Gajanand and ors. Vs. State of M.P. and ors. - Court Judgment

Khan, J.

1. One LPA and these petitions involve similar questions of law and fact and are disposed off by this common judgment. Even though, writ petitioners are represented by more than one counsel. Shri M.M. Asudani took it upon himself to deputise for them all, to facilitate disposal of these petitions hanging fire since 1996 and going through bouts of litigations from here to the Apex Courts and back.

2. Petitioners are Bhumi Swamies of around 63 acres of land comprising survey Nos. 684/1, 684/1/3, 684/1/4, 684/1/5, 681/1/7, 684/1/8. 684/1/10, 684/2/1, 684/2/3, 684/2/4, 684/3/1, 684/3/2, 684/ 3/3, 684/3/4 and 684/3/5 in Patwari Halka No. 9, situate at Rangwasa, Tehsil-Indore, which is under acquisition for establishment of a 'Diamond Park' euphemism for Industrial area to accommodate diamond cutting and polishing units. They are engaged in a life and death struggle to ward off the acquisition and their attack to it is multipronged ranging from technicalities of law to national Security considerations.

3. It all seems to have started in 1994 when state Government formulated its industrial Policy providing special facilities/ incentives to promote 100% export oriented and mineral based industrial units. A 'Diamond Park' was also conceived for housing diamond cutting and polishing units. One Private; Company M/s. B. Arun Kumar International responded to this and requested for allotment of 150-200 acres of land near Indore for establishing of a diamond polishing and processing unit. The Government machinery consequently swung into action to seize upon this offer. A Committee of high ranking officials was constituted to identify and select the site for proposed 'Diamond Park'. This Committee surveyed four sites and after weighing pros arid cons found the land in Village Rangwasa suitable for it, About 118 hectares were earmarked for the purpose out of which 90 hectares or so belonged to the Government and remaining 73 hectares private land was proposed to be acquired. Accordingly, a proposal to acquire this private land was floated by Madhya Pradesh Adhyogik Kendra Vikas Nigam (hereinafter called M.P.A.K.V.N.) which was approved by! he Government in Commerce and Industry Department of the Government vide communication elated 18-1-1996. The Collector look the follow-up action, sought sanction of the Revenue Commissioner and issued notification dated 30 1-1996 read with Section 17(1) of the Act for emergency acquisition of 73.04 hectares of private, land for specified public purpose of establishing a 'Diamond Park'. This was followed by notification Under Section 6 issued by respondent No. 7 on 9-2-1996 declaring that land was required for public purpose and directing the Collector to takeover its possession within fifteen days.

4. Petitioners filed writ petitions against this, assailing the action on the ground that stated public purpose was vague and the whole exercise was mala fide, designed to benefit a private Company M/s. B Arun Kumar International, Writ Court rejected the contentions raised and dismissed the writ petitions vide judgment dated 12-4-1996. Petitioners took appeals against this which were also dismissed on 25-6-1996. They, thereafter, filed S.L.Ps. wherein Supreme Court ordered thus :--

'Mr. P.P. Rao, learned counsel for the first respondent the State of Madhya Pradesh states that the Notification dated 9th February, 1996 under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act shall be withdrawn within a period of two weeks from today. Thereupon within one week, notices under Section 5A shall be issued to all the land owners concerned to file objections to the proposed acquisition.

Such objections shall be filed by the land owners within two weeks of the date of receipt of the notices by them. The land owners shall be given the opportunity of hearing and the order of the objections shall be passed after complying with the requirement of Section 5A. The procedure under the Act shall thereafter be followed.'

5. In compliance thereto respondent No. 7 issued a notification dated 11-10-1996 withdrawing notification No. 18, dated 9-2-1996 issued Under Section 6 of the Act, and respondent No. 10 issued a notice Under Section 5A on 25-10-1996 inviting objections from the land owners. This notice, however, carried a note allegedly explaining and elaborating the public purpose as under :--

'Diamond Park means establishment of industries for Diamond cutting polishing and production of jewellery by Madhya Pradesh Audhogik Kendra Vikas Nigam (Ltd) Indore registered on behalf of Madhya Pradesh and also establishment and development of Industrial area and colonies for the workers and employees working in industrial unit including the facilities like school, hospital etc.'

