Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
			'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
			'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
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			'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
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$title_for_layout = 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | '
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
		'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
		'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
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		'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p></p><p>',
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			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
			'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
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			'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
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			'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
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			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
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			'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
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		'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
		'sub' => 'Family',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
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- indian penal code, 1890.sections 307 & 324: [lokeshwar singh panta & b.sudershan reddy,jj] assault proof - appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - no evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - however opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury held, appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under section 324 of i.p.c., sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him - it was also alleged that the respondent once tried to.....

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '504449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
			'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
			'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
		'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
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		'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
		'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
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		'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p></p><p>',
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			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
			'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
			'sub' => 'Family',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'surendra-singh-chauhan-vs-mamta-chouhan',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '504449',
		(int) 1 => 'surendra-singh-chauhan-vs-mamta-chouhan'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '504449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
		'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
		'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p></p><p>',
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gulab c. gupta, j.1. this is husband's appeal, filed under section 28 of the hindu marriage act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th april, 1984, passed by ii additional judge to the court of district judge, jabalpur in civil suit no. 31-a of 1983.2. the parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. the appellant, in his application filed under section 13 of the act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. it was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent.....

Judgment:

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '504449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
			'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
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			'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
			'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
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			'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
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			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
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			'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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		'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
		'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
		'sub' => 'Family',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p>',
	(int) 13 => '<p>'
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Gulab C. Gupta, J.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '504449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
			'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
			'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
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			'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
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$title_for_layout = 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | '
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		'id' => '504449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
		'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
		'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p>',
	(int) 13 => '<p>'
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1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.

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			'id' => '504449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
			'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
			'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
			'sub' => 'Family',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'surendra-singh-chauhan-vs-mamta-chouhan',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '504449',
		(int) 1 => 'surendra-singh-chauhan-vs-mamta-chouhan'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '504449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
		'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
		'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p>',
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2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '504449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
			'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
			'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
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			'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
			'sub' => 'Family',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'surendra-singh-chauhan-vs-mamta-chouhan',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '504449',
		(int) 1 => 'surendra-singh-chauhan-vs-mamta-chouhan'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '504449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
		'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
		'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p>',
	(int) 13 => '<p>'
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3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '504449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
			'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
			'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
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			'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
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$title_for_layout = 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '504449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
		'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
		'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p>',
	(int) 13 => '<p>'
)
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4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '504449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
			'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
			'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
			'sub' => 'Family',
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			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '504449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
		'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
		'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
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		'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p>',
	(int) 13 => '<p>'
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5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '504449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
			'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
			'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
			'sub' => 'Family',
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			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '504449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
		'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
		'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
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		'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p>',
	(int) 13 => '<p>'
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6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '504449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
			'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
			'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
			'sub' => 'Family',
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			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '504449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
		'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
		'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
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		'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
		'sub' => 'Family',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p>',
	(int) 13 => '<p>'
)
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7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '504449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
			'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
			'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
			'sub' => 'Family',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '504449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
		'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
		'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
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		'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
		'sub' => 'Family',
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$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p>',
	(int) 13 => '<p>'
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8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | ',
	'desc' => array(
		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '504449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
			'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
			'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
			'sub' => 'Family',
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			'circuit' => null
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		(int) 0 => '504449',
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$title_for_layout = 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '504449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
		'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
		'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
		'sub' => 'Family',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
)
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$ctype = ' High Court'
$caseref = ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu<br>'
$content = array(
	(int) 0 => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p>',
	(int) 13 => '<p>'
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9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '504449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
			'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
			'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
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			'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
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$title_for_layout = 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
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		'id' => '504449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
		'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
		'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p></p><p>',
		'observations' => null,
		'overruledby' => null,
		'prhistory' => '',
		'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
		'ratiodecidendi' => '',
		'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
		'sub' => 'Family',
		'link' => null,
		'circuit' => null
	)
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p>',
	(int) 13 => '<p>'
)
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10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '504449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
			'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
			'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
			'favorof' => null,
			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
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			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
			'sub' => 'Family',
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			'circuit' => null
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$title_for_layout = 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '504449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
		'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
		'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p>',
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11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | ',
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			'id' => '504449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
			'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
			'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
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			'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'findings' => null,
			'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
			'observations' => null,
			'overruledby' => null,
			'prhistory' => '',
			'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
			'ratiodecidendi' => '',
			'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
			'sub' => 'Family',
			'link' => null,
			'circuit' => null
		)
	),
	'casename_url' => 'surendra-singh-chauhan-vs-mamta-chouhan',
	'args' => array(
		(int) 0 => '504449',
		(int) 1 => 'surendra-singh-chauhan-vs-mamta-chouhan'
	)
)
$title_for_layout = 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '504449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
		'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
		'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p></p><p>',
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		'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p>',
	(int) 13 => '<p>'
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12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.

