| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/498553 |
| Subject | Motor Vehicles |
| Court | Madhya Pradesh High Court |
| Decided On | Jul-28-1989 |
| Case Number | M.P. No. 746 of 1989 |
| Judge | V.D. Gyani and ;A.G. Qureshi, JJ. |
| Reported in | AIR1990MP119 |
| Acts | Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 - Sections 57, 57(8) and 62 |
| Appellant | Vallabhdas |
| Respondent | State Transport Appellate Tribunal and ors. |
| Appellant Advocate | R.C. Waghmare, Adv. |
| Respondent Advocate | Kulshreshtha, Adv. |
| Disposition | Petition allowed |
| Cases Referred | Shiv Chand Amolak Chand v. The Regional Transport Authority |
A.G. Qureshi, J.
1. The petitioner in this petition is a transport operator and is carrying on the business of plying stagecarriages on the strength of the permits granted to him under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. The respondent No. 3 Omprakash Agarwal is a new entrant in the transport business. He holds a permit for Navdatodi to Balakwada and Kawadia to Mandleshwar routes. The respondent No. 3 earlier tried to obtain a temporary permit from Balakwada to Khargone, but could not succeed. Thereafter the respondent No. (8) applied for grant of a temporary permit on the part of the route between Balakwada and Khargone. The petitioner objected to the grant of the permit. The Secretary, R.T.A. rejected the said application also.
2. Thereafter the attempt of respondent No. 3 to obtain permit between Maingaon to Khargone was also unsuccessful. Thereafter he again applied for grant of a temporary permit between Balakwada to Khargone for a period from 27-12-88 to 25-4-89. However, despite the objection of the petitioner the permit was granted to respondent No. 3, vide order of the Secretary, R.T.A., Indore dated 27-2-1989. The petitioner (respondent No. 3) thereafter did not lift the temporary permit for about two months and thereafter filed another application for temporary permit on 17-4-1989 with effect from 21-4-1989 to 20-8-1989. The Secretary, RTA granted the permit for the aforesaid period to respondent No. 3.
3. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the Secretary, RTA the petitioner preferred a revision before the S.T.A.T. under Section 64(a) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The revision was registered as Revision No. 121 of 89. The petitioner also made a prayer for staying the operation of the order of the Secretary, RTA granting the permit. The STAT, however, did not stay the order of the Secretary, R.T.A. granting the permit to respondent No. 3. Hence this petition on the ground that the date, fixed for next hearing is 21-6-1989 whereas from 1-6-1989 the post of STAT shall become vacant as a result of the retirement of the present incumbent Shri J.A. Khare.
4. During the course of the argument it has been argued inter alia by the learned counsel for the petitioner that an applicationfor grant of a permanent permit on the route in question is pending with the RTA. Therefore in view of the bar contained in Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act a temporary permit could not be granted.
5. On the other hand it has been argued that the application panding is for grant of extension of the route and not for grant of a new permit. Although an application for grant of an extension has to be treated as grant of a new permit by fiction of law, but it is only for procedural purposes and in no case it can be treated as an application for grant of a new permit attracting the bar contained in Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act. This point has been argued at length by both the parties and in this respect judgments of Rajasthan and Kerala High Courts and of this Court were cited.
6. In our opinion the Supreme Court in the case of Shiv Chand Amolak Chand v. The Regional Transport Authority, AIR 1984 SC 9, has clearly laid down that application under Section 57(8) for short extension of route is not an application for grant of a new permit. The Supreme Court has held that the context in which Sub-section (8) occurs and its juxtaposition with Sub-sections (3) to (7) in Section 57 clearly indicate that what is sought to be made applicable to an application referred to in Sub-section (8) by treating it as an application for grant of new permit is the procedure set out in Sub-sections (3) to (7) of Section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act and nothing more. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court it cannot be said that the application for grant of an extension of a route filed under Section 57(8) of the Motor Vehicles Act should be treated as an application for grant of a new permit for all the purposes and such an application if pending shall attract the bar contained in Section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act against grant of a temporary permit on the route for which the application for grant of a permanent permit is pending. Therefore, we are of opinion that the Secretary, R.T.A. has not erred in any way in holding that the pendency of an application under Section 57(8) of the Motor Vehicles Act on the route in question does not bar the issuance of a temporary permit.
7. On merits we find that the particular temporary need was determined by the Secretary, R.T.A. in its order dated 27-2-1989 and a permit was granted for the period between 27-12-1988 to 25-4-89, whereas the order passed on 21-4-1989 is not an order in the eye of law because the learned Secretary, R.T.A. has not determined the existence of a particular temporary need taking into consideration all the factors especially the marriage and open season. The order of the RTA is only for the issuance of a permit on the basis of the particular temporary need determined by his predecessor-in-office wherein he was of the opinion that the need existed only up to 24-4-1989 whereas the impugned order has been passed on 21-4-1989 granting a temporary permit from 21-4-1989 to 20-8-89. Therefore, the order impugned dated 21-4-1989 being an order against the provisions of law and the position of law settled by various decisions of the Courts cannot be allowed to be sustained. Although a revision petition was pending before the STAT, but in view of the fact that the S.T.A.T. was not constituted till the date of hearing of this case we heard the arguments on merits finally.
8. In the result this petition is allowed. The order impugned is quashed for the reasons stated above. As a result of the order in this petition the revision petition pending before the S.T.A.T. shall also stand disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.