Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr. - Court Judgment

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			'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
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			'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
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			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
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			'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
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		'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
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		'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
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		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
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		'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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		'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.</p><p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p></p><p>',
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			'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'judgement' => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.</p><p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => '2007(1)MPLJ429',
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		'respondent' => 'Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
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			'id' => '507606',
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			'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
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			'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
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			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
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		'judgement' => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.</p><p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p></p><p>',
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			'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007(1)MPLJ429',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Tenancy',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
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	'casename_url' => 'munna-lal-vs-smt-roopa-devi-anr',
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		(int) 0 => '507606',
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$title_for_layout = 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '507606',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.</p><p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p></p><p>',
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			'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
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		'judgement' => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.</p><p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p>',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'
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Arun Mishra, J.

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			'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
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			'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
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			'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
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			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
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			'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
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		'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
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		'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
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		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
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		'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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		'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.</p><p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p>',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'
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1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.

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			'id' => '507606',
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			'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
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			'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
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			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
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			'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => '2007(1)MPLJ429',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
			'sub' => 'Tenancy',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
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	'casename_url' => 'munna-lal-vs-smt-roopa-devi-anr',
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		(int) 0 => '507606',
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$title_for_layout = 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '507606',
		'acts' => '',
		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => '',
		'counseldef' => '',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.</p><p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p>',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'
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2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.

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			'id' => '507606',
			'acts' => '',
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			'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
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			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
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			'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
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		'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
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		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
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		'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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		'judgement' => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.</p><p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p>',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'
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3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '507606',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
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		'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
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		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.</p><p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p>',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'
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4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '507606',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
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		'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
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		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.</p><p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p>',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'
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5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '507606',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
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		'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
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		'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
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		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.</p><p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p>',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'
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6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '507606',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
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		'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
