Anand Swaroop Tiwari Vs. Ram Ratan Jatav and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- - 6. learned counsel for the complainant as well as the learned additional advocate general shri govind singh and other counsel who assisted the court rebutted the submission and contended that the expressions 'try' and 'trial' in section 14 of the act comprehend within their scope 'enquiry' also and the provision has to be understood in the light of the legislative scheme which highlights the need for speedy and expeditious trial in case of certain offences directed against members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and that while securing machinery for speedy trial, legislature could not have intended to delay trial by requiring committal proceedings. undoubtedly, in section 8(3), it was clearly laid down that subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section.....orderu.l. bhat, c.j.1. first respondent herein filed a complaint before the special court, bhind under section 14 of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes (prevention of atrocities) act, 1989 (for short the act) alleging that the petitioner and second respondent committed offences punishable under section 342, indian penal code and section 3(1)(x) of the act. the special court took cognizance and issued process. the revision petitioner challenges this order contending that since the sessions court has been specified as the special court, it cannot take cognizance of any offence without committal order by a competent magistrate.2. the earliest decision of this court on this controversy is one by pandey, j. in sukhlal jatav v. state of m. p., 1993 mplj 875, 1993 jlj 679 taking the view.....

Judgment:
ORDER

U.L. Bhat, C.J.

1. First respondent herein filed a complaint before the Special Court, Bhind under Section 14 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short the Act) alleging that the petitioner and second respondent committed offences punishable under Section 342, Indian Penal Code and Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. The Special Court took cognizance and issued process. The revision petitioner challenges this order contending that since the Sessions Court has been specified as the Special Court, it cannot take cognizance of any offence without committal order by a competent Magistrate.

2. The earliest decision of this Court on this controversy is one by Pandey, J. in Sukhlal Jatav v. State of M. P., 1993 MPLJ 875, 1993 JLJ 679 taking the view that a case under the Act cannot be committed to the Special Court and the Special Court is a Court of original Jurisdiction and is entitled to take cognizance without committal. Hon. Dwivedi, J. in Meerabai v. Bhujbal, Misc. Cr. Case No. 1270 of 1992 referred the matter to a Division Bench taking the view that the Special Court is only a Sessions Court, that it is required to follow the procedure prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code) since no separate procedure is described under the Act and a charge-sheet on complaint under the Act has to be filed before a competent Magistrate who could commit the case to a Special Court and that the Special Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance on the basis of charge-sheet or a complaint. The order of reference is reported in 1994 JLJ 203.

3. A Division Bench of the High Court consisting of Hon. Dharmadhikari, J. and Hon. Tej Shankar, J. in Meerabai v. Bhujbal, 1995 Cri. L.J. 2376 agreed with the view taken in Meerabai's case and overruled the view taken in Sukhlal Jatav's case. When the present case came before one of us (Bhat, C. J.) it was contended that the decision of the Division Bench required reconsideration and accordingly, the matter was referred to a larger Bench. This is how the case has come before us.

4. Hon. Pandey, J. followed the view taken by a Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Re. Director General of Prosecution reported in 7993 (1) Cr.L.J. 760. The High Court of Kerala relied on certain observations in A.R. Antule's case, AIR 1984 SC 718. The Court was of the view that special Court under the Act is neither a Court of Session nor a Court of Magistrate but a Court of original jurisdiction which; in the absence of provisions in the Act regarding the procedure to be followed by it can take cognizance of an offence and proceed with trial under the Code without being inhibited of Section 193 of the Code. The Court also relied on the observations in State of Bihar v. Ramnaresh, AIR 1957 SC 389 where in the context of Section 494 of the old Code corresponding to Section 321 of the Code it was held that expressions, 'try' or 'tried' used in Section 494 arc wide enough to cover all types of enquiry and trial. A similar view has been taken by the Orissa High Court in Udhabhai v. Gova Bindhani, 1994 Cr.L.J. 3815. A contrary view was taken by a Division Bench of Patna High Court in Jhagru Mehto v. State of Bihar, 1991 (1) Crimes page 643. The Court took the view that in the absence of any provision under the Act as to the procedure to be followed by Special Court procedure prescribed in the Code has to be followed in view of Section 5 of the Code, but there appears to be serious lacuna in the Act inasmuch as Section 193 of the Code prohibits a Court of Session from taking cognizance of an offence without committal, that there is no express provision in the Act conferring on a Special Court power to take cognizance of an offence without committal and committal procedure is essential.

5. Learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioner supported the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court on the basis of following submissions : Special Court is really a specified Sessions Court and therefore, is a Sessions Court for the purpose of the Code and is governed by Section 193 of the Code. It is not a Court of the type contemplated in Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 or other statutes. The Act does not contain any provision of the nature contained in analogous Act laying down either that a Special Court can take cognizance on a police report or a complaint, or that committal is not required. The Act also does not indicate the procedure to be followed by Special Court in which case Section 4(2) of the Code read in the light of Section 5 of the Code would be attracted and the Special Court has to follow the procedure prescribed under the Code. The position is made clearer by the absence of any provision in the Act conferring on the Special Court power to hold enquiry on a private complaint analogous to the power conferred by Section 200 or 202 of the Code. The expression used in Section 14 of the Act is 'trial' and 'try' which expression will not comprehend within its scope 'enquiry' under Chapter XV of the Code.

6. Learned Counsel for the complainant as well as the learned Additional Advocate General Shri Govind Singh and other counsel who assisted the Court rebutted the submission and contended that the expressions 'try' and 'trial' in Section 14 of the Act comprehend within their scope 'enquiry' also and the provision has to be understood in the light of the legislative scheme which highlights the need for speedy and expeditious trial in case of certain offences directed against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and that while securing machinery for speedy trial, legislature could not have intended to delay trial by requiring committal proceedings. Learned counsel further contended that the absence in the Act of express provision similar to that in other Acts declaring the Special Court can take cognizance without committal has no significance in view of the legislative scheme and the amplitude of the expressions 'trial' and 'try'.

7. The preamble of the Act states that this is an Act to prevent commission of offences of atrocities against the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, to provide for Special Courts for the trial of such offences and for the relief and rehabilitation of the victims of such offences and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. Section 2(d) of the Act defines 'Special Court' as a Court of Session specified as a Special Court In Section 14. Unless the context otherwise requires, words and expressions not defined in the Act and defined in the code shall have the meanings assigned in the code. Section 3 of the Act refers to the offences which are to be tried by Special Court. None of these specific offences is as such an offence under Indian Penal Code, though some of the offences under the Act overlap some Indian Penal Code offences. Maximum punishment prescribed for various offences under Sections 3, 5 and 13 may be tabulated as follows :

Offence Sentence Minimum sentenceClauses (i) to (xv) Imprisonment for a term which Six monthsof Section 3(1) may extend to 5 years and with fine.Clauses (i) & (ii) Imprisonment for seven years or Six months,of Section 3(2) upwards and fine.Clause (iii) of Seven years RI and fine. Six monthssection 3(2)Clause (iv) of Imprisonment for life and fine,section 3(2)Clause (v) of Imprisonment for life and finesection 3(2)Clause (vi) of Imprisonment provided for thesection 3(2) main offence.Clause (vii) of Punishment provided for thesection 3(2) offence.Section 5 Punishment provided for the One yearoffenceSection 13 One year and fine.

8. By virtue of Section 6 of the Act, subject to other provisions of the Act, the provisions of Sections 34, 49 and Chapters IV, V, V-4, XXIII of the Indian Penal Code shall, so far as may be apply for purposes of the Act. Section 7 enables forfeiture of the property of certain persons by Special Court. Section 8 deals with presumptions as to offences. Chapter III of the Act deals with externment of a person. Chapter likely to commit offences under the Act. Sections 11 to 13 of the Act are ancillary provisions.

