Mukhtar Ali Vs. State of U.P. and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- land acquisition act, 1894 [c.a. no. 1/1894]. section 4; [sushil harkauli, s.k. singh & krishna murari, jj] acquisition of land held, court cannot issue a writ of mandamus directing the state authorities to acquire a particular land. land acquisition is not purely ministerial act to be performed by executive no direction in nature of mandamus whether interim or final can be issued by court under article 226 necessarily to acquire particular land in public interest. land acquisition is not a purely ministerial act to be performed by the executive and therefore, no mandamus can be issued by the court in exercise of its power under article 226 of the constitution, whether suo motu or otherwise, whether in public interest litigation or otherwise directing acquisition of land under the provisions of land acquisition act, 1894. it would, however, be open to the court in exercise of that power to invite the attention of the executive to any public purpose and the need for land for meeting that public purpose and to require the executive to take a decision, even a reasoned decision, with regard to the same in accordance with the statutory provisions, perhaps even within a reasonable time frame. however, the power of the court under article 226 must necessarily stop at that. thereafter, if the decision taken by the executive is capable of challenge and, there exist appropriate legal grounds for such challenge, it may also be open to the court to quash the decision and to require reconsideration. but no direction in the nature of mandamus whether interim or final can be issued by the court under article 226 to the executive to necessarily acquire a particular area of a particular piece of land for a particular public purpose. section 4; compulsory acquisition of land powers of state government held, renewal of lease in favour of petitioners would not take away power of state government of compulsory acquisition of land. renewal of lease would at best be taken into consideration for determining quantum of compensation. - muniswamy 1977crilj1125 ,may be placed on record while concluding this revision :in the revision against framing of charge the revisional court has to see if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is a ground of presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is open to the court to say that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.orderb.k. sharma, j.1. this is a revision against the judgment and order dated 19-1-1993 passed by sri k. n. singh, the then 1st addl. sessions judge, saharanpur in criminal revision no. 530 of 1992, whereby he allowed the revision of the present opposite parties nos. 2 to 7 and set aside the judgment and order dated 12-8-1992 passed by sri s. b. sharma, the then ii judicial magistrate, saharanpur in case no. 308 of 1990 mukhtar ali v. irfanul haq, under section 63 of the copyright act, police station kotwali nagar, district saharanpur holding that the present opposite parties nos. 2 to 7 were liable to be charged for the offence under section 63 of the copyright act and directing the case to be fixed for 24-8-1992 for framing of the charges and directing them to appear before the court on that date. by the order dated 12-8-1992 the learned magistrate discharged a co-accused jafar. however, the said discharge is not in controversy in this revision.2. the criminal case started on a complaint made by mukhtar ali present applicant-revisionist in the court of the learned magistrate under section 63 of the copyright act. the allegations in the said complaint were that the complainant and his brothers were the proprietors of m/s. imdadia book depot, deoband and were also carrying on the business in the name of qutub khana imdadia, deoband, that the firm was carrying on the business of printing, publishing and supply of religious books, that the accused nos. 1 to 5 were partners of the firm known as qutub khana rashidia and rashidia book depot, that the accused no. 6 jafar was the manager of the said firms, that accused nos. 1 to 5 and 7 and 8 were purchasing the books from the market and printing and publishing the same, that accused no. 9 was proprietor of the firm darul kitab in deoband and used to purchase the books from other accused and supply the same, that the father of the applicant-maulana mohammad ali was a scholar of arabic language and he had translated the book 'hidayatun nahab' which was known as a standard book for the students who were eager of learning arabic from arabic to urdu and also prepared a commentary with the name of 'miswahun nahab,' that this book was published in the year 1950 by the imdadia book depot, deoband and sold through m/s. kutub khana imdadia, that the father of the complainant died in the year 1952 but the complainant continued the publishing of the book, that he also obtained copyright in the year 1979 and got it registered under the copyright act, that accused nos. 1 to 8 also used to purchase this book from the complainant's father and they had now committed the breach of the copyright by printing and publishing a book titled as 'sharah hidaytun moh,' that the subject-matter of the book was identical with the matter of the said book 'miswahun nahab' written by the father of the complainant, although it's title and name have been changed by the accused persons, that accused no. 9 had also full conscious knowledge of the copyright and yet had purchased the book from them and sold it at deoband.3. the accused were summoned and then after hearing the parties on question of framing of the charge the learned magistrate passed the order dated 12-8-1992 holding that a case was made out for the framing of charges and fixing a date for framing the charges and directing the accused persons to appear on that date.4. in the revision before the 1st addl. sessions judge, saharanpur, it was claimed that the learned magistrate has acted beyond his jurisdiction as the original literature was written by some other unknown persons and only the commentary was made by complainant's-father and so the whole book could not be registered in the copyright board and that in any case it was not a case of infringement of copyright. the pleas of the accused persons found favour with the learned 1st addl. sessions judge, saharanpur who passed the impugned