6. Petitioners filed objections Under Section 5A taking all conceivable grounds against the acquisition. But these were rejected and a report dated 24-9-1996 was formulated by respondent No. 10 culminating in issuance of fresh notification dated 1-1-1997 u/S, 6 and Section 9 of the Act.

7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was informed of all this and it disposed of the petitions by the following order dated 21-2-1997 :--

'The procedure referred to in our order dated 11th October. 1996, having been followed, a report under Section 5A submitted and a notification under Section 6 issued, nothing survives in these SLPs and they are disposed of.

The petitioners shall be at liberty to file writ petitions in the High Court challenging the notification under Section 4 and the fresh notification under Section 6 and for all consequential reliefs. In deciding the writ petitions the High Court shall not take into account any observation made in the judgment and order which is under challenge in these SLPs. The writ petitions shall be decided on their merits and in the light of the law. We make it clear that we express noopinion upon the merits.

For a period of 21 days from today, the status quo as of today shall be maintained.'

8. That is how petitioners have filed these writ petitions praying for quashment of notifications under 4 and 6 dated 30-1-1996 and 1-1-1997 respectively and the report of Land Acquisition Officer dated 24-12-1996 and for declaration that the land was no! for public purpose and a direction for investigation and inquiry into the matter.

9. Though petitioners have taken all conceivable grounds under the sky to question the acquisition, their main case is that this acquisition was vitiated because See-lion 4 notification was ambiguous and indefinite as stated public purpose. 'Diamond Park' was not commonly comprehensible and that this omission could not be filled up or improved upon by any explanation or elaboration in Section 5A notice. It is alleged that the controversial acquisition was for a private purpose to benefit a private company M/s. B. Arun Kumar International. It is also urged that the land under acquisition was not suitable for the specified purpose and that the proposed project was loaded with dangerous consequences for country's national security. The area was extremely sensitive as it lay only four Kms. or so from Military Head Quarters at Mhow and was in close proximity to the Centre of Advance Technology, Department of Automic Energy besides a T. B. Sanitorium and Research Centre. Support in this regard is sought from communication of Military Station Commander dated 8-5-1996 and 12-7-1996, that of Defence State Officer and also the then MP. Kalyan Singh, who had all objected to the acquisition on defence and security considerations. The site was also unsuitable because of non availability of diamonds and skilled labourer in the area. Even the water and electricity connections were also not available and required to be managed from Pithampur which could lead to closure of various industries there. Similarly diamond cutting and polishing was an indoor industry which could be accommodated in a compact building and would not require allotment of 200 acres of land which was being done only to benefit the private company.

10. Petitioners added grievance is that Acquisition Authorities had failed to consider their objections and to satisfy requirements of Section 5A. These objections were given a short shrift and dealt with in a mechanical manner. The report of LAO dated 26-12-1996 is also attacked on a variety of grounds including that it was contrary to environmental guidelines for set up of an industry.

11. Apart from all this, petitioners counsel Shri Asudani took a last minute jurisdictional plea to project that the impugned acquisition suffered from lack of jurisdiction. According to him the compulsory acquisition to private land could only be decided upon and ordered by the 'Appropriate Government' Under Section 4 of the Act and non else. In the present case the whole exercise was undertaken by Revenue Commissioner and Collector, Indore, which was incompetent. Therefore, all orders passed by them and Notifications issued were void, ab-initio, though, this ground was not borne by the writ petitions, it required to be dealt with as the plea touched the root of the matter.

12. Respondents have filed a detailed reply expectedly repelling the contentions raised by the petitioners. Their case is that the proposed 'Diamond Park' was the offspring of the Government's industrial policy promulgated way back in 1994 and had nothing to do with the offer made by private company M/s. B. Arun Kumar which surfaced on the scene much later. The project was estimated to earn Rs. 1000/- crores in foreign exchange and employ about 10,000 people. It is explained that diamond mines in the country and in the state were on the verge of exhaustion necessitating import of uncut diamonds from abroad which could be exported after cutting and polishing to earn much needed foreign exchange and to provide employment to local people. That is why State Government had decided to develop a 'Diamond Park' in Indore taking in regard all relevant factors. The site was selected and found suitable by a team of high ranking officers. Out of 118 acres of land required only 73 hectares of private land was to be acquired which was baron and rocky involving a modest financial implications'. The land was to vest in the Government and would be controlled and regulated by M.P.A.K.V.N. for developing infrastructure and then to allocate earmarked plots to deserving Units in diamond cutting and polishing on 99 year lease basis. It was liable to be allotted in accordance with M. P.Allotment of land and Shed Rules, 1974.

