Rajesh Amarsinh Rajpoot Vs. State of M.P. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- - ujjain as well as second a. apart from this the words 'may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody' used in sub-section (2) of section 309 clearly indicate that a person who has been brought before a magistrate in lawful custody may be recommitted to custody be an order of the magistrate provided the requirements contained in sub-section (2) of section 309, criminal procedure code are satisfied. the division bench of this high court disapproved the inaction on the part of the magistrate to release the accused on bail in such situation. so also the division bench of this high court disapproved the act of magistrate to convert the detention from section 167(2) to section 309 of the code. so also the division bench has disapproved the act of the magistrate in postponing the order of release of the accused on bail in such situation. has submitted during the course of his argument that the applicant is facing a trial at ujjain as well as some trials in gujarat for stealing draft book containing various sheets of drafts to be issued by the bank where he was serving as peon, and, therefore for the purposes of ensuring his presence for such trials heavy security needs to be ordered to be taken from the applicant accused.orderj.g. chitre, j.1. heard shri r. s. kushwaha counsel for the petitioner. shri desai dy. g. a. for the state.the present applicant is facing prosecution for offences punishable under sections 420, 467, 468 of indian penal code which was being investigated into by police kotwali, ujjain. the applicant was arrested on 3-5-1994 in respect of crime no. 86/94. the charge sheet has been filed in the court of judicial magistrate, first class ujjain on 10-8-1994. the applicant accused had moved an application for bail before the same court on 8-8-1994. the learned magistrate posted that application for hearing on 9-8-1994. on 9-8-1994 the argument was heard and the matter was posted for decision on 10-8-1994. meanwhile the investigating agency submitted the charge sheet against the present applicant on 10-8-1994. on 10-8-1994 the learned magistrate passed an order rejecting the bail application of the applicant by holding that the bail application has been dismissed as charge-sheet has been filed against the applicant, and that made the applicant to approach sessions court, ujjain for bail.2. the applicant moved an application for bail in sessions court, ujjain, under the provisions of section 167(2) of the criminal procedure code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'code') which was heard by 2nd additional sessions judge, ujjain on 11-8-1994. he dismissed that bail application on 18-8-1994 by holding that charge-sheet has been filed within 90 days, and that made the applicant to approach finally the high court.3. shri r. s. kushwaha learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the charge-sheet has not been filed against the applicant within the period of 90 days and, therefore, the applicant should have been released on bail by j.m.f.c. ujjain as well as second a.s.j. ujjain because it is his right to get the bail in view of provision of section 167(2) of the code.4. shri desai dy. g. a. appearing for the state submitted that the applicant was transferred to the custody of j.m.f.c. ahmedabad on 25-5-1994 and, therefore, he was not in continuous detention in view of the order passed by j.m.f.c, ujjain in respect of crime no. 86/94. he submitted that the applicant is not entitled to get the bail as a matter of right under section 167(2) of the code.5. in the matter of khinvdan v. state of rajasthan reported in 1975 cri.lj. 1984, rajasthan high court observed that -'the provisions contained in proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of section 167, are of a mandatory nature and are added as new provisions in the new code to provide a satisfactory solution of the problem of delayed investigation and to avoid unnecessary detention of the accused persons for very long period causing great hardship and misery to them.' 'the fact that in such a case the magistrate having jurisdiction purports to take cognizance of the offence beyond 60 days on an incomplete police investigation report will not render the detention legal and remand valid under section 309(2). the earlier continued illegal detention of the petitioner could not be validated by the order of remand passed by the magistrate in the instant case after purporting to take cognisance of an offence. the magistrate having jurisdiction could by a warrant remand the accused in custody under sub-section (2) of section 309 only if the police report under section 173, criminal procedure code was filed before him within 60 days from the date of arrest of the accused and if after taking cognizance of the offence or commencement of the trial he considered it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of or adjourn, the inquiry or the trial. apart from this the words 'may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody' used in sub-section (2) of section 309 clearly indicate that a person who has been brought before a magistrate in lawful custody may be recommitted to custody be an order of the magistrate provided the requirements contained in sub-section (2) of section 309, criminal procedure code are satisfied. the words 'in custody' may reasonably be construed to mean custody authorised by law or in pursuance of a valid order directing detention of an accused person, if the custody or detention of a person is illegal. such a person in custody is entitled to be released on bail immediately before taking of cognizance of an offence by magistrate on police report filed beyond the period of 60 