order dated 19-1-1993 and allowed the revision and set aside the order of the learned magistrate dated 12-8-1992, hence this revision by the complainant.5. in this revision the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties claimed that a revision was maintainable against an order framing the charges against the accused persons. the claim of the counsel for the revisionist is that an order for framing the charges in a criminal case is an interlocutory order against which no revision lay in view of the bar in section 397(2) of the code of criminal procedure. sub-section (2) of section 397 of the cr. p.c. lays down that the power of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in appeal, revision, trial and other proceeding.6. the learned counsel for the revisionist has relied on several authorities in support of the said proposition that a revision is not maintainable against the order of the learned magistrate framing the charges. he relied on the authority, bimal kumar chandra v. state 1976 cri lj 1864 (cal). in this authority it was held that the order of committal by magistrate was an interlocutory order against which no revision was maintainable.7. the next authority relied upon by the learned counsel for the revisionist was kamal krishna v. state 1977 cri lj 1492 (cal). in this authority also it was held that the order of commitment was an interlocutory order and revision against the same was barred.8. next, reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the revisionist on the authority, ambika prasad v. state of u.p. 1992 all cri c 200. in this authority it was said that no revision lay against the order making committal of a case to the court of session.9. then learned counsel for the revisionist placed reliance upon the authority, jayaprakash v. state 1981 cri lj 460 (ker). it was a single judge authority. in this authority reliance has been placed on the authority v.c. shukla v. state : 1980crilj690 . we will refer to this authority of v.c. shukla's case later on.10. then reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the revisionist on the authority, satyanarayan mohapatra v. state of orissa 1992 cri lj 2904 (orissa). it also is a single judge authority. in this authority it was held that the order framing charges was an interlocutory order against which no revision lay.11. then reliance was placed on the authority madhu limaye v. state of maharashtra : 1978crilj165 . this madhu limaye's case was also relied upon by the learned counsel for the opposite parties. we will refer to madhu limaye's case later on when we will deal with the case law cited by_ the learned counsel for the opposite parties.12. the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has placed reliance on the authority of the apex court, amar nath v. slate of haryana : 1977crilj1891 . in this authority he placed reliance on the following observations made by the apex court (at p. 2189 of air) :-.it seems to us that the term 'interlocutory order' in section 397(2) of the 1973 code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. it merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the high court against that order because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in section 397 of the 1973 code. thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under section 397(2) of the 1973 code. but orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial court be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the high court. 13. next reliance has been placed on the authority madhu limaye v. state of maharashtra : 1978crilj165 . in this case of madhu limaye, a complaint was preferred by the public prosecutor before the sessions judge for the offence under section 500, i.p.c. regarding certain statements made by the appellant containing some defamatory statements against the law minister of the government of maharashtra. an application was made by madhu limaye before the sessions judge seeking dismissal of the complaint. the sessions judge rejected his contentions and framed charge, whereupon the matter came up by way of appeal before the apex court. in this authority in para 13 the following observations of lord esher relied upon in s. kuppuswami rao v. the king , have been quoted :- ..if their decision, whichever way it is given, will, if it stands, finally dispose of the matter in dispute, i think that for the purposes of these rules it is final. on the other hand, if their decision, if given in one way, will finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but if given in the other, will allow the action to go on, then i think it is not final, but interlocutory. it was then observed :-.it is to be noticed that the test laid down therein was that if the objection of the accused succeeded, the proceeding could have ended but not vice versa. the order can be said to be a final order only if, in either event, the action will be determined...in our judgment such an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified.... in such a situation it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression 'interlocutory order' as invariably being converse of the words 'final order.' there may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in kuppuswami's case (supra), but yet it may not be an interlocutory order pure or simple. some kinds of order may fall in between the two. by a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in sub-section (2) of section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of interlocutory orders.... in this authority it was concluded in para 15 :-.yet, for the reasons already alluded to, we feel no difficulty in coming to the conclusion, after due consideration, that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397(2). 