13. It is submitted that approval to acquire private land was accorded by the State Government in the Commerce and Industry Department on 18-1-1996 and thereafter General Manager DIC requested Collector to take necessary action for the acquisition. Circular dated 26-12-1983 was issued by the Government requiring permission of Revenue Commissioner for any emergency takeover if the land intended to be acquired was more than 100 acres. The Government by order dated 22-3-1985 had appointed all Commissioners and Collectors as ex-officio Secretary/Deputy Secretary for the purpose of Section 4 to 7 and 5A of the Act empowers them to exercise thereunder. It is denied that land was to be acquired, for M/s. B. Arun Kumar International. On the contrary, the MOU was reached with this Company and also with one Belgium Company called Rosy Blue who had committed to set up four diamond cutting and polishing units investing about Rs. 400 crores which could provide employment to four thousand persons. The sole object was to benefit from the expertise of these companies to earn foreign exchange and to provide employment to the local unemployed. The proposed 'Diamond Park' had the capacity to house twelve units besides providing housing and other amenities in a small township of its own.

14. All other allegations made by the petitioners are denied. It is pointed out that they had raised the bogey of security threat only to frustrate the setting up of a project which could have benefited the local people and promoted industrial culture in the State. Petitioner's apprehension about the threat to National Security is said to be baseless. Even the Defence Ministry had allayed fears in this regard by declaring that proposed project did not involve any direct security implication. But, petitioners, who are leading businessmen and who wanted to make a fortune out of the land due to rapid urbanisation had persisted in their campaign for their own ends. It is stated that only a small number of bona fide agriculturists could be effected by the acquisition, but even they hold other better land and were proposed to be compensated in case of any hardship.

15. All this raises the following issues for consideration and determination :--

1. Whether the stated purpose, 'establishment of Diamond Park' was vague and indefinite and whether it could be explained away in Section 5A notice which was directed to be issued by the Supreme Court in first round of litigation?

2. Whether such alleged vagueness had caused any prejudice to petitioners disabling them from taking objections to the acquisition and whether objections filed by them were not considered?

3. Whether proposed acquisition was mala fide and in colourable exercise of power to confer any undue benefit on a private company M/s. B. Arun Kumar International and whether it was required to be undertaken in conformity with procedural requirements of Chapter VII of L.A.A.?

4. Lastly, whether land under acquisition was unsuitable for the stated purpose and whether its acquisition could pose any threat to national security or violate any environmental guidelines.

16. It is a beaten track that Government could compulsorily acquire private land only for a public purpose and not for any private purpose. What is a public purpose depended upon various factors and variables. There is no comprehensive definition of the expression available even in LAA. Section 4 of the Act also gives its inclusive definition. But broadly it is understood to mean a purpose involving community interest. Its contours and parameters vary with times and prevailing conditions in a particular locality.

17. It is also no more res integra that it was for the Government to decide whether there existed a 'public purpose' or not and whether the land proposed to be acquired was needed or likely to be needed for such purpose or whether such need was genuine. It was not for the Courts to appreciate and evaluate evidence and to sit in judgment over the decision of Government unless it was shown to be mala fide, fraudulent and in colourable exercise of power. Similarly it was for the Government again to adjudge whether the land proposed to be acquired was suitable for the stated purpose. In Bajirao's case 1995 (2) SCC 442, it was aptly laid down by Supreme Court :--

'It is primarily for the State Government to decide whether there exists public purpose or not, and it is not for this Court or the High Courts to evaluate the evidence and come to its own conclusion whether or notthere is public purpose unless it comes to the conclusion that it is a mala fide or colourable exercise of the power. In other words, the exercise of the power serves no public purpose or it serves a private purpose.'

18. There is also no quarrel with the proposition that Vagueness or ambiguity or indefiniteness in the stated 'public purpose' in Section 4 notification invalidates the acquisition process. This is so because it deprives a person interested in the land of the valuable safeguards/guarantees made available to him under Section 5A of LAA. If it prejudice and disables him/her from effectively raising objections to the acquisition, it vitiates the whole acquisition process.