days.'6. the division bench of this high court in the matter umashankar and ors. v. state of m.p. reported in 1982 cri.l.j. 1186 observed that :'when a person was under continuous detention for more than 90 days filed an application for release on bail under section 167(2) proviso (a) and the challan was filed pending the application and magistrate taking cognisance of the challan remanded the accused to custody under section 309 the act of magistrate converting the remand from under section 167(2) to one under section 309 pending the application for bail, was illegal.'this high court in the same matter observed that -'magistrate cannot postpone the release on bail of an accused under proviso (a) to section 167(2) after expiry of 90 days or 60 days as the case may be, just to enable the police to file the challan and to alter the detention under section 167 to one under section 309. it is the duty of the magistrate soon after the expiry of the maximum period to inform the accused of his release on bail under section 167(2) proviso (a). once the accused of his own or on being told of his right by the magistrate is prepared to furnish bail the magistrate must order the accused to be released on bail without waiting for the challan and must release him when bail is furnished.'7. in the matter of ved prakash choudhari v. state of haryana and ors. reported in air 1980 sc 846 the supreme court observed that -'section 167(2) empowers the magistrate to authorise the detention of an accused in such custody as he thinks fit for a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole. more importantly, there is a precious interdict protective of personal freedom which states that no magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person exceeding 90 days in grave cases and 60 days in lesser cases.'in the same matter the supreme court observed that -'law is what law does and not what law writes in the books beyond the reach of those behind bars. in this perspective article 21 of the constitution and section 167(2) of the criminal procedure code are dead letter for each petitioner. article 21 guarantees personal liberty in these terms : 'no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.' in the same judgment the supreme court has deprecated the act of magistrate authorising repeated detention mechanically unconscious of the provisions which obligated the magistrates to monitor the proceedings. in that matter the accused was languishing in jail for six years and that was deprecated by the supreme court by further observing - 'if the salt hath lost its savour, wherewith shall it be salted?' if the law officers charged with the obligation to protect the liberty of persons are mindless of constitutional mandates and the code's dictates, how can freedom survive for the ordinary citizen?'8. in the matter of hitendra vishnu thakur and ors. v. state of maharashtra and ors. reported in (1994) 4 scc 602 the supreme court has observed that -'the law enjoins upon the investigating agency to carry out the investigation in a case where a person has been arrested and detained with utmost urgency and complete the investigation with great promptitude in the prescribed period. sub-section (2) of section 167 of the code lays down that the magistrate to whom the accused is forwarded may authorise his detention in such custody, as he may think fit, for a term specified in that section. the proviso to sub-section (2) fixes the outer limit within which the investigation must be completed and in case the same is not completed within the said prescribed period the accused would acquire a right to seek to be released on bail and if he is prepared to furnish bail the magistrate shall release him on bail and such release shall be deemed to be grant of bail under chapter xxxiii of the code of criminal procedure. the object behind the enactment of section 167 of the code was that the detention of an accused person should not be permitted in custody pending investigation for any unreasonably longer period. it may not be possible to complete the investigation in every case within 24 hours or even 15 days as the case may be even if the investigating agency proceeds with utmost promptitude, parliament introduced the proviso to section 167(1) of the code prescribing the outer limit within which the investigation must be completed. section 167 read with section 20(4) of tada, thus strictly speaking is not a provision for 'grant of bail' but deals with the maximum period during which a person accused of an offence may be kept in custody and detention to enable the investigating agency to complete the investigation and file the charge sheet if necessary in the court. the proviso to section 167(2) of the code read with section 20(4) of tada, therefore, creates an indefeasible right in an accused person on account of 'default' by the investigating agency in the completion of the investigation within the maximum period prescribed or extended as the case may be to seek an order for his release on bail.'in the said judgment the supreme court after following the judgments of supreme court in the matters of hussainara khatoon v. home secy., state of bihar, aslam babalal desai v. state of maharashtra, rajanikant jivanlal patel v. intelligency officer, narcotic control bureau, new delhi observed that -'the right of bail under section 167(2) proviso (a) thereto is absolute. it is a legislative command and not court's discretion. if the investigating agency fails to file charge sheet before the expiry of 60/90 days, as the case may be the accused in custody should be released on bail. the magistrate has no power to remand a person beyond the stipulated period of 90/60 days. he must pass an order of bail and communicate the same to the accused to