14. next, the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties relied upon the authority, v.c. shukla v. state through c.b.i. : 1980crilj690 . the discussion in this authority has been made in two parts. the first part relates to the position of interlocutory order under section 397(2) of the cr. p.c. and the other part, which is the subsequent part, relates to the position of interlocutory order in the light of special courts act, 1979. here we are concerned only with the first part of that judgment which deals with the interpretation of the expression 'interlocutory order' as appearing in section 397(2) of the cr. p.c. the majority decision of this case was rendered by hon'ble s. m. fazal ali, j. the relevant observations are contained in para 6 at page 968 of the judgment:-a division bench consisting of three-judges held that an order framing a charge was not an interlocutory order and, therefore, a revision against such an order was competent before the sessions judge or the high court... then the above-noted observations of madhu limaye's case : 1978crilj165 (supra) were quoted with approval and the matter so far as concluded at page 970 of the judgment:-.we might reiterate here even at the risk of repetition that the term 'interlocutory order' used in the code of criminal procedure has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial because the bar contained in section 397(3) of the code would apply to a variety of cases corning up before the courts not only being offences under the penal code but under numerous acts. if, therefore, the right of revision was to be barred, the provision containing the bar must be confined within the four corners of the spirit and the letter of the law. in other words, the revisional power of the high court or the sessions judge could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi final. the same, however, in our opinion could not be said of the special courts act which was meant to cover only specified number of crimes and criminals and the objective attained was quickest despatch and speediest disposal. 15. the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has also relied upon a division bench authority of the apex court, mohanlal devdanbhai chokshi v. j.s. wagh 1981 cri lj 454 (bom). in this authority relying upon the case of madhu limaye : 1978crilj165 and the case of v. c. shukla : 1980crilj690 (supra) it was held that the order framing charge is not an interlocutory order under section 397(2) of the cr. p.c. so, in view of these authority of the apex court, it is clear that an order framing the charge is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of section 397(2), cr. p.c.16. however, in the present case the learned magistrate was yet to frame the charges against the accused persons in the case and he had only come to the conclusion that it was a fit case in which charges should be framed against the accused persons and fixed a date for framing of the charges and directed the accused persons to appear before him on that date. therefore, it cannot be said that the order which had been challenged in the revision before 1st addl. sessions judge, saharanpur was an order framing charge. before the 1st addl. sessions judge, saharanpur the order passed by the learned magistrate that was actually impugned cannot be said to be an order framing charges about which it may be said that against it a revision lay before the sessions judge.17. in regard to this point, learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has argued that the said order having been passed by the 1st addl. sessions judge as far back as 19-1-1993 it will not be fit and proper to upset it in the year 1998. in my opinion this consideration cannot weigh with this court while disposing of this revision. then it has been argued by the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties that if the impugned order passed by the magistrate was an interlocutory order, then the order passed in revision against the same will also be an interlocutory order and as such it is not liable to be set aside. this contention is fallacious. there is nothing interlocutory about the order dated 19-1-1993 passed by the 1st addl. sessions judge. it is a final order so far as the matter that was raised before him is concerned. if the learned sessions judge entertained a revision against an order which is only an interlocutory one and altered it and the result is the discharge of the accused, then the high court can and must interfere in revision against such an order.18. the learned counsel for the revisionist in this case has placed reliance before me on an authority of the apex court, radhey shyam v. kunj behari : 1990crilj669 in which it was said that at the stage of framing the charge meticulous consideration of evidence and materials by court is not required. in that case it was observed by the apex court that the high court's conclusion about the inadequacy of the evidence against the respondent was a premature assessment of evidence. the ratio of the case was that the order framing charge cannot be quashed on a meticulous consideration of evidence and materials by court. these observations of the apex court are always to be kept in mind by a revisional court while disposing of a revision. the following observations of the apex court in the authority, state of karnataka v. l. muniswamy : 1977crilj1125 , may be placed on record while concluding this revision :-in the revision against framing of charge the revisional court has to see if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is a ground of presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is open to the court to say that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. the crucial consideration for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient material for proceeding against the accused is whether the material on record, if unrebutted is such on the basis of which a conviction can be said reasonably to be possible. all this would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down. 19. we are not making any observation about the merits of the case one way or the other as it might prejudice the parties before the magisterial court.20. for the reasons aforesaid, the revision is allowed. the impugned order dated 19-1-1993 passed by the 1st addl. sessions judge, saharanpur in criminal revision no. 530 of 1992 irfanul haq and 5 ors. v. state and anr., is set aside. the learned magistrate concerned shall fix an early date in crl. case no. 308 of 1990 and direct the contesting opposite parties to appear before him on the date fixed and proceed to frame charges against them in accordance with law.21. a copy of this judgment shall be issued to the learned counsel for the revisionist within a week from today on payment of usual copying charges.22. a copy of this judgment shall be sent at once by the registry to the learned magistrate concerned by fax/registered post for information and compliance.