19. There may be cases where the stated purpose may not be expressed/indicated in so many words in Section 4 notification. But if such explanation/elucidation is otherwise available from contemporaneous official record to the interested person and does not impinge upon his right to object, the acquisition process cannot be faulted. The acid test, therefore, remained whether the person interested was handicapped or disabled from raising objections to the acquisition because of any vagueness or indefiniteness in the 'public purpose' and not how and in what manner such purpose was stated in Section 4 notification. In M. P. Housing Board v. Mohd. Shafi. 1992 (2) SCC 168 the Supreme Court found the stated purpose vague because Acquisition Authority could not come forward with any explanation and clarification. Similar situation was noticed by the Court in Munshi Singh's case 1973 (2) SCC 337 : (AIR 1973 SC 1150). But the Apex Court felt satisfied in Somawanti's case AIR 1963 SC 151 and Bajirao's 1995 (2) SCC 442 case where the purpose was not stated in so many words and yet was treated public purpose on the explanation offered in counter-affidavit and borne by official record. As such petitioners contention that public purpose was to be judged from the expression used in Section 4 notification and no recourse could to be taken to any other record was misconceived. This was negated by Supreme court in Jairam's case 1971 (2) SCC 671 (sic) where it considered government Affidavit that the land was needed to start new industry, and later affirmed in SS Darshan v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1996 SC 671 as under (at page 673) :---

'No doubt all the documents have to be read together to determine the purpose of the present acquisition.'

'We have no doubt that the cumulative effect of all these documents is that thepresent acquisition for the purpose of set-tint, up the Technology Park by the Govt. of Karnataka.'

This position was further clarified in Bajirao's case (supra) in which Supreme court accepted the amplification of 'public purpose' entioned in the counter-affidavit and borne by the record and distinguished the judgment in M.P. Housing Board's case by observing thus :--

'In M. P. Housing, Board's case on which strong reliance was placed by the counsel for the appellant, the facts were the notification issued under Section 4(1) did not specify any public purpose. The notification merely reads that the land detailed in the schedule attached thereto was required for a public purpose. The notification further disclosed that the State Government was being of the opinion that the provision of Sub-section (1) of Section 17 was applicable in respect of the land required to be acquired, it dispensed with the enquiry under Section 5A of the Act. The schedule of the land was given. In that context a Bench of three Judges considered the controversy and had held that the latter elaboration that the land was acquired for the planned development under the M. P. Housing Construction Board was vagued and that, therefore, it was not a public purpose. Accordingly, the notification was quashed. It is seen that this Court consistently has taken the view that if the purpose has been mentioned in the notification as a public purpose, whether it 'specified' the public purpose or not, the Court did not go behind the public purpose nor seek specifications published under Section 4(1). When declaration under Sub-section (1) of Section 6 was published, the public purpose was held to be conclusive by operation under Section 6(3). If there is any vagueness and if it is specified in the counter-affidavit or is evident from the record, it was also accepted by this Court amplifying the public purpose in the notification. If it is not a public purpose, i.e. to serve general interest but individual interest, it was held to be a colourable exercise of power. In M. P. Housing Board case as no mention was made of any public purpose in the notification issued under Section 4(1) thesubsequent clarification was not accepted by this Court. The Court did not lay down any law contrary to or inconsistent with the law laid down by the two constitution Bench judgments and successive three Judge Benches and two Judge Benches. Therefore, the ratio therein must be understood in the backdrop of the facts and renders little assistance to the appellants.'

20. All this shows that even if stated public purpose in Section 4 Notification was not all that clear and comprehensive, any explanation offered by the Government in its counter-affidavit and borne by its official record could be referred to and relied upon for understanding the true nature of the stated purpose. Moreover, the stated public, purpose in Section 4 Notification was not required to be understood by the common man in the street bat the person interested in land so that he could resist the acquisition by taking objections against it and seeking consideration of these Under Section 5A of the Act. Once such person had objected to the acquisition and had riot suffered any prejudice in any way, the stated purpose could not be faulted for any vagueness or indefiniteness taking away the valuable safeguards Under Section 5A of the Act.

