjoining states of Gujarat and Maharashtra and plying them on the roads of the city.

8. For the foregoing reasons these petitions deserved to be dismissed. They are accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.