Judgment:
ORDER

B.K. Sharma, J.

1. This is a revision against the judgment and order dated 19-1-1993 passed by Sri K. N. Singh, the then 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Saharanpur in Criminal Revision No. 530 of 1992, whereby he allowed the revision of the present opposite parties Nos. 2 to 7 and set aside the judgment and order dated 12-8-1992 passed by Sri S. B. Sharma, the then II Judicial Magistrate, Saharanpur in Case No. 308 of 1990 Mukhtar Ali v. Irfanul Haq, under Section 63 of the Copyright Act, police station Kotwali Nagar, District Saharanpur holding that the present opposite parties Nos. 2 to 7 were liable to be charged for the offence under Section 63 of the Copyright Act and directing the case to be fixed for 24-8-1992 for framing of the charges and directing them to appear before the Court on that date. By the order dated 12-8-1992 the learned Magistrate discharged a co-accused Jafar. However, the said discharge is not in controversy in this revision.

2. The criminal case started on a complaint made by Mukhtar Ali present applicant-revisionist in the Court of the learned Magistrate under Section 63 of the Copyright Act. The allegations in the said complaint were that the complainant and his brothers were the proprietors of M/s. Imdadia Book Depot, Deoband and were also carrying on the business in the name of Qutub Khana Imdadia, Deoband, that the firm was carrying on the business of printing, publishing and supply of religious books, that the accused Nos. 1 to 5 were partners of the firm known as Qutub Khana Rashidia and Rashidia Book Depot, that the accused No. 6 Jafar was the Manager of the said firms, that accused Nos. 1 to 5 and 7 and 8 were purchasing the books from the market and printing and publishing the same, that accused No. 9 was proprietor of the firm Darul Kitab in Deoband and used to purchase the books from other accused and supply the same, that the father of the applicant-Maulana Mohammad Ali was a scholar of Arabic language and he had translated the book 'Hidayatun Nahab' which was known as a standard book for the students who were eager of learning Arabic from Arabic to Urdu and also prepared a commentary with the name of 'Miswahun Nahab,' that this book was published in the year 1950 by the Imdadia Book Depot, Deoband and sold through M/s. Kutub Khana Imdadia, that the father of the complainant died in the year 1952 but the complainant continued the publishing of the book, that he also obtained copyright in the year 1979 and got it registered under the Copyright Act, that accused Nos. 1 to 8 also used to purchase this book from the complainant's father and they had now committed the breach of the copyright by printing and publishing a book titled as 'Sharah Hidaytun Moh,' that the subject-matter of the book was identical with the matter of the said book 'Miswahun Nahab' written by the father of the complainant, although it's title and name have been changed by the accused persons, that accused No. 9 had also full conscious knowledge of the copyright and yet had purchased the book from them and sold it at Deoband.

3. The accused were summoned and then after hearing the parties on question of framing of the charge the learned Magistrate passed the order dated 12-8-1992 holding that a case was made out for the framing of charges and fixing a date for framing the charges and directing the accused persons to appear on that date.

4. In the revision before the 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Saharanpur, it was claimed that the learned Magistrate has acted beyond his jurisdiction as the original literature was written by some other unknown persons and only the commentary was made by complainant's-father and so the whole book could not be registered in the Copyright Board and that in any case it was not a case of infringement of Copyright. The pleas of the accused persons found favour with the learned 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Saharanpur who passed the impugned order dated 19-1-1993 and allowed the revision and set aside the order of the learned Magistrate dated 12-8-1992, hence this revision by the complainant.

5. In this revision the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties claimed that a revision was maintainable against an order framing the charges against the accused persons. The claim of the counsel for the revisionist is that an order for framing the charges in a criminal case is an interlocutory order against which no revision lay in view of the bar in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sub-section (2) of Section 397 of the Cr. P.C. lays down that the power of revision conferred by Sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in appeal, revision, trial and other proceeding.