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	'title_for_layout' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | ',
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		'Judgement' => array(
			'id' => '504449',
			'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
			'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
			'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
			'authreffered' => '',
			'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
			'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
			'caseanalysis' => null,
			'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
			'citingcases' => '',
			'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
			'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
			'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
			'court_type' => 'HC',
			'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
			'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
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			'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
			'judgement' => '<p style="text-align: justify;">Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p style="text-align: justify;">12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p style="text-align: justify;"></p><p style="text-align: justify;">',
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			'pubs' => 'II(1990)DMC208',
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			'respondent' => 'Mamta Chouhan',
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$title_for_layout = 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs Mamta Chouhan - Citation 504449 - Court Judgment | '
$desc = array(
	'Judgement' => array(
		'id' => '504449',
		'acts' => '<a href="/act/50935/hindu-marriage-act-1955-complete-act">Hindu Marriage Act, 1955</a> - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28',
		'appealno' => 'First Appeal No. 118 of 1984',
		'appellant' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan',
		'authreffered' => '',
		'casename' => 'Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan',
		'casenote' => ' - INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1890.Sections 307 & 324: [Lokeshwar Singh Panta & B.Sudershan Reddy,JJ]  Assault Proof - Appellant allegedly dealt sickle blow to deceased - Testimony of eye-witnesses showed that sudden altercation ensued between appellant and deceased - No evidence to indicate any previous enmity between parties - Single blow of sickle had been inflicted by appellant on back of deceased - Incised wound allegedly inflicted by appellant - However opinion of doctor proved that deceased had not died due to direct result of said injury Held, Appellant is therefore liable to be convicted under Section 324 of I.P.C., Sentence of 3 years imprisonment reduced to period undergone by appellant considering mental agony suffered by him -  It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'.This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. 6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
		'caseanalysis' => null,
		'casesref' => ' and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu;',
		'citingcases' => '',
		'counselplain' => 'P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.',
		'counseldef' => 'M.A. Khan, Adv.',
		'court' => 'Madhya Pradesh',
		'court_type' => 'HC',
		'decidedon' => '1987-02-10',
		'deposition' => 'Appeal dismissed',
		'favorof' => null,
		'findings' => null,
		'judge' => 'Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
		'judgement' => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.</p><p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.</p><p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.</p><p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.</p><p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.</p><p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.</p><p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.</p><p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.</p><p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.</p><p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.</p><p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.</p><p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.</p><p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p></p><p>',
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	(int) 0 => '<p>Gulab C. Gupta, J.',
	(int) 1 => '<p>1. This is husband's appeal, filed under Section 28 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') and is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30th April, 1984, passed by II Additional Judge to the Court of District Judge, Jabalpur in Civil Suit No. 31-A of 1983.',
	(int) 2 => '<p>2. The parties are legally married husband and wife and have a son born to them out of this wedlock. The appellant, in his application filed under Section 13 of the Act, prayed for a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and desertion by the respondent. It was alleged in the said application that the respondent is of a quarrelsome nature and lived with the appellant only for about 4 months in a period of 2-1/2 years. Even during this period, it was alleged, the respondent created problems by treating with cruelty the infant son and other members of the family. It was also alleged that the respondent once tried to throw the infant child into a well and also tried to burn herself. It was further alleged that she was, at the relevant time living with her in-laws and had thereby permanently brought the relationship to an end. The