| SooperKanoon Citation | sooperkanoon.com/488305 |
| Subject | Service |
| Court | Allahabad High Court |
| Decided On | Sep-08-2003 |
| Case Number | Special Appeal No. 865 of 2003 |
| Judge | M. Katju and ;Umeshwar Pandey, JJ. |
| Reported in | (2004)1UPLBEC112 |
| Appellant | Upendra Kumar Saxena and ors. |
| Respondent | State of U.P. and ors. |
| Appellant Advocate | Anil Srivastava and ;Gaurav Kumar Srivastava, Advs. |
| Respondent Advocate | S.C. |
| Disposition | Appeal dismissed |
| Cases Referred | In Indian Council of Agricultural Research v. Raja Balwant Singh College
|
Excerpt:
- land acquisition act, 1894 [c.a. no. 1/1894]. section 4; [sushil harkauli, s.k. singh & krishna murari, jj] acquisition of land held, court cannot issue a writ of mandamus directing the state authorities to acquire a particular land. land acquisition is not purely ministerial act to be performed by executive no direction in nature of mandamus whether interim or final can be issued by court under article 226 necessarily to acquire particular land in public interest. land acquisition is not a purely ministerial act to be performed by the executive and therefore, no mandamus can be issued by the court in exercise of its power under article 226 of the constitution, whether suo motu or otherwise, whether in public interest litigation or otherwise directing acquisition of land under the provisions of land acquisition act, 1894. it would, however, be open to the court in exercise of that power to invite the attention of the executive to any public purpose and the need for land for meeting that public purpose and to require the executive to take a decision, even a reasoned decision, with regard to the same in accordance with the statutory provisions, perhaps even within a reasonable time frame. however, the power of the court under article 226 must necessarily stop at that. thereafter, if the decision taken by the executive is capable of challenge and, there exist appropriate legal grounds for such challenge, it may also be open to the court to quash the decision and to require reconsideration. but no direction in the nature of mandamus whether interim or final can be issued by the court under article 226 to the executive to necessarily acquire a particular area of a particular piece of land for a particular public purpose.
section 4; compulsory acquisition of land powers of state government held, renewal of lease in favour of petitioners would not take away power of state government of compulsory acquisition of land. renewal of lease would at best be taken into consideration for determining quantum of compensation.
- this is a well settled principle of exercise of writ jurisdiction. it is well-settled that a mere direction of the supreme court or the high court, without laying down any legal principle, is not a precedent, vide delhi administration v.m. katju and umeshwar pandey, jj.1. heard learned counsel for the appellants.2. we have carefully perused the judgment of the learned single judge dated 10.6.2003 and find no infirmity in the same. the learned single judge has discussed the matter in detail and we fully agree with the reasoning given by him. if a department, a factory or an establishment is closed down, there is no legal principle that the employee has a right to get alternative employment. no doubt, the loss of a job of an employee causes great hardship to his family, but a writ cannot be issued on the basis of hardship. some error of law or illegality has to be demonstrated before a writ can be issued.3. it may be mentioned that in a writ petition the petitioner has not only to show that there is equity in his favour, but he has also to show, that there is law in his favour...unless, both are in his favour, a writ will not be issued. the appellant cannot claim a writ merely because equity is in his favour. this is a well settled principle of exercise of writ jurisdiction. so far as the appellant is concerned, he has not been able to show any legal principle that a person who is retrenched from an establishment, factory or department has a right to get alternative employment.4. learned counsel for the appellant has shown us certain directions issued by the supreme court in certain cases for grant of alternative employment to an employee who has lost his job on closure of the department, establishment or factory. it is well-settled that a mere direction of the supreme court or the high court, without laying down any legal principle, is not a precedent, vide delhi administration v. manoharlal, air 2002 sc 3088 (vide para 5).5. in indian council of agricultural research v. raja balwant singh college, 2003 (1) esc 424, a division bench of this court, relying on several decisions of the supreme court, held that merely because in some decisions the supreme court directed regularization of some employees it does not amount to laying down any law and hence these decisions were not precedents.6. the supreme court often issues directions without laying down any legal proposition and unless there is some principle of law laid down by the supreme court, the petitioner cannot claim benefit of the direction issued by the supreme court without laying down any legal principle. we arc not aware of any legal principle that the petitioner whose service has been terminated on closure of a department, establishment or factory has a legal right to get alternative employment. the number of jobs in the country is limited and this court should not embarrass the authorities by issuing such directions.7. there is no force in this appeal and it is dismissed.
Judgment:M. Katju and Umeshwar Pandey, JJ.
1. Heard learned Counsel for the appellants.
2. We have carefully perused the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 10.6.2003 and find no infirmity in the same. The learned single Judge has discussed the matter in detail and we fully agree with the reasoning given by him. If a department, a factory or an establishment is closed down, there is no legal principle that the employee has a right to get alternative employment. No doubt, the loss of a job of an employee causes great hardship to his family, but a writ cannot be issued on the basis of hardship. Some error of law or illegality has to be demonstrated before a writ can be issued.
3. It may be mentioned that in a writ petition the petitioner has not only to show that there is equity in his favour, but he has also to show, that there is law in his favour...Unless, both are in his favour, a writ will not be issued. The appellant cannot claim a writ merely because equity is in his favour. This is a well settled principle of exercise of writ jurisdiction. So far as the appellant is concerned, he has not been able to show any legal principle that a person who is retrenched from an establishment, factory or department has a right to get alternative employment.
4. Learned Counsel for the appellant has shown us certain directions issued by the Supreme Court in certain cases for grant of alternative employment to an employee who has lost his job on closure of the department, establishment or factory. It is well-settled that a mere direction of the Supreme Court or the High Court, without laying down any legal principle, is not a precedent, vide Delhi Administration v. Manoharlal, AIR 2002 SC 3088 (vide Para 5).
5. In Indian Council of Agricultural Research v. Raja Balwant Singh College, 2003 (1) ESC 424, a Division Bench of this Court, relying on several decisions of the Supreme Court, held that merely because in some decisions the Supreme Court directed regularization of some employees it does not amount to laying down any law and hence these decisions were not precedents.
6. The Supreme Court often issues directions without laying down any legal proposition and unless there is some principle of law laid down by the Supreme Court, the petitioner cannot claim benefit of the direction issued by the Supreme Court without laying down any legal principle. We arc not aware of any legal principle that the petitioner whose service has been terminated on closure of a department, establishment or factory has a legal right to get alternative employment. The number of jobs in the country is limited and this Court should not embarrass the authorities by issuing such directions.
7. There is no force in this appeal and it is dismissed.