9. Section 14 of the Act reads thus :

'14. Special Court - for the purpose of providing for speedy trial, the State Government shall, with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the High Court, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify for each district a Court of Session to be a Special Court to try the offences under this Act.

The State Government with the concurrence of the Chief Justice is required to specify for each district a Court of Session to be Special Court to try offences under the Act and this provision is made for purpose of providing for speedy trial. Section 18 bars the applicability of Section 438 of the Code. Section 19 bars the applicability of Section 360 of the Code and provisions under the Probation of Offenders Act to the persons above the age of 18 years who are found guilty under the Act. Section 20 states that save as otherwise provided in the Act provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any custom or usage or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law. Section 21 imposes on the State Government duty to take such measures as may be necessary for the effective implementation of the Act.

10. Both sides place reliance on the decision in A. R. Antule's case which arose under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952. Section 6 of the Act empowers the State Government to appoint as many Special Judges as are necessary to try the specified categories of offences. Section 7 makes it clear that such offences should be tried only by the Special Judges. Section 8 expressly empowers the Special Judge to take cognizance of offences without the accused being committed or tried and that in trying the accused shall follow the procedure prescribed by the Old Code for trial of warrant cases by the Magistrates. The Special Judge also has authority to tender pardon which shall be deemed to have been tendered under the provisions of the Old Code. The provisions of the Code in so far as they are not inconsistent with the Act of 1952 apply to the proceedings before the Special Judge and for purposes of the said provisions. Section 8 lays down that Special Judge shall be deemed to be Sessions Judge trying cases without a jury or without the aid of assessors. A private complaint was filed against A. R. Antule alleging commission of offence triable by Special Judge under the Act of 1952. The Special Judge took cognizance of the offences upon the complaint and adjourned the case for recording evidence of the complainant and on the adjourned day, A. R. Antule appeared and contended, inter alia, that Special Judge cannot take cognizance upon a private complaint. Section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 requires a prior investigation by Police Officer of the designated rank.

11. The Supreme Court in A R. Antule's case rejected the contention that a private complaint does not lie in the absence of an unambiguous provision in the Act to that effect. The Court referred to the express provisions of Section 8 and noticed that these express provisions did not bar initiation of proceedings by private complaint. The decision rested on express provisions of the 1952 Act. Observations of the Court are instructive. At the beginning of paragraph 27, it was stated -

'It is, however, necessary to decide with precision and accuracy the position of a Special Judge and the Court over which he presides styled as the Court of a Special Judge because unending confusions have arisen by either assimilating him with a Magistrate or with a Sessions Court.'

It was noticed that experience of several years after the passing of the 1947 Act showed that a specific forum for trial of such offences was necessary and this realisation led to the enactment of 1952 Act.

12. After referring to Section 6 of the Code according to which there are four types of criminal Courts functioning under the High Court namely, Court of Session, Judicial Magistrates of the First Class, Judicial Magistrates of the Second Class and Executive Magistrates, the Supreme Court observed -

'As already pointed out, there were four types of criminal Courts functioning under the High Court. To this list was added the. Court of a Special Judge.'

The Court further observed -

'Now that a new Criminal Court was being set up, the Legislature took the first step of providing its comparative position in hierarchy of Courts under Section 6, Criminal Procedure Code by bringing it to level more or less comparable to the Court of Session, but in order to avoid any confusion arising out of comparison by level, it was made explicit in Section 8(1) itself that it is not a Court of Session because it can take cognizance of offences without commitment as contemplated by Section 193, Criminal Procedure Code. Undoubtedly, in Section 8(3), it was clearly laid down that subject to the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 8, the Court of Special Judge shall be deemed to be a Court of Session trying cases without a jury or without the aid of assessors. In contradistinction to the Sessions Court this new Court was to be a Court of original jurisdiction. The legislature then proceeded to specify which out of the various procedures set out in the Code, this new Court, shall follow for trial of offences before it.'