respondent, in her written-statement, admitted that she was the married wife of the appellant and a son was born out of the wedlock on 4-7-1979. She, however, denied that she was of quarrelsome nature or has treated any one with cruelty. She further alleged that on 21-6-1980 the appellant relations physically assaulted her and forced her to leave the house. The matter was also reported to the police. She therefore, claimed that she had neither done any thing to be guilty of cruelty nor had she deserted the appellant. According to her, she was forced to live separated because of the cruel behaviour of the appellant and the members of the family. In the written statement, she also submitted that she was entitled to maintenance for herself and her minor son under Section 25 of the Act. The learned trial Judge on consideration of oral and documentary evidence on record, held that the appellant has failed to prove his case of either cruelty or desertion. The learned Judge accepted the case set up by the respondent and concluded that the members of the appellant's family had physically thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 and thereafter the appellant himself refused to permit her to stay in the house. On the aforesaid findings, the learned Judge felt that the respondent was entitled to maintenance under Section 25 of the Act and therefore, directed payment of Rs. 300/-per month as maintenance for herself and her minor child. It is this judgment and decree that is impugned in the present appeal.',
	(int) 3 => '<p>3. At the time of final hearing of the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant did not challenge the findings recorded by the trial Court about cruelty and desertion and submitted that he challenged the impugned order only in so far as it grants maintenance under Section 25 of the Act. In view of the aforesaid, it is not considered necessary to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court that the appellant has failed to prove his case of 'cruelty' by the respondent. This finding is accordingly affirmed. Similarly, the finding of the trial Court that it was the appellant's family members who had forcibly thrown out the respondent from the house on 21-6-1980 is also affirmed. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance under Section 25 of the Act, as no 'decree' as contemplated under this provision has been passed by it. The argument is that dismissal of appellant's application for divorce does not amount to 'passing any decree' within the meaning of this section. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in Jitbandhan v. Gulab Devi, 1983 MPLJ (SN) 4. This decision is based on several decisions of other High Courts in the country. It is, therefore, submitted that according to the established law the trial Court, while dismissing the appellant's application for divorce, could not have passed an order under Section 25 of the Act. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, supported the impugned judgment and decree.',
	(int) 4 => '<p>4. Section 25 of the Act deals with permanent alimony and maintenance to either the wife or the husband and empowers the Court exercising jurisdiction under the Act to direct payment at the time of passing any decree or at any time subsequent thereto. This section does not deal with grant of maintenance allowance to children, which is covered by Section 26 of the Act. The said section is wide enough to include a decision not only of the custody of children but also their maintenance and education. The said provision not only authorises the Court to pass interim order but also make such provision in the decree as it may deem just and proper. Since the order of maintenance has been passed not only for the respondent wife but also for her minor son, the matter will require consideration under both these provisions.',
	(int) 5 => '<p>5. Since the respondent has been driven out of his matrimonial home without any just cause, she would certainly be entitled to maintenance for herself and for her minor child. Obligation of the appellant to maintain his minor child also flows from the provisions of Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act. Since the respondents' right to, claim maintenance cannot be doubted in the context of the facts and circumstances of the case, she will have to approach Courts either under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code or under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act for appropriate relief in this regard, in case this Court holds that the trial Court acted without jurisdiction in granting maintenance in these proceedings. In such a situation the litigation between the parties will not end and start a new in different forum. It is not the intention or purpose of Section 25 or 26 of the Act to promote multiplicity of proceedings by denying respondent's claim for maintenance, even though on facts she is entitled to the claim. Section 23A of the Act, introduces by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 indicates an intention to the contrary. In the statements of Objects and Reasons it was clearly and specifically stated that this provision was inserted 'with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings'. This section provides that the respondent, apart from contesting the petition, can also seek relief on the ground of petitioner's cruelty, adultery and desertion and if any one of those grounds is proved by the respondent he or she, as the case may be, will be entitled for the relief under the Act to which he or she should been entitled if he or