furnish the requisite bail bonds.'in the matter the said accused was released on bail though he was facing a trial for offence punishable under tada.9. the learned dy. g.a. for the state submitted that in the present matter the applicant was remanded to the custody of j.m.f.g, ahmedabad on 25-5-1994 and, therefore, he was not in detention under the order of j.m.f.c, ujjain and therefore, he is not entitled to bail. he also pointed out during the course of arguments that when the present applicant was brought to ujjain in the present crime on 3-5-1994, he was already under the detention by the order of j.m.f.c, ahmedabad.10. i do not agree with him, because the observations made by rajasthan high court, division bench of this high court and the supreme court make it very clear that it is very important right of the accused to be on bail by the default committed by the investigating agency in not submitting the charge sheet within period of 60/90 days. the division bench of this high court disapproved the inaction on the part of the magistrate to release the accused on bail in such situation. so also the division bench of this high court disapproved the act of magistrate to convert the detention from section 167(2) to section 309 of the code. so also the division bench has disapproved the act of the magistrate in postponing the order of release of the accused on bail in such situation.11. for the purpose of defeating the right which the accused acquires by such default in view of provision of section 167(2)(a) of the code the investigating agency may find out various devices. it may show the arrest of the accused during that period in some other crime and may contend that the said accused was under detention pertaining to some other crime. as it has happened in the present case. the investigating agency may sharewelly submit the charge sheet in the court before the court passes the order of bail so as to make up the time of 60/90 days. the court has to be on guard in weeding out such devices or scheme which can be followed by investigating agency for the purposes of defeating the right of accused to get bail under section 167(2)(a) of the code which is the mandate of law.12. touching the arguments advanced on behalf of the state by shri desai dy. g.a. following moot question arises for answer 'whether by such release the investigation in respect of the crime registered against such accused would be hampered?' the answer is obvious no because by using appropriate provision of code, the investigating agency pertaining to subsequent crime or crimes registered against such an accused can get custody of such an accused for doing necessary investigation. but in that event, such investigating agency would be obliged to satisfy the magistrate that there is need of such custody of the accused for doing necessary investigation. such investigating agency will have to present reasonable grounds for justifying such prayer.13. the detention of accused in police custody is necessary for investigation for a limited period unless the crime under investigation requires detailed and complicated investigation. for doing necessary investigation the accused is required to be in custody for interrogating him, for confronting him and for getting from him clues for solving the mystery of the crime committed. the presence of the accused in police custody is necessary for preventing the accused from destroying the evidence which investigating agency can collect against him. 'investigation' does not mean unreasonable and unlimited detention of an accused in custody. under the pretext of investigation, the investigating agency cannot detain the accused for unlimited period and that is why the law has provided the maximum limit of 60/90 days by making such provisions in section 167(2)(a) of the code.14. when the mandate of the law is giving a right to an accused to get the bail, no court can postpone it. unfortunately in the present matter it has happened. that cannot be permitted to be continued further. hence this court is enlarging the applicant on bail.15. the learned dy. g.a. has submitted during the course of his argument that the applicant is facing a trial at ujjain as well as some trials in gujarat for stealing draft book containing various sheets of drafts to be issued by the bank where he was serving as peon, and, therefore for the purposes of ensuring his presence for such trials heavy security needs to be ordered to be taken from the applicant accused. shri kushwaha is also willing to give heavy security but submitted that it should be restricted to rs. 10,000/-. in this matter the accused is charged for committing theft of draft sheets worth rs. 6 lacs so far as the present crime is concerned. this applicant who happens to be peon cannot give security in terms of lacs. the amount of security should be sufficient enough to enable him to furnish the security. he cannot be put to hardship and cannot be denied to get released on bail by asking him to furnish unnecessarily heavy security. finding out the golden mean, i come to the conclusion that he needs to be directed to furnish security to the extent of rs. 15,000/- (fifteen thousand) with one surety and pr to that extent. some conditions need to be imposed for the purposes of securing his presence for said trial which should be the important consideration.16. thus, i allow this application and release the applicant on bail on his furnishing security to the tune of rs. 15,000/- (fifteen thousand) with one surety and pr bond before the judicial magistrate first class ujjain (shri samadia) where his case is pending for trial. he is directed not to threaten, contact or induce any of the prosecution witnesses. the record be sent to the trial magistrate forthwith.c.c. to parties.