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		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.</p><p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p>',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'
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7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '507606',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '2007(1)MPLJ429',
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			'respondent' => 'Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
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		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.</p><p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p></p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p>',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'
)
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Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '507606',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '2007(1)MPLJ429',
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			'respondent' => 'Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
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		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.</p><p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p></p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p>',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'
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8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '507606',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
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		'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
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		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.</p><p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p>',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'
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9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '507606',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
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		'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
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		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.</p><p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p>',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'
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10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '507606',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
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		'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
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		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.</p><p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p>',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'
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11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '507606',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
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		'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
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		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.</p><p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p>',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'
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12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '507606',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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$title_for_layout = 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
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		'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
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		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.</p><p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p>',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'
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13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '507606',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '2007(1)MPLJ429',
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			'respondent' => 'Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
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		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.</p><p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p></p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p>',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'
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14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '507606',
			'acts' => '',
			'appealno' => '',
			'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
			'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => '',
			'counseldef' => '',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Arun Mishra, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p style="text-align: justify;">Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => '2007(1)MPLJ429',
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			'respondent' => 'Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
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$title_for_layout = 'Munna Lal Vs Smt Roopa Devi and anr - Citation 507606 - Court Judgment | '
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		'appealno' => '',
		'appellant' => 'Munna Lal',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Munna Lal Vs. Smt. Roopa Devi and anr.',
		'casenote' => 'Tenancy - Eviction - Burden of Proof - Section 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act - Appellant was in occupation of suit shop @300/- p.m rent - Respondents filed suit for eviction of appellant - Dismissed - Appeal - Allowed - Hence, present petition - Whether Appellate Court has erred in placing burden of proof on appellant-tenant to prove that respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation - Held, from perusal of record it is revealed that respondent had no alternative accommodation for conducting their own business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by plaintiffs/respondent - Hence, petition dismissed as no merit -  -  In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah;',
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		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '2007-01-25',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Arun Mishra, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.</p><p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.</p><p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.</p><p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.</p><p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.</p><p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .</p><p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.</p><p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:</p><p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.</p><p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.</p><p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.</p><p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.</p><p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.</p><p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.</p><p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.</p><p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p></p><p>',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Arun Mishra, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This appeal has been preferred by the defendant aggrieved by reversal of judgment and decree passed by Trial Court. The Trial Court has dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff/respondent for bonafide requirement of starting of the business by Manoj Jain based on 12(1)(f) of M.P. Accommodation Control Act (hereinafter referred to as 'Act'). The Appellate Court has found that the plaintiffs required the suit accommodation bonafide for starting of the business by Manoj Kumar Jain. The alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation for that purpose.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. Plaintiffs Rupa Bai and Manoj Kumar Jain came to the Court averring that house was owned by Rupa Devi situated at Ganj Gate, Sadar Bazar, Murar, District Gwalior having Municipal No. 133/34. The defendant was in occupation of the disputed shop @ of Rs. 300/- per month. Same was required bonafide by the plaintiff for business of electricity goods by Manoj Kumar. There was no other alternative accommodation available in the limits of Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. Plaintiff No. 2 was unemployed. Plaintiffs were having the means required for initiation of the business. Notice was served by Registered Post Acknowledgment Due. Shop was not vacated nor the rent due was paid, hence suit was filed.