she presented a petition seeking such relief. It cannot be seriously disputed that the respondent could have approached the Court for judicial separation on the ground of cruelty and would have obtained the relief on the findings recorded by the trial Court. In such a proceeding she could have claimed maintenance for herself and her son. In view of clear language of Section 23A and the intention of the legislature there appears to be no justification for not entertaining her cross-objection and granting her the relief of maintenance. Then the words 'any relief under this Act on that ground' are wide enough to include the relief of maintenance based on proof of cruelty. In C. Snonaih v. Padma, AIR 1983 Kar. 114 it was held that in a proceeding filed under Act for divorce or judicial separation or restitution of conjugal rights the respondent in addition to opposing the claim of the petitioner was entitled to make a counter claim for any relief under the Act, including the claim for alimony, on the ground of petitioner's adultery, cruelty or desertion. In this case an application claiming alimony was considered sufficient. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the relief granted to the respondent can be sustained under this provision.',
	(int) 6 => '<p>6. Even otherwise the intention of the legislature clearly is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and settle every dispute, particularly connected matters like maintenance, custody of children etc. in the same proceedings. The intention clearly is to settle all grievances connected with adultery, cruelty or desertion, of both the parties in the same proceeding. Now, if this be the proclaimed object of the statute, efforts of the court should be to interprete its provisions in such a manner as to best harmonise with the subject of the provision and bring out its object. In Workmen, D.T.E. v. Management, D.T.E., AIR 1958 SC 333 and Santa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1976 SC 2386, the Supreme Court laid down that the words of a statute when there is doubt about their meaning, are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonise with the subject of the enactment and the object which the legislature had in view. Their meaning is found not so much in a strict prammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. In State of Haryana v. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1975 SC 1952 and Carew & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2260, it was laid down that where two interpretations are feasible, the Court will prefer that which advances the remedy and suppresses the mischief as the legislature envisioned. In Bushing Schmitz V. Menghani, AIR 1977 SC 1569, the Supreme Court emphasised the necessity of 'project oriented approach' keeping in mind the principle that legislative futility is to be ruled out so long as interpretative possibility permits. In Motor Owners' Insurance Co. Ltd. v. J.K. Modi, AIR 1981 SC 2059, it was emphasised that expression used in a statute should ordinarily be understood in a sense in which they best harmonise with the object of the statute and which effectuate the object of the legislature. It may therefore, appear that in case of difficulty in deciding the correct meaning of any word used in the section that interpretation which gives effect to the intention of the legislature and achieves the object and purpose of the statute must be preferred. Under the circumstances, any interpretation of Section 25 of the Act will have to be such as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and give relief to the respondent in these very proceedings.',
	(int) 7 => '<p>7. Inspite of it several High Courts have held that the words 'at the time of passing the decree' appearing in Section 25(1) of the Act mean at the time of passing any decree of the kind referred to in earlier provision of the Act and not at the time of dismissing the petition for any of the reliefs provided in those sections or any time subsequent thereto. The expression 'any decree', according to this view, does not include an order of dismissal and an order dismissing the petition is not accepted as 'the passing of a decree' within the meaning of this provision. (A. Chinna Babu v. Akasam Parbati, AIR 1967 Ori. Shantaram v. Malti, AIR 1964 Bom. 83 and Minarani v. Dashrath, AIR 1963 Cal. 428. These cases were, however, decided before 1976 amendment and therefore do not take into consideration the new legislative policy. In the context of the amendment and insertion of Section 23A of the Act, the view must be held to be obsolete. Even otherwise this court in Ravikumar v. Manorama, FA No. 82 of 1980 decided 17-3-1981, dissented from the decision of Bombay High Court in Santaram v. Malti (supra), and held the Court, even while dismissing the application, had jurisdiction to pass to order in favour of respondent. According to this Court, Section 25(1) of the Act premits application for maintenance of the wife to be made either at the time the Court passes the decree or at any time subsequent thereto and this power was not dependent on passing any decree. The Court, therefore, held that it was wrong to contend that the application made by the wife subsequent to the dismissal of the original petition was not maintainable. In taking this view, the Court observed that it is the duty of the Court to put a construction upon this section which does not attribute absurdity to the legislature and which would advance the purpose of legislation and stop the mischief. This Court, therefore, held that even though the appellant failed to prove his case for divorce on the ground claimed, still this, by itself, is no ground to deprive the respondent wife and minor children of their right to claim maintenance. This case is therefore, the authority for the proposition that even when the Court dismisses the application of the husband for divorce for his failure to prove the allegation, it has jurisdiction to grant the relief of maintenance to the respondent wife.',