6. The learned counsel for the revisionist has relied on several authorities in support of the said proposition that a revision is not maintainable against the order of the learned Magistrate framing the charges. He relied on the authority, Bimal Kumar Chandra v. State 1976 Cri LJ 1864 (Cal). In this authority it was held that the order of committal by Magistrate was an interlocutory order against which no revision was maintainable.

7. The next authority relied upon by the learned counsel for the revisionist was Kamal Krishna v. State 1977 Cri LJ 1492 (Cal). In this authority also it was held that the order of commitment was an interlocutory order and revision against the same was barred.

8. Next, reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the revisionist on the authority, Ambika Prasad v. State of U.P. 1992 All Cri C 200. In this authority it was said that no revision lay against the order making committal of a case to the Court of Session.

9. Then learned counsel for the revisionist placed reliance upon the authority, Jayaprakash v. State 1981 Cri LJ 460 (Ker). It was a single Judge authority. In this authority reliance has been placed on the authority V.C. Shukla v. State : 1980CriLJ690 . We will refer to this authority of V.C. Shukla's case later on.

10. Then reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the revisionist on the authority, Satyanarayan Mohapatra v. State of Orissa 1992 Cri LJ 2904 (Orissa). It also is a single Judge authority. In this authority it was held that the order framing charges was an interlocutory order against which no revision lay.

11. Then reliance was placed on the authority Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra : 1978CriLJ165 . This Madhu Limaye's case was also relied upon by the learned counsel for the opposite parties. We will refer to Madhu Limaye's case later on when we will deal with the case law cited by_ the learned counsel for the opposite parties.

12. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has placed reliance on the authority of the Apex Court, Amar Nath v. Slate of Haryana : 1977CriLJ1891 . In this authority he placed reliance on the following observations made by the Apex Court (at p. 2189 of AIR) :-.It seems to us that the term 'interlocutory order' in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the rights of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial Court be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court.

13. Next reliance has been placed on the authority Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra : 1978CriLJ165 . In this case of Madhu Limaye, a complaint was preferred by the Public Prosecutor before the Sessions Judge for the offence under Section 500, I.P.C. regarding certain statements made by the appellant containing some defamatory statements against the Law Minister of the Government of Maharashtra. An application was made by Madhu Limaye before the Sessions Judge seeking dismissal of the complaint. The Sessions Judge rejected his contentions and framed charge, whereupon the matter came up by way of appeal before the Apex Court. In this authority in para 13 the following observations of Lord Esher relied upon in S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King , have been quoted :- ..If their decision, whichever way it is given, will, if it stands, finally dispose of the matter in dispute, I think that for the purposes of these rules it is final. On the other hand, if their decision, if given in one way, will finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but if given in the other, will allow the action to go on, then I think it is not final, but interlocutory.

It was then observed :-.It is to be noticed that the test laid down therein was that if the objection of the accused succeeded, the proceeding could have ended but not vice versa. The order can be said to be a final order only if, in either event, the action will be determined...in our judgment such an interpretation and the universal application of the principle that what is not a final order must be an interlocutory order is neither warranted nor justified.... In such a situation it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression 'interlocutory order' as invariably being converse of the words 'final order.' There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami's case (supra), but yet it may not be an interlocutory order pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in Sub-section (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of interlocutory orders....

In this authority it was concluded in para 15 :-.Yet, for the reasons already alluded to, we feel no difficulty in coming to the conclusion, after due consideration, that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which, when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2).

14. Next, the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties relied upon the authority, V.C. Shukla v. State through C.B.I. : 1980CriLJ690 . The discussion in this authority has been made in two parts. The first part relates to the position of interlocutory order under Section 397(2) of the Cr. P.C. and the other part, which is the subsequent part, relates to the position of interlocutory order in the light of Special Courts Act, 1979. Here we are concerned only with the first part of that judgment which deals with the interpretation of the expression 'interlocutory order' as appearing in Section 397(2) of the Cr. P.C. The majority decision of this case was rendered by Hon'ble S. M. Fazal Ali, J. The relevant observations are contained in para 6 at page 968 of the judgment:-

A Division Bench consisting of three-Judges held that an order framing a charge was not an interlocutory order and, therefore, a revision against such an order was competent before the Sessions Judge or the High Court...