21. In S.S. Darshan's case, the land acquired for 'Information Technology Park' was considered as public purpose. Similarly in Smt. Somavanti's case, expression 'setting up of a Factory' which was later on elaborated was held to be a public purpose in Bajirao's case. Notification indicated pub-lie purpose to be 'Sai Baba Sansthan, Shirdi' and after examining various materials placed on record Apex Court held as under :--

'The question, therefore, is whether this notification is vague and the public purpose mentioned therein is liable to be quashed on that ground. The leading judgment of this Court in this behalf is the ratio laid down in Somawanti v. State of Punjab, (AIR 1963 SC 151). The facts therein were that the State of Punjab exercised the power under Section 4(1) and issued the notification followed by the declaration under Section 6 that land was likely to be needed by the Government for a public purpose, namely for the setting up of a factory (elaborated later on) for manufacturing various ranges of refrigeration compressors and ancillary equipments. It was contended that the public purpose is a colourable exercise of the statutory poweroffending their rights to hold the property under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution. The Constitution Bench per majority dealing with that question held (at SCR p. 801) that the Act made no attempt to define public purpose in a compendious way. Public purpose is bound to vary with the times and the prevailing conditions in a given locality and therefore, it would not be a practical proposition even to attempt a comprehensive definition of it. It is because of this that the legislature has left it to the Government to say what is a public purpose and also to declare the need of a given land for a public purpose. At (SCR) p. 804 it was held that whether in a particular case the purpose for which land is needed is a public purpose or not is for the State Government to be satisfied about. If the purpose for which the land is being acquired by the State is within the legislative competence of the State, the declaration of the Government will be final subject, however, to one exception. That exception is that if there is a colourable exercise of powers, the declaration will be open to challenge at the instance of the aggrieved party. If it appears that what the Government is satisfied about is not a public purpose at all the action of the Government would be colourable as not being relatable to the power conferred upon it by the Act and its declaration will be a nullity. Subject to this exception the declaration of the Government will be final. Therefore, Constitution Bench upheld the notification when it was mentioned that the public purpose was for industrial development without any specification.'

22. Therefore, we find nothing wrong in the clarification made in Section 5A notice issued by Acquisition Authority in compliance to orders passed by Supreme Court that 'Diamond Park' envisaged setting up of diamond cutting and polishing units and other infrastructural facilities. It was not intended to make up any omission in Section 4 Notification but to spell out that the purpose was to create an industrial area/ estate which had its genesis in the Industrial Policy of the Government and to apprise the interested persons of its true purpose to enable them to contest the acquisition.

23. It is the admitted position that petitioners filed objections to the proposed acquisition in response to notice under Section 5A as provided by the Supreme Court.

They accordingly stood informed and were aware of the true nature of the stated purpose before filing their objections, Therefore, even if it was assumed that stated purpose 'Diamond Park' in Section 4 notification appeared misleading and somewhat vague initially, it was cured by the amplification/ elucidation made in Section 5A notice affording effective opportunity to petitioners to file their objections to the acquisition. Petitioner's objections against the acquisition were accorded due consideration but were not allowed by the Collector who formulated the report recommending acquisition and a declaration by the Government under Section 6. Record shows that Collector's report was prepared after requisite consideration of objections filed by petitioners and due application of mind. All told it cannot be said or held that petitioners were prejudiced in any way in objecting to the acquisition and seeking consideration of their objections. Having gone through the mill, they can't be now allowed to turn around and harp on the alleged vagueness in the public purpose stated in Section 4 notification.

24. Petitioners' next contentions is that the proposed acquisition was mala fide, undertaken in colourable exercise of power with a view to benefit the private company M/s. B. Arun Kumar International. In fact the acquisition was processed under a cloak sidetracking the procedure provided for such acquisition under Chapter VII of the LAA. Support for this is drawn by referring to sequence of events beginning with the all important meetings between the Company representatives and the Chief Minister and the follow-up letter written to Revenue Commissioner, Indore, for seeing through the controversial acquisition. It is also alleged that Chief Minister had shown undue interest in the matter, mobilising the official machinery to complete the acquisition somehow.