Judgment:
ORDER

J.G. Chitre, J.

1. Heard Shri R. S. Kushwaha counsel for the petitioner. Shri Desai Dy. G. A. for the State.

The present applicant is facing prosecution for offences punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468 of Indian Penal Code which was being investigated into by police Kotwali, Ujjain. The applicant was arrested on 3-5-1994 in respect of Crime No. 86/94. The charge sheet has been filed in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class Ujjain on 10-8-1994. The applicant accused had moved an application for bail before the same Court on 8-8-1994. The learned Magistrate posted that application for hearing on 9-8-1994. On 9-8-1994 the argument was heard and the matter was posted for decision on 10-8-1994. Meanwhile the investigating agency submitted the charge sheet against the present applicant on 10-8-1994. On 10-8-1994 the learned Magistrate passed an order rejecting the bail application of the applicant by holding that the bail application has been dismissed as charge-sheet has been filed against the applicant, and that made the applicant to approach Sessions Court, Ujjain for bail.

2. The applicant moved an application for bail in Sessions Court, Ujjain, under the provisions of Section 167(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as 'Code') which was heard by 2nd Additional Sessions Judge, Ujjain on 11-8-1994. He dismissed that bail application on 18-8-1994 by holding that charge-sheet has been filed within 90 days, and that made the applicant to approach finally the High Court.

3. Shri R. S. Kushwaha learned counsel for the applicant submitted that the charge-sheet has not been filed against the applicant within the period of 90 days and, therefore, the applicant should have been released on bail by J.M.F.C. Ujjain as well as Second A.S.J. Ujjain because it is his right to get the bail in view of provision of Section 167(2) of the Code.

4. Shri Desai Dy. G. A. appearing for the State submitted that the applicant was transferred to the custody of J.M.F.C. Ahmedabad on 25-5-1994 and, therefore, he was not in continuous detention in view of the order passed by J.M.F.C, Ujjain in respect of Crime No. 86/94. He submitted that the applicant is not entitled to get the bail as a matter of right under Section 167(2) of the Code.

5. In the matter of Khinvdan v. State of Rajasthan reported in 1975 Cri.LJ. 1984, Rajasthan High Court observed that -

'the provisions contained in proviso (a) to sub-section (2) of Section 167, are of a mandatory nature and are added as new provisions in the new code to provide a satisfactory solution of the problem of delayed investigation and to avoid unnecessary detention of the accused persons for very long period causing great hardship and misery to them.' 'The fact that in such a case the Magistrate having jurisdiction purports to take cognizance of the offence beyond 60 days on an incomplete police investigation report will not render the detention legal and remand valid under Section 309(2). The earlier continued illegal detention of the petitioner could not be validated by the order of remand passed by the Magistrate in the instant case after purporting to take cognisance of an offence. The Magistrate having jurisdiction could by a warrant remand the accused in custody under sub-section (2) of Section 309 only if the police report under Section 173, Criminal Procedure Code was filed before him within 60 days from the date of arrest of the accused and if after taking cognizance of the offence or commencement of the trial he considered it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of or adjourn, the inquiry or the trial. Apart from this the words 'may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody' used in sub-section (2) of Section 309 clearly indicate that a person who has been brought before a Magistrate in lawful custody may be recommitted to custody be an order of the Magistrate provided the requirements contained in sub-section (2) of Section 309, Criminal Procedure Code are satisfied. The words 'in custody' may reasonably be construed to mean custody authorised by law or in pursuance of a valid order directing detention of an accused person, if the custody or detention of a person is illegal. Such a person in custody is entitled to be released on bail immediately before taking of cognizance of an offence by Magistrate on police report filed beyond the period of 60 days.'

6. The Division Bench of this High Court in the matter Umashankar and Ors. v. State of M.P. reported in 1982 Cri.L.J. 1186 observed that :

'when a person was under continuous detention for more than 90 days filed an application for release on bail under Section 167(2) proviso (a) and the challan was filed pending the application and Magistrate taking cognisance of the challan remanded the accused to custody under Section 309 the act of Magistrate converting the remand from under Section 167(2) to one under Section 309 pending the application for bail, was illegal.'

