State of M.P. Vs. Kantilal and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
criminal - suicide note - sections 304(b) and 498(a) of indian penal code, 1860(ipc) - deceased was wife of respondent no 1 - deceased consumed poison and died - fir lodge by father of deceased against respondent alleging that respondents demanded dowry and harassed deceased before incident - respondents tried under sections 304(b) and 498(a) of ipc, however, acquitted by trial court - hence, present appeal - held, deceased committed suicide and left a suicide note behind her wherein she stated that she is committed suicide as being not able to become either good daughter in law or good wife - further, no evidence produced by prosecution to establish that any harassment committed upon deceased before suicide - thus, order of trial court not suffered from any perversity - appeal dismissed - motor vehicles act, 1988 [c.a. no. 59/1988]section 147; [a.k. patnaik, cj, s.s. jha & a.m. sapre, jj] liability of insurer - third party insurance held, the insured who is a party to the insurance is not a third party for the purpose of chapter xi of the act, particularly section 147 thereof. thus, any person other than the insurer and the insured who are parties to the insurance policy is a third party. the insurer, however, would not be liable for any bodily injury or death of a third party in an accident unless the liability is fastened on the insurer under the provisions of section 147 of the act or under the terms and conditions of the policy of insurance. hence, the mere fact that a passenger is a third party would not fasten liability on the insurer unless such liability arises under section 147 of the act or under the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. an employee is a third party inasmuch as he is not a party to the insurance policy. but merely because an employee is a third party, the insurance company would not be liable to compensate in case such employee suffers bodily injury or dies in an accident in which the motor vehicle is involved unless section 147 of the act fixes such liability on the insured or unless the terms and conditions of the contract of insurance fixes liability on the insurer. section 147 (1)(b) of the act provides that in order to comply with the requirements of chapter xi of the act, a policy of insurance must be a policy which insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2) against the liabilities mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) thereunder. even if an employee is a passenger or a person travelling in a motor vehicle which is insured as per the requirements of sub-section (1) of section 147 of the act, the insurer will not be liable to cover any liability in respect of death or bodily injury of such employee unless such employee falls in one of the categories mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c)of clause (i) of the proviso to sub-section (1)of section 147 of the act and further in cases where such employees fall under categories mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of clause (i) of the proviso to sub-section (1`) of section 147 of the act, the insurer is liable only for the liability under the workmens compensation act, 1923. [national insurance co. ltd. v sarvanlal, 2004 (4) mpht 404 (d.b) overruled]. sections 147 & 96 & m.p. m.v. rules, 1994, rule 97; [a.k. patnaik, cj, s.s. jha & a.m. sapre, jj] control of transport vehicles m.p. rules relate to provisions of control of transport vehicles and it cannot be adopted for interpreting sections 147 and 145 of the m.v. act to hold the insurer liable for death or bodily injury suffered by passenger. [national insurance co. ltd. v sarvanlal, 2004 (4) mpht 404 (d.b) overruled]. - d-9 clearly negatived even the slightest suggestion of dowry demand. though at the time of engagement he had given many articles, the bridegroom side was not satisfied and they had persisted in their demand of a gold chain and he had told them that there were many ceremonies yet to be performed in which they would receive sufficient number of gifts. after about a fortnight of the marriage, their daughter had gone to madras and lived with him for about 3 weeks but she did not appear happy. she had complained that the atmosphere of her matrimonial house was quite different and was not congenial. 1 dinesh kumar in paragraph 29 of the impugned judgment and observed that he has admitted that when sanjana had come to madras and when he was alone with her and enquired as to why he was so depressed, she had only stated that the atmosphere of her matrimonial home was different and not congenial and that they did not like her work and the dowry that she had brought. d-6, d-7 and d-8. she has also admitted that thereafter she had opportunity to speak to her over the telephone on three occasions but on none she had complained that her in-laws or her husband were demanding dowry. 3 manisha, a close friend of the deceased, she has stated that when after marriage the deceased had come to madras, she did not look happy and she did not socialize. under section 498a, ipc culpability is attached if the husband or the relative of the husband subjects such woman to cruelty and 'cruelty' has been defined to mean any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or tc cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman or harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. d-9. in this note, addressed to her husband, she has stated that she was leaving the world despite the fact that he (her husband) had showered love and that while leaving the world she was finding it difficult but because she was neither a good daughter-in-law nor a good wife she was leaving.s.k. kulshrestha, j.1. the state has filed this appeal against the acquittal of the respondents for offences under sections 304b and 498a of the ipc as also under section 4 of the vide judgment dated 11-3-1996 of the sixth additional sessions judge, indore in sessions trial no. 159/93.2. according to the prosecution, deceased sanjana mehta, aged 22 years, was married to accused mahesh on 3-2-1991, who consumed poison and died. on learning about the said fact over the phone at indore, her parents rushed to chennai and looked for the reason for her having consumed the poison. whey they examined the matter in that perspective, realisation dawned upon them that although they had given sufficient dowry, the accused were dissatisfied and they had expressed their annoyance. in the report ex. p-l, other details of the events were also mentioned to emphasise the fact that the deceased must have been harassed in pursuance of the demand of dowry which must have impelled her to bring an end to her life. it was in this respect that the respondents were prosecuted for the said offences.3. on trial, however, the