25. All this is refuted by official respondents in their counter-affidavits. Their stand is that establishment of a 'Diamond Park' was a part of the Government's Industrial Policy and the Scheme envisaged providing employment to about 4000 local unemployed and to earn a foreign exchange of Rs. 1000/-crores. M/s. B. Arun Kumar international had only initiated the process and MOU was reached with this Company, valid for oneyear, to benefit from its expertise in the field. 26. All that remained to be seen in this backdrop was whether acquisition was in fact intended to be made for the private company in colourable exercise of power. It does not seen so in the given situation and circumstances. It may be true that the whole exercise was prompted by the proposal mooted by M/s. B. Arun Kumar International and precipitated by the meeting of company representatives with the Chief Minister, but that would not straightway lead to the conclusion that proposed acquisition was aimed at benefiting the private company and was required to be undertaken in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the Act. Merely because M/s. B. Arun Kumar International had set the ball rolling does not make out that the disputed land was to be acquired for the company. More so when it is explained by official respondents that the land was to be acquired for creation of an Industrial Estate called 'Diamond Park', requiring 1'18 hectares of land to accommodate 12 Diamond Cutting and Polishing Units and for providing other infrastructural facilities, which was to be transferred to MPAKVN for allotment to prospective entrepreneurs in accordance with its allotment and sheds Rules. In the present day industrial promotion culture. It is not uncommon for Chief Ministers to invite and persuade Industrialists to make investments for encouraging industrial growth in their respective States and very often incentives are offered to them for the purpose. They cannot be charged of doing so for their personal gain unless the action is proved to be a colourable exercise of power. The State of M. P., though possessed of resources, is an industrially backward State and therefore any effort to build up its industrial culture should not be allowed to be killed on bald and generalised allegations. Given regard to sequence of events leading to impugned acquisition we feel convinced that the action was neither mala fide, nor in colourable exercise of power. Firstly no mala fides are alleged against any official functionary. Nor is there anything to show that the transaction was afflicted by any Quid Pro Quo. It is not understandable how the Chief Minister would benefit from the alleged deal with the land under acquisition was to vest in the Government and was to be transferred of MPAKVN for beingregulated and supervised by it.

27. The Supreme Court dealt with similar situation in SS Darshan's case and held that the acquisition was for the public purpose of establishment of 'Information Technology Park' and that transfer of the land to M/s. Banglore Information Pvt. Ltd. Company was only to benefit from the expertise of that Company. The Court observed as follows :--

'It says that the present acquisition is made for the said project and the involvement of the Company is only for this purpose ensuring the use of the land acquired only for this project, namely establishment of the Information Technology Park, since the expertise required for the establishment of the park is being provided by the Singapore Consortium and Tata Industries Ltd. The affidavit gives the details of the control by the Board to ensure use of the entire land only for this project and not for any other purpose. Proceedings of the meeting of the Board held on 24-1-1994 have been annexed to the affidavit. This mentions clearly that in the joint venture agreement, it is clearly provided that the Board has veto power in the matters pertaining to policies and guidelines etc. and provision has been made to enable the Board to enforce the policy decisions. It further provides as under :--

'The proposed Information Technology Park would have the facilities like power supply, water supply, centrally air conditioning facilities for transmission of data through satellite etc. in addition to the common facilities, like administrative block, canteen, hospitals and residential accommodation for the Executive staff the park should be fully functional before expiry of the lease period.' The other provisions also indicate the that involvement of the Company is only forcarrying out the object of setting up this project.'

28. L/C for petitioners, Mr. Asudani also made some ancillary submissions to assail the acquisition. He asserted that the land under acquisition was not suitable for the stated purpose, which if carried out, would pose threat to the national security and contravene some environmental guidelines. Needless to emphasise determination of the suitability of a petitioners land for public purpose falls within the province of the land acquisition Authority and so does the extentof its requirement. A person interested in the land had no say in the matter. This stands settled by the Supreme Court in Ramgir Goswami v. State of Gujarat 1988 (1) SCC 466 holding as under :--

The assessment of suitability of land to be acquired for concerned public purpose is primarily for the LAO to consider and no good reason has been shown to us which could warrant interference with his decision.'