This High Court in the same matter observed that -

'Magistrate cannot postpone the release on bail of an accused under proviso (a) to Section 167(2) after expiry of 90 days or 60 days as the case may be, just to enable the police to file the challan and to alter the detention under Section 167 to one under Section 309. It is the duty of the Magistrate soon after the expiry of the maximum period to inform the accused of his release on bail under Section 167(2) proviso (a). Once the accused of his own or on being told of his right by the Magistrate is prepared to furnish bail the Magistrate must order the accused to be released on bail without waiting for the challan and must release him when bail is furnished.'

7. In the matter of Ved Prakash Choudhari v. State of Haryana and Ors. reported in AIR 1980 SC 846 the Supreme Court observed that -

'Section 167(2) empowers the Magistrate to authorise the detention of an accused in such custody as he thinks fit for a term not exceeding 15 days in the whole. More importantly, there is a precious interdict protective of personal freedom which states that no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person exceeding 90 days in grave cases and 60 days in lesser cases.'

In the same matter the Supreme Court observed that -

'law is what law does and not what law writes in the books beyond the reach of those behind bars. In this perspective Article 21 of the Constitution and Section 167(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code are dead letter for each petitioner. Article 21 guarantees personal liberty in these terms : 'No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law.' In the same judgment the Supreme Court has deprecated the act of Magistrate authorising repeated detention mechanically unconscious of the provisions which obligated the Magistrates to monitor the proceedings. In that matter the accused was languishing in jail for six years and that was deprecated by the Supreme Court by further observing - 'If the salt hath lost its savour, wherewith shall it be salted?' If the law officers charged with the obligation to protect the liberty of persons are mindless of constitutional mandates and the Code's dictates, how can freedom survive for the ordinary citizen?'

8. In the matter of Hitendra Vishnu Thakur and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in (1994) 4 SCC 602 the Supreme Court has observed that -

'the law enjoins upon the investigating agency to carry out the investigation in a case where a person has been arrested and detained with utmost urgency and complete the investigation with great promptitude in the prescribed period. Sub-section (2) of Section 167 of the Code lays down that the Magistrate to whom the accused is forwarded may authorise his detention in such custody, as he may think fit, for a term specified in that section. The proviso to sub-section (2) fixes the outer limit within which the investigation must be completed and in case the same is not completed within the said prescribed period the accused would acquire a right to seek to be released on bail and if he is prepared to furnish bail the Magistrate shall release him on bail and such release shall be deemed to be grant of bail under chapter XXXIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The object behind the enactment of Section 167 of the Code was that the detention of an accused person should not be permitted in custody pending investigation for any unreasonably longer period. It may not be possible to complete the investigation in every case within 24 hours or even 15 days as the case may be even if the investigating agency proceeds with utmost promptitude, Parliament introduced the proviso to Section 167(1) of the Code prescribing the outer limit within which the investigation must be completed. Section 167 read with Section 20(4) of TADA, thus strictly speaking is not a provision for 'grant of bail' but deals with the maximum period during which a person accused of an offence may be kept in custody and detention to enable the investigating agency to complete the investigation and file the charge sheet if necessary in the Court. The proviso to Section 167(2) of the Code read with Section 20(4) of TADA, therefore, creates an indefeasible right in an accused person on account of 'default' by the investigating agency in the completion of the investigation within the maximum period prescribed or extended as the case may be to seek an order for his release on bail.'

In the said judgment the Supreme Court after following the Judgments of Supreme Court in the matters of Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secy., State of Bihar, Aslam Babalal Desai v. State of Maharashtra, Rajanikant Jivanlal Patel v. Intelligency Officer, Narcotic Control Bureau, New Delhi observed that -

'The right of bail under Section 167(2) proviso (a) thereto is absolute. It is a legislative command and not Court's discretion. If the investigating agency fails to file charge sheet before the expiry of 60/90 days, as the case may be the accused in custody should be released on bail. The Magistrate has no power to remand a person beyond the stipulated period of 90/60 days. He must pass an order of bail and communicate the same to the accused to furnish the requisite bail bonds.'

In the matter the said accused was released on bail though he was facing a trial for offence punishable under TADA.