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. The defendant in the written statement denied the plaint averments and contended that there were shops in the house in question which were not disclosed in the map. Plaint map was not correct. The disputed shop belongs to all the legal representatives of the deceased Kali Charan. There was partition between them. Requirement was denied. Plaintiff Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur in the name and style of 'Jain Electrical Repairing Center' in the shop owned by him. There were other alternative accommodations available, which have been concealed. Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business of STD/PCO in the shop situated at Ganj Gate, Murar, that fact has also been concealed. Plaintiffs were not having arrangements of funds required for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar Jain. Requirement was not bonafide, hence it was prayed that suit be dismissed.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Both the parties have adduced the evidence; oral and documentary. The Trial Court as per judgment and decree dated 15-11-2000 dismissed the suit on the ground that plaintiffs have concealed the availability of alternative accommodation in the plaint as such they were not entitled to seek ejectment. Plaintiffs have not adduced the evidence so as to show that alternative accommodation was not suitable, hence they were non suited. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Judge, an appeal was preferred, that has been allowed as per impugned judgment and decree dated 5-10-2002 by 7th ADJ, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 19-A/2002. The Appellate Court has come to the conclusion that alternative accommodation pointed out by the defendant was in fact a space created below the stair case and considering its dimension 5 x approax. 3 feet, it was not suitable for the purpose of business as such suit shop is required bonafidely by the plaintiffs. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Court below decreeing the suit on the ground of Section 12 (1)(f) of the Act, this appeal has been preferred by the defendant/tenant.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing with Shri Anand Bharadwaj for appellant has submitted elaborately that it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove unsuitability of the shop available at Ganj Gate just behind the disputed shop. Not one but two shops were available one admeasuring 5x4 ft. approx. below the space created by stair case and another shop which has been later on shown to be occupied by Bheekam Chand was also vacant at the time of filing of the suit. He has further submitted that in the plaint map existence of two shops was suppressed and it was suggested that the disputed shop occupied by the defendant was the only shop in the house as two other shops were available. In those shops, if there was necessary, Manoj Kumar Jain could have started the business. He has further submitted that it was wrongly averred in the plaint that Manoj Kumar Jain was unemployed. In fact, he was running the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur and there was registration of the shop in his name in the shop owned by Vaikunthi Bai. He has further submitted that there is subsequent event that has taken place during pendency of this appeal. The shop occupied by Bheekam Chand was sold by Rupa Devi to Pankaj Kumar as per sale deed dated 13-1-2003 later on Pankaj Kumar has exchanged the said shop just behind the disputed shop with Bheekam Chand as per exchange deed dated 30-10-2005. This exchange has been made with oblique motive to get rid of the finding of the Trial Court that this shop was in fact available as alternative accommodation, thus plaintiff should be non suited due to aforesaid subsequent event as exchange is colourable device in order to prove that requirement is bonafide. He has further stated that out of two shops behind the disputed shop, one of the shops has been let out by the plaintiff Rupa Devi to Shri Rakesh Jain, thus the requirement is not bonafide. The amendment be allowed and enquiry be ordered. He has relied upon the decisions in Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal : [2001]3SCR925 , Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta : [1999]3SCR1260 , Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad 1982 MPRCJ 1, Ashok Kumar v. Kishan Singh 2001 (3) M.P.H.T. 371 : 2001 (II) MPJR 269, Gareeb Chand v. Dilip 1982 MPACJ 420, Hakumuddin Saifi v. Prem Narayan Barchhiha 1998 (1) MPLJ 203, Adil Jamshed Frenchman (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and Ors. : AIR2005SC996 , S.A. No. 107/04, decided on 16-10-2005 by this Court (unreported). In finding of fact that interference can be made under Section 100, CPC, he has relied on; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRs. : [2001]251ITR84(SC) , Bondar Singh and Ors. v. Nihal Singh and Ors. : [2003]2SCR564 , Govind Prasad and Anr. v. Saddu @ Sadhuram and Ors. 2003 RN 331, Ishwar Dass Jain (dead) through LRs. v. Sohan Lal (dead) by LRs. : AIR2000SC426 , Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal (supra). To submit that amendment can be allowed at appellate stage, he has referred to; Laxmi Kumar Baori v. Sarman 1993 (I) WNSN 30, Keshar Singh (Smt.) v. Mukesh D. Ramteke 2002 (I) WNSN 76, Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain : [1987]1SCR275 and Sri Balaji Krishna Hardware Stores v. Srinivasaiah : AIR1998SC994 .',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Shri R.D. Jain, learned Sr. Counsel with Shri S. Jain appearing for respondents while refuting the submissions contended that the shop suggested at the stage of evidence by the defendant/appellant Munna Lal is of small dimension. By no stretch of imagination it can be said to be suitable alternative accommodation for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods as shop admeasuring 5 x 3 ft. and in fact is not a shop but a space created beneath the stair case, that is the only way to reach the stair case from the road as apparent from photographs P-11, P-12 and P-13. Correctness of photographs has been admitted by defendant and defendant himself has admitted that business of Ghee is used to be carried on in the shop just behind the disputed shop, that was in fact the business done by Bheekam Chand and he has taken this Court to the evidence on record to show that Bheekam Chand was in fact doing the business of Nova Ghee, thus the other shop which was not available could not be said to be an alternative accommodation. He has further submitted that there is evidence on record that brother of Manoj Kumar Jain used to run the business of STD/PCO at Thatipur at the tenanted premises, which was owned by Vaikunthi Bai. As Bheekam Chand was already doing the business at the time of filing of the suit in the shop situated behind the disputed shop and there is finding recorded by the Appellate Court to that effect, thus the sale of shop occupied by Bheekam Chand to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchange by Pankaj Kumar of the said portion with Bheekam Chand with the property situated at Thatipur cannot be said to be with an objective to prove the need, as it was not an accommodation available at the time of filing of the suit, shop has been exchanged with Bheekam Chand as he was doing the business for considerable time. Application under Order 6 Rule 17 cannot be allowed for the reasons that only two shops have been shown by the plaintiff. In one of the shops Bheekam Chand was doing the business and the other shop has not been found to be suitable by the Appellate Court considering its dimension and as it is just a space created below the stair case. Thus, it cannot be said to be suitable alternative accommodation, it has in fact not been let out during pendency of this appeal to Shri Rakesh Jain. Thus, no case for entertaining application under Order 6 Rule 17 read with Order 7 Rule 11 is made out.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. This appeal has been admitted by this Court on the following substantial question of law:',