29. The same would hold true about any threat perception to the national security. These matters are better left to be taken care of by the Government and to be handled by it. A person aggrieved of the acquisition of his land need not intermeddle in such affairs and venture into such thickets. Any plea touching, the security considerations of the country required to be taken with all concern but once any such threat perception was ruled out by the Government itself, that should remove all doubts and set the matter at rest. Likewise petitioners' allegations about contravention of environmental guidelines also appears premature at this stage. The issue would arise only if proposed unit required such guidelines to be followed for their establishment,

30. Petitioners' counsel, Mr. Asudani raised a last minute jurisdictional plea which goes to the root of the matter. He contended that u/S, 4 of LAA it was 'Appropriate Government' alone which was to feel satisfied whether private land was needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a company etc. Such satisfaction or decision could not be drawn or taken by any other official functionary. That is why some other States had made suitable amendments in this provision to insert word 'Collector' after 'Appropriate Government' to enable him to exercise the power. Similarly under Section 5A even though a person interested in land was required to file objections in writing to Collector, such objections were required to be considered by the 'Appropriate Government' and either rejected or accepted by it. The declaration Under Section 6 was also to be made by the 'Appropriate Government'. But, in the present case the whole exercise was undertaken by the Collector and Commissioner who could not be delegated any such power exercisable by the 'Appropriate Government'. Reliance in this regard is placed on Articles 154 and 163 of the Constitutionand also Rules 5 and 6 of the Rules of Business and Rules 4 and 6 of Business Allocation Rules of the Government. These Rules arc interpreted to suggest that power of the Government could be delegated by the Governor only to the Ministers and none-else and that Government could not designate any officer as Ex-officio Secretary to the Government because Rule 5 of Business Allocation Rules provided for only one Secretary to the Government. It is also submitted by him that decision to acquire a private land could be only expressed in an order passed in the name of the Government under Rule 6 of these Rules. For all this support is sought from AIR 1967 SC 1145 and AIR 1957 Mad 4 to show that any instruction or order passed by the Minister was not a Government order and that a decision to acquire could be embodied in Government order to be expressed in the name of Governor.

31. Mr. Vivek Tankha. Learned Advocate General explained that Governor was empowered under Article 166 of the Constitution to make Rules for more convenient transactions of the Government business and for allocation of such business to its Ministers other than the one in which he was to exercise his discretion under the Constitution. Governor had thereby made Rules of Business and issued supplementary instructions. Under Rule 4 of Business Allocation Rules he had allocated Revenue department which included land acquisition to Revenue Minister who could direct disposal of any item of business in his department by a Secretary/Deputy Secretary under Rule 2-A of supplementary instructions to Rule 13 of Business Rules. Meanwhile, Government in G.A.D. had issued notification dated 21-1-1983 appointing Collectors as Ex-officio Deputy Secretaries and Commissioners as Ex-officio Secretaries under entry 59 of these Rules. Therefore, in this manner Government was competent to appoint Commissioner as ex-officio Secretary and Collector as Deputy Secretary and so was Revenue Minister authorised to delegate acquisition business to Revenue Commissioner and Collector, (ex-officio Secretary and Deputy Secretary) appointed for the purpose.

32. Mr. Asudani's submission, though attractive on the face, appears devoid of substance on close scrutiny of relevant provisions of the Constitution and the BusinessRules. It is elementary that executive power of the State vests with the Governor who exercises it through the Council of Ministers and subordinate officers under Article 154 of the Constitution. The Governor is the Constitutional head and is required to exercise his powers on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. It is also well established that he is bound by such advice save otherwise in matters where he is to exercise his discretion under the Constitution. Therefore, while the business of the Government is required to be transacted in the name of Governor, it is not possible or practicable that all such business was dealt with by him or by the Council of Ministers or for that matter an individual Minister. That is why he is empowered by Article 166 of the Constitution to make Rules of Business for more conversant transaction of business and for allocation of such business among Ministers and also' officials. Pursuant thereto when Ministers and officials discharge functions allotted to them, they are doing so as limbs of the Government and their decisions become the decisions of the Government. This finds support in the Supreme Court judgment AIR 1970 SC 1102 observing thus (at page 1106) :--

'The Minister is not expected to burden himself with the day to day administration. His primary function is to lay down the policies and programmes of his ministry while the Council of Ministers settle the major policies and programmes of the Government. When a civil servant takes a decision, he does not do it as delegate of his Minister. He does it on behalf of the Government. It is always open to a Minister to call for any file in his ministry and pass orders. He may also issue directions to the officers in his ministry and regarding the disposal of Government business either generally or as regards any specific case. Subject to that over all power, the officers designated by the 'Rules' or the standing orders, can take decisions on behalf of the Government. These officers are the limbs of the Government and not its delegates.'