Dealing with the query whether the Special Judge becomes a Magistrate, the Court observed :

'This is the fallacy of the whole approach. In fact, in order to give full effect to Section 8(1), the only thing to do is to read Special Judge in Sections 238 to 250 wherever the expression 'Magistrate' occurs. This is what is called legislation by incorporation. Similarly, where the question of taking cognizance arises, it is futile to go in search of the fact whether for purposes of Section 190 which conferred power on the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence. Special Judge is Magistrate? What is to be done is that one has to read the expression 'Special Judge' in place of Magistrate, and the whole thing becomes crystal clear. The Legislature wherever it found the gray area clarified it by making specific provision such as the one in sub-section (2) of Section 8 and to leave no one in doubt further provided in sub-section (3) that all provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code so far as they are not inconsistent with the Act apply to the proceedings before a Special Judge. At the time when the 1952 Act was enacted, what was in operation was the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898. It did not envisage any Court of a Special Judge and the Legislature never wanted to draw up an exhaustive Code of Procedure for this new Criminal Court which was being set up. The net outcome is that a new Court of original jurisdiction was set up and wherever a question arose as to what are its powers in respect of specific question brought before it as Court of original criminal jurisdiction, it had to refer to the Criminal Procedure Code undaunted by any designation clantrap. When taking cognizance a Court of Special Judge enjoyed powers under Section 190. When trying cases, it is obligatory to follow the procedure for trial of warrant cases by a Magistrate though as and by way of status it was equated with a Court of Session. The entire argument inviting us to specifically decide whether a Court of a Special Judge for a certain purpose is a Court of Magistrate or a Court of Session revolves round a mistaken belief that a Special Judge has to be one or the other and must fit in the shot of a Magistrate or a Court of Session. Such an approach would strangulate the functioning of the Court and must be eschewed. Shorn of all embellishment, the Court of a Special Judge is a Court of original criminal jurisdiction. As a Court of original criminal jurisdiction in order to make it functionally oriented, some powers were conferred by the statute setting up the Court. Except those specifically conferred and specifically denied, it has to function as a Court of original criminal jurisdiction not being hidebound by the terminological status description of Magistrate or a Court of Session. Under the Code, it will enjoy all powers which a Court of original criminal jurisdiction enjoys, save and except the ones specifically denied.'

13. The Act under consideration does not contain express provisions similar to those contained in Section 8 of 1952 Act. Therefore, the question arises as to what is the necessary implication of the scheme and provisions of the Act. The observations in A. R. Antule's referred to above shall guide us in arriving at a correct conclusion. The preamble asserts that the Act is to prevent commission of offences of atrocities against the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and to provide Special Courts for trial of such offences. Section 14 of the Act states that the Special Court is intended for purposes of providing 'speedy trial.' To ensure speedy trial Section 15 requires a Special Public Prosecutor to be appointed to conduct cases in the Court. Application of Section 438 of the Code to cases under the Act is taken away. Application of provisions of Section 360 of the Code and Probation of Offenders Act. Section 20 of Act provides for overriding other laws. The Act has been enacted in the wake of sharp criticism about the inactivity of the State in protecting the most downtrodden sections of the society from atrocities at the hands of others. On the basis of past experience, it was evidently felt that trial of these offences should not be entrusted to the criminal courts in the hierarchy of courts which are overburdened with work and the trial should be entrusted to Special Courts. The status of level of the Court is indicated in Section 14 which requires specification of Court of Session as a special Court. The Act does not contain express provision regarding the procedure to be followed by Special Court. But there are sufficient indications of the legislative intention that Special Courts are to be governed by provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure except to the extent' of any inconsistency with the provisions of the Act. Section 4(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code states that all offences under any statute other than Indian Penal Code shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code, but subject to the provisions of such statute regulating such matters. Section 5 says that nothing contained in the Code shall, in the absence of a specific provision to the contrary, affect any special or local law for the time being in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force. Reference may be made to Section 193 of the Code according to which, except as otherwise expressly provided by the Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court of Session shall take cognizance of any offence as a Court of Original Jurisdiction unless the case has been committed to it by a Magistrate under this Code. The Legislature, in enacting the Act, must necessarily be cognizant of Sections 4 and 5 of the Code.

