Shyam Charan Lal Vs. Ram Gopal Gupta - Court Judgment

S.P. Mehrotra, J.

1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, inter alia, praying for quashing the judgment and order dated 24.8.2002 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge (S.D.)/Prescribed Authority, Court No. 3. Varanasi, and the judgment and order dated 30.10.2002 (Annexure-4 to the writ petition) passed by the learned District and Sessions Judge, Varanasi.

2. The dispute relates to an accommodation on the ground floor in House No. B. 22/270C Shankudhara, Khojwa, Varanasi. The said accommodation has hereinafter been referred to as the 'disputed accommodation.'

3. From the allegations made in the writ petition, it appears that Smt. Rama Gupta, wife of the respondent filed a release application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the U. P. Act No. XIII of 1972 (in short 'the Act') against the petitioner for release of the disputed accommodation. It was, inter alia, alleged in the said release application that the said Smt. Ram Gupta was the owner and landlady of the said House No. B. 22/270C situated in Mohalla Sankudhara, Khojwa, Varanasi ; and that the petitioner was the tenant of the disputed accommodation at the monthly rent of Rs. 205 per month ; and that the age of the said Smt. Rama Gupta was 75 years while the age of her husband (respondent herein) was 85 years ; and that the said Smt. Rama Gupta as well as her husband were very old and were suffering from various diseases ; and the said Smt. Rama Gupta bond fide required the disputed accommodation for keeping her elder son with her ; and that the elder son of the said Smt. Rama Gupta had taken voluntary retirement ; and that the petitioner was employed in the Life Insurance Corporation, and that the petitioner had a house constructed in village Bhagwanpur, Varanasi after taking loan from his department ; and that the petitioner could easily shift his family in that house ; and that the petitioner would not suffer any hardship, in case, the release application was allowed while Smt. Rama Gupta and her family would suffer greater hardship in case of rejection of the said release application. The said release application was registered as P.A. Case No. 6 of 1999 ; a copy of the said release application has been filed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition.

4. During the pendency of the said release application, the said Smt. Rama Gupta expired and her husband Ram Gopal was substituted as her heir and legal representative.

5. The release application was contested by the petitioner.

6. Evidence was led by both the sides in respect of their respective case.

7. By the judgment and order dated 24.8.2002, learned Additional Civil Judge (S.D.)/Prescribed Authority, Court No. 3, Varanasi, allowed the said release application in respect of the disputed accommodation. It was, inter alia, held by the learned Prescribed Authority that the need of the respondent was bona fide ; and that the respondent would suffer greater hardship than would be suffered by the petitioner in case the petitioner was evicted from the disputed accommodation.

8. Thereupon, the petitioner filed an appeal which was registered as Misc. Rent Appeal No. 17 of 2002.

9. By the judgment and order dated 30.10.2002, learned District and Sessions Judge, Varanasi, dismissed the said appeal filed by the petitioner. It was, inter alia, held that the need of the respondent was bona fide, and that the respondent would suffer greater hardship in case of rejection of the said release application than would be suffered by the petitioner in case, the said release application was allowed.

10. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition.

11. Heard Sri Deepak Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri G. K. Gupta, learned counsel for the caveator-respondent.

12. Sri Deepak Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the findings recorded by the authorities below on the question of bona fide need and comparative hardship are erroneous.

13. Having considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner, I find myself unable to accept the same. The authorities below, on a detailed consideration of the material on record, have recorded the findings of fact on the question of bonafide need as well as comparative hardships.

14. This Court in the exercise of writ jurisdiction normally does not interfere with the findings of fact unless such findings are shown to be patently illegal or perverse. No illegality or perversity has been committed by authorities below in recording the said findings of fact on the questions of bond fide need and comparative hardships.

15. Reference in the regard may be made to certain decisions of the Apex Court.16. In India Pipe Fitting Co. v. Fakruddin M.A. Baker and Anr., AIR 1978 SC 45, it was laid down by the Apex Court that the conclusions of fact cannot be interfered with by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The findings on the question of bond fide requirement of the landlord recorded by the courts below by appreciating the entire evidence cannot be interfered with by the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

17. In Munni Lal and Ors. v. Prescribed Authority and Ors., AIR 1978 SC 29, it was laid down by the Supreme Court that the finding on the question of comparative hardship of the landlord was finding of fact, and the same cannot be interfered with by the High Court in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

18. In Ashok Kumar and Ors. v. Sita Ram, 2001 (3) AWC 1997 (SC) : 2001 (2) ARC 1 : 2001 (43) ALR 783 (SC), the Apex Court held as follows (paragraphs 9 and 15 of the said ARC) :

'9. The position is too well-settled to admit of any controversy that the finding of fact recorded by the final court of fact should not ordinarily be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction, unless the Court is satisfied that the finding is vitiated by manifest error of law or is patently perverse. The High Court should not interfere with a finding of fact simply because it feels persuaded to take a different view on the material on record.

The question that remains to be considered is whether the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction was justified in setting aside the order of the appellate authority. The order passed by the appellate authority did not suffer from any serious illegality, nor can it be said to have taken a view of the matter, which no reasonable person was likely to take. In that view of the matter there was no justification for the High Court to interfere with the order in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. In a matter like the present case where orders passed by the statutory authority vested with power to act quasi-judicially is challenged before the High Court, the role of the Court is supervisory and corrective. In exercise of such jurisdiction the High Court is not expected to interfere with the final order passed by the statutory authority unless the order suffers from manifest error and if it is allowed to stand it would amount to perpetuation of grave injustice. The Court should bear in mind that it is not acting as yet another appellate court in the matter. We are constrained to observe that in the present case the High Court has failed to keep the salutary principles in mind while deciding the case.'

19. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this writ petition lacks merit, and the same is liable to be dismissed. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed.

20. Sri Deepak Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner then submits that some time be granted to the petitioner for vacating the disputed accommodation.

21. I have heard Sri Deepak Verma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri G.K. Gupta, learned counsel for the caveator-respondent on this question also.

22. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, it is directed that the petitioner will not be evicted from the disputed accommodation till 30.4.2003 provided the petitioner gives an undertaking on his personal affidavit before the Prescribed Authority, Varanasi, within one month from today incorporating the following conditions :

(1) The petitioner will vacate the disputed accommodation on or before 30th April, 2003 and will handover peaceful vacant possession of the same to the respondent.

(2) The petitioner will continue to pay rent in respect of the disputed accommodation to the respondent till the date of vacating the disputed accommodation.

In case, the aforesaid requisite undertaking is not given within the time granted or the petitioner fails to comply with any of the conditions incorporated in the undertaking, this order granting time to the petitioner for vacating the disputed accommodation will stand vacated automatically and it will become open to the respondent to execute the release order forthwith.