Sita Ram S/O Sri Kamta Prasad Vs. Sri Dhar Son of Sri Mulu and ors. - Court Judgment

Excerpt:
- land acquisition act, 1894 [c.a. no. 1/1894]. section 4; [sushil harkauli, s.k. singh & krishna murari, jj] acquisition of land held, court cannot issue a writ of mandamus directing the state authorities to acquire a particular land. land acquisition is not purely ministerial act to be performed by executive no direction in nature of mandamus whether interim or final can be issued by court under article 226 necessarily to acquire particular land in public interest. land acquisition is not a purely ministerial act to be performed by the executive and therefore, no mandamus can be issued by the court in exercise of its power under article 226 of the constitution, whether suo motu or otherwise, whether in public interest litigation or otherwise directing acquisition of land under the provisions of land acquisition act, 1894. it would, however, be open to the court in exercise of that power to invite the attention of the executive to any public purpose and the need for land for meeting that public purpose and to require the executive to take a decision, even a reasoned decision, with regard to the same in accordance with the statutory provisions, perhaps even within a reasonable time frame. however, the power of the court under article 226 must necessarily stop at that. thereafter, if the decision taken by the executive is capable of challenge and, there exist appropriate legal grounds for such challenge, it may also be open to the court to quash the decision and to require reconsideration. but no direction in the nature of mandamus whether interim or final can be issued by the court under article 226 to the executive to necessarily acquire a particular area of a particular piece of land for a particular public purpose. section 4; compulsory acquisition of land powers of state government held, renewal of lease in favour of petitioners would not take away power of state government of compulsory acquisition of land. renewal of lease would at best be taken into consideration for determining quantum of compensation. barkat ali zaidi, j.1. a civil appeal being number 5195 pending in the court of special judge (e.c. act)/ additional district judge jalaun at orai was dismissed by the presiding officer on 2.3.2002, subsequent to, dismissal of appellant's (plaintiffs) application for adjournment.2. the appellant did not apply for restoration of appeal within the prescribed period of 30 days and thereafter made an application under section 5 limitation act for condonation of delay and restoration of the appeal which the court dismissed, vide the impugned order dated 27.9.2004, and that is how the appellant has come up before this court by filing this appeal.3. counsel for the parties have been heard.4. presiding officer has, in his order, mentioned that the appeal had been pending for the last 7 years numerous adjournments were taken by the appellant and on 21.2.2002 when an application was moved by the appellant for adjournment it was clarified in the order that it is the last adjournment and no further adjournment would be allowed and 2.3.2002 was fixed for hearing of the appeal. on the said date again an application was given for adjournment by the appellant which was dismissed by the presiding officer. it was mentioned by the appellant in his application for adjournment that owing to remaining busy preparations could not be made for argument in the appeal and another date may, therefore, be given. the judge mentioned in his order that no plausible reason has been assigned in the application as to why arguments could not be prepared and he further clarified that on the last date it was specifically mentioned in the order that no further adjournment would be allowed and with this observation the presiding officer dismissed the application in consequence whereof the appeal was also dismissed.5. thereafter the appellant did not apply for restoration within the stipulated period of 30 days and gave an application under section 5 limitation act for condonation of delay on 16.4.2002. it was mentioned in the application that the appellant remained busy in his professional work as a teacher and therefore, could not apply earlier. the presiding officer noted in his order that in the application under section 5 limitation act no specific reason has been given for seeking condonation of delay, and it has not been indicated, that what were the compulsions, under which, the appellant could not apply for restoration of appeal within time. it will appear from the above that the reasons given by the appellant for adjournment of the appeal as also subsequently for condonation of delay were wholly unsubstantial, hazy and inadequate. it was not mentioned in the adjournment application, as also noted by the presiding officer, as to why arguments could not be prepared in the appeal. no sufficient reason was assigned for the same. similarly in the application given for condonation of delay, 15 days after expiry of the period of limitation, it was not mentioned as to what specific work kept the appellant engaged for which reason he could not apply for restoration of appeal. a mere cursory statement that the appellant remained busy in his school work cannot be considered sufficient reason for condonation of delay. it cannot, therefore, be said that the presiding officer was wrong in dismissing the appellant's application.6. previously courts did show lenience and latitude in dealing with applications for adjournments and condonation of delay. it is high time a changed perspective and attitude is adopted, since the courts are already overburdened with cases resulting in inordinate delay in disposal of cases. those days of condonation of dalliance and delay should now be over and in cases where no sufficient and proper reason is assigned for delay, the court must adopt the stern attitude and refuse relief. that will also help in transmitting a message that the court will no more be indulgent and parties beware. 7. appeal dismissed.