14. It would be useful in this connection to refer to schedule I of the Code dealing with classification of offences. The schedule indicates classification of various offences under the Indian Penal Code with reference to punishment, cognizability, bailability and by what Court triable. Part 1 deals with the offences under Indian Penal Code. Part 2 deals with offences against other laws. Offences against the other laws are classified in three categories. First category takes in offences punishable for death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for more than seven years. Such offences are cognizable, non-bailable and triable by Court of Session. Second category takes in offences punishable with imprisonment for three years and upwards, but not. more than 7 years. Such offences are cognizable, non-bailable and triable by Magistrate of the First Class. Third category takes in offences punishable with imprisonment for less than three years or with fine only. Such offences are non-cognizable, bailable and triable by any Magistrate. Offences under the Act would fall within all the three categories and would be required to be tried by two different categories of Courts. Such a contingency would have affected the proper implementation of the Act. For this reason also the Parliament provided for trial by a Special Court which is outside the hierarchy of Criminal Courts. Special Court can try offences falling under any of the categories of cases referred to in part 2 of Schedule I to the Code. The level of the Special Court is equated to that of Court of Session for several reasons. Experienced Judges would be available to preside over Special Courts. Such officers would also be well-equipped to try grave offences calling for severe sentences like imprisonment for life or for long term of years.

15. Our attention has been invited to a decision of this Court in Bar Association Jhabua v. State of M. P., 1995 MPLJ 562, 1995 JLJ 255, where a Division Bench held that Court of Sessions is a Court of Sessions Division and the Sessions Judge and Additional Sessions Judges function as Court of Session and, therefore, when a Court of Sessions Judge is specified as a Special Court, Additional Sessions Judges also have the jurisdiction to try the cases. This does not mean that a Special Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act is a Court of Sessions or is to function as a Court of Sessions. The purpose of Section 14 of the Act is to prescribe the level of the Court and to ensure that officers of experience and knowledge are made available to exercise jurisdiction thereunder and not to lay down that Special Court is a Court of Sessions subject to the restrictions under Section 193 of the Code. Court of Sessions is to be specified as Special Court; once that is done, the Court is a Special Court and it does not continue to be a Court of Session. The Legislature would have done well to provide specifically for -.- the procedure to be followed by the Special Court. In the absence of any such provision the Court cannot throw up its hands saying that this is a lacuna in the Act. The Court has to consider the controversy in the setting of the legislative scheme and the purpose of providing for Special Court of a very high status, namely, to ensure speedy trial of offences to safeguard the interests of weaker sections of the population. Cases of all the offences under Section 3 of the Act would be warrant cases; cases of offences under Sections 4 and 13 would be summons cases. Necessarily trial of such cases would be governed by the provisions of the Code relating to trial of warrant cases or summons cases, as the case may be, by Magistrates for this purpose. Wherever the expression 'Magistrate' occurs in Chapter XIX or XX of the Code, it has to be read as 'Special Court' as indicated in A. R. Aniule's case. Special Court is not a Sessions Court, but is a criminal Court of original jurisdiction and is not governed by the provisions of Section 193 of the Code. Special Court can take cognizance in any of the circumstances referred to in Section 190 of the Code and is also governed by the provisions of Chapters XV and XVI of the Code which are not inconsistent with its status and functions as a Court of original jurisdiction.