9. The learned Dy. G.A. for the State submitted that in the present matter the applicant was remanded to the custody of J.M.F.G, Ahmedabad on 25-5-1994 and, therefore, he was not in detention under the order of J.M.F.C, Ujjain and therefore, he is not entitled to bail. He also pointed out during the course of arguments that when the present applicant was brought to Ujjain in the present crime on 3-5-1994, he was already under the detention by the order of J.M.F.C, Ahmedabad.

10. I do not agree with him, because the observations made by Rajasthan High Court, Division Bench of this High Court and the Supreme Court make it very clear that it is very important right of the accused to be on bail by the default committed by the investigating agency in not submitting the charge sheet within period of 60/90 days. The Division Bench of this High Court disapproved the inaction on the part of the Magistrate to release the accused on bail in such situation. So also the Division Bench of this High Court disapproved the act of Magistrate to convert the detention from Section 167(2) to Section 309 of the Code. So also the Division Bench has disapproved the act of the Magistrate in postponing the order of release of the accused on bail in such situation.

11. For the purpose of defeating the right which the accused acquires by such default in view of provision of Section 167(2)(a) of the Code the investigating agency may find out various devices. It may show the arrest of the accused during that period in some other crime and may contend that the said accused was under detention pertaining to some other crime. As it has happened in the present case. The investigating agency may sharewelly submit the charge sheet in the court before the Court passes the order of bail so as to make up the time of 60/90 days. The Court has to be on guard in weeding out such devices or scheme which can be followed by investigating agency for the purposes of defeating the right of accused to get bail under Section 167(2)(a) of the Code which is the mandate of law.

12. Touching the arguments advanced on behalf of the State by Shri Desai Dy. G.A. following moot question arises for answer 'whether by such release the investigation in respect of the crime registered against such accused would be hampered?' The answer is obvious No because by using appropriate provision of Code, the investigating agency pertaining to subsequent crime or crimes registered against such an accused can get custody of such an accused for doing necessary investigation. But in that event, such investigating agency would be obliged to satisfy the Magistrate that there is need of such custody of the accused for doing necessary investigation. Such investigating agency will have to present reasonable grounds for justifying such prayer.

13. The detention of accused in police custody is necessary for investigation for a limited period unless the crime under investigation requires detailed and complicated investigation. For doing necessary investigation the accused is required to be in custody for interrogating him, for confronting him and for getting from him clues for solving the mystery of the crime committed. The presence of the accused in police custody is necessary for preventing the accused from destroying the evidence which investigating agency can collect against him. 'Investigation' does not mean unreasonable and unlimited detention of an accused in custody. Under the pretext of investigation, the investigating agency cannot detain the accused for unlimited period and that is why the law has provided the maximum limit of 60/90 days by making such provisions in Section 167(2)(a) of the Code.

14. When the mandate of the law is giving a right to an accused to get the bail, no court can postpone it. Unfortunately in the present matter it has happened. That cannot be permitted to be continued further. Hence this Court is enlarging the applicant on bail.

15. The learned Dy. G.A. has submitted during the course of his argument that the applicant is facing a trial at Ujjain as well as some trials in Gujarat for stealing draft book containing various sheets of drafts to be issued by the bank where he was serving as peon, and, therefore for the purposes of ensuring his presence for such trials heavy security needs to be ordered to be taken from the applicant accused. Shri Kushwaha is also willing to give heavy security but submitted that it should be restricted to Rs. 10,000/-. In this matter the accused is charged for committing theft of draft sheets worth Rs. 6 lacs so far as the present crime is concerned. This applicant who happens to be peon cannot give security in terms of lacs. The amount of security should be sufficient enough to enable him to furnish the security. He cannot be put to hardship and cannot be denied to get released on bail by asking him to furnish unnecessarily heavy security. Finding out the golden mean, I come to the conclusion that he needs to be directed to furnish security to the extent of Rs. 15,000/- (Fifteen thousand) with one surety and PR to that extent. Some conditions need to be imposed for the purposes of securing his presence for said trial which should be the important consideration.

16. Thus, I allow this application and release the applicant on bail on his furnishing security to the tune of Rs. 15,000/- (Fifteen thousand) with one surety and PR bond before the JUDICIAL MAGISTRATE FIRST CLASS UJJAIN (Shri Samadia) where his case is pending for trial. He is directed not to threaten, contact or induce any of the prosecution witnesses. The record be sent to the trial Magistrate forthwith.

C.C. to parties.