learned additional sessions judge found that it was not proved that she was subjected to any harassment or cruelty and in this view of the matter, the learned judge has acquitted the respondents.4. learned dy. advocate general has referred to the evidence on record, especially the evidence of p.w. 1 dinesh kumar, father of the girl and p.w. 3 manisha in support of his contention that though such demands are confined to the family members and do not percolate to persons outside the family, there was evidence on record from independent sources to the effect that the accused had persisted in their demand for dowry after the marriage and in the consequent harassment. learned counsel for the respondent/accused has, however, supported the judgment of the trial court and submitted that all the witnesses have modulated their statements in the court in departure from what they had stated during investigation and the suicide note ex. d-9 clearly negatived even the slightest suggestion of dowry demand.5. p.w. 1 dinesh kumar chordiya, father of the deceased, has deposed that marriage of his daughter was solemnised with the accused mahesh mehta on 3-2-91. at that time her husband was residing at indore. though at the time of engagement he had given many articles, the bridegroom side was not satisfied and they had persisted in their demand of a gold chain and he had told them that there were many ceremonies yet to be performed in which they would receive sufficient number of gifts. after about a fortnight of the marriage, their daughter had gone to madras and lived with him for about 3 weeks but she did not appear happy. she had complained that the atmosphere of her matrimonial house was quite different and was not congenial. during this period, he had also received a letter in which he was asked to settle the account. on 10-4-1991, he received information that his daughter had consumed poison and died.6. learned judge has considered the evidence of p.w. 1 dinesh kumar in paragraph 29 of the impugned judgment and observed that he has admitted that when sanjana had come to madras and when he was alone with her and enquired as to why he was so depressed, she had only stated that the atmosphere of her matrimonial home was different and not congenial and that they did not like her work and the dowry that she had brought. she has also not been able to explain the omission of this fact in the report ex. p-1 and in her statements ex. d-6, d-7 and d-8. she has also admitted that thereafter she had opportunity to speak to her over the telephone on three occasions but on none she had complained that her in-laws or her husband were demanding dowry. she had only stated that maid-servant had been removed and she was made to work.7. coming to the statement of p.w. 3 manisha, a close friend of the deceased, she has stated that when after marriage the deceased had come to madras, she did not look happy and she did not socialize. she told her once that her in-laws were demanding dowry. from indore, she had sent a letter ex. p-5. in commenting upon the evidence of manisha (p.w. 3), the learned additional sessions judge in paragraph 37 of the impugned judgment has stated that with regard to the demand of dowry, she had not stated anything in her police statement ex. d-2 and about this omission she has not offered any explanation.8. the offence of 'dowry death' under section 304b of the ipc, as essential ingredient, requires the prosecution to show that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. the explanation appearing thereunder assigns the same meaning to the 'dowry' as is contained in section 2 of the dowry prohibition act. under section 498a, ipc culpability is attached if the husband or the relative of the husband subjects such woman to cruelty and 'cruelty' has been defined to mean any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or tc cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman or harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. section 113b of the indian evidence act creates a presumption in respect of the dowry death if it is shown that soon before the death of the woman she had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry.9. from the provisions referred to above, it is clear that the provisions of sections 304b and 498a of the ipc would be attracted only when it is shown that the deceased was harassed or treated with cruelty in connection with or in pursuance of the demand for dowry. nothing has come in the evidence of p.w. 1 dinesh kumar or p.w. 3 manisha to suggest that behaviour of the accused was such as to constitute harassment or cruelty. though a conscious endeavour was made by these persons to introduce the element of cruelty and harassment, the same stood belied by the omission in their statements to the police with which they were duly confronted. in case of shanta bai, the trial court has observed in paragraph 30 that the statement made by her in order to implicate the accused persons, was significantly absent and in her statement ex. d-l to the police. under these circumstances, when the basic ingredient of the offence under sections 304b and 498a of the ipc namely the harassment and cruelty on account of demand of dowry or for any property either from the deceased or from her relatives is absent, it can not be said that the respondents were guilty of commission of the offences alleged. if the matter is examined from another perspective, the situation gets further clarified. it is not disputed that while the deceased committed suicide she left a note behind marked as ex. d-9. in this note, addressed to her husband, she has stated that she was leaving the world despite the fact that he (her husband) had showered love and that while leaving the world she was finding it difficult but because she was neither a good daughter-in-law nor a good wife she was leaving. had it been a case of harassment by her husband or her in-iaws or other members of the family, she would not have left a note such as ex. d-9 behind. the note ex. d-9 completely negatives the allegation of the prosecution against the respondents.10. in an appeal against acquittal if the view of the trial court is reasonable and it does not suffer from any perversity, even if another view is possible, the view of the trial court is required to be accepted. in view of the testimony of witnesses and the documentary evidence especially d-9, we are of the view that the inferences drawn by the trial court and the conclusions arrived at are reasonable and proper and they do not suffer from any infirmity, much less perversity, to call for interference in an appeal against acquittal. we are, therefore, of the view that no interference is called for in this appeal against acquittal. the state appeal is, therefore, dismissed. the bail bonds of respondents shall stand discharged.