33. In State of M. P., Governor had made Rules of Business and Rules of allocation of Business and had also issued instructions thereunder. Under Rule 4 of BAR he had put Revenue Department under the charge of a Minister. He had further allotted business ofland acquisition to the Revenue Department. The Revenue Minister was authorised to delegate the power for disposal of any item of business to the Secretary of the Department under Rule 2-A of the Supplementary Instructions issued Rule 13 of Business Rules. Similarly the government had declared in terms of Entry 49 of Business Allocation Rules that General Administrative Department would be entitled to designate ex-officio officers and in exercise whereof it had notified the Revenue Commissioners and Collectors as ex-officio Secretaries/ Deputy Secretaries to take decisions in land acquisition matters on behalf of the Government. All this showed that power to deal with land acquisition subject flowed down to Secretary/Deputy Secretary of the Revenue Department or any other official who was declared/appointed/designated so ex-officio for the purpose and once such appointed ex-officio Secretary (Revenue Commissioner) was asked to dispose of land acquisition matters by the Minister-in-charge under Rule 2-A of supplementary instructions, he assumed the jurisdiction to deal with such matters and all his actions and decisions become that of the Government.

33A. Mr. Asudani's reliance on AIR 1957 Mad 48 to suggest that Minister's order to empower ex-officio Secretary (Revenue Commissioner) was invalid as it was not a Government order and that such power could not be delegated by him is wholly misconceived. It is true that a Minister's instruction or direction does not partake the character of a Government order unless formalised in conformity with the Rules of Business but in the present case no such Government order was required to be passed to vest the requisite power in the Revenue Commissioner. It is also fallacious to contend that the Minister could not delegate such power because Governor alone could do that. Once Governor himself had empowered the Minister to ask the Secretary to deal with and dispose of any item of business under the rules, it tantamounted to delegation of power by the Governor himself. We are also not impressed by the submission that such power could be delegated only to 'a Secretary', perhaps implying Secretary of the Department. This overlooks a situation where a department may have more than one Secretary and the Minister could delegate the power to any of them.

34. For all this we hold that the stated purpose 'establishment of 'Diamond Park' in Section 4 notification did not suffer from any vagueness or indefiniteness and was validly issued, elucidation of public purpose carried in Section 5A notice was in order and not intended to fill up any omission or lacunae in Section 4 notification. It is further held that impugned acquisition was for the public purpose of establishing an industrial area in tune with the Industrial Policy of the Government called 'Diamond Park' and was not for the benefit of private company M/s. B. Arun Kumar International Ltd. The action was neither mala fide nor in colourable exercise of power and nor did it suffer from any lack of jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances of the case. The declaration made by the Government under Section 6 of LAA that acquisition was being made for public purpose thus assumed finality and it was free to proceed further in the matter under law. All the writ petitions, therefore, fall and are dismissed.

35. LPA No. 118/96 related to same subject matter is directed against Writ Court Order dated 3-7-1996 passed in W.P. No. 415/96. It appears that this petition was tagged with some other connected petitions calling in question the impugned acquisition which were dismissed by Writ Court on 12-4-1996 on merits by a reasoned order and later affirmed by the LPA Bench.

36. Despite the dismissal of these petitions, W.P.No. 415/96 somehow survived and was pressed in service by appellants on the ground that it raised some additional grounds not dealt with by the Writ Court in other connected writ petitions. Writ Court, however, found that appellants/writ petitioners had raised these additional grounds in the Rejoinder which could not be met by respondents. Noticing that subject matter was pending consideration of the Supreme Court in one SLP, learned single Judge dismissed appellants' W.P.No. 145/96 and vacated the status quo order. Hence, this appeal on the plea that Writ Court had failed to deal with additional ground taken in W.P.No. 415/96.

37. A perusal of those grounds shows that these stand dealt with our judgment (supra) resulting in dismissal of the writ petitions on the subject matter. Therefore, this appeal can be safely deemed disposedoff in the light of this Judgment covering the additional points raised in W.P.No. 415/96.