Ramjilal Munshilal Gaur Vs. Ganesha Mulu and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- motor vehicles act, 1988 [c.a. no. 59/1988]section 147; [a.k. patnaik, cj, s.s. jha & a.m. sapre, jj] liability of insurer - third party insurance held, the insured who is a party to the insurance is not a third party for the purpose of chapter xi of the act, particularly section 147 thereof. thus, any person other than the insurer and the insured who are parties to the insurance policy is a third party. the insurer, however, would not be liable for any bodily injury or death of a third party in an accident unless the liability is fastened on the insurer under the provisions of section 147 of the act or under the terms and conditions of the policy of insurance. hence, the mere fact that a passenger is a third party would not fasten liability on the insurer unless such liability arises under section 147 of the act or under the terms and conditions of the insurance policy. an employee is a third party inasmuch as he is not a party to the insurance policy. but merely because an employee is a third party, the insurance company would not be liable to compensate in case such employee suffers bodily injury or dies in an accident in which the motor vehicle is involved unless section 147 of the act fixes such liability on the insured or unless the terms and conditions of the contract of insurance fixes liability on the insurer. section 147 (1)(b) of the act provides that in order to comply with the requirements of chapter xi of the act, a policy of insurance must be a policy which insures the person or classes of persons specified in the policy to the extent specified in sub-section (2) against the liabilities mentioned in clauses (i) and (ii) thereunder. even if an employee is a passenger or a person travelling in a motor vehicle which is insured as per the requirements of sub-section (1) of section 147 of the act, the insurer will not be liable to cover any liability in respect of death or bodily injury of such employee unless such employee falls in one of the categories mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c)of clause (i) of the proviso to sub-section (1)of section 147 of the act and further in cases where such employees fall under categories mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of clause (i) of the proviso to sub-section (1`) of section 147 of the act, the insurer is liable only for the liability under the workmens compensation act, 1923. [national insurance co. ltd. v sarvanlal, 2004 (4) mpht 404 (d.b) overruled]. sections 147 & 96 & m.p. m.v. rules, 1994, rule 97; [a.k. patnaik, cj, s.s. jha & a.m. sapre, jj] control of transport vehicles m.p. rules relate to provisions of control of transport vehicles and it cannot be adopted for interpreting sections 147 and 145 of the m.v. act to hold the insurer liable for death or bodily injury suffered by passenger. [national insurance co. ltd. v sarvanlal, 2004 (4) mpht 404 (d.b) overruled]. - the failure to produce the sale deed as noticed above was taken note of to sustain the plea of repurchase. but on that account, due to defect in rule 3, jurisdiction to initiate, continue or conclude proceedings by the sub-divisional officer under the adhiniyam cannot be denied to him, when a defective application is made, not conforming to the requirement of rule 3 law is well-settled.ordert.s. doabia, j.1. the respondents no. 1 and no. 2 ganesha and ramsingh sought the benefit of madhya pradesh samaj ke kamjor vargon ke krishi bhumi dharakon ka udhar dene walon se paritran tatha mukti adhiniyam, 1976. according to them, they were made to part with a piece of agricultural land in survey no. 47 in village semai, tahsil datia for a petty amount of rs. 2,000/-. an application preferred under the above act was entertained and allowed by the competent authority. the copy of the order which came to be passed has been placed on record as annexure p/2. an appeal was preferred against the same. this appeal was dismissed. the copy of this order is annexure p/l. the purchaser felt aggrieved against the above orders. this is how the present petition under articles 226 and 227 came to be filed by them in this court.2. in support of the petition the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted :-(i) that, the petition filed by respondents nos. 1 and 2 was barred by limitation;(ii) that, no preliminary enquiry was held; and(iii) that, there was no sufficient ground made out for interference in favour of respondents nos. 1 and 2.3. so far as the merits of the case are concerned, a finding has been recorded that the transaction in question was a prohibited transaction. the fact that the sale deed in question which should have been in the possession of the petitioner was not produced was taken note of. an inference was drawn in favour of the respondents nos. 1 and 2. this inference was in favour of the plea of respondents nos. 1 and 2 to the effect that they had repurchased the land and an endorsement was made on the back of the sale deed to this effect. the failure to produce the sale deed as noticed above was taken note of to sustain the plea of repurchase.4. the argument that the application filed by the respondents nos. 1 and 2 was barred by limitation be examined.5. it be seen that this objection was raised before the appellate authority. the appellate authority observed that nothing prevented the concerned authority to take suo motu cognizance in this case.6. after giving this reasoning, it was held that the petition could not be thrown out on the ground of limitation.7. the learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on a division bench decision of this court reported as jahar singh and others etc. v. collector, shivpuri district and others, air 1988 mp 311. para 12 is relevant and may be noticed :'although an application under section 5 may be made in 'such form and within the time and manner as may be prescribed' to avail protection and relief under the adhiniyam, the power of the sub-divisional officer to act suo motu under section 6 is not affected thereby. true, there is some doubt about the time within which such application may be made as rule 3 of 1978 niyam is not clear. but on that account, due to defect in rule 3, jurisdiction to initiate, continue or conclude proceedings by the sub-divisional officer under the adhiniyam cannot be denied to him, when a defective application is made, not conforming to the requirement of rule 3 law is well-settled. rules cannot control or defeat any provision of the parent act. according to us, it would be competent for the s.d.o. to act 'on his own motion' when any 'prohibited transaction of loan' is brought to his notice informally, in other words, in a manner which does not conform to the strict requirement of section 5 of the adhiniyam or rule 3 of 1978 niyam.'8. apart from this power to initiate suo motu action was specifically conferred on the revenue officers. reference in this regard may by made to amendment act no. 29 of 1988. section 15(3) reads as under :'(3) the sub-divisional officer may, on his own motion or on receipt of the application under sub-section (2) proceed to deal with the matter as if it were an action taken on his own motion under section 6 or an application under section 5 as the case may be and the provision of the act shall so far as may be apply thereto as they apply to an action taken on his own motion under section 6 or to an application under section 5.'9. apart from this, the sub-divisional officer had the power to exercise suo motu power. this is apparent from section 6(2) of the act. this reads as under:(2) the sub-divisional officer shall by a notice served on the prohibited transaction of loan call upon them to place all relevant facts and documents before him at such place, on such date and at such time as may be specified in the notice.10. the sub-divisional officer as also the appellate authority has expressly adverted to this aspect of the matter and has categorically stated that they are exercising suo motu power. thus the plea that proceedings were not initiated within limitation is not sustainable.11. there is another aspect of the matter. the respondents nos. 1 and 2 preferred an application before the tahsildar on 1-9-1983. this application was rejected as not maintainable. the counsel for respondents nos. 1 and 2 submit that the application should have been forwarded to appropriate forum. in any case no fault can be found with the exercise of power by the competent authority, which was in nature of suo motu exercise. on merits the finding recorded by the authorities, cannot be faulted. the sale consideration was meagre. the plea of repurchase had been set up. this was rightly believed.this petition is without merit and the same is dismissed.