Then the above-noted observations of Madhu Limaye's case : 1978CriLJ165 (supra) were quoted with approval and the matter so far as concluded at page 970 of the judgment:-.We might reiterate here even at the risk of repetition that the term 'interlocutory order' used in the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be given a very liberal construction in favour of the accused in order to ensure complete fairness of the trial because the bar contained in Section 397(3) of the Code would apply to a variety of cases corning up before the Courts not only being offences under the Penal Code but under numerous Acts. If, therefore, the right of revision was to be barred, the provision containing the bar must be confined within the four corners of the spirit and the letter of the law. In other words, the revisional power of the High Court or the Sessions Judge could be attracted if the order was not purely interlocutory but intermediate or quasi final. The same, however, in our opinion could not be said of the Special Courts Act which was meant to cover only specified number of crimes and criminals and the objective attained was quickest despatch and speediest disposal.

15. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has also relied upon a Division Bench authority of the Apex Court, Mohanlal Devdanbhai Chokshi v. J.S. Wagh 1981 Cri LJ 454 (Bom). In this authority relying upon the case of Madhu Limaye : 1978CriLJ165 and the case of V. C. Shukla : 1980CriLJ690 (supra) it was held that the order framing charge is not an interlocutory order under Section 397(2) of the Cr. P.C. So, in view of these authority of the Apex Court, it is clear that an order framing the charge is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397(2), Cr. P.C.

16. However, in the present case the learned Magistrate was yet to frame the charges against the accused persons in the case and he had only come to the conclusion that it was a fit case in which charges should be framed against the accused persons and fixed a date for framing of the charges and directed the accused persons to appear before him on that date. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order which had been challenged in the revision before 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Saharanpur was an order framing charge. Before the 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Saharanpur the order passed by the learned Magistrate that was actually impugned cannot be said to be an order framing charges about which it may be said that against it a revision lay before the Sessions Judge.

17. In regard to this point, learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties has argued that the said order having been passed by the 1st Addl. Sessions Judge as far back as 19-1-1993 it will not be fit and proper to upset it in the year 1998. In my opinion this consideration cannot weigh with this Court while disposing of this revision. Then it has been argued by the learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties that if the impugned order passed by the Magistrate was an interlocutory order, then the order passed in revision against the same will also be an interlocutory order and as such it is not liable to be set aside. This contention is fallacious. There is nothing interlocutory about the order dated 19-1-1993 passed by the 1st Addl. Sessions Judge. It is a final order so far as the matter that was raised before him is concerned. If the learned Sessions Judge entertained a revision against an order which is only an interlocutory one and altered it and the result is the discharge of the accused, then the High Court can and must interfere in revision against such an order.

18. The learned counsel for the revisionist in this case has placed reliance before me on an authority of the Apex Court, Radhey Shyam v. Kunj Behari : 1990CriLJ669 in which it was said that at the stage of framing the charge meticulous consideration of evidence and materials by Court is not required. In that case it was observed by the Apex Court that the High Court's conclusion about the inadequacy of the evidence against the respondent was a premature assessment of evidence. The ratio of the case was that the order framing charge cannot be quashed on a meticulous consideration of evidence and materials by Court. These observations of the Apex Court are always to be kept in mind by a revisional Court while disposing of a revision. The following observations of the Apex Court in the authority, State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy : 1977CriLJ1125 , may be placed on record while concluding this revision :-

In the revision against framing of charge the revisional Court has to see if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is a ground of presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is open to the Court to say that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The crucial consideration for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient material for proceeding against the accused is whether the material on record, if unrebutted is such on the basis of which a conviction can be said reasonably to be possible. All this would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and no rule of universal application can be laid down.

19. We are not making any observation about the merits of the case one way or the other as it might prejudice the parties before the Magisterial Court.

20. For the reasons aforesaid, the revision is allowed. The impugned order dated 19-1-1993 passed by the 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Saharanpur in Criminal Revision No. 530 of 1992 Irfanul Haq and 5 Ors. v. State and Anr., is set aside. The learned Magistrate concerned shall fix an early date in Crl. Case No. 308 of 1990 and direct the contesting opposite parties to appear before him on the date fixed and proceed to frame charges against them in accordance with law.

21. A copy of this judgment shall be issued to the learned counsel for the revisionist within a week from today on payment of usual copying charges.

22. A copy of this judgment shall be sent at once by the Registry to the learned Magistrate concerned by Fax/registered post for information and compliance.