	(int) 8 => '<p>Whether the First Appellate Court has erred in placing the burden of proof on the appellant-tenant to prove that the respondents/landlord has no alternative accommodation in the concerned city.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>8. No doubt about it that burden to prove that the requirement is bonafide is on the plaintiff. Parties have adduced the evidence in the instant case and it is required to consider whether finding recorded by the Appellate Court with respect to non-availability of suitable alternative accommodation suffers with error of law or error has been caused due to misplacing burden of proof. In the plaint it has been mentioned that plaintiffs have no other alternative suitable accommodation within the Municipal Corporation, Gwalior. In the written statement it was submitted that the plaint map was not correct and there were two more shops in the disputed house which were suppressed in the plaint map. The plaintiffs had other suitable alternative accommodation, thus requirement was not bonafide. When we consider the evidence, it is clear that in one of the shops behind the disputed shop Bheekam Chand was doing the business of Nova Ghee. Existence of Ghee Shop has been admitted by defendant himself in Para 21 of his deposition. He has not disputed the correctness of photographs when he was confronted with Paragraphs P-11, P-12 and P-13. A bare look at the so called 3rd shop suggested by the defendants makes it clear that it is in fact a way to go up stairs. There is stair case visible in the photographs itself. It is a small area just below that stair case admeasuring even as per the statement made by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj, learned Counsel. He was fairly stated that area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Even assuming that dimension given by the other witnesses of 5 x 2 1/2 ft. and 5 x 3 ft. are incorrect. Even as per the defendant the area is not more than 5 x 4 ft. Question is when space below the stair case, can be said to be reasonable suitable accommodation in order to non suit the plaintiffs. I fully agree with the finding recorded by the Appellate Court that the third shop suggested by the plaintiff was not in fact in the shape of shop. The defendant himself has suggested that it is not possible to put counter inside that. It is necessary to put it outside on the platform in order to do the business, that he has stated in Para 11 of his deposition. In view of the aforesaid statement of the defendant, I have absolutely no hesitation in accepting plaintiffs case that it was not in fact the shop available for doing the business. Even if it is in the shape of shop, it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable alternative accommodation available to the plaintiff for the purpose of business by Manoj Kumar Jain of electrical goods. Thus, I have no hesitation in affirming the finding of the Appellate Court in that regard.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>9. Shri Vinod Kumar Bharadwaj, learned Counsel appearing for the appellant has relied upon the aforesaid various decisions to submit that it was necessary to the plaintiff to plead that alternative accommodation was not suitable. In the absence of pleading and proof to that effect plaintiffs' suit could not have been decreed and the finding of fact of the Trial Court was proper. The Appellate Court has erred in law in reversing the same, such a finding cannot be said to be binding in the second appeal. There is no dispute with the preposition laid down in the aforesaid decisions, however, in the instant case, the two shops were suggested as alternative accommodation by the defendant; one was already occupied by Bheekam Chand, who was doing the business of Nova Ghee at the time of filing of the suit thus it was not alternative accommodation. Apart from that the other shop as per dimension and being only a space available beneath the stair case could not be said to be suitable alternative accommodation as such I find that no dent is caused in the case of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>10. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Vinod Bharadwaj at great pain that at Thatipur business was carried on by Manoj Kumar Jain of STD/PCO in the premises of Vaikunthi Devi. Manoj Kumar Jain has stated that his brother was running STD/PCO and said premises was tenanted premises. There is nothing on record to show that the place where STD/PCO was run by Ajit Jain at Thatipur, was owned by any of the plaintiffs or by family of Kalicharan. Shri Bharadwaj has fairly conceded to this aspect that there is no evidence on record, but he has further submitted that it was necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in case accommodation was rented one to produce the receipts. In my opinion statement made by Manoj Kumar Jain that it was rented accommodation and in the absence of there being any material to the contrary on record, it could not be said to be an alternative suitable accommodation available. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that Manoj Kumar Jain was doing the business at Thatipur as that has been proved to be in the tenanted premises, that could not be a ground to non suit the plaintiffs on the ground under Section 12(1)(f) of the Act. As no person can sit idle for years together to wait for his own accommodation being vacated and particularly in view of the fact that it was tenanted accommodation at Thatipur owned by Vaikunthi Bai, no dent is caused in the requirement of the plaintiffs.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>11. Coming to the submission raised by Shri Bharadwaj that sale/exchange of the property during pendency of this appeal is for the purpose of making out a case for bonafide requirement. Submission could have accepted only if accommodation was vacant at the time when the suit was filed or subsequently at any point of time. The plaintiff, Manoj Jain and the witnesses examined on behalf of plaintiffs have stated that it was occupied by Bheekam Chand, cross-examination was not made to the effect that it was vacant at the time of filing of the suit. The shop was already occupied at the time of filing of the suit by Bheekam Chand, it was sold to Pankaj Kumar and later on exchanged by Pankaj Kumar with Bheekam Chand, that appears to be for the reason that Bheekam Chand was doing the business for a considerable period in the same shop. Sale/exchange cannot be said to be in order to create a ground of bonajide requirement as it was not an alternative accommodation available to the plaintiffs for the purpose of business of Manoj Kumar. Thus no dent is caused by aforesaid subsequent event and documents placed on record.',
	(int) 13 => '<p>12. Coming to the applications filed under Order 6 Rule 17 on 29-10-2003. In the application it has been averred that in the shop behind the disputed shop Rakesh Jain has been inducted as tenant. In the reply defendant has clearly stated that so called third shop has not been found to be reasonable suitable accommodation for the purpose of requirement and it cannot be said to be a shop. In other shop Bheekam Chand was already carrying on the business and that shop has been exchanged with him by Pankaj Kumar, in recognition of his right of doing business for considerable period. In my opinion with respect to the third shop there is already finding recorded, statement made by the defendant himself and there is evidence on record and aforesaid recorded statement of appellant's Counsel as to its dimension and it being small space below stair case, indicate that it cannot be said to be reasonable suitable space for the purpose of need set up by the plaintiffs in the plaint. Thus, the so called subsequent event has no bearing on this appeal. Though plaintiffs have denied in reply that they have inducted any tenant, whatever that may be as the so called third shop has not been found to be in the shape of shop and considering its dimension, I find that no useful purpose is going to be served by holding an enquiry as it has not been found to be a reasonable suitable accommodation by the Appellate Court and that finding in my considered opinion is correct. Thus the submission raised fails.',
	(int) 14 => '<p>13. Thus, I find no merit in this appeal. As prayed by Shri Bharadwaj at this stage appellant is given one year's time to arrange for an alternative accommodation but this enjoyment of one year's period is subject to the condition that the appellant shall furnish an undertaking within four weeks from today to handover the vacant possession on expiry of one year's period from today before the Executing Court and on further condition of depositing upto date rent and shall continue to deposit the monthly rent.',
	(int) 15 => '<p>14. Resultantly, this appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed. No costs.<p>',
	(int) 16 => '<p>'
)
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