Naraini Devi (Smt.) Vs. Iind Additional District Judge - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- land acquisition act, 1894 [c.a. no. 1/1894]. section 4; [sushil harkauli, s.k. singh & krishna murari, jj] acquisition of land held, court cannot issue a writ of mandamus directing the state authorities to acquire a particular land. land acquisition is not purely ministerial act to be performed by executive no direction in nature of mandamus whether interim or final can be issued by court under article 226 necessarily to acquire particular land in public interest. land acquisition is not a purely ministerial act to be performed by the executive and therefore, no mandamus can be issued by the court in exercise of its power under article 226 of the constitution, whether suo motu or otherwise, whether in public interest litigation or otherwise directing acquisition of land under the provisions of land acquisition act, 1894. it would, however, be open to the court in exercise of that power to invite the attention of the executive to any public purpose and the need for land for meeting that public purpose and to require the executive to take a decision, even a reasoned decision, with regard to the same in accordance with the statutory provisions, perhaps even within a reasonable time frame. however, the power of the court under article 226 must necessarily stop at that. thereafter, if the decision taken by the executive is capable of challenge and, there exist appropriate legal grounds for such challenge, it may also be open to the court to quash the decision and to require reconsideration. but no direction in the nature of mandamus whether interim or final can be issued by the court under article 226 to the executive to necessarily acquire a particular area of a particular piece of land for a particular public purpose. section 4; compulsory acquisition of land powers of state government held, renewal of lease in favour of petitioners would not take away power of state government of compulsory acquisition of land. renewal of lease would at best be taken into consideration for determining quantum of compensation. - 6. on the other hand, it has been contended by sri shekhar representing the respondent that revisional court was well within jurisdiction in deciding the revision and dismissing the suit it did not exceed its jurisdiction in allowing the revision. at best the revisional court if satisfied that there was material irregularities committed by the trial court could have remanded the matter to the trial court for afresh decision. perusal of the impugned judgment clearly indicates that the revisional court exceeded its jurisdiction in re-appreciating the evidence already considered by the trial court and recording a finding contrary to that of the trial court which was not within the scope of section 25 of 1887 act.vikram nath, j.1. this writ petition has been filed by the landlord for quashing the judgment dated 28.7.1984 passed by the iind additional district judge, agra where by the revision has been allowed and judgment and decree of the judge small causes court dated 30.7.1983 decreeing the suit of the landlord petitioner for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment has been set aside and suit has been dismissed.2. the dispute relates to house no. 34/naubasta loha mandi, agra of which the petitioner is the owner and landlady and in a part of the said building respondent no. 2 was tenant on monthly rent at rs. 50/- per month. as there was default in payment of rent since 1.11.1976, the petitioner after terminating the tenancy filed a suit for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment which was registered as scc suit no. 1179 of 1981, narayani devi v. sitaram. the tenant contested the suit and filed written statement and claimed to be the owner of the disputed premises on account of adverse possession. the trial court held that the plaintiff petitioner was the owner and landlord and the defendant-respondent no. 2 was the tenant of the premises in dispute and there existed relationship of landlord and tenant between them. it further held that there was default in payment of rent. the trial court vide judgment-dated 30.7.1983 decreed the suit for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment.3. the tenant filed revision under section 25 of the provincial small causes court act, 1887 (in short referred to as the 1887 act) which was registered as civil revision no. 116 of 1983. the revisional court vide judgment dated 28.7.1984 recorded a finding that there existed no relationship of landlord and the tenant between the parties and therefore, the suit had been wrongly decreed. it accordingly allowed the revision and set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court and dismissed the suit. aggrieved by the same, the present petition has been filed by the landlord.4. i have heard sri ramendra asthana learned counsel for the petitioner and sri m.d. singh shekhar, learned counsel for the respondent tenant.5. it has been submitted by sri asthana, learned counsel for the petitioner that the trial court having recorded a finding of fact on appraisal of the material evidence on record that relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the plaintiff and defendant, therefore, in view of the said findings and in view of the admitted default, the suit was decreed. it is submitted by sri asthana that the revisional court exceeded its jurisdiction in re-appreciating the evidence already considered by the trial court and in arriving at a different conclusion holding that there did not exist relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. this finding recorded by the revisional court was beyond the scope of revisional power as provided under section 25 of 1887 act. the revisional court apart from appreciating the evidence also took into consideration the fact that as the tenant had denied the title of the plaintiff landlord and had himself asserted to be owner and landlord of the premises in dispute in account of adverse possession, the trial court ought to have returned the plaint under section 23 of 1887 act for presentation before proper court as there existed a bonafide dispute of title.6. on the other hand, it has been contended by sri shekhar representing the respondent that revisional court was well within jurisdiction in deciding the revision and dismissing the suit it did not exceed its jurisdiction in allowing the revision. the findings recorded by the revisional court are based on sound reasoning and it has rightly dismissed the suit.7. counsel for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment in the case of luxmi kishore v. har prasad shukla, 1981 arc page 545, in support of his contention that the revisional court exercising power under section 25 of 1887 act could not substitute its own finding. at best the revisional court if satisfied that there was material irregularities committed by the trial court could have remanded the matter to the trial court for afresh decision. perusal of the impugned judgment clearly indicates that the revisional court exceeded its jurisdiction in re-appreciating the evidence already considered by the trial court and recording a finding contrary to that of the trial court which was not within the scope of section 25 of 1887 act.8. further the observations of the revisional court regarding applicability of section 23 of 1887 act merely because a defence has been set up in the written statement claiming title cannot oust the jurisdiction of the judge small causes court. until and unless it is established that a bona fide dispute of title actually existed on the basis of the material on record, the plaint cannot be returned and it could not be held that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties.9. in view of the above, the impugned judgment of revisional court dated 28.7.1984 is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the revisional court for reconsideration, in view of the observations made above and if necessary it may remand the matter to the trial court.10. accordingly the writ petition is allowed and impugned judgment dated 28.7.1984 is set aside. the matter is remanded to the revisional court for decision afresh in accordance with the observations made above. since the matter is an old one the revisional court will make an endeavour to decide the revision within four months from the date of filing of certified copy of this judgment.