Judgment:
ORDER

T.S. Doabia, J.

1. The respondents No. 1 and No. 2 Ganesha and Ramsingh sought the benefit of Madhya Pradesh Samaj Ke Kamjor Vargon Ke Krishi Bhumi Dharakon Ka Udhar Dene Walon Se Paritran Tatha Mukti Adhiniyam, 1976. According to them, they were made to part with a piece of agricultural land in survey No. 47 in village Semai, tahsil Datia for a petty amount of Rs. 2,000/-. An application preferred under the above Act was entertained and allowed by the competent authority. The copy of the order which came to be passed has been placed on record as annexure P/2. An appeal was preferred against the same. This appeal was dismissed. The copy of this order is annexure P/l. The purchaser felt aggrieved against the above orders. This is how the present petition under Articles 226 and 227 came to be filed by them in this Court.

2. In support of the Petition the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted :-

(i) that, the petition filed by respondents Nos. 1 and 2 was barred by limitation;

(ii) that, no preliminary enquiry was held; and

(iii) that, there was no sufficient ground made out for interference in favour of respondents Nos. 1 and 2.

3. So far as the merits of the case are concerned, a finding has been recorded that the transaction in question was a prohibited transaction. The fact that the sale deed in question which should have been in the possession of the petitioner was not produced was taken note of. An inference was drawn in favour of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2. This inference was in favour of the plea of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 to the effect that they had repurchased the land and an endorsement was made on the back of the sale deed to this effect. The failure to produce the sale deed as noticed above was taken note of to sustain the plea of repurchase.

4. The argument that the application filed by the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 was barred by limitation be examined.

5. It be seen that this objection was raised before the appellate authority. The appellate authority observed that nothing prevented the concerned authority to take suo motu cognizance in this case.

6. After giving this reasoning, it was held that the petition could not be thrown out on the ground of limitation.

7. The learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on a Division Bench decision of this Court reported as Jahar Singh and others etc. v. Collector, Shivpuri District and others, AIR 1988 MP 311. Para 12 is relevant and may be noticed :

'Although an application under Section 5 may be made in 'such form and within the time and manner as may be prescribed' to avail protection and relief under the Adhiniyam, the power of the Sub-Divisional Officer to act suo motu under Section 6 is not affected thereby. True, there is some doubt about the time within which such application may be made as Rule 3 of 1978 Niyam is not clear. But on that account, due to defect in Rule 3, jurisdiction to initiate, continue or conclude proceedings by the Sub-Divisional Officer under the Adhiniyam cannot be denied to him, when a defective application is made, not conforming to the requirement of Rule 3 law is well-settled. Rules cannot control or defeat any provision of the parent Act. According to us, it would be competent for the S.D.O. to act 'on his own motion' when any 'prohibited transaction of loan' is brought to his notice informally, in other words, in a manner which does not conform to the strict requirement of Section 5 of the Adhiniyam or Rule 3 of 1978 Niyam.'

8. Apart from this power to initiate suo motu action was specifically conferred on the Revenue Officers. Reference in this regard may by made to Amendment Act No. 29 of 1988. Section 15(3) reads as under :

'(3) The Sub-Divisional Officer may, on his own motion or on receipt of the application under sub-section (2) proceed to deal with the matter as if it were an action taken on his own motion under Section 6 or an application under Section 5 as the case may be and the provision of the Act shall so far as may be apply thereto as they apply to an action taken on his own motion under Section 6 or to an application under Section 5.'

9. Apart from this, the Sub-Divisional Officer had the power to exercise suo motu power. This is apparent from Section 6(2) of the Act. This reads as under:

(2) The Sub-Divisional Officer shall by a notice served on the prohibited transaction of loan call upon them to place all relevant facts and documents before him at such place, on such date and at such time as may be specified in the notice.

10. The Sub-Divisional Officer as also the appellate authority has expressly adverted to this aspect of the matter and has categorically stated that they are exercising suo motu power. Thus the plea that proceedings were not initiated within limitation is not sustainable.

11. There is another aspect of the matter. The Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 preferred an application before the Tahsildar on 1-9-1983. This application was rejected as not maintainable. The counsel for Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 submit that the application should have been forwarded to appropriate forum. In any case no fault can be found with the exercise of power by the competent authority, which was in nature of suo motu exercise. On merits the finding recorded by the authorities, cannot be faulted. The sale consideration was meagre. The plea of repurchase had been set up. This was rightly believed.

This petition is without merit and the same is dismissed.