	(int) 8 => '<p>8. The learned counsel for the appellant, however, relies on Jitbandhan v. Smt. Gulab Devi, 1983 M.P.L.J. (SN) 4 and submits that the view of this Court is not different than other High Courts. This case follows decisions of Gujarat, Orissa and Bombay High Courts referred to above and hold that the Court while dismissing the application had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. This decision neither takes into consideration the decision in Ravikumar's case (Supra) nor does it refer to Section 23A of the Act. Indeed the judgment contained no discussion of the law on the subject. This was however a case where the respondent had made no application claiming maintenance as required under Section 25(1) of the Act and yet an order for maintenance was passed. The Court's view that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to grant maintenance was based on not only the absence of an application by the respondent, but also the view of the law taken by other High Courts. There appears to be no dispute that in the absence of an application or counter claim by the respondent, the court would have no jurisdiction to grant maintenance. Under the circumstances, the final decision of the Court in Jitbandhan's case can be supported on this ground. The decision cannot be accepted as laying down a law different than that stated in Ravikumars case. Even otherwise Ravikumar's case contains reasons for the view which in the opinion of this Court, are sound and hence the said decision is preferable.',
	(int) 9 => '<p>9. Gurucharan Kaur v. Ram Chand, AIR 1979 P & H. 206 and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu, AIR 1980 Raj. 102 are decisions rendered subsequent to 1976 amendment and take the view earlier taken by Bombay, Orissa and Gujarat High Courts. According to these decisions, the expression 'passing any decree' in Section 25 means decree granting relief of the nature stated in Section 9 to 13 of the Act. Therefore, when the petition by the husband under Section 9 is dismissed for any reason whatsoever, award of maintenance to the wife Under Section 25 is illegal. These decisions also do not take into consideration either the legislative intent of avoiding multiplicity of proceedings or the clear language of Section 23A of the Act. They do not, therefore appeal to the conscience of this Court. The purpose of the provision is to solve human problems and avoid unnecessary litigation. This purpose and intention has become a casualty in these decisions and are therefore not acceptable to this Court.',
	(int) 10 => '<p>10. The language of Section 25 of the Act as it is, is clear enough and its natural and ordinary meaning sufficiently effectuates the purpose sought to be achieved. The word 'decree' even without the aid of the word 'any' takes within its every formal expression of adjudication which conclusively is the right of the party with regard to all or any matter into controversy. There appears to be no justification for holding that only that adjudication which is in favour of the appellant would constitute a decree and not one which is against him. The addition of the word 'any' as an adjective to the word 'decree' only emphasises its content. There appears to be no justification for curtailing the ambit and scope of these words to hold that the impugned decree is not a 'decree' for purposes of Section 25 of the Act though it is a 'decree' for purposes of Section 28 of Act. Indeed this reasoning would be inconsistent and illogical, besides contrary to the expressed intention of the legislature. Under these circumstances, this Court finds no justification for deviating from the earlier view of the Court in Ravi Kumar's case. As a necessary corrollary this Court has no hesitation in rejecting the appellant's submission of lack of jurisdiction in the trial Court.',
	(int) 11 => '<p>11. The impugned order, as observed earlier also provides for maintenance of the minor son, which could only be done under Section 26 of the Act. Because of the difference in the language used in this Section the logic of Section 25(1) as found in judgments of various High Courts has no relevance. There can be no doubt that the trial Court had the necessary authority and jurisdiction to order maintenance of the minor son. The amount awarded is so small that it may not even suffice for the maintenance of the son. The impugned order could therefore be sustained under Section 26 of the Act.',
	(int) 12 => '<p>12. The appeal fails and dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 250/-.<p>',
	(int) 13 => '<p>'
)
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Subject	Family
Court	Madhya Pradesh High Court
Decided On	Feb-10-1987
Case Number	First Appeal No. 118 of 1984
Judge	Gulab C. Gupta, J.
Reported in	II(1990)DMC208
Acts	Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 - Sections 13(1), 24, 25, 25(1), 26 and 28
Appellant	Surendra Singh Chauhan
Respondent	Mamta Chouhan
Appellant Advocate	P.S. Gothalwal, Adv.
Respondent Advocate	M.A. Khan, Adv.
Disposition	Appeal dismissed
Cases Referred	and Darshan Singh v. Mst. Desu

Surendra Singh Chauhan Vs. Mamta Chouhan - Court Judgment