16. It is contended that if warrant case procedure is to be adopted, the case has to pass through the stage of enquiry and in a case of private complaint, there may be occasion for an enquiry under Section 202 of the Code and since the Act has empowered the Special Court to 'try' or conduct 'trial' and has not empowered the Special Court to conduct an 'enquiry' it must follow that the Special Court can only function as a Court of Session whose jurisdiction arises only on committal. Reference is made to the definition of 'enquiry' in Section 2(1)(g) of the Code as meaning every enquiry, other than a trial, conducted under this Code by a Magistrate or Court. Our attention has been invited to a decision of Allahabad High Court and another of Patna High Court. In R. P. Kapoor v. Pratap Singh Kairon, AIR 1966 All. 66, the Allahabad High Court considered the scope of preliminary enquiry under Section 476 of the old Code and held that an enquiry should be made in the case of an offence under Section 195(l)(b) or (c), Indian Penal Code and thereafter a complaint should be forwarded to the competent Magistrate. In that connection, the Court observed that 'enquiry' as defined in Section 4(1)(k) of the old Code does not include trial. In Tuneshwar Prasad Singh and Anr. v. State of Bihar, AIR 1978 Patna 225, committal proceeding was pending in regard to an offence under Section 392, Indian Penal Code. The question arose whether Magistrate has power to remand the accused to custody between the date of taking cognizance and the date of committal. The question depended on the true interpretation of the provisions of Section 209 read with Section 309(2) of the Code. It was held that a proceeding under Section 209, i.e. committal proceeding, is in the nature of an 'enquiry' within the meaning of Section 2('l)(g) of the Code and as such under Section 309(2), read with Section 209, the Magistrate having taken cognizance and before committal, is empowered to remand the accused. The Court observed that the definition of the term 'enquiry' does not lead one very far and the term 'enquiry' has a very wide connotation under the Code, that while trial is a judicial proceeding which ends either in conviction or acquittal, enquiry takes in investigation into facts, causes, effects and relations generally. Application of mind to ascertain what evidence is made out on the facts alleged and whether such an offence is exclusively triable by a Court of Session is an absolute necessity for the Magistrate before he can commit a case. Bringing of the judicial mind to bear upon the facts alleged and the ascertainment of the particular penal provision which is attracted and as to whether such offence is exclusively triable by a Court of Session certainly needs a scrutiny in the sense of an enquiry, though within a very narrow compass. These decisions are of no assistance to us in considering the amplitude and significance of the expression 'trial' or 'try'.

17. The Supreme Court, in The State of Bihar v. Ram Naresh Pandey and Anr., AIR 1957 SC 389, had occasion to consider the meaning and significance of these words in the context of power of withdrawal of a case at committal stage under the provisions of the old Code. The provision, similar to Section 321 of the Code, enables withdrawal from prosecution of any person either generally or in respect of anyone or more of the offences for which he is 'tried' and consequential order or discharge or acquittal being passed. After referring to the distinction sought to be drawn between the words 'trial' and 'enquiry' and the definition of the word 'enquiry' under Section 4(k) of the old Code, the Court observed as follows :

'There is hardly anything in this definition which throws light on the question whether the word 'trial' is used in the relevant section in a limited sense as excluding an inquiry. The word 'trial' is not defined in the Code. 'Trial' according to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, means the conclusion by a competent tribunal, of questions in issue in legal proceedings, whether civil or criminal, (Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 3rd Edition, Vol. 4, page 3092) and according to Wharton's Law Lexicon, means the hearing of a cause, civil or criminal, before a judge who has jurisdiction over it, according to the laws of the land'. (Wharton's Law Lexicon, 14th Edition, P. 1011). The words 'tried' and 'trial' appear to have no fixed or universal meaning. No doubt, in quite a number of sections in the Code to which our attention has been drawn, the words 'tried' and 'trial' have been used in the sense of reference to a stage after the inquiry. That meaning attaches to the words in those sections having regard to the context in which they are used. There is no reason why where these words are used in another context in the Code, they should necessarily be limited in their connotation and significance. They are words which must be considered with regard to the particular context in which they' are used and with regard to the scheme and purpose of the provision under consideration.' (Emphasis provided)

18. We have to understand the meaning, amplitude and significance of provision used in Section 14 in the background of legislative scheme, the purpose sought to be achieved, namely 'speedy trial' of categories of offences against the most depressed and oppressed class of citizens. The provisions regarding committal proceeding under the old Code were found to be conducive to delay in disposal of cases leading to injustice all round and were drastically altered in enacting the present Code. The elaborate enquiry contemplated in the old Code had to be replaced by an enquiry of a very limited scope with a view to expedition. Even such enquiry of limited scope can contribute to delay as we find from our experience over the years after the enactment of the present Code. Even in this State, there are thousands of cases pending committal for long periods. In these circumstances, it is clear that these words used in Section 14 of the Act should be understood in a wide sense as to include all stages of investigation and application of judicial mind, whether technically regarded as 'enquiry' or 'trial'. The full amplitude of expression 'to try' has been explored by various authoritative dictionaries, according to which the expression means 'examine judicially to examine and investigate a controversy by legal method', 'to submit someone to judicial enquiry', 'to submit a case to judicial examination.' According to Black's Dictionary 'trial' means a judicial examination in accordance with the law of the land, of a cause, either civil or criminal, of the issues between the parties, whether of law of facts, before a Court that has jurisdiction over it. Understood in this sense, the words must necessarily be comprehended within its scope, all stages, including taking cognizance, enquiry in the technical sense and trial in the technical sense. We are quite conscious that a contrary view is not impossible; but bearing in mind the legislative scheme and purpose, we are of the opinion that the interpretation that we seek to give accords with the legislative intention. Looking at the matter even pragmatically, we are satisfied that a view or understanding which dispenses with the cumbersome and delay-prone committal proceedings accords with public interest as well as the interest of those who may be arraigned before a Special Court.

19. Special Courts under the Act exercising jurisdiction in different districts have been following different procedures. Special Courts in some districts have been insisting on committal of cases to them, a view which we have found to be erroneous. Special Courts in some other districts have been taking cognizance on receipt of police charge-sheets or challans and also on private complaints, which we uphold as correct. Wherever Special Courts have received committal orders in police challan cases and on that basis have taken cognizance, it is quite unnecessary to retrace their steps or to take cognizance afresh. Special Courts, in such cases, may proceed with the cases as if cognizance has been lawfully taken, since committal orders necessarily refer to police challans and cognizance could be said to have been taken on the basis of such challans. Where committal orders have been passed in private complaint cases, Special Courts may deal with the cases, as if they are dealing with private complaint cases under Section 200 of the Code, reading 'Special Courts' wherever the expression 'Magistrate' occurs.

20. In the result, we hold as follows :

(a) Special Courts under the Act are not to function as Sessions Court, but as Courts 'of original jurisdiction'.

(b) Proceedings of Special Court are governed by Section 190, Chapters XV, XVI (other than Section 209) as also Chapters XIX and XX as the case may be and such other provisions of the Code as are not inconsistent with the scheme and provisions of the Act, reading 'Special Courts' wherever the expression 'Magistrate' occurs.

(c) Section 193 of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not apply to proceedings under the Act and committal orders are not required.

(d) Special Court can take cognizance on private complaints after following the procedure provided in the Code in relation to private complaints.

(e) Where cognizance has already been taken on the basis of committal orders in Police challan cases, it is not necessary for the Courts to retrace their steps or to take cognizance afresh.

(f) Where cognizance has already been taken on the basis of committal orders in private complaint cases, the Special Courts may deal with the cases as if they are dealing with private complaints under Section 200 of the Code.

21. The challenge against the proceedings of Special Court in